Filed: May 26, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 14-979-cr United States v. Milter UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDE
Summary: 14-979-cr United States v. Milter UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER..
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14‐979‐cr
United States v. Milter
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL
EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER
JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of May, two thousand fifteen.
1 PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER,
2 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
3 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
4 Circuit Judges.
5 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
6
7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
8
9 Appellee,
10
11 v. No. 14‐979‐cr
12
13 S. GEORGE MILTER,
14
15 Defendant‐Appellant.*
16 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
17
18
The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption of this case as set forth
*
above.
1 FOR APPELLANT: Daniel M. Perez, Law Offices of Daniel M. Perez,
2 Newton, NJ.
3
4 FOR APPELLEE: Carrie H. Cohen, Michael A. Levy, Assistant
5 United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United
6 States Attorney for the Southern District of New
7 York, New York, NY.
8
9 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
10 Southern District of New York (Katherine B. Forrest, Judge).
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
12 AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
13 S. George Milter appeals from the District Court’s judgment of conviction
14 entered March 17, 2014, sentencing him principally to sixty‐one months’
15 imprisonment, following his plea of guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation
16 of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. On appeal, Milter argues that his sentence was procedurally
17 and substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
18 facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
19 explain our decision to affirm.
20 Milter contends that the District Court committed procedural error by
21 failing to recognize that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s parsimony clause is mandatory and
22 that § 3553(a)(6) requires courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted
23 nationwide sentence disparities. Because Milter did not raise these claims below,
24 we review them for plain error. United States v. Rubin, 743 F.3d 31, 39 (2d Cir.
25 2014). We conclude that Milter’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable
26 under this standard. The District Court expressly applied the parsimony clause,
27 noting that 60 months’ imprisonment was “not quite enough” but that 61
28 months’ imprisonment was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve
29 the various factors of 3553(a).” App’x 106. “Since the District Judge correctly
2
1 calculated and carefully reviewed the Guidelines range, [she] necessarily gave
2 significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted
3 disparities.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007); see also United States v.
4 Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006).
5 We also conclude that Milter’s sentence was not substantively
6 unreasonable. The District Court carefully considered the § 3553(a) factors,
7 citing, among other things, the duration of Milter’s offense and the emotional
8 and financial pain Milter caused to the victims, even after it became clear that
9 they were “in extremis.” App’x 107. On this record, we cannot say that the
10 sentence imposed by the District Court fell outside “the range of permissible
11 decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)
12 (quotation marks omitted).
13 We have considered Milter’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
14 are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court
15 is AFFIRMED.
16 FOR THE COURT:
17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
3