JAMES S. MOODY, Jr., District Judge.
Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("§ 2255 motion") on February 11, 2014 (CV Dkt. 1).
Upon consideration of Petitioner's response to the show cause order, the record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the § 2255 motion must be dismissed as time-barred.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") was enacted on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA added a new statutory limitations period to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 971 (2000). Section 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).
The Judgment in Petitioner's criminal case was entered on March 13, 2012 (CR Dkt. 129). Because Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, his judgment of conviction became "final" under § 2255(f) fourteen (14) days later, on March 27, 2012. See Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) ("when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires"); Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(A)(i) ("In a criminal case, a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the . . . entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed"). Petitioner therefore had one year from that date to file his § 2255 motion, i.e., March 27, 2013. He did not file the § 2255 motion until February 11, 2014, more than ten months after the limitations period expired. Consequently, Petitioner's § 2255 motion is untimely.
Although the § 2255 motion is untimely, this Court may still review the motion if Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). Equitable tolling is available if Petitioner demonstrates that (1) he has pursued his rights diligently and (2) an extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely exercising his rights. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010).
Petitioner has not shown that an extraordinary circumstance prevented him from timely filing his § 2255 motion. He implicitly argues in his response to the Court's show cause order that he is entitled to equitable tolling because prior to his conviction, he had no prior criminal history and therefore was ignorant of both state and federal law (see CV Dkt. 7). He further argues that it was not until after he entered federal prison and researched cases similar to his case that he realized his attorney provided ineffective assistance during the criminal proceedings (Id.). Petitioner's ignorance of state and federal law, and the law pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, is not an "extraordinary circumstance" and therefore does not justify equitable tolling. See Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Wakefield v. Railroad Retirement Board, 131 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Ignorance of the law usually is not a factor that can warrant equitable tolling.")); United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (pro se status and ignorance of the law do not justify equitable tolling).
Moreover, Petitioner has not shown any action on his part that would demonstrate the reasonable diligence required to justify equitable tolling. Consequently Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
1. The petition (Dkt. 1) for writ of habeas corpus is
2. The