GREENE, J.
At its core, this lawsuit concerns the existence of a historic "Farm Road," the origins of which date back well over a century. While the history of Farm Road may lie in antiquity, it has become the focal point of much contention in the past decade. Indeed, Farm Road has been the subject of several lawsuits, in both the state and federal courts of Maryland,
Petitioners, William Rounds, Marvin Gaither, Clifton Lee, James Bell, Bernice Martin, and Robert
According to their Amended Complaint, Petitioners own properties located along Farm Road and a "10 Foot Right-of-Way" (collectively the "Farm Road"), which together provide the only means of access to Petitioners' properties. The properties are located on a tract of land in Sandy Spring, Maryland, bordered roughly by Goldmine Road to the north, Brooke Road to the south, and Chandlee Mill Road to the east. Petitioners allege that Farm Road runs north and south between Goldmine Road and Brooke Road through the center of the tract.
Petitioners aver that Respondent Brown began developing the "Dellabrooke" subdivision along with "Dellabrooke Forest" (collectively the "Dellabrooke subdivisions") on the northern end of Farm Road in 1994. During this development, Brown is alleged to have eliminated Farm Road's access to Goldmine Road in the north, as well as created a "fictional" conservation easement
The Areys purchased a portion of the fictional easement in order to develop the property in 2003. Prior to their purchase, the Areys allegedly worked with Brown in order to eliminate Farm Road's northern access to Goldmine Road as well as eliminate Farm Road in its entirety. In doing so the Areys would increase the value of the property they subsequently purchased from Brown.
Apart from the Commission's approval of the fraudulent Dellabrooke subdivision
In an effort to resolve the dispute, the then acting Montgomery County Executive issued a letter to the Commission urging the Commission to recognize Farm Road.
Petitioners allege that the Commission, citing to the reasons noted above, did not waver in its decision to refuse to issue Petitioners addresses.
Following their failed attempts at obtaining addresses, Petitioners determined the present suit was necessary and, in an effort to comply with the notice requirement
On June 16, 2008, Petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Subsequently, Petitioners' suit was dismissed on July 15, 2011 for failure to exhaust state remedies. Awkard v. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, RWT-08-1562, 2011 WL 2896005 (D.Md. July 15, 2011).
Petitioners filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on August 11, 2011. The Amended Complaint, filed on October 17, 2011, includes the following claims as to the Commission: Count I (substantive due process violation), Count II (procedural due process violation), Count III (regulatory taking violation), and Count IV (declaratory judgment that the Commission exceeded its authority)
For the reasons stated below, we answer each of the questions in the affirmative.
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for legal correctness. Patton v. Wells Fargo Financial Md., Inc., 437 Md. 83, 95, 85 A.3d 167, 173 (2014); Heavenly Days Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs., Inc., 433 Md. 558, 568, 72 A.3d 199, 204-05 (2013). As we noted previously,
Shailendra Kumar, P.A. v. Dhanda, 426 Md. 185, 193, 43 A.3d 1029, 1033 (2012) (quoting Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 421 Md. 59, 72, 25 A.3d 200, 207 (2011)).
The intermediate appellate court upheld the Circuit Court's dismissal of Counts I-IV against the Commission on the grounds that Petitioners failed to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement, CJP § 5-304.
At the outset, we emphasize what is not before us in the present case. Petitioners have not argued, before this Court, that they actually complied with the notice requirement of the LGTCA. Moreover, although raised in the Circuit Court below, no issue has been raised by Petitioners as to whether they have substantially complied with the notice requirement of the LGTCA. Instead, this Court is asked to resolve whether Petitioners, in bringing an action against the Commission for alleged violations of the state constitution, were required to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. With respect to whether Petitioners have demonstrated good cause to excuse their failure to comply, we limit our review to whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion in finding that no good cause existed.
