MICHAEL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and/or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). This case is before the Court upon Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (doc. 31), the Commissioner's Memorandum in Opposition (doc. 32), Plaintiff's Reply (doc. 33), the administrative record, and the record as a whole.
Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI on October 10, 2002, alleging a disability onset date of November 12, 2001. Tr. 52-54, 446-48. Plaintiff claimed she is disabled due to a number of impairments including, inter alia, major depression, an anxiety disorder, a personality disorder, and sleeping problems. Tr. 70.
After initial denials of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ David Redmond. Tr. 477-508. In a written decision issued on April 18, 2006, ALJ Redmond found Plaintiff not "disabled." Tr. 16-25. Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 5-7. Plaintiff then timely filed an appeal in this Court. Doc. 1. On February 21, 2008, the Court remanded the matter to the Commissioner under Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to consider new evidence (i.e., the medical opinion of a new treating psychiatrist). Doc. 11.
Upon remand, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Amelia Lombardo. Tr. 1085-1106. ALJ Lombardo issued a written decision on August 23, 2011 finding Plaintiff not "disabled." Tr. 671-84. Specifically, ALJ Lombardo's Findings were as follows:
Tr. 675-84 (brackets and footnote added).
Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making ALJ Lombardo's non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 654-56. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). This matter is now back before the Court to review ALJ Lombardo's decision.
At the hearing before ALJ Lombardo, Plaintiff testified that she was 5'7" tall, and weighed 324 pounds. Tr. 1088. She initially lost 200 pounds after having gastric bypass surgery in 2004, but gained 100 pounds back after pregnancy with her son. Tr. 1091.
She lived, at that time, in a one-story house with her fiancé, Chris Ward, and three-yearold son. Tr. 1088. Mr. Ward did most of the cooking and household chores, but Plaintiff did laundry and washed the dishes. Tr. 1094-95.
Plaintiff testified that she was no longer able to work due to pain caused by degenerative disc disease in her back and arthritis in both knees. Tr. 1090. She took pain medication, and received injections in her back and knees to lessen her pain and other symptoms. Tr. 1090-91. Further, she was prescribed hearing aids for both ears, and also had diabetes and glaucoma. Tr. 1091, 1101. She reported that she could lift 10 pounds; walk 3 blocks without interruption; and sit for a maximum of 45 minutes. Tr. 1094. She reported no problems using her arms, hands, or fingers. Id.
Plaintiff also testified that she suffered from depression and had panic attacks. See tr. 1091, 1098. She lacked energy and felt "drained." Tr. 1098. She took psychiatric medications and saw her psychiatrist every 8 to 12 weeks to refill her prescriptions. Tr. 1092. She acknowledged that she was terminated from a community mental health center after she stole prescription scripts. Tr. 1099-1100.
ALJ Lombardo also incorporated into her decision the testimony of Mary Eileen Buban, Psy.D., a clinical psychologist who testified as an impartial medical expert during Plaintiff's prior administrative hearing before ALJ Redmond. Tr. 535-39, 674-75. Dr. Buban opined that Plaintiff suffered from depression and anxiety. Tr. 535. She reported that Plaintiff's mental health treatment was erratic, and Plaintiff had a history of being non-compliant with medication and therapy. See tr. 535-36. Dr. Buban further opined that Plaintiff's mental impairments resulted in just mild restrictions of her daily activities; moderate difficulties with social functioning; moderate difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace; and that Plaintiff had no repeated episodes of decompensation.
Eric Pruitt, a vocational expert ("VE"), also testified at the hearing before ALJ Lombardo. Tr. 1102-05. ALJ Lombardo proposed a series of hypotheticals regarding Plaintiff's RFC to the VE. Tr. 1103-04. Based on Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the VE testified that, although Plaintiff could no longer perform her past relevant work, she could perform, in the regional economy, 23,000 jobs at the light exertional level and 3,100 jobs at the sedentary exertional level. Tr. 1104.
The Court's inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-73 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ has a "`zone of choice' within which [he or she] can act, without the fear of court interference." Id. at 773.
