NAJAM, Judge.

Statement of the Case

Following this court's reversal of Bruce Ryan's convictions on direct appeal but before this court's opinion was certified as final, Ryan petitioned the trial court for an appeal bond. The court granted Ryan's petition but placed him under numerous restrictions, which were supervised by the local community corrections program. The Indiana Supreme Court then reversed this court's decision and reinstated Ryan's convictions. See Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 673 (Ind. 2014) ("Ryan I"). Ryan spent a total of 429 days under the conditions of his appeal bond, and he never violated any of those conditions. As such, following the reinstatement of his convictions, Ryan moved the trial court for an award of credit time1 for the time he had served under the conditions of the bond.

Ryan now appeals the trial court's denial of that request, and he and the State present numerous arguments for our review. We hold, as a matter of first impression, that credit time for a defendant's release on an appeal bond is prohibited under Indiana law. We also hold that, insofar as his arguments require this court to review the conditions of his release on his appeal bond, Ryan's arguments are moot. Indiana Appellate Rule 18 provided Ryan with a clear and immediate opportunity to have the court on appeal review the conditions of his release when they were imposed, but Ryan did not exercise that option. He may not now ask this court to review the conditions of his release under the guise of a request for credit time. Thus, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

Following a two-day trial, on August 14, 2012, a jury found Ryan guilty of two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, both as Class C felonies. On October 24, 2012, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"), with two years executed and three years suspended to probation. Ryan filed a direct appeal and, in an opinion issued on July 31, 2013, this court reversed his convictions, holding that several statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument constituted misconduct. Consequently, we remanded for a new trial.

Five days later, Ryan petitioned the trial court to set an appeal bond "to stay execution of his remaining sentence, stay probation[,] and stay the requirement that [he] register as a sex offender." Appellant's App. at 26. Ryan explained that he sought an appeal bond because "the length of time until [the] opinion [of the court of appeals] is certified may be quite long," and he would "suffer a[n] irreparable harm by being required to continue to serve time in the [DOC], by being required to register for sex offender probation[,] and by being required to register on the sex offender registry." Id. at 28, 30.

The trial court held a hearing on Ryan's petition on September 12, 2013, which was about five weeks before Ryan was due to be released from his executed term in the DOC. Near the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Ryan presented "a low risk of flight" and "a low risk of dangerousness to the community." Tr. at 17. As such, the court granted Ryan's petition and "set a new bond of $5,000.00 surety." Id. The court stated that it would "stay probation" upon Ryan's release. Id.

Immediately following the court's statements, the State asked whether the court would consider GPS monitoring as a condition of Ryan's release. The court agreed and ordered Ryan to be placed on GPS monitoring through Marion County Community Corrections ("MCCC"). Ryan objected in light of the court's finding that he was not a flight risk. The court overruled Ryan's objection, stating that "the alleged victim is a child and this will probably come as quite a shock to them [sic] if it hasn't already." Id. at 18. The court then ordered Ryan "to comply with all rules, regulations, procedures and/or treatment recommendations, [and] pay all fees" pursuant to his placement with the MCCC. Appellant's App. at 10.

Thereafter, Ryan posted his bond and, on September 18, reported to the MCCC to obtain his GPS monitoring device. At that time, the MCCC required Ryan to sign an "Electronic Monitoring Contract" that imposed the following relevant "Conditions of Electric [sic] Monitoring":

Id. at 43-45.2 The MCCC also required Ryan to sign a separate "GPS Program" document, which imposed additional, GPS-specific conditions, such as how to wear the device, charge the device, and understand the device's signals. Id. at 46-47. Ryan acknowledged that the violation of any of the conditions of his release could result in his reimprisonment.

Two weeks after being released, on October 2 Ryan moved the trial court to terminate one of the conditions of his release, namely, the condition that he submit to random drug and alcohol testing. Ryan argued that this condition was unrelated to assuring either his presence at trial or the safety of another. The trial court agreed and, two days later, it ordered the MCCC to remove this condition of Ryan's release. Ryan did not make a similar request for any of the other conditions of his release.

Meanwhile, the Indiana Supreme Court granted the State's petition for transfer of jurisdiction over this court's opinion in Ryan's direct appeal. Thereafter, the court concluded that the prosecutor's statements were not misconduct, and the court reinstated Ryan's convictions. Ryan I, 9 N.E.3d at 673. Ryan sought rehearing, which the court denied on August 26, 2014.

About six weeks later, on October 7, 2014, the Marion County Probation Department ("MCPD") began supervising Ryan along with the MCCC. See Appellant's App. at 120; Tr. at 26-27. Despite the MCPD's involvement, the conditions of Ryan's release did not change at this time. On October 20, the MCPD informed Ryan that he was "not to receive [c]redit" time for the time he had been supervised by the MCCC. Appellant's App. at 12.

Ryan moved the trial court to terminate his placement with the MCCC and award him credit time for the time he had spent with the MCCC under the conditions of his appeal bond.3 The court held a hearing on Ryan's motion on November 21. At that hearing, the State acknowledged that "[Ryan is] being monitored by two different entities . . . and it seems rather duplicative at this point." Tr. at 27.

At the conclusion of the November 21 hearing, the court ordered Ryan to be removed from his placement with the MCCC and to begin serving his originally ordered probation with the MCPD.4 At this time, Ryan registered as a sex offender and began "sex offender treatment." Id. at 39. The court held a separate hearing in December on Ryan's request for credit time. At that hearing, the State argued that Ryan's release on his appeal bond was analogous to a defendant's release on pretrial bail.5 The trial court agreed, stating:

Id. at 40. The court then entered judgment on Ryan's motion, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Ryan appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for credit time for the time he served with the MCCC under the conditions of his release on his appeal bond. Trial courts are authorized to issue appeal bonds under Indiana Code Chapter 35-33-9. At the time of Ryan's petition for an appeal bond, Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-1 provided6 that "[a] person convicted of an offense who has appealed . . . may file a petition to be admitted to bail pending appeal." Upon granting such a petition, Section 35-33-9-4(a) requires the trial court to "fix bail in a reasonable amount, considering the nature of the offense and the penalty adjudged, as will insure compliance by the defendant with the terms of the bond" and to "make an order containing the terms of bail." And Section 35-33-9-3(a) requires the defendant to promise to:

Finally, Section 35-33-9-5(c) states:

(Emphasis added.)

As our supreme court has recognized: "Neither the United States Constitution nor the Indiana Constitution confers a constitutional right to bond pending appeal." Tyson v. State, 593 N.E.2d 175, 177 (Ind.1992). Rather, "the right to bail pending appeal is . . . a matter of legislative grace." Willis v. State, 492 N.E.2d 45, 46 (Ind.Ct.App.1986). As such, "the authority of the courts to grant such bail is limited to the authority granted by statute." Id. And Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-1 plainly grants to the trial court the discretion necessary to consider a defendant's petition for bail on appeal. Id. at 47.

But bail on appeal is also provided for under Indiana Appellate Rule 18. In relevant part, that Rule states:

Ind. Appellate Rule 18. As our supreme court has explained:

Tