OPINION and ORDER

ROBERT L. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Bradley Skolnik, Executive Director of the Indiana State Board of Law Examiners, and Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller (hereinafter the Board). Plaintiff John Otrompke contends Rule 12 of the Indiana Supreme Court Rules for Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys is unconstitutional. He seeks a permanent injunction against the Board of Law Examiners' use of the rule, and he also asks the court to order the Board to admit him to practice law in Indiana. The Board moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It argues that Mr. Otrompke doesn't have standing because his injury is speculative and his case isn't ripe. Mr. Otrompke opposes the motion and asserts standing to proceed under the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2000 Mr. Otrompke graduated from DePaul University College of Law, and he once was a member of the Communist Party. Mr. Otrompke hasn't been licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction. He would like to be licensed to practice law in Indiana, but he hasn't applied for admission to the Indiana bar. Mr. Otrompke says it is very easy for a law to be declared unconstitutional, but it could be quite difficult for him to proceed under an unconstitutional statute. So he seeks the court's determination of whether certain aspects of the Admission Rules are constitutional.

In his complaint, Mr. Otrompke argues Admission Rule 12, which encompasses a character and fitness requirement, is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Admission to the Indiana bar requires a recommendation from the Committee on Character and Fitness that the applicant possesses "the necessary good moral character and fitness to perform the obligations and responsibilities of an attorney practicing law in the State of Indiana." Admission Rule 12 § 1. Mr. Otrompke also alleges Admission Rule 12 § 2's requirement that an applicant inform the Board of Law Examiners "with full candor of any facts which bear, even remotely, upon the question of the applicant's character and fitness and general qualifications to practice law" violates the Fifth Amendment's testimonial privilege, and in general, Admission Rule 12 violates his fundamental right to pursue a profession and the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities clause, due process clause, and equal protection clause. Mr. Otrompke unsuccessfully pursued similar litigation in the Northern District of Illinois that challenged the constitutionality of the rules of the Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar. Otrompke v. Hill, 592 F. App'x 495, 496 (7th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, No. 14-1328 (May 7, 2015). The Board contends that Mr. Otrompke's claims are speculative and moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. In his response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Otrompke primarily focuses on sections 2 and 3 of Admission Rule 12.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may assert dismissal is appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. To evaluate jurisdiction, the court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995). "The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that [he] meets the required elements of standing." Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Board argues that Mr. Otrompke lacks standing to pursue his case because he hasn't suffered an injury. Article III of the Constitution limits this court's judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies." Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 473 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). Encompassed by the doctrine of standing, this limitation requires a federal court litigant's alleged injury to be: (1) concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent (as opposed to hypothetical); (2) fairly traceable to the conduct complained of; and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)). The Board contends that Admission Rule 12 hasn't injured Mr. Otrompke because he hasn't applied to practice law in Indiana. Admission Rule 12 hasn't been applied to Mr. Otrompke or invoked by the Board to decline his admission. But the injury inquiry doesn't stop there.

Mr. Otrompke concedes that he hasn't applied to practice law in Indiana but says that he would like to apply. He therefore challenges Admission Rule 12 pre-enforcement. "To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement in a preenforcement action, the plaintiff must show `an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and that there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.'" ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590-591 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). The threat of future harm in a pre-enforcement challenge must be more than speculative, Otrompke v. Hill, 592 F. App'x 495, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014)), and is often substantial when a statute1 limits speech. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d at 473-474. Mr. Otrompke alleges that he might be injured by Admission Rule 12 § 3, which prohibits admission to the Indiana bar to a "person who advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States or this state by force, violence or other unconstitutional or illegal means." Mr. Otrompke argues that if he applies, he could be denied admission because he wants to advocate revolution and based on his past membership in the Communist Party. He contends the prohibition of advocacy of revolution violates the First Amendment. Mr. Otrompke also alleges that he could suffer irreparable harm because Admission Rule 12 § 6 allows the Board to find that an applicant shouldn't be permitted to reapply for admission and section 8 says a hearing may be dispensed with. If he applies, Mr. Otrompke concludes that he could be forever barred from the practice of law in Indiana and this could be done without a hearing.