The second judicial inquiry — reviewing the correctness of the ALJ's legal analysis — may result in reversal even if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). "[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746.
To be eligible for DIB and/or SSI benefits, a claimant must be under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a "disability" includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both "medically determinable" and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in "substantial gainful activity" that is available in the regional or national economies. Id.
Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ's review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing that he or she is "disabled" under the Social Security Act's definition. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997).
This is a sad case in which Plaintiff passed away after the administrative proceedings below, but before this appeal was resolved. See doc. 30. As Plaintiff's counsel has made clear, however, her death was not related to her alleged disabilities. See supra note 2 (referencing doc. 35).
Plaintiff claims ALJ Lombardo erred by: (1) failing to give appropriate weight to the findings by her treating psychiatrist, R. Gollamudi, M.D., and her treating therapist, Wes Stratton, L.S.W.; and (2) improperly evaluating her credibility. See doc. 31. The Court finds both arguments without merit. The record demonstrates that ALJ Lombardo fully and fairly considered both the original medical evidence supporting Plaintiff's disability claim, and the new evidence made part of the record after the Court's Sentence Six remand, and reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
While the medical opinions of treating doctors are generally entitled to controlling weight or great deference, a treating doctor's conclusory statement — that the claimant is disabled — is not determinative of the ultimate issue of disability. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Rather, a treating doctor's opinion is to be given controlling weight only if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques, and not inconsistent with the other evidence of record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993). To that end, an ALJ may properly reject a treating physician's opinion that does not meet these standards. See Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529-31 (6th Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, when a treating doctor's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider certain factors — e.g., supportability of the opinion, and consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole — and must also give "good reasons" for the weight given to that opinion.
Dr. Gollamudi completed interrogatories on November 5, 2005 after treating Plaintiff for less than four months (from May 2, 2005 through August 25, 2005). He then opined that Plaintiff had "marked" restrictions of her daily living activities; "marked" difficulties with social functioning; and "marked" deficiencies of concentration, persistence, and pace. Tr. 455-64. (These interrogatories were the cause for the Sixth Sentence remand. See doc. 11 at PageID 78-82.) On May 31, 2008, Dr. Gollamudi completed supplemental interrogatories and again opined that Plaintiff was unable to work due to her mental impairments.
ALJ Lombardo fully considered Dr. Gollamudi's opinions, and reasonably determined that his non-disability findings were not entitled to controlling or deferential weight based on the following rationale:
Tr. 679 (brackets and footnotes added).
ALJ Lombardo articulated good reasons, which are supported by substantial evidence, for discrediting Dr. Gollamudi's opinion. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. First, the cursory treatment records from Dr. Gollamudi did not support the "marked" level of limitations he assessed. See generally tr. 597-636, 1078-84. According to Dr. Gollamudi, the results of Plaintiff's mental status examinations were consistently normal. See, e.g., tr. 613, 617-36. Moreover, Dr. Gollamudi noted on many visits that Plaintiff's symptoms had improved. See, e.g., tr. 602-06, 608, 613-15, 617-18, 621-22. Similarly, the notes of other mental health professionals do not support, and are in conflict with, Dr. Gollamudi's disability finding. See, e.g., tr. 241-46, 249-52, 270-93, 311-21.
Additionally, there are many indications in the record that Plaintiff was not compliant with her treatment — i.e., missing appointments and not taking medication. See, e.g., tr. 165, 234, 240-41, 274, 312; see also 20 C.F.R §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (noting a claim of disability will be denied if the claimant fails to follow prescribed treatment without good reason); Payne v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F. App'x 109, 114-15 (6th Cir. 2010). While recognizing that in certain cases symptoms of a mental disorder may excuse a claimant's failure to comply with treatment, see White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 283 (6th Cir. 2009), this is not such a case, as the records do not suggest that Plaintiff's mental impairments were so severe that she could not remember to attend appointments and take her medications. Accord Smith-Marker v. Astrue, 839 F.Supp.2d 974, 983-84 (Rose, J.; Newman, M.J.) (S.D. Ohio 2012). To the contrary, some treatment notes indicated that she was, in fact, capable of managing her own treatment. See, e.g., tr. 177 (Dr. Bromberg's note that Plaintiff "appears capable of cooperating with a treatment program"), 314 (Dr. Pina's statement that Plaintiff "has capacity to decide and make treatment planning decisions related to her care").
