VAIDIK, Chief Judge.
In 2007 the Brown County Commissioners enacted an ordinance establishing a county-wide fire-protection district. In 2011 the Commissioners amended the ordinance, reducing dramatically the scope of the ordinance and the powers granted to the Board of Trustees. County-resident freeholders first filed suit for declaratory judgment, and then the Commissioners and the freeholders filed cross motions for summary judgment, asking the trial court to determine whether the amended ordinance was a valid exercise of the Commissioners' authority. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the freeholders, finding that the amendment was a de facto dissolution of the ordinance, in contravention of the Fire District Act and this Court's opinion in Gaudin v. Austin, 921 N.E.2d 895 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).
In 2007 the then-governing Brown County Board of Commissioners ("the Commissioners")
Appellant's App. p. 139-40.
The Ordinance incorporated many sections of the Fire District Act found at Indiana Code chapter 36-8-11, including the appointment of a five-member board of fire trustees, trustee's meetings, trustee's powers and duties, tax levies, and the purchase of firefighting equipment. Paragraph G(a)(l) of the Ordinance provides that the board of trustees "has the same powers and duties as a township executive... with respect to fire protection functions...." Id. at 142. Paragraph G(a)(4) provides that the trustees "shall exercise general supervision of and make regulations for the administration of the district's affairs. This shall include establishing the authority and protocols for Incident Command." Id. And paragraph G(a)(17) authorizes trustees to "levy taxes at a uniform rate on the real and personal property within the district," subject to certain limitations and special accounting procedures and administration. Id. at 143.
The Ordinance has been the subject of two previous cases: Sanders v. Board of
Thereafter, in January 2009, the Commissioners attempted to dissolve the fire district, which led to another legal challenge by county-resident freeholders. In Gaudin, freeholders challenged the Commissioners' attempt to dissolve the fire-protection district, and this Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the Commissioners, holding that while the Fire District Act explicitly provides in two discrete sections for establishment of a district either by ordinance or by freeholder petition, the Act sets forth only one method of dissolution — the freeholder-petition process described in Indiana Code section 36-8-11-24 — and thus the Commissioners lacked authority to unilaterally dissolve the district. See Gaudin, 921 N.E.2d at 897-900; see also Ind.Code § 36-8-11-24("(a) Proceedings to dissolve a fire protection district may be instituted by the filing of a petition with the county legislative body that formed the district .... (b) The petition must be signed: (1) by at least twenty percent (20%), with a minimum of five hundred (500), of the freeholders owning land within the district; or (2) by a majority of those freeholders owning land within the district; whichever is less.").
After Gaudin, in March 2011, the Commissioners amended the Ordinance. The Amended Ordinance provided in part:
Appellant's App. p. 148, 155.
Thus, the Amended Ordinance dramatically reduced the overall purpose(s) of the District: from providing fire-protection and fire-prevention services to providing nothing more than "fire[-]prevention education within the District." Id. at 155 (emphasis added). The Amended Ordinance also changed the composition of the board of trustees from five members — including a Hamblen Township representative and an "at large" member — to three members representing the three townships "actually served by the District" and out-lined a procedure for appointing the new three-person board. Id. at 149. Moreover, the Amended Ordinance removed the special accounting procedures, restricted the District to levying taxes on only real property (and not personal property, as permitted in the Ordinance), and provided that "[t]he District shall seek funding through non-tax sources, such as grants and donations, to fund its activities so as to minimize or eliminate any tax impact on Brown County property owners." Id.
In August 2011 Brown County residents and property owners ("the Freeholders") filed a suit for declaratory judgment against the Commissioners and the Board of Trustees, seeking to set aside the amendment to the Ordinance. After mediation in September 2013, the parties agreed upon a stipulated question to be resolved by cross-motions for summary judgment presented to the trial court: "Is the amended ordinance 09-04-07-01, a valid exercise of the authority of the Brown County Commissioners?" Id. at 37. In March 2014 the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Freeholders. The trial court's order provided in relevant part:
Id. at 7-10 (formatting altered).
The Commissioners now appeal the trial court's order.
When we review the grant or denial of summary judgment, we use the same standard as the trial court. Gaudin, 921 N.E.2d at 896. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Where the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo. Id. The interpretation of a statute presents a pure question of law for which summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Id.
The goal of statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the General Assembly. Id. We presume the legislature intended the language used in a statute to be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result. Id. Statutes relating to the same general subject matter are in pari materia and should be construed together so as to produce a harmonious statutory scheme. Id. To determine legislative intent, we read the sections of an act together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized with the remainder of the statute. Id. If two statutes or two sets of statutes appear inconsistent in some respects, but can be rationalized to give effect to both, then we are obliged to do so. Id. at 896-97.
On appeal, the Commissioners argue that the amendment of the Ordinance is permitted under Indiana's Home Rule Act, set forth in Indiana Code chapter 36-1-3. According to Section 36-1-3-1, Home Rule applies to all "units," and "unit" means county, municipality, or township. See Ind.Code § 36-1-3-1, Ind.Code § 36-1-2-23. Thus, Home Rule applies to the Commissioners. Section 36-1-3-3 provides:
Ind.Code § 36-1-3-3 (emphasis added). But there are limitations to this power: Section 36-1-3-5(a)(2) provides: "[A] unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power ... is not expressly granted to another entity...." And according to Section 36-1-3-8(a)(3): "[A] unit does not have ... [t]he power to impose duties on another political subdivision, except as expressly granted by statute."