Disregarding Mr. Otrompke's past membership in the Communist Party and his purported desire to advocate for some type of revolution, the only fact in the record that supports Mr. Otrompke's desire to be admitted to practice law in Indiana is his graduation from an accredited law school. Mr. Otrompke hasn't been licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction in the country, and he hasn't passed the Indiana bar exam. Because he hasn't been admitted to practice in another state or alleged that he meets the application requirements beyond the character and fitness section, the court has no reason to believe that he will or will not fulfill the many requirements that must be met to be admitted to practice law in the state of Indiana. The court can't conclude with any certainty that the character and fitness portion of the application process would be applied to Mr. Otrompke. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 474 (7th Cir. 2012) (chilling of protected speech (self-censorship) is a distinct harm that equals an Article III injury if the plaintiff has "alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against" him) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988)). Mr. Otrompke's claim of a future injury under the allegedly unconstitutional Admission Rule 12 is consequently purely hypothetical and certainly isn't imminent. Cf. Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1264 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (one applicant denied admission to the bar because she didn't meet the requirements of a state bar admission rule; second applicant who didn't meet the rule's requirements for the same reason didn't have to show that he would have standing individually); Jacobs v. Florida Bar, 50 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 1995) (members of the bar who had used advertisements in the past that violated new rules regulating the state bar faced a credible threat of potential discipline by the bar if they continued to use the advertisements).

Mr. Otrompke asserts that he needn't apply and be denied admission to challenge Admission Rule 12 because he brings a facial challenge to the law's constitutionality. He says the rule violates the First Amendment because it is impermissibly overbroad and vague. But even a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must be based on an actual, albeit speculative, case, not a hypothetical or imaginary one. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) ("The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined."); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 476 (7th Cir. 2012). As discussed previously, Mr. Otrompke's case is based on a hypothetical situation — if he applied for admission to the Indiana bar and if he met the many other requirements for admission, the Board would deny him admission for unconstitutional reasons related to speech. Mr. Otrompke presents few facts and many theories, which doesn't amount to a case based on legitimate speculation about what might happen when, not if, the statute is applied to him. A facial challenge isn't warranted based on the sparse record that Mr. Otrompke can offer.

Additionally, Mr. Otrompke alleges a possible injury to a third party, whom he refers to as his "predecessor before the Indiana Committee Mr. Brown." Mr. Otrompke claims that Mr. Brown may have been denied admission to the Indiana bar pursuant to Admission Rule 12 § 2 due to his religious beliefs. As a general rule, "a litigant must assert his own legal rights and cannot assert the legal rights of a third party." Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). "[I]n the First Amendment context, [however,] `litigants are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.'" Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-393 (1988). "When a person or entity seeks standing to advance the constitutional rights of others," the court asks two questions: (1) "has the litigant suffered some injury in fact sufficient to create a case or controversy in the Article III sense?"; and (2) "as a prudential matter, is the plaintiff the proper proponent of the particular legal rights he is asserting?" Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d at 739. Under Admission Rule 12 § 2, an applicant must possess good moral character, which "includes, but is not limited to, the qualities of honesty, fairness, candor, trustworthiness, observance of fiduciary responsibility, and of the laws of this State and of the United States, and a respect for the rights of other persons and things, and the judicial process." Mr. Otrompke argues that this requirement is aimed at conduct commonly associated with expression — religious beliefs about government and authority. He claims that Mr. Brown was denied admission under section 2 because he believes Mr. Brown may be a Jehovah's Witness. Mr. Brown's dispute with the Board is summarized in Brown v. Bowman, 668 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2012). The Board denied Mr. Brown's admission application, he exhausted his direct appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims related to the Board's denial under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 439. Mr. Brown was actually Roman Catholic, and he alleged that the Board's evaluation of his application focused on his religious beliefs. Id. Thus, Mr. Otrompke presents a theory based on an incorrect fact, and Mr. Brown litigated the issue on his own behalf. Mr. Otrompke doesn't have standing to assert the legal rights of Mr. Brown.

Finally, Mr. Otrompke names the Indiana Attorney General in this suit but makes no allegations against him. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.1 requires a party challenging the constitutionality of a state statute to provide notice to the state Attorney General, but it doesn't require he be named as a party. The complaint doesn't state a claim against the Attorney General, and he must be dismissed as a defendant.

IV. CONCLUSION

The court can't resolve hypothetical claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by the Board and Attorney General Zoeller (Doc. No. 7) and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants.

SO ORDERED.