Filed: Jul. 22, 1996
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: and Cyr, Circuit Judge. Angel Santana, one of twenty-three, Per Curiam.departure at sentencing.government of its contingent obligation.Santiago-Gonzalez, 66 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir.Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 578 (1st Cir.agreement.
July 22, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 95-1229
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANGEL SANTANA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jos Antonio Fust , U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
Thomas R. Lincoln, with whom Law Offices of Thomas R. Lincoln was
on brief for appellant.
Juan A. Pedrosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jos A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior
Litigation Counsel, and Nelson P rez-Sosa, Assistant United States
Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
Per Curiam. Angel Santana, one of twenty-three
Per Curiam.
defendants involved in an extensive drug trafficking operation,
claims that the government failed to comply with their plea
agreement by refusing to request a "substantial assistance"
departure at sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. 3551 and U.S.S.G.
5K1.1. We find no error.
Santana pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute in excess of 2,300 kilograms of cocaine. See
21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The plea agreement required Santana
to cooperate in the government's investigation of drug
trafficking, drug-related murders, firearms trafficking, and
other criminal violations, and to continue to provide complete,
truthful and accurate information and testimony on an ongoing
basis. In return, the government agreed to request a downward
departure for "substantial assistance."
Santana contended below that he complied with the plea
agreement by providing information which the government used
against his codefendants, and by testifying at the trial of a
codefendant. Thus, he argued, the government acted in bad faith
by refusing to request a downward departure. The government
responded, and the district court agreed, that Santana breached
the plea agreement by failing to disclose, inter alia, all his
knowledge about the drug-related murders, thereby relieving the
government of its contingent obligation. See United States v.
Santiago-Gonzalez, 66 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
2
Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 578 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
484
U.S. 989 (1987).
We review the district court's factual findings under
the "clear error" standard, United States v. Clark, 55 F.3d 9, 11
(1st Cir. 1995), but conduct de novo review of its ultimate
finding that the plea agreement was not breached by the
government. See id. at 11; United States v. Atwood,
963 F.2d
476, 478 (1st Cir. 1992). There is ample record support for the
district court ruling that the government reasonably regarded
Santana's failure to disclose all he knew about drug-related
murders, among other matters, as a material breach of their plea
agreement. As Santana failed to fulfill a material condition
precedent to the government's obligation to recommend a downward
departure for substantial assistance, the government was under no
obligation to do so.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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