COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge.
Richard N. Terry, proceeding pro se, brought this action against Defendant First Merit National Bank.
The facts of this case are far from clear. At core, this action appears to pertain to the foreclosure of a property in Ohio state court. See Compl at 2 ("The matter in general seeks to adequately challenge the foreclosure on a mortgage to the following described property in Franklin County, Ohio"). Plaintiff describes the property in question as "Hunter's Ridge Sec. 8 Lot 507." That description refers to the property with the address, 652 Lytton Ct., Gahanna OH 43230, which is also Plaintiff's address. See Compl. at 32, Exhibit "A" to Planned Unit Development Rider. The property was subject to foreclosure in the Franklin County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas, case number 13 CV 006485, with a judgment of foreclosure issued June 9, 2014. See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C. Because the Court concludes, below, that it has no jurisdiction over any of the claims in this action and because Plaintiff has not conveyed them in a clear fashion, it is not necessary to recite the facts further at this point. Insofar as the facts of this case are essential to resolving the jurisdictional questions before the Court, the Court presents them below.
On July 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action, proceeding pro se. On August 11,
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim, that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims against them, and that the United States District Court for the District of Columbia is an improper venue for this action.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and can adjudicate only those cases entrusted to them by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Kokonen
When personal jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a factual basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C.Cir.1990). To establish that personal jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff cannot rest on bare allegations or conclusory statements but "must allege specific acts connecting [each] defendant with the forum." Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C.Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To make such a showing, the plaintiff is not required to adduce evidence that meets the standards of admissibility reserved for summary judgment and trial[;]" but rather, the plaintiff may "rest her arguments on the pleadings, `bolstered by such affidavits and other written materials as [she] can otherwise obtain.'" Urban Inst. v. FINCON Servs., 681 F.Supp.2d 41, 44 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.Cir.2005)). In the case of a pro se plaintiff, although the Court is required to construe the pro se complaint liberally, see Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F.Supp.2d 182, 183 (D.D.C.2006), "[p]ro se plaintiffs are not freed from the requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their claims." Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F.Supp.2d 21, 23 (D.D.C.2010) (citation omitted).
As noted above, Defendant moves to dismiss arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against it. It also moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for improper venue. In addition, insofar as Defendant has not raised other bases on which to dismiss this action with respect to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction,
IMark Marketing Servs., LLC v. Geoplast S.p.A, 753 F.Supp.2d 141, 149 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir.1963)). In view of these considerations, and because this Court concludes that it plainly lacks both subject matter jurisdiction over all claims in this action and personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court does not reach Defendant's remaining arguments for dismissal. The Court addresses subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction in turn.
Among other arguments for dismissal, Defendant argues that the Court ought to abstain from assuming jurisdiction in this case because "Federal courts have the discretion to abstain from considering state law matters under consideration by state courts when sound public policy requires abstention." Mot. to Dismiss at 6 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943)). But the Court is faced with a more fundamental barrier to asserting jurisdiction: because all claims in this action either challenge an Ohio state court foreclosure decree or are inextricably intertwined with that state-court judgment, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action. Even though Defendant did not raise this specific jurisdictional argument,
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State." 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a judge-made corollary of section 1257, makes this jurisdiction exclusive. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006) (quoting Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by `state-court losers' challenging `state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.'" Id. at 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198 (citations omitted). "The doctrine applies only in `limited circumstances,' where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court." Id. at 466, 126 S.Ct. 1198 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a claim only if three criteria are met. See id. at 462, 126 S.Ct. 1198.
First, "[t]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked must have actually been a party to the prior state-court judgment." Id. Here, the prior state-court judgment at issue is the foreclosure decree issued against Plaintiff in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in the case FirstMerit Mortgage Corporation v. Terry, case no. 13 CV 006485. See Compl. at 2; Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. at 18-21. Richard N. Terry, plaintiff in this action, and Lue Cindy Terry were the defendants in that state-court foreclosure action. See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. at 18. The first prong of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is satisfied.
Second, "the claim raised in the federal suit must have been actually raised or inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment." Lance, 546 U.S. at 462, 126 S.Ct. 1198. Because it is unclear exactly what Plaintiff is claiming in this action, other than generally seeking redress with respect to the foreclosure judgment, it is unclear whether Plaintiff actually raised the claims in this action in the foreclosure action. But claims are "inextricably intertwined" with a prior state-court judgment unless their "core" is "independent" of that judgment. See Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 76 (D.C.Cir.1997); see also Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir.2002) ("[W]e [ask] whether the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress."). Insofar as the Court can make sense of the complaint, Plaintiff's complaint appears to allege that Defendant's actions with respect to the mortgage in question invalidate the foreclosure decree in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. See Compl. at 2 ("The matter in general seeks to adequately challenge the foreclosure on a mortgage to the following
The third and final requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that "the federal claim must not be parallel to the state-court claim." Lance, 546 U.S. at 462, 126 S.Ct. 1198. A federal claim is parallel to a state-court claim if it is filed after the state-court claim, but before the state court enters judgment. See Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 289-91, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal court of jurisdiction over a claim only if it was brought in federal court after judgment was entered in a state court. Id. In this proceeding, Plaintiff "seeks to adequately challenge the foreclosure on a mortgage to the following described property in Franklin County, Ohio, and legally described as Hunter's Ridge Sec. 8 Lot 507." Compl. at 2. The foreclosure decree was entered on June 9, 2014. See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. at 15 (docket of Franklin County Case No. 13 CV 006485).
The claims in this action meet all three of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's criteria: Plaintiff was a party to the state-court foreclosure proceeding, the claims in this action are inextricably intertwined with that proceeding (if not actually raised in that proceeding), and this action was filed after the state-court final judgment. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims in this action.
In addition to the other jurisdictional defenses that Defendant raises, Defendant
To determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction over a particular defendant, a court in this district must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine that the relevant District of Columbia statutes authorize either general jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-423, or specific jurisdiction, D.C. Code § 13-423. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.Cir.2000); see also Edmond v. United States Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C.Cir.1991) (even when subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on a federal question, plaintiffs must rely on the D.C. long-arm statute to assert personal jurisdiction over out-of-district defendants). If a defendant's contacts within the forum are "continuous and systematic," a court may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant with respect to a suit arising out of any subject matter unrelated to the defendant's activities within the forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). A court may exercise specific jurisdiction to entertain controversies based on acts of a defendant that "touch and concern the forum." Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d 76, 81 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Steinberg v. Int'l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927, 928 (D.C.Cir.1981)). Second, the court must find that its exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of constitutional due process. See GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347.
General jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate any claims brought against a defendant. See Steinberg v. Int'l Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d at 929. The D.C. Code grants a District of Columbia court general jurisdiction over a person who is "domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintain his or its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia." D.C. Code § 13-422. But Defendant's principal place of business is in Ohio, and Defendant has no contacts with
Specific jurisdiction arises where a defendant engages in certain kinds of conduct enumerated in the District's long-arm statute.
Even if the Court concluded that the statutory provisions of the D.C. Code supported jurisdiction, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction unless it comported with the requirements of due process. The Court concludes that it would not comport with due process. This determination turns on whether a defendant's "minimum contacts" with the District of Columbia establish that "the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal citation and quotation
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would allow this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. As a result, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2).
Because the Court concludes that all claims against Defendant must be dismissed because of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court does not reach other merits-based arguments or jurisdictional bases for dismissing the claims against Defendant, including the argument that there is neither diversity nor federal question jurisdiction over this action.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's [13] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action as a result of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action in its entirety. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Order, dated November 17, 2014, ECF No. 17. Plaintiff has not subsequently filed an amended complaint.