PAUL W. GRIMM, District Judge.
Plaintiff Augustine Ukaegbu filed suit against Defendants Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ("SPS") and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Inc. ("Wells Fargo") with regard to their handling of the Note and Deed of Trust encumbering his real property at 13114 Shinnecock Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.
Ukaegbu purchased 13114 Shinnecock Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland (the "Property") and later refinanced his mortgage loan with Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc. ("MLN" or the "Lender"), executing a Note and Deed of Trust for $799,999 on September 14, 2006. Compl. ¶¶ 1-2; Deed of Tr. 1-2, Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 1-2; Note, Compl. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-3, at 25-28. The Deed of Trust lists Mitchell L. Heffernan as Trustee and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), "a separate corporation that [was] acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns," as the beneficiary.
Id. ¶ 24, at 13.
MLN indorsed the Adjustable Rate Balloon Note ("Note") in blank. Note 4, ECF No. 1-3, at 28. The Note states that "[t]he Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note is called the `NoteHolder.'" Id. at 1, ECF No. 1-3 at 25. Ukaegbu later filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland, and BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BAC") signed a Proof of Claim on December 28, 2010 and filed it on January 20, 2011, asserting that it was "loan servicer[] for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as trustee for the Holders of Sasco 2007-MLN1 who is the holder of the note." Proof of Claim, Compl. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-3, at 2, 4. Its Proof of Claim included a True and Certified Copy of the Note indorsed in blank. Note, ECF No. 1-3 at 25-28.
And, on December 28, 2012, MERS, acting as nominee for MLN, executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust, in which it "assign[ed] and transfer[red] to
Yet, according to Ukaegbu, Wells Fargo could not have been a proper holder of the Note in its capacity as the trustee for SASCO 2007-MLN1, because MLN had not created SASCO 2007-MLN1 when it filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Code on February 5, 2007, such that the mortgages amassed in SASCO 2007-MLN1 were the property of MLN's estate and not its to sell. See id. ¶¶ 5, 13-15, 17-18. Ukaegbu alleges that, at the time MERS executed the Assignment of Deed of Trust as nominee for MLN in December 2012, "MLN no longer existed," as it had "been long since liquidated and closed after its completed chapter 11 years before this assignment took place." Id. ¶¶ 12 & n.3.
Although he disputes its ownership, Ukaegbu concedes that he defaulted on the loan. Id. ¶ 27. After he defaulted, SPS, acting as servicer of the loan on behalf of Wells Fargo, attempted to collect payments and arrearages and threatened foreclosure. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. In response, Plaintiff filed this suit, claiming that "SPS as servicer for Wells Fargo, had no right to collect the debt in its behalf" because
Id. ¶¶ 13-15, 17-18. On that basis, he claims violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq.; the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq.; and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; and he seeks a declaratory judgment and to quiet title to the property. He also claims that Wells Fargo is liable for fraudulent concealment, negligence, and violation of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r, for failing to notify him that Wells Fargo allegedly was the holder of the Note and Deed of Trust.
Ukaegbu's claim that Wells Fargo was not the holder of the Note and was not assigned the Deed of Trust forms the basis for five of his eight causes of action. Defendants do not raise the issue of whether Ukaegbu has standing to challenge Wells Fargo's status as noteholder, but "jurisdictional standing is an issue to be considered sua sponte by the court." Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1223 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Gen. Tech. Applications, Inc. v. Exro Ltda, 388 F.3d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Standing is a jurisdictional issue. . . ."); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. Datanet Eng'g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[Q]uestions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point during the proceedings and may (or, more precisely, must) be raised sua sponte by the court."). And, Plaintiff addresses standing in his Opposition. See Pl.'s Opp'n 5-9.
Int'l Primate Prot. League v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, (1984)) (emphasis in Int'l Primate).
Ukaegbu insists that "no transfer of possession, endorsements or any chain of assignments exists and in fact never took place," thereby challenging whether MERS could, as nominee for MLN, assigned MLN's rights to the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo in the Assignment of Deed of Trust.