Moreover, as ALJ Lombardo recognized, the other medical opinions in the record were inconsistent with Dr. Gollamudi's opinion. See tr. 681. Jerry Flexman, Ph.D., an examining neuropsychologist, found in December 2003 that Plaintiff had no "marked" functional limitations. Tr. 230-31. Additionally, two consultative psychologists — John Malinky, Ph.D. (in February 2003) and Mel Zwissler, Ph.D. (in January 2004) — likewise opined that Plaintiff had no "marked" limitations in any functional areas. Tr. 195, 264. Similarly, in June 2004, Desiderio Pina, M.D. performed a psychiatric evaluation on Plaintiff, and reported a GAF score of 70-80, which indicates only slight to mild symptoms.
Accordingly, ALJ Lombardo's decision — to accord "little weight" to Dr. Gollamudi's opinion — is supported by substantial evidence and compliant with Social Security regulations. Accord Lane, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 970-71 (finding the ALJ's decision — to not afford controlling weight to the treating doctors' opinions — was supported by substantial evidence because the opinions were inconsistent with the treatment notes and unsupported by the medical record).
Plaintiff further argues that ALJ Lombardo erroneously rejected the opinion of her treating mental health therapist, Mr. Stratton. Doc. 31 at PageID 140-41. This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, Mr. Stratton is not an "acceptable medical source" under Social Security regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513, and his opinion, therefore, does not merit deference. See SSR 06-03p, 2006 SSR LEXIS 5 at *4-5, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. Additionally, there is no separate opinion by Mr. Stratton; rather, he merely co-signed the interrogatories completed by Dr. Gollamudi. See tr. 455-64. Moreover, ALJ Lombardo provided a separate analysis for Mr. Stratton and similarly provided "good reasons" for rejecting his opinion, such as Plaintiff's noncompliance with treatment and the inconsistency of his opinion with Plaintiff's reported daily activities (e.g., caring for her three-year-old son and doing household chores). Tr. 680.
Last, Plaintiff challenges ALJ Lombardo's credibility analysis. It is the ALJ's function, and not the reviewing court's, to evaluate the credibility of the claimant. Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, an ALJ's credibility findings are entitled to considerable deference and should not be lightly discarded. Casey, 987 F.2d at 1234. The Court is "limited to evaluating whether or not the ALJ's explanations for partially discrediting [a claimant] are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003) (brackets added).
Plaintiff first argues that ALJ Lombardo erroneously disregarded her complaints of disabling pain in her back and knees. See doc. 31 at PageID 142-43. Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions, the ALJ "afford[ed] her the maximum benefit of the doubt" with respect to these complaints, and limited her to a reduced range of light work (i.e., "simple, repetitive[] tasks that would afford her the opportunity to alternate between sitting and standing at intervals of thirty minutes" and "occasional stooping, crouching, kneeling, or crawling"). Tr. 678, 681. Such limitations reasonably address Plaintiff's allegations of pain in her back and knees.
Further, the ALJ appropriately determined that Plaintiff's claims of disabling mental impairments lacked credibility for the following reasons: her failure to seek mental health treatment until after filing her DIB application; her history of being noncompliant with medication and treatment; the medical opinions indicating that she had only mild to moderate impairments in functioning; and her inconsistent statements to various medical sources regarding her education, compare tr. 176 with tr. 410 and tr. 1096. See tr. 681-82. See also Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (finding an ALJ may discount credibility where there are "contradictions among the medical reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence"); Kendrick v. Astrue, 886 F.Supp.2d 627, 638 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (Rose, J.; Newman, M.J.) (finding an ALJ properly discounted the claimant's credibility based on his inconsistent testimony); Lane, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (same). To that end, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff's assignments of error unmeritorious, and further finds ALJ Lombardo's non-disability determination supported by substantial evidence.