Fire Protection Districts are governed by Indiana Code chapter 36-8-11 ("the Fire District Act" or "the Act"). A fire-protection district is a "municipal corporation" and therefore a "political subdivision." Ind.Code § 36-1-2-10, Ind.Code § 36-1-2-13 ("`Political subdivision' means municipal corporation or special taxing district.") & Ind.Code § 36-8-11-16. The Fire District Act provides two different means of establishing a fire-protection district: by ordinance — as was done in this case — or by freeholder petition. Ind.Code §§ 36-8-11-4, -5; see also Sanders, 892 N.E.2d at 1254. However, the Fire District Act provides only one method for dissolution, outlined in Indiana Code section 36-8-11-24:
Ind.Code § 36-8-11-24.
Returning now to the Commissioners' amendment to the Ordinance, we observe that as a general matter, the Amended Ordinance eliminated virtually every purpose for which the Ordinance was originally created, stating in the preamble: "the Board of Commissioners has concluded that all of the purposes for which the district was established are unnecessary...." Appellant's App. p. 148. Whereas the Ordinance was created for the broad purposes of fire protection and prevention, conferring on the Board of Trustees the "same powers and duties as a township executive ... with respect to fire protection functions ....," id. at 142, and permitting the Trustees to "exercise general supervision of and make regulations for the administration of the district's affairs[,]" id., the Amended Ordinance provided that "the sole purpose of the District shall be to conduct fire prevention education within the District." Id. at 148 (emphasis added). The Amended Ordinance also provided that "[t]he District shall seek funding through non-tax sources, such as grants and donations, to fund its activities so as to minimize or eliminate any tax impact on Brown County property owners." Id. at 149. In other words, we agree with the trial court's characterization of the Commissioners' treatment of the Ordinance: they "gut[ted]" it. Id. at 10. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the "amendment" the Commissioners made to the Ordinance was so extreme and far-reaching as to amount to a de facto dissolution of the Ordinance, in contravention of both Section 36-8-11-24 and Gaudin, 921 N.E.2d 895.
Having determined that the Amended Ordinance was not a valid exercise of the authority of the Commissioners because it amounted to a de facto dissolution, we now address the question of whether the Commissioners had the authority to amend the Ordinance at all. Because there is no mention in the Fire District Act of any procedure for amending an ordinance establishing a fire-protection district, the Commissioners argue that Home Rule supports their position. See Appellant's Br. p. 13. In particular, they assert that "[a]ny doubt as to the existence of [the] power of [the County to amend the Fire District Ordinance] shall be resolved in favor of its existence." See id. at 15 (citing I.C. § 36-1-3-3(b), which actually provides: "[A]ny doubt as to the existence of a power of a unit shall be resolved in favor of its existence."). They also cite Section 36-1-3-4(b)(2), which provides: "A unit has ... all other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs, even though not granted by statute." And they put forth Section 36-1-3-5(a)(2), which provides: "a unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power ... is not expressly granted to another entity."
But as to that last statute, the Freeholders argue that the Commissioners did grant the power to another entity: once the Commissioners established the District, it became a "separate and independent entity"; therefore, the Freeholders' argument continues, "the Commissioners' authority over the District ceased upon its establishment, except to the extent that the Fire District Act allows." Appellee's
The trial court agreed. In granting summary judgment in favor of the Freeholders, the trial court wrote: "By passage of the 2007 ordinance establishing the Fire District the Commissioners granted the authority to the Fire District to undertake the statutory purposes outlined in both the Indiana Statute and the ordinance itself." Appellant's App. p. 9. Accordingly, once the Commissioners — as a "unit" — granted this authority to the District, they "relinquished the power to exercise control over those functions set forth in the Ordinance." Id.; see also I.C. § 36-1-3-5(a)(2) ("[A] unit may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power ... is not expressly granted to another entity."). As stated in the trial court's order: "Nothing within Indiana Code [chapter] 36-8-11 suggests the `unit' retains any authority over the Fire District, once established." Appellant's App. p. 9. We agree.
We find that in creating the District, which then became a separate entity (or
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MAY, J., concur.
On appeal, this Court reversed on these issues, finding that the trial court had erroneously relied on Dillon's Rule, which provided that "a municipality could exercise only those powers specifically granted, necessarily implied, or indispensable to a municipal corporation." See id. at 66. In support of their contention that the Town Council exceeded its legal authority in enacting the ordinance, the Park Board Members had argued that the Indiana Code did not give the Town Council explicit authorization to do so. Id. at 61. But the proper legal inquiry, this Court wrote, is based on Indiana's Home Rule Act, which provides that "unless an act is prohibited it is allowed." Id.
Alessia is factually distinguishable in at least two important ways. First, in Alessia this Court wrote that "conspicuously absent from [the parks-and-recreations statutes] is any restriction on a municipal corporation's authority to dissolve a park board and parks department." Id. at 62. But in the case before us, the Fire District Act does explicitly restrict the Commissioners' ability to dissolve the District. See I.C. § 36-8-11-24; see also Gaudin, 921 N.E.2d at 899-900.
And second, the Park Board Members asserted that the Town Council had violated Indiana Code section 36-1-3-8, which provides, "[A] unit does not have ... the power to impose duties on another political subdivision, except as expressly granted by statute." I.C. § 36-1-3-8(a)(3). This Court rejected that argument, writing: "The dissolution of the Park Board and the Parks Department is not equivalent to giving obligatory tasks or functions to them, which is what [that statute] prohibits." Alessia, 985 N.E.2d at 62. In this case, the Commissioners argue that they are "expressly granted by statute the power to assign any or all of the purposes listed in Ind[iana] Code [section] 36-8-11-4 to the Fire District." Appellant's Reply Br. p. 7-8. But what Section 36-8-11-4 actually says is that the Commissioners may establish fire protection districts for any of the listed purposes — not that they are statutorily authorized to amend the Ordinance whenever they want. See I.C. § 36-8-11-4.
