MARVIN J. GARBIS, District Judge.
The Court has before it Defendant Housing Authority of Baltimore City's Motion to Dismiss Complaint or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] and the materials submitted relating thereto. The Court finds a hearing unnecessary.
At times relevant hereto, Plaintiff Inshallah Brown ("Brown"), an African-American woman, was employed by Defendant Housing Authority of Baltimore City ("HABC") and received housing through HABC's Housing Choice Voucher Program. Brown had problems with her landlords and problems in the work environment that eventually resulted in the termination of her employment and her filing the instant lawsuit. In this lawsuit, Brown presents claims in Six Counts, seeking to impose liability for racial discrimination and retaliation against HABC.
By the instant motion, HABC seeks dismissal of all claims against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Court finds the summary judgment motion premature and disallows it without prejudice. As discussed herein, the Court grants dismissal of some, but not all, claims asserted in the Complaint.
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. A complaint need only contain "`a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'"
When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are accepted as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. However, conclusory statements or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not [suffice]."
Inquiry into whether a complaint states a plausible claim is "`a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'"
The motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) is, in the instant case, duplicative of the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
At all times relevant hereto, HABC has been a "public body corporate and politic" that administers the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program ("HCVP") in Baltimore City. Md. Code Ann., Hous. & Cmty. Dev. § 15-104 (2006).
Brown is an individual who commenced her employment with HABC on February 14, 2006, as a maintenance worker. Brown was promoted rapidly and, in the year 2011, began working in the Leasing Department of the HCVP until the termination of her employment on April 15, 2015. Complaint [ECF No. 1] ¶¶
In 2012, Brown received a voucher for subsidized housing through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. ¶ 12. She utilized the voucher and rented an apartment from Defendants Dwayne London and Alicia London ("the Landlords").
In June 2014, Brown filed a complaint against the Landlords with Code Enforcement, Housing, and Community Development and the HCVP, alleging various health and safety violations in her home. Two inspectors investigated Brown's allegations and wrote up violations against the Landlords in June 2014.
Thereafter, and allegedly in retaliation, Landlord Dwayne London sent emails to Brown's managers at HABC falsely alleging that Brown did not pay rent and that she had unauthorized occupants and drug activity in her home. ¶ 19. These false allegations put Brown in danger of losing her job and housing voucher. ¶¶ 20-21.
On July 15, 2014, Brown was asked to meet about these allegations with HABC's then Acting Administrator, Norman Young, and the Associate Deputy Director of the HCVP, Nicholas Calace ("Calace"). In the meeting, Calace questioned Brown about the allegations. Brown denied them and told Calace that she thought that the Landlords had made false accusations against her to retaliate for her housing complaint against them and because Brown is an African-American woman. ¶¶ 33, 36.
Dwayne London gave Calace notice that he wanted to inspect Brown's house on a specific date. Brown did not allow inspection on the date London requested because of her work schedule. As a result of the scheduling conflict, Calace threatened to withhold Brown's housing voucher and possibly terminate her job if she did not allow London to inspect on the day he wanted. ¶¶ 29-32.
On September 18, 2014, Brown filed an administrative complaint with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights ("the First Charge") [ECF No. 19-5 at 6] stating therein that she believed she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race and describing the alleged Landlord violations and her complaint about the way the situation was handled by Calace. She stated "I do not believe that Caucasian employees are treated the same way. I believe that Mr. Calace's actions and statements were designed to harass and intimidate me. I believe that the only reason that I am being treated in this manner is because of my race."
Brown has not supplied the document that presented the findings resulting from her First Charge or the date upon which the findings were made. However, she does not allege that there was any finding of probable cause that the alleged race-based discrimination occurred.
Brown alleges that in 2014-2015, an assistant manager, Dawnay L. Green-Chrisp ("Green-Chrisp"), and Brown's supervisor, David Harper ("Harper"), repeatedly removed files from her desk without notice, which made it difficult for her to do her job. Brown alleges that she "believed that her efforts to do her job were being sabotaged by management because of her race and because of retaliation over her filing the EEOC complaint against Calace." ¶ 64. Both Harper and Green-Chrisp are African Americans.
Christopher Monroe ("Monroe"), a white male, was a program specialist who worked on the same files as Brown. Brown alleges that Monroe often did not process his part of the files on time. Monroe's untimeliness caused Brown's files to be delinquent. Brown was disciplined and eventually terminated for not processing files in a timely manner. ¶ 68. Monroe was not disciplined for his lateness and was promoted. Green-Chrisp also had delinquent files, but was not disciplined.