Indeed, "[t]his Court has consistently held that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the propriety of the assignment of a mortgage loan." Powell, 2016 WL 5815884, at *4 (citing Henry v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. TDC-14-1344, 2016 WL 1248672, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 2016) ("Henry's claim for a declaratory judgment that Defendants lack rights to the Deed of Trust and lack authority to foreclose necessarily fails because it is premised on the alleged invalidity of the assignments of the Deed and Note" and "Henry . . . lacks standing to challenge the validity of such assignments."); Pruitt v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. TDC-15-1310, 2016 WL 337531, at *2 (D. Md. Jan. 28, 2016) ("As Pruitt acknowledged when she signed the Deed of Trust, the Note could be transferred. Such an assignment affects the rights and obligations of the parties to the transfer, not Pruitt, whose obligation to make monthly payments remains. Consequently, Pruitt lacks standing to challenge the Assignment."); Danso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. PX 16-1396, 2016 WL 4437653, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2016)). And, "[i]n the consumer lending context, a party `generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Id. (quoting Wolf v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 512 F. App'x 336, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, I will not consider Plaintiff's claims insofar as he challenges whether Wells Fargo received the Deed of Trust pursuant to the Assignment of Deed of Trust because he lacks standing to assert them, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. See id.; see also Int'l Primate, 500 U.S. at 77.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for "the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule's purpose "`is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'" Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006)). To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state "a plausible claim for relief," as "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. See Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing standard from Iqbal and Twombly). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Ukaegbu is proceeding pro se, and his Complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); however, liberal construction does not absolve Plaintiff from pleading plausible claims. See Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981) (citing Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1977)).
Harris v. Angliker, 955 F.2d 41, 1992 WL 21375, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).
The Court "may consider the complaint itself and any documents that are attached to it," as well as any "document that the defendant attaches to its motion to dismiss if the document was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and if the plaintiffs do not challenge its authenticity." CACI Int'l v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes."). Additionally, I may take judicial notice of the filings in Bankruptcy Court and the Land Records Office of Prince George's County pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
Generally, where allegations in the Complaint conflict with an attached written instrument, "the exhibit prevails." Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). Yet, "[p]laintiffs attach exhibits to their complaints for all sorts of reasons, . . . and it is not always appropriate to conclude that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of an attached document." Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2016). For example, a plaintiff claiming libel does not adopt the contents of any allegedly libelous document he attaches. See id.
Id.
Plaintiff's fraud allegations must meet the "heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b)." Piotrowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. DKC-11-3758, 2013 WL 247549, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2013). Additionally, a plaintiff fails to state a claim where the allegations on the face of the complaint show that an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, would bar any recovery. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214-15 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)); see Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that dismissal is proper "when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense").
The MCDCA bars debt collectors from "claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a right with knowledge that the right does not exist." Md. Code Ann., Com. Law. § 14-202(8). "To plead a claim under the MCDCA, Plaintiff must set forth factual allegations tending to establish two elements: (1) that Defendants did not possess the right to collect the amount of debt sought; and (2) that Defendants attempted to collect the debt knowing that they lacked the right to do so." Lewis v. McCabe Weisberg & Conway, No. DKC 13-1561, 2014 WL 3845833, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2014). The MCPA similarly provides that "`a person may not engage in any unfair or deceptive trade practice,'" such as making a "false or misleading statement[]," in relation to "`[t]he extension of consumer credit' or the `collection of consumer debts.'" Piotrowski v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. DKC-11-3758, 2013 WL 247549, at *10 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2013) (quoting Com. Law § 13-303). Further, it provides for a private action pursuant to Com. Law § 13-408. To state a claim under the MCPA, a plaintiff "must allege (1) an unfair or deceptive trade practice or misrepresentation that is (2) relied upon, and (3) causes them actual injury." Bey v. Shapiro Brown & Alt, LLP, 997 F.Supp.2d 310, 319 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Stewart v. Bierman, 859 F.Supp.2d 754, 759 (D. Md. 2012)).
Ukaegbu claims in Counts I and II that Defendants violated the MCDCA and MCPA by attempting to collect on the Note when "Wells Fargo was never in possession of the original Note, never received a proper and legal assignment/transfer of Plaintiff's Deed of Trust, and did not have nor could prove a complete chain of endorsements/transfers or possession of Plaintiff's Note to SASCO." Compl. ¶¶ 39-41, 48. But, as noted, Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Assignment of Deed of Trust.