A brief overview of the LGTCA itself is appropriate. As this Court previously explained in Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, 291, 587 A.2d 485, 488 (1991):
In order to address these concerns, the LGTCA, among other things, acts to limit the designated local governments'
Where an employee of a local government is sued, the LGTCA affords the employee limited protections. First, the Act provides that "[e]ach local government shall provide for its employees a legal defense in any action that alleged damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed ... within the scope of employment." CJP § 5-302(a). Second, where a plaintiff prevails on his or her claim, the LGTCA provides that "a person may not execute against an employee on a judgment rendered for tortious acts or omission committed ... within the scope of employment [and without malice]." CJP § 5-302(b). Instead, the "local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment[.]" CJP § 5-303(b)(1). If the employee acts with malice, however, "[a]n employee shall be fully liable" and "the local government may seek indemnification for any sums it is required to pay[.]" CJP § 5-302(b). In other words, the employee would be liable for any amount in excess of the local government's liability, which is limited by CJP § 5-303. The effect of the LGTCA is to "provide a remedy for those injured by local government officers and employees, acting without malice in the scope of their employment, while ensuring that the financial burden of compensation is carried by the local government ultimately responsible for the public officials' acts." Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 108, 660 A.2d 447, 466 (1995).
With respect to only these protections, the LGTCA makes clear that "[a] local government may not assert governmental or sovereign immunity to avoid the duty to defend or indemnify an employee[.]" CJP § 5-303(b)(2). Apart from this limited waiver of immunity, the LGTCA does not waive any preexisting immunity against suit held by the local government or its employees. Hansen v. City of Laurel, 420 Md. 670, 679-80 n. 5, 25 A.3d 122, 128 n. 5 (2011) ("First, the LGTCA does not waive the limited immunity enjoyed by local governments[.]... Second, the LGTCA does not waive any immunity enjoyed by `public officials' and other similar representatives of local government against potential tort claimants.").
Under the LGTCA, the liability of the local government is limited and "may not exceed $200,000 per an individual claim, and $500,000 per total claims[.]" CJP § 5-303(a). This cap limits the local government's liability in both a suit brought directly against the governmental entity itself and in a suit brought against the employee, where the governmental entity must provide indemnification. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 684, 4 A.3d 946, 951 (2010) (explaining that "the General Assembly enacted ... an emergency measure `clarifying that the monetary limits on the liability of a local government under the [LGTCA] apply to claims against local governments when named as defendants'"). As part of the limitation on liability, CJP § 5-303(c)(1) notes that "[a] local government may not be liable for punitive damages."
Finally, the LGTCA provides the procedural prerequisites to bringing a cause of action against a local government or its employees. The LGTCA's notice requirement provides, in part, that "an action for unliquidated damages may not be brought against a local government or
We note that the enactment of the LGTCA did not serve to create a cause of action against the local governments or their employees. Put simply, "[t]he only actions which can be brought directly against a local government are those authorized by law
In this case, the Circuit Court, as well as the Court of Special Appeals, concluded that the notice requirement of the LGTCA must be satisfied in order to bring a state constitutional claim for unliquidated damages
Under CJP § 5-304, a plaintiff is required to send notice to the local government within 180 days of an injury as a condition precedent to bringing an action for unliquidated damages. "It is a longstanding principle of Maryland jurisprudence that the LGTCA notice provision is a condition precedent to maintaining an action directly against a local government or its employees." Hansen, 420 Md. at 682, 25 A.3d at 130. See also Prince George's Cnty. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 467, 19 A.3d 859, 869 (2011); Rios v. Montgomery Cnty., 386 Md. 104, 127, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005); Mitchell v. Housing Auth., 200 Md.App. 176, 191, 26 A.3d 1012, 1021 (2011). As we have previously stated, the purpose of the notice requirement is "to apprise a local government of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation, i.e., while the evidence was still fresh and the recollection of the witnesses was undiminished by time, sufficient to ascertain the character and extent of the injury and its responsibility in connection with it." Longtin, 419 Md. at 466, 19 A.3d at 869 (citation omitted). See also Maynard, 359 Md. at 389-90, 754 A.2d at 385 (quoting Bartens v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 293 Md. 620, 626, 446 A.2d 1136, 1138-39 (1982)) (explaining that the purpose of the notice requirement of the predecessor to the LGTCA was "to protect the municipalities and counties of the State from meretricious claimants and exaggerated claims by providing a mechanism whereby the municipality or county would be apprised of its possible liability at a time when it could conduct its own investigation").
Nothing in the statute's language or its legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended to exclude any category
We most recently upheld the application of the notice requirement to state constitutional claims in Dehn Motor Sales, LLC v. Schultz, 439 Md. 460, 96 A.3d 221 (2014). In Dehn Motor Sales, the plaintiff, Dehn, filed claims against two police officers of the Baltimore City Police Department, among others, alleging state constitutional violations arising out of the towing of vehicles from Dehn's property. 439 Md. at 468-69, 96 A.3d at 226-27. After the completion of discovery, the officers moved for summary judgment arguing, in part, that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement of the LGTCA. Dehn Motor Sales, 439 Md. at 472, 96 A.3d at 228. The trial court granted the officers' motion "conclud[ing] that the State constitutional claims were barred by the [LGTCA]." Dehn Motor Sales, 439 Md. at 475, 96 A.3d at 230. On appeal, this Court was asked to consider whether the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirement. By affirming the trial court's determination that the plaintiff had not demonstrated substantial compliance, this Court implicitly concluded that the notice requirement was properly applied to the plaintiff's state constitutional claims. Dehn Motor Sales, 439 Md. at 487, 96 A.3d at 238. Having found no indication in the plain language of the statute or in our caselaw that the notice requirement is inapplicable to actions alleging violations of the state constitution, we decline to restrict the statute in the manner suggested by Petitioners.
The Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse their failure to comply timely and fully with the notice requirement. As discussed above, an action may proceed despite a failure to comply strictly with the LGTCA
Where a plaintiff fails to comply with the notice requirement, it is the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate "good cause." If the local government defendant is unable to "affirmatively show that its defense has been prejudiced by lack of required notice ... the court may entertain the suit even though the required notice was not given." CJP § 5-304. As we explained in Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 271, 761 A.2d 56, 63 (2000), "[t]he test for whether good cause exists ... is `whether the claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.'" (citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]his `good cause' exception leaves the courts some discretion in enforcing the notice requirement, and allows a court, in certain circumstances, to avoid an unjust result." Longtin, 419 Md. at 467, 19 A.3d at 869-70. Cognizant of this discretionary authority, we confine our review to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in making its good cause determination. Woodland, 438 Md. at 434-35, 92 A.3d at 390.
After conducting a hearing, the Circuit Court concluded as a matter of law that Petitioners failed to present any evidence establishing good cause. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Special Appeals. In affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, the intermediate appellate court "reject[ed] [Petitioners'] contention that they prosecuted their claims with the degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances." Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 107, 75 A.3d at 997. The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that, according to the Amended Complaint, Petitioners took no action between November 2007-the date Petitioners allege they became aware of the Commission's wrongful acts-and June 2008-the date Petitioners sent the first notice letter-apart from apparently contacting the County Executive, who wrote a letter urging the Commission to issue addresses for Farm Road. Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 107-08, 75 A.3d at 997. The intermediate appellate court concluded that "persuading one officeholder to write one letter-and taking no further action [in a seven-month span]-does not amount to the degree of diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would have exercised." Rounds, 214 Md. App. at 108, 75 A.3d at 997. Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals rejected any notion that the delay in sending notice was caused by the Commission's allegedly misleading representations. Id. Petitioners failed to explain how this contributed to a delay after they became aware of the alleged misconduct.
Petitioners challenge the reasoning of the courts below and conclude that they "clearly provided proof of a good cause waiver." In support of their position, Petitioners argue that the Commission has not
On the basis of the record before us, we are unable to conclude that the Circuit Court abused its discretion. Similar to the Court of Special Appeals, we are unable to conclude that the sole act of some unidentified person soliciting the assistance of the County Executive in the span of time between the alleged injury date (November 2007) and the notice dates (June 10, 2008 and July 21, 2008) unequivocally constitutes good cause. Petitioners present no reason for the delay in sending notice after learning of the injury. In other words, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to have concluded that this conduct fails to amount to good cause. Therefore, having found no abuse of discretion, we shall not disturb the trial court's determination.
In Counts V-XI of the Amended Complaint, Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment that they have an easement with respect to Farm Road against all named defendants: the Commission, Brown, MHG, Riggs, the Areys, the Messes, Hill, and Johnson. The Amended Complaint also includes the assertion that not every person owning property adjacent to Farm Road had been joined; however, Petitioners assert that the "other adjacent property owners have agreed not to contest the relief sought herein." The Circuit Court dismissed Counts V-XI without prejudice for failure to join necessary parties.
The Court of Special Appeals offered three reasons for its conclusion: (1) Petitioners failed to name the other interested property owners; (2) Petitioners failed to specify the number of other property owners; and (3) Petitioners attempted to waive the presence of other property owners by alleging that they would not contest the relief sought, which Petitioners cannot themselves do. Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 111-12, 75 A.3d at 999-1000 (quoting LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Reeves, 173 Md.App. 392, 402, 919 A.2d 738, 744 (2007)) ("The failure to join a necessary party constitutes a defect in the proceedings that cannot be waived by the parties."). The intermediate appellate court also rejected Petitioners' argument that the court should merely accept their allegation that others "agreed not to contest the relief sought" to mean that they knew about the lawsuit and specifically declined to participate, which would satisfy an exception to compulsory joinder that we announced in City of Bowie v. MIE Props., Inc., 398 Md. 657, 703-04, 922 A.2d 509, 537 (2007).
Counts V-XI were brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, CJP § 3-405(a), which provides that "[i]f declaratory relief is sought, a person who has or claims any interest which would be affected by the declaration, shall be made a party." Md. Rule 2-211 further provides that:
We have long held that the "general rule [is] that ordinarily, in an action for a declaratory judgment, all persons interested in the declaration are necessary parties." Williams v. Moore, 215 Md. 181, 185, 137 A.2d 193, 196 (1957). Similar to this case, Williams involved a declaratory judgment action regarding an easement. In that case, at least two other property owners had an interest in the purported easement, because their properties abutted the easement, but were not named in the suit. This Court held that without all adjacent property owners (who could be affected by the declaratory judgment regarding the easement), the case had to be dismissed. Williams, 215 Md. at 186, 137 A.2d at 197. In other words, the failure to join necessary parties was "fatal." Id.
We have recognized an exception to the joinder requirement, relevant here. "`[P]ersons who are directly interested in a suit, and have knowledge of its pendency, and refuse or neglect to appear and avail themselves of their rights, are concluded by the proceedings as effectually as if they were named in the record.'" MIE Properties, Inc., 398 Md. at 703, 922 A.2d at 537 (quoting Bodnar v. Brinsfield, 60 Md.App. 524, 532, 483 A.2d 1290, 1295 (1984)). In MIE Properties, we stated further that "we identify as the controlling principles the non-joined party's knowledge of the litigation affecting its interest and its ability to join that litigation, but failure to do so." 398 Md. at 704, 922 A.2d at 537 (emphasis in original). Therefore, to excuse non-joinder of necessary parties, Petitioners must demonstrate, without resorting to self-serving hearsay declarations, that (1) the non-joined party clearly had knowledge of the pending litigation, and (2) the non-joined party must have purposefully declined to join the litigation, despite the party's ability to join. Petitioners in this case have not demonstrated sufficient facts to excuse the participation of the "other adjacent property owners."
Petitioners would have us conclude that their statement in the Amended Complaint, that "other adjacent property owners have agreed not to contest the relief sought herein," is sufficient to demonstrate that the "other adjacent property owners" had express knowledge of the litigation as well as the ability to join the suit and failure to do so. We decline to do so. Petitioners' conclusory statement implying knowledge of all interested landowners is grossly insufficient. As stated by COSA, "[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss, although a court assumes the truth of a complaint's factual allegations, the court (1) does not consider `bald assertions [or] conclusory statements[,]' Forster [v. State], 426 Md. [565,] 604, 45 A.3d 180[, 203 (2012)] (citation omitted); and (2) construes against the plaintiff `[a]ny ... uncertainty in the [complaint's factual] allegations[.]' Shenker [v. Laureate Educ., Inc.], 411 Md. [317,] 335, 983 A.2d 408[, 418 (2009)]." Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 111-12, 75 A.3d at 1000. Moreover, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals's view that Petitioners failed to provide names or even the number of additional landowners who would be potentially affected by a declaratory judgment regarding an easement over Farm Road. In this case, Petitioners clearly failed to establish that the non-joined parties met the MIE
Petitioners assert Counts XII ("wrongful interference with easement rights") and XIII ("slander of title") of their Amended Complaint against the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown, and the Areys. On Respondents' motions, the Circuit Court dismissed Counts XII and XIII, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that judgment, on the grounds that the causes of action were time-barred pursuant to CJP § 5-101 ("A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.") and CJP § 5-105 ("An action for assault, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues."), respectively. For the reasons we shall explain further in this opinion, we affirm, but for different reasons, the Court of Special Appeals's conclusion that dismissal was proper as to Count XII. We shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals's judgment as to Count XIII, however, and conclude that dismissal of that count was premature at this stage of the litigation.
Petitioners' Count XII alleges "wrongful interference with easement rights" against the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown, and the Areys. Petitioners specifically allege that they "have and enjoy an easement with respect to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way[, and that Respondents] intentionally and purposefully obstructed [Petitioners'] easement and interfered with their reasonable enjoyment of their easement rights." It is undisputed that Brown and the Areys owned and developed properties to the north of Petitioners' properties, and that at some point during the development of the Dellabrooke subdivisions, "northern access" to Farm Road was eliminated. Accordingly, we can deduce that Count XII arises out of the elimination of Petitioners' alleged easement on the northern side of Petitioners' properties.
Count XIII alleges "slander of title" against the Commission, MHG, Riggs, Brown, and the Areys. In Count XIII, Petitioners allege that "[Respondents] deliberately ignored public records referring to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way, and intentionally omitted references to Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way in creating development documents and submitting those documents to the Commission[,]" which were subsequently improperly approved by the Commission. By submitting false documents, Petitioners allege, Respondents "falsely stated and/or agreed to the intentional false publication of, or knowingly facilitated the false publication of, the title history of the land for the area covering Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way." In addition, Petitioners allege that, by knowingly approving the false documents, the Commission "falsely stated the title history of the land for the area covering Farm Road and the 10 Foot Right-of-Way and, in doing so, maliciously published false words." Thus, like Count XII, Count XIII arises out of the activities surrounding the development and elimination of the alleged easement to the north of Petitioners' properties.
In their preliminary motions to dismiss pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322, Respondents contend that Counts XII and XIII should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds, because, where Petitioners admitted that "access to Goldmine Road was
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that Petitioners had at least "inquiry notice" of their claims by 2003 at the latest, and, therefore, the June 2008 filing in federal court was untimely. Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 115-17, 75 A.3d at 1002-03. Noting that Petitioners "[did] not allege the date on which Brown allegedly `eliminated the northern access to Farm Road,'" the court determined that "the Amended Complaint implies that Brown's alleged elimination of northern access to Farm Road occurred sometime in or before 2003." Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 115, 75 A.3d at 1002. Based on that determination, the court therefore "assume[d] that Brown's alleged elimination of northern access to Farm Road occurred sometime in or before 2003 (when the Areys allegedly bought the 69 acres)." Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 116, 75 A.3d at 1002.
In conducting its statute of limitations analysis, the Court of Special Appeals relied in part on its prior opinion in Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md.App. 606, 40 A.3d 435 (2012), which involved the same original property and basic facts regarding the development of Dellabrooke and the alleged elimination of Farm Road. In that case, Bacon, the appellant landowner, brought suit on June 9, 2006 against the Commission, the development group, and other property owners asserting his entitlement to an easement over Farm Road, which he alleged ran across property he purchased on October 1, 2002. Bacon, 203 Md.App. at 618, 40 A.3d at 442-43. Bacon "alleged that Farm Road's access to Gold Mine Road `was permanently cut' in 1994, with the initial approval of Brown's subdivisions, and that northward access of Farm Road to Gold Mine Road was prohibited, in 2001, with approval of the Dellabrooke subdivisions and the `recordation of Plat 21707.'" Bacon, 203 Md.App. at 619, 40 A.3d at 443. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissed Bacon's claims, in part, as time-barred. The Court of Special Appeals held that, based on the above allegations, Bacon "had knowledge of facts sufficient to constitute, at least, inquiry notice" and that by making such allegations, Bacon "acknowledged that he `reasonably should have known' or with diligent investigation could have known at the time he purchased the property that he could not use Farm Road to access Gold Mine Road." Bacon, 203 Md.App. at 660-61, 40 A.3d at 468. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that his claim accrued when he took title to the property on October 1, 2002. Bacon, 203 Md.App. at 663, 40 A.3d at 469.
As in Bacon, the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case concluded that the alleged elimination of Farm Road provided Petitioners with "inquiry notice that their ability to access Farm road was in danger." Rounds, 214 Md.App. at 116, 75 A.3d at 1002. In the alternative, the court concluded that Petitioners were placed on inquiry notice when the Commission approved Plat 21707 on August 3, 2000.
Petitioners ultimately rely on the discovery rule to contend that they did not discover, and had no reason to know of, their injury until the denial of addresses by the Commission in November 2007. Specifically, Petitioners insist that it was not until the Commission denied their request for addresses that "it came to light that [Respondents], working together, effectively erased Farm Road and its ten-foot right-of-way from the books, providing the Commission with an unfounded justification to deny [Petitioners] residential addresses." In other words, Petitioners maintain that their claims accrued in November 2007. Respondents argue that Petitioners had at least inquiry notice, if not actual notice, of any possible claim by 2003 at the latest, based not on chain-of-title notice but "by virtue of the open development of Dellabrooke since 1994" and the undisputed elimination of northern access to Farm Road. Respondents MHG and Riggs note that the Court of Special Appeals in Bacon looked at the "totality of the facts, including the development of Dellabrooke, undisputed obstruction of the road, recording of the initial plat in 1994 and the recording of Record Plat 21707 [in] 2001." Like in Bacon, Respondents contend, all of those facts as alleged by Petitioners in this case, when taken together, demonstrate sufficient notice that any right to use Farm Road was being challenged at some point prior to 2003.
For any statute of limitations analysis, the operative date is the date that a claim accrues. Generally, a claim accrues when the plaintiff suffers the actionable harm. The "discovery rule" is an exception to this general rule, and operates to "toll[] the accrual date of the action until such time as the potential plaintiff either discovers his or her injury, or should have discovered it through the exercise of due diligence." Poole v. Coakley & Williams Const., Inc., 423 Md. 91, 131, 31 A.3d 212, 236 (2011) (quotation omitted). Simply put, the discovery rule provides that a "cause of action accrues when the claimant in fact knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong." Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981) (holding the discovery rule to be generally applicable). For purposes of the discovery rule, depending on the circumstances, "inquiry notice" is sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. "[I]nquiry notice `means having knowledge of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiffs to undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge of the alleged [cause of action].'" Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Halle
In this case, Respondents raised the statute of limitations defense in a preliminary motion to dismiss pursuant to Md. Rule 2-322. It is well settled that "a motion to dismiss ordinarily should not be granted by a trial court based on the assertion that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations unless it is clear from the facts and allegations on the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run." Litz v. Maryland Dep't of the Environment, 434 Md. 623, 641, 76 A.3d 1076, 1086 (2013). See also Antigua Condo. Ass'n v. Melba Investors Atl., Inc., 307 Md. 700, 711 n. 5, 517 A.2d 75, 80 n. 5 (1986) (noting that "if correct, the defense of limitations clearly appeared from the face of the complaint and the defense could properly be raised by a motion to dismiss under Md. Rule 2-322(b)."); Desser v. Woods, 266 Md. 696, 703, 296 A.2d 586, 591 (1972) ("It is well settled that the defenses of the bar of the statute of limitations and of laches may only be availed of by demurrer to a bill of complaint when they appear on the face of the bill of complaint, itself, and other matters not so appearing cannot be considered in determining whether or not these defenses are a bar to the alleged cause of action."). Accordingly, our review is limited "to the universe of the facts and allegations contained in [the Amended Complaint]" and all reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable to Petitioners. Litz, 434 Md. at 642, 76 A.3d at 1087.
The allegations relevant to Counts XII and XIII contained in Petitioners' Amended Complaint read as follows:
Absent from these factual allegations is the date on which Petitioners became aware of the elimination of northern access to Farm Road.
"We have held consistently that `the question of accrual in § 5-101 is left to judicial determination,' unless the determination rests on the resolution of disputed facts regarding discovery of the wrong." Poole, 423 Md. at 131, 31 A.3d at 236 (quoting Frederick Rd. Ltd. P'ship v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 95, 756 A.2d 963, 973 (2000)). Accordingly, where it is unclear from the facts and allegations on the face of the Amended Complaint what Petitioners knew and when they knew it, the question of accrual rests on a determination of fact. This is a question appropriate for the fact finder, not the appellate court. See Litz, 434 Md. at 641, 76 A.3d at 1086 ("When it is necessary to make a factual determination to identify the date of accrual, however, those factual determinations are generally made by the trier of fact, and not decided by the court as a matter of law."). Based on our review of the Amended Complaint, we conclude that Petitioners alleged facts sufficient to survive a preliminary motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. Therefore, dismissal was premature.
The Circuit Court also concluded that, even if the date of accrual was not until November 2007, Count XII ("wrongful elimination of easement rights") was time-barred in any event because Count XII was not included in the initial federal court case. Rather, Count XII was first made a part of the state court complaint filed in 2011, more than three years after the latest possible accrual date. The Circuit Court declined to accept Petitioners' argument that Count XII would relate back to the initial filing in federal court because, although it was a different legal theory, it arose out of the same facts. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not address this question, because it held that both claims were time-barred based on the date of accrual, when the trial court gives an alternate ground for a conclusion, it is reasonable for the appellate court to review it for legal correctness. See Bailiff v. Woolman, 169 Md.App. 646, 653, 906 A.2d 409, 414 (2006) ("We still must satisfy ourselves ... that the alternative holding is indeed the one that ... would legally constitute a freestanding basis in support of the trial court's decision.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we shall provide guidance on this point in anticipation of remand.
The Circuit Court concluded that "since [Petitioners] did not specifically assert a claim for wrongful interference in the federal district court case, the statute of limitations will not date back to or be tolled from the filing of the district court case." This conclusion was based on the Circuit Court's interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ("supplemental jurisdiction"). We have explained:
The Circuit Court in this case concluded that "`[a]sserted' under § 1367(d) is not read broadly to include state law claims not expressly asserted in the federal complaint, despite the fact that the state complaint may contain the same facts." At least one other state court has agreed with this conclusion. In Rester v. McWane, Inc., 962 So.2d 183 (Ala.2007), cited by the Circuit Court in this case, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that "[u]nder 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations for state-law claims is tolled only when a party seeks to refile in the state court the same state-law claims the party asserted in the federal court." 962 So.2d at 186. United States District Courts have held similarly. See In re Vertrue Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.Supp.2d 703, 721 (N.D.Ohio 2010) aff'd sub nom. In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474 (6th Cir.2013) ("[O]nly those state law claims actually asserted in [the federal case] are subject to statutory tolling [under § 1367(d).]").
Petitioners rely on a Kansas appellate court case in support of their position. Specifically, they point to where the Kansas Court of Appeals stated that where "[p]laintiffs filed their petition ... within the 30-day window created by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) ... any theories of state law liability fairly within the notice provided to Brown County in the federal complaint should be treated as timely for limitations purposes." Estate of Belden v. Brown Cnty., 46 Kan.App.2d 247, 261 P.3d 943, 975 (2011). The Kansas case is inapposite, however. The plaintiffs in Belden first filed suit in federal court alleging both constitutional and state-law claims against Brown County, through its board of commissioners, individual commissioners, the county sheriff, and several jail employees, resulting from the death of Belden while he was incarcerated in a county jail. Id. at 950. Following dismissal by the federal court, the plaintiffs refiled their state-law claims in a new case in state court within the 30 day time period provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Id. at 975. In the state court, the county argued that it could not be held vicariously liable based on the statute of limitations, because the "[p]laintiffs did not include a specific assertion of vicarious liability in their federal court complaint." Id. at 974. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the county "fail[ed] on its statute of limitations argument because [p]laintiffs' federal complaint provided sufficient notice to the [c]ounty that it faced vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of various Sheriff's Department employees." Id. at 975. The court specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a vicarious liability theory would "relate back" to the filing of the federal case. Id. at 974. Thus, the court's conclusion rested on the fact that the plaintiffs had adequately asserted claims for liability against the county as an employer, even though in the original federal complaint the plaintiffs had not used the words "respondeat superior" or "vicarious liability." Id. at 974-75.