Brown alleges that she received a negative performance evaluation and was placed, without notice to her, under a Performance Improvement Program ("PIP") by Harper and Calace.
Brown filed a grievance in January 2015 regarding being placed on the PIP, her heavy caseload, and the files being removed from her desk. A grievance hearing took place on February 24, 2015. ¶ 85.
In March 2015, Brown received a warning for an unprocessed account, which Brown attributes to someone's removing the file from her desk and a computer system malfunction. ¶ 95.
On April 15, 2015, Brown received notice that HABC had terminated her employment. ¶ 102.
Brown filed another grievance against HABC through the Union, AFSCME. At her grievance hearing, Brown's witnesses were not allowed to testify and the hearing was stopped prematurely because a Human Resources Officer had a meeting and because the Union representative said the grievance would be handled in arbitration. ¶¶ 104-05. Brown was notified on July 10, 2015, that the HABC Hearing Officer ruled against her grievance and that the Union would not take her case to arbitration. ¶ 106.
On June 1, 2015, Brown filed an EEOC Complaint ("the Second Charge") [ECF No. 19-5 at 16] claiming that HABC had retaliated against her for filing the First Charge. On August 31, 2016, she received a "right to sue letter" in response.
Brown filed the Complaint [ECF No. 1] on November 2, 2016, asserting claims in six Counts:
By the Court's Order Approving Notice of Voluntary Dismissal [ECF No. 15], all claims against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore were dismissed from the suit.
On December 29, 2016, HABC filed the instant Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] seeking dismissal of all claims against it in the Complaint.
In Count I, Brown asserts a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stating that she was a victim of racial discrimination in employment, alleging disparate treatment and hostile work environment.
Title VII states, in relevant part:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
HABC contends that Brown's Title VII claims in Count I must be dismissed because they are untimely and her pleading is inadequate to establish a claim of racial discrimination.
An aggrieved individual may bring a civil action under Title VII within ninety days of receipt of a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28.
Brown filed the First Charge [ECF No. 19-5 at 6] on or about September 18, 2014. Compl. ¶ 35. Brown contends that she filed the Complaint in the instant case within ninety days of receiving her Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue, but she does not specify if that relates to the First Charge. Pl.'s Opp. [ECF No. 22-1] at 5-6. She also contends that her suit is timely as to the allegations in the First Charge because her Second Charge for retaliation was based on her termination, which was "a continuous violation from Calace's race-based threat of termination" detailed in her First EEOC Charge.
"The continuing violation theory allows for consideration of incidents that occurred outside the time bar when those incidents are part of a single, ongoing pattern of discrimination, i.e., when the incidents make up part of a hostile work environment claim."
Here, the actions of Brown's supervisor Calace disclosed in the First Charge stemmed from distinct problems with the Landlords. In the Second Charge, signed June 1, 2015, Brown referred to "acts of retaliation" for the First Charge, referring generally to a disputed poor performance evaluation, a tuition reimbursement denial, being placed on a PIP, and being discharged on April 15, 2015. These are discrete violations involving different actors and times, and, as alleged, not part of a continuing violation of disparate treatment.
However, the record as it now exists does not establish when Plaintiff received Notice from the EEOC regarding the First Charge. Therefore, the Court shall not dismiss Count 1 as timebarred because essential facts underlying the Defendant's time bar contention are not clearly established by the pleadings.
Brown asserts that she has presented plausible racial discrimination claims in the Complaint because her factual allegations establish disparate treatment and a hostile work environment.
"[A]n employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination . . . to survive [a] motion to dismiss," but the plaintiff's factual allegations must be evaluated under the "ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint" that require a plaintiff to state a plausible claim that rises above the speculative level.
To state a race-based discrimination claim a plaintiff must allege facts to satisfy the cause of action created by the statute —
Brown alleges that she was a member of a protected group and that she suffered adverse employment actions by being placed on a PIP, being given warnings, and eventually being terminated because her files were delinquent and she was not managing her caseload.
Brown alleges that her co-workers, Monroe, who is white, and Green-Chrisp, who is African American, "both had accounts and files that were unprocessed or processed untimely, yet neither was placed on a PIP, given an unsatisfactory rating, or terminated; in fact, both were promoted." ¶ 101.
These conclusory allegations simply do not support an inference that Brown was put on a PIP, admonished for late files, and later terminated
The factual allegations in the Complaint do not present a plausible claim of racial discrimination.
Accordingly, Brown has not adequately pleaded a Title VII disparate treatment claim.
To establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege:
The factual allegations Brown provides to support her hostile work environment claim are (1) that she was treated differently than a white co-worker whose files were also delinquent, (2) that Harper and Green-Chrisp, both African American, repeatedly moved files off her desk and stopped supporting her work efforts in order to sabotage her because of her race, and (3) that on July 15, 2014, Calace threatened to revoke her housing voucher and discipline her at work if she did not allow the Landlords to inspect her home on a particular date.
The Complaint presents insufficient factual allegations to present a plausible inference that the actions of HABC's employees were racially motivated. The Complaint sets forth actions of Brown's co-workers and supervisors, but the alleged actions have no racial component or discriminatory tone that would permit the Court to infer that these actions were done because of Brown's race. In fact, Brown alleges that Green-Chrisp did not follow the procedure for notifying program specialists when she removed files from their desks in general — not just when she removed files from Brown's desk. ¶ 57.
Brown's factual allegations are speculative and conclusory and do not set forth a plausible Title VII claim of hostile work environment.
Accordingly, all claims in Count I shall be dismissed.
Title VII provides that:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(2012).
To establish a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that she engaged in a protected activity; (2) HABC acted adversely against her; and (3) the protected activity was causally connected to the adverse action.
Brown has alleged that she engaged in a protected activity by filing her First Charge on September 18, 2014.
Brown has alleged that HABC acted adversely against her in retaliation by:
¶ 121. The Court will assume, as contended by Brown, that at least her placement on the PIP,
The Court concludes that, when viewing the Complaint in a light most favorable to Brown, it presents factual allegations adequate to present a plausible claim that these adverse employment actions had a causal relationship to her protected activity.
Brown filed the First Charge on September 18, 2014. It appears that HABC received Notice of the First Charge on or about December 2, 2014. Notice [ECF No. 19-5] at 3. Brown alleges that she received a negative performance evaluation three weeks later, on December 24, 2014, and was placed under a PIP in December 2014.
Brown received a written warning in March 2015 for an unprocessed account, and only a month later, on April 15, 2015, Brown's employment was terminated. In her Second Charge, Brown stated that she was the only person to be discharged, rather than suspended, after a first write up. Second Charge [ECF No. 19-5] at 16.
"[A] causal connection for purposes of demonstrating a prima facie case exists where the employer takes adverse employment action against an employee shortly after learning of the protected activity."
Therefore, Brown's Title VII retaliation claim (Count III) shall not be dismissed.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
Brown may not plead a § 1981 racial discrimination or retaliation claim against HABC, a state actor.
Brown has not pled the existence of an official policy or custom of discrimination by HABC.
Accordingly, Brown's § 1981 discrimination and retaliation claims in Counts II and III shall be dismissed.
In Count IV, Brown asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24
Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 18.
As a local government agency,
Brown did not adequately plead constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, nor has she alleged that HABC maintained a policy or practice of depriving individuals of their constitutional rights.
Furthermore, Brown fails to allege that she was deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or Article 24.
Therefore, Brown's claims stated in Count IV shall be dismissed.
In Count V, Brown asserts a state law claim against the Landlords for tortious interference with her employment. This claim is not asserted against HABC and is, therefore, beyond the scope of the instant motion. The Court shall note, however, that this claim against the Landlords appears to be within the supplemental pendant and ancillary jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of its interrelationship with the federal law claim being asserted against HABC.
HABC contends that Brown's claims for intentional inflection of emotional distress ("IIED") and violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights must be dismissed because Brown did not comply with the Local Government Tort Claim Act's ("LGTCA") notice requirement, which applies to state constitutional and tort law claims.
The LGTCA provides, in relevant part, that:
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-304(b)(1) (2013).
"The notice is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action for damages, and compliance with the notice provision should be alleged in the complaint as a substantive element of the cause of action."
The Complaint does not allege that Brown provided HABC with notice, nor does Brown contest dismissal of the state law claims on this basis. Brown has not provided good cause for why the notice requirement should be waived.
Accordingly, Brown's IIED claim and Article 24 claim against HABC shall be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons:
SO ORDERED.