Moreover, this Court has concluded that MERS had the authority to assign a deed of trust under similar circumstances in Pruitt, 2016 WL 337531. There, Pruitt obtained a mortgage loan for her residential property from American Home Mortgage in 2006. Id. at *1. The deed of trust that secured her promissory note "name[d] American Home Mortgage as the lender and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (`MERS') as the nominee for the lender and as the beneficiary"; both documents "state[d] that the Note [could] be transferred." Id.
Id. In addition to noting that "Pruitt lack[ed] standing to challenge the validity of the transactions that transferred to Defendants the rights to enforce the Note and the Deed of Trust," the Court concluded that "MERS did have authority to assign the Deed of Trust." Id. at *2. It reasoned that "[t]he Deed of Trust name[d] MERS and `the successors and assigns of MERS' as the beneficiaries and nominees of the lender, American Home Mortgage," and "thus expressly grant[ed] MERS the right to assign the Deed of Trust." Id.
As for the blank indorsement, "[w]hen indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed." Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 3-205(b); see also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Brock, 63 A.3d 40, 49 (Md. 2013) ("[T]he person in possession of a note . . . indorsed in blank, is a holder entitled generally to enforce that note."). When a borrower defaults on a mortgage, the "holder in possession of [a] Note that contain[s] a blank endorsement, either . . . the servicing agent or any of the substitute trustees [is] empowered to enforce the Note." Okoro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. PX 16-0616, 2016 WL 5870031, at *8 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2016) (quoting Andrews v. Brown, 2016 WL 3017692, at *5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 26, 2016), and concluding that claims that defendant "wrongfully" accelerated the Note without an assignment of the deed of trust when the note had been indorsed in blank "fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed"), aff'd, No. 16-2274, 2017 WL 1291278 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017). BAC, which was the servicer of the loan at the time, had possession of the Note, disclosed that Wells Fargo was the holder of the Note, and attached a True and Certified Copy of it to its Proof of Claim in Ukaegbu's bankruptcy proceeding. Proof of Claim & Note, ECF No. 1-3, at 2, 4, 25-28; see also Appt. of Sub. Trs. 1 (referring to Wells Fargo as the holder of the Note). Therefore, Wells Fargo was the holder of the Note, and Wells Fargo and SPS, as Wells Fargo's later servicer of the loan, were entitled to enforce the Note. See Okoro, 2016 WL 5870031, at *8; Com. Law § 3-205(b).
Ukaegbu relies on Anderson v. Burson, 35 A.3d 452 (Md. 2011), to argue that possession of a blank indorsement is not sufficient to enforce a note. Pl.'s Opp'n 9. But, Anderson is inapposite because it discusses the enforcement of a note by a "nonholder in possession," not the holder. See Anderson, 35 A.3d at 461. "`[T]he holder of the instrument'" is another category of "person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument." Id. (quoting Com. Law § 3-301).
Ukaegbu asserts that he "has not attached the[se] documents [to his Complaint] for their truth or authenticity" but rather "to demonstrate how they collectively contradict Wells Fargo's claim to be the owner and holder of the Note. . . ." Pl.'s Opp'n 1. Notably, he does not dispute their authenticity or contents; he contends that the documents are inconsistent, do not convey the rights they purport to convey, and are insufficient to establish Wells Fargo as the holder of his Note. See id. at 2. But, insofar as the documents' contents conflict with his descriptions of them, "the exhibit prevails." Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). And, I take judicial notice of the filings in Bankruptcy Court and the Land Records Office of Prince George's County pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Consequently, based on the pleadings, including the attached exhibits, Wells Fargo is the holder and was assigned the Deed of Trust. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish "that Defendants did not possess the right to collect the amount of debt sought" to state a claim under the MCDCA. See Lewis, 2014 WL 3845833, at *6. Nor can he show that Defendants' representation that they had the right to enforce the Note was a misrepresentation for purposes of the MCPA. See Bey, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 319. Both claims must be dismissed.
The FDCPA "protects consumers from abusive and deceptive practices by debt collectors, and protects non-abusive debt collectors from competitive disadvantage." Stewart v. Bierman, 859 F.Supp.2d 754, 759 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted)). To state a claim for relief under the FDCPA, Plaintiff must allege that "(1) [he] has been the object of collection activity arising from consumer debt, (2) the defendant is a debt [] collector as defined by the FDCPA, and (3) the defendant has engaged in an act or omission prohibited by the FDCPA." Id. at 759-60 (citation omitted); see Ademiluyi v. PennyMac Mortg. Inv. Trust Holdings I, LLC, 929 F.Supp.2d 502, 524 (D. Md. 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692). The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from, inter alia, "us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt," 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, or "[t]aking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if—(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest," id. § 1692f(6)(A). Plaintiff claims in Count III that SPS violated these FDCPA provisions "[b]y sending Plaintiff [a] September 1, 2016, letter falsely representing that Wells Fargo was the holder and/or owner of Plaintiff's Note and demanding payment and threatening to enforce a security interest if the debt was not paid." Compl. ¶ 52. As discussed, Wells Fargo was the holder of his Note, and therefore such a representation by SPS was not false. Consequently, Ukaegbu fails to state a claim for a violation of § 1692e or § 1692f(6)(A) because SPS's representation on its September 1, 2016 letter was not "false, deceptive, or misleading," and there was a "present right to possession of the property claims as collateral through an enforceable security instrument," namely, the Deed of Trust. See15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f(6)(A). This claim, also, must be dismissed. See Stewart, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 759-60.
Pruitt v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. DKC 15-1308, 2015 WL 9490234, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 30, 2015).
In Pruitt, the plaintiff sought "a declaration `that Wells Fargo [was] not a "holder" of the Note and [was] without right to enforce the Note,'" based on the plaintiff's assertion that "Wells Fargo [was] still not in possession of the Note." Id. The Court denied the relief, concluding that there was "no current case or controversy before the court," given that "Defendants attach[ed] the Deed of Trust, the Note, and the Assignment to their unopposed motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff allege[d] no facts whatsoever casting doubt on Defendants' status as assignee of the relevant documentation." Id. at *8. Consequently, the Court concluded that Pruitt "fail[ed] to set forth plausible facts showing her entitlement to declaratory relief." Id.
Here, similarly, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that "Wells Fargo as trustee for the SASCO Trust or in its own behalf, has no legal or equitable interests in Plaintiff's Note, Deed of Trust or property" and "no right to enforce Plaintiff's Note or to enforce a claimed security interest in the subject property." Compl. 24. But, as discussed, the documents attached to the Complaint, including the Deed of Trust, Note with blank indorsement, and Assignment of Deed of Trust, show that Wells Fargo is the holder of the Note and was assigned the Deed of Trust and prevail over Ukaegbu's contrary assertions. Therefore, I will decline to enter the declaratory judgment. See Pruitt, 2015 WL 9490234, at *7-8.
Ukaegbu also seeks to quiet title to the Property, claiming that "the subject Note has been permanently lost and/or destroyed while in the possession of the original lender in order to hide the existence of underwriting fraud and [a] fraudulent appraisal," and as a result, without "a complete chain of ownership and possession of the original not[e], Defendants do not have any legal or valid claim to any security interests or any other interests in Plaintiff's property." Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65, 67; see also Am. Compl. "To prevail on a claim to quiet title, Plaintiff must show by clear proof that Defendants lack a right to enforce the Deed of Trust." Roberson v. Ginnie Mae REMIC Trust 2010 H01, 973 F.Supp.2d 585, 589-90 (D. Md. 2013); see also, e.g., Porter v. Schaffer, 728 A.2d 755, 766-67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); Kasdon v. G.W. Zierden Landscaping, Inc., 541 F.Supp. 991, 995 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Kasdon v. United States, 707 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1983).
As previously stated, the Note is attached to the Complaint.
Ukaegbu claims that Wells Fargo violated TILA by failing to give Plaintiff "any notice at all concerning Wells Fargo's ownership (let alone a notice containing the [statutorily] required information)." Compl. ¶ 54. Similarly, he claims Wells Fargo is liable for fraudulent concealment for "deliberately conceal[ing] the transfer [of Plaintiff's Note] for several years" and "caus[ing] and allow[ing] Plaintiff to believe that other entities owned the loan to avoid its own liability for a predatory loan and to thwart an action for rescission until after all statutes of limitations had expired." Id. ¶ 59. And in Count V, which is labeled as "Negligence Against Both Defendants," Ukaegbu claims that Wells Fargo breached the duties that "TILA regulations impose . . . upon creditors. . . . in failing to give notice as required by TILA as alleged in [Count IV]." Id. ¶ 56.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's TILA claim is time-barred by the one year statute of limitations applicable to these claims, and his fraudulent concealment and negligence claims are barred by Maryland's three-year statute of limitations for these common law claims. Defs.' Mem. 8, 9. It is true that Maryland's three-year statute of limitations applies to these common law claims. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101. And, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, "any action under [TILA] may be brought in any United States district court . . . within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation." "This Court may suspend the statute of limitations for TILA violations `until the plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable diligence discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud or concealment.'" Atkinson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. RDB 10-159, 2010 WL 4137558, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2010) (quoting Browning v. Tiger's Eye Benefits Consulting, 313 F. App'x 656, 663 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)).
As Defendants see it, Plaintiff reasonably should have known that Wells Fargo had the right to enforce the Note as of January 20, 2011, when BAC filed its Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy Court. Defs.' Mem. 9. Ukaegbu counters:
Pl.'s Opp'n 22. Yet, as noted, BAC did not hold itself out as the creditor in its Proof of Claim. Rather, after checking the box as the creditor on the Proof of Claim, it clarified in unmistakably bold letters at the top of its Itemized Statement of Interest and/or Charges: "
Even without the Proof of Claim, the Assignment of Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo was filed in the Land Records on February 20, 2013. See Okoro v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. PX 16-0616, 2016 WL 5870031, at *7 (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2016) (stating that "the status of the blank Note was neither unknowable, nor undiscoverable, during the limitations period" when "[t]he Note is simply the Plaintiffs' underlying loan which Plaintiffs could have obtained from public land records at any time"). Based on this filing, the TILA statute of limitations would have run by February 20, 2014 and the applicable Maryland statute of limitations by February 20, 2016, still well before Plaintiff filed suit on October 12, 2016. Accordingly, the statutes of limitations ran before he filed suit, and his TILA, fraudulent concealment, and negligence claims must be dismissed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); Atkinson, 2010 WL 4137558, at *3; Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.
In sum, Ukaegbu fails to state a claim under the MCDCA, MCPA, or the FDCPA (Counts I, II, and III), or for a declaratory judgment or quiet title. Additionally, Ukaegbu's TILA, fraudulent concealment, and negligence claims (Counts IV, V, and VI) are time-barred and subject to dismissal. Accordingly, I will dismiss his Complaint in its entirety. Because Ukaegbu cannot amend his pleadings further to avoid the statute of limitations or contradict the documents that show Wells Fargo had the right to enforce the Note, dismissal will be with prejudice. See Weigel v. Maryland, 950 F.Supp.2d 811, 825-26 (D. Md. 2013) ("When a plaintiff fails to state a claim, he `should generally be given a chance to amend the complaint. . . before the action is dismissed with prejudice."[] But, dismissal with prejudice is proper if there is no set of facts the plaintiff could present to support his claim. See, e.g., Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm., Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630 (4th Cir. 2008)."). A separate order will issue.
For purposes of considering whether Plaintiff has stated a claim in his Complaint, I accept the facts that Plaintiff alleged in his pleadings as true. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011). Ukaegbu also attached various documents to his Complaint, which are a part of his pleading for all purposes. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). To the extent that Plaintiff does not dispute the contents of those documents, where they conflict with his description of them, the exhibits prevail. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2016); Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991).
original lender or a subsequent assignee transfers the loan. Danso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. PX 16-1396, 2016 WL 4437653, at *1 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2016) (citing Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359, 1361-62 (2010)). "Once a loan is assigned to MERS, the public land title records no longer reveal who (or what) actually owns a lien on the property in question." Peterson, Foreclosure, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1371.
Id. (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Brock, 63 A.3d 40, 42 (Md. 2013)).
