Order Granting in Part Motion for Taxation of Costs

PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE, Magistrate Judge.

Following partial summary judgment, Doc. 61, and a jury verdict, Doc. 136, the clerk entered final judgment in favor of CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSXT"), and against Steven Barfield, Doc. 138. Before the Court is CSXT's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) to allow $8796.51 in costs against Barfield. Docs. 139, 139-1, 139-2.1 After CSXT filed the motion, the Court allowed Barfield's counsel to withdraw and directed Barfield to file any response by May 12, 2017. See Docs. 148, 149. He did not file a response.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) codifies the "venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs." Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 133 S.Ct. 1166, 1172 (2013). It provides costs "should be allowed to the prevailing party" unless federal law or a court order provides otherwise.2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).

"[W]hether to award costs ultimately lies within the sound discretion of the district court." Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1172. But if a court exercises its discretion to deny full costs, it "must have and state a sound basis." Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

28 U.S.C. § 1920 limits a district court's discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) by listing costs a court may allow. Maris Distr. Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 302 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). They are:

28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Section 1920 reflects congressional policy to place "rigid controls on cost-shifting in federal courts." Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444 (1987). "[A]s is evident from § 1920," costs are "limited to relatively minor, incidental expenses," and "almost always amount to less than the successful litigant's total expenses in connection with a lawsuit." Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given careful scrutiny." Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964), disapproved of on another ground by Crawford, 482 U.S. at 443. Once the prevailing party has shown the requested costs are allowed under § 1920, the losing party must rebut the presumption favoring their award. Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991). A court may decline to allow costs in § 1920 but may not allow costs not in § 1920. Crawford, 483 U.S. at 442.

"[G]ood faith and limited financial resources are not enough to overcome the strong presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party," Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, 149 F. App'x 831, 832 (11th Cir. 2005), and a court abuses its discretion if it considers the relative wealth of the opposing parties, Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039. A court may, but need not, consider a non-prevailing party's finances. Id. In the "rare circumstances" in which a court does, the court may not decline to tax any costs at all. Id. If a court considers a non-prevailing party's finances, it must "require substantial documentation of a true inability to pay" (i.e., "clear proof of the non-prevailing party's dire financial circumstances"). Id.

CSXT provides an affidavit from counsel stating the costs "are correct and have necessarily been incurred in this case"; invoices for the costs; and a completed "Bill of Costs" form in which counsel verifies the statement, "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing costs are correct and were necessarily incurred in this action and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed." Doc. 139-2.

The following costs requested by CSXT are allowed, reduced, or not allowed. Where allowed, the costs are allowed under § 1920, the costs are supported by invoices and counsel's unrebutted affidavit and declaration under penalty of perjury that CSXT necessarily incurred them, and Barfield has not challenged them as unreasonable. Where reduced or not allowed, insufficient details are provided to determine if the costs are allowed under § 1920, or the costs are not allowed under § 1920.

Having failed to respond to CSXT's motion to tax costs, Barfield has provided no information about his finances sufficient to satisfy his burden of providing "clear proof of ... dire financial circumstances" justifying reducing costs against him. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039 (quoted).

The Court grants in part and denies in part CSXT's motion, Doc. 139, awards it $7373.66 in costs against Barfield, and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of CSXT and against Barfield for $7373.66.