Unlike the Kansas case, where the plaintiffs simply refined their state law claims, the Petitioners in this case asserted an entirely new cause of action for wrongful
As an alternate ground for dismissing Counts XII and XIII against MHG and Riggs, the Circuit Court concluded that MHG and Riggs owed no duty of care to Petitioners and therefore could not be liable to Petitioners for their wrongful interference with easement rights or slander of title claims. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not address this issue, because it affirmed dismissal of Counts XII and XIII on other grounds, as we stated above, we shall review the alternate ground for the trial court's decision to provide guidance in anticipation of remand. As we have affirmed the dismissal of Count XII on the basis of limitations, we shall focus solely on Count XIII ("slander of title").
In reaching its decision, the Circuit Court relied on Carlotta v. T.R. Stark & Assocs., Inc., 57 Md.App. 467, 470 A.2d 838 (1984). In Carlotta, the plaintiffs brought suit against adjacent landowners for continuing trespass, and against the adjacent landowners' surveyor for aiding and abetting the landowners "by negligently preparing an erroneous survey plat of the disputed property boundary." 57 Md.App. at 469, 470 A.2d at 838. The trial court sustained the surveyor's demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. Carlotta, 57 Md.App. at 469, 470 A.2d at 838-39. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that "a surveyor of a disputed boundary line does not owe a duty of care to a non-reliant third party adjacent landowner." Carlotta, 57 Md.App. at 472, 470 A.2d at 840.
Carlotta is inapposite to the instant case, however, because it involved a claim sounding in negligence, in which the plaintiff was required to prove the predicate duty of care. See also Bacon v. Arey, 203 Md.App. 606, 664, 40 A.3d 435, 470 (2012) (quoting Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407, 414, 879 A.2d 1088, 1092 (2005)) ("There can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one person owes to another."). Conversely, in this case, Petitioners' Count XIII alleges an action for intentional slander of title. Petitioners have alleged no duty of care or any breach thereof on the part of Respondents, and there is no contention by Respondents that duty of care or breach thereof is an element of a claim for slander of title.
As we have stated, our review at the motion to dismiss stage is limited to whether Petitioners pled sufficient facts to support a claim. To support a claim for slander of title, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show (1) a false statement, (2) that the false statement was communicated to someone else (publication), (3) malice, and (4) special damages. See Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 607-09, 291 A.2d 37, 49 (1972) (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed.1971)). See also Rite Aid Corp. v. Lake Shore Investors, 298 Md. 611, 625, 471 A.2d 735, 742 (1984) ("Special damages are those which result in a pecuniary
As in the present case, where a local government has been sued for violations of citizens' constitutional rights, under Maryland common law "there is ordinarily no local government immunity." Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 102, 660 A.2d 447, 463 (1995) (citations omitted) and cases cited therein. As we explained in DiPino, "sitting atop [the principles of immunity] is [the] LGTCA." 354 Md. at 49, 729 A.2d at 370. As discussed infra, where a plaintiff maintains an action against a local government or its employees (i.e. where the local government has no immunity), the LGTCA affects the allocation of financial liability between the local government and its employees.
We note that, although Petitioners title Count III as a "Regulatory Taking" the allegations under Count III contain a prayer for "compensatory, statutory, and punitive" relief. Therefore, this allegation is subject to the LGTCA because Count III seeks unliquidated damages for the alleged wrongful conduct of the Commission and sounds in tort. To the extent Count III could be based upon a theory of inverse condemnation, we do not wish to give the impression that a taking in the constitutional sense would implicate the provisions of the LGTCA. Indeed, we recognize that applying the LGTCA to a constitutionally based taking could conflict with a vested right to just compensation (i.e. where the value of plaintiff's property exceeded the cap on the local government's liability). This issue, however, is not before us. We are asked to consider whether Petitioners, in bringing a cause of action for alleged government violations of the constitution seeking unliquidated damages, were required to comply with the notice requirement of the LGTCA.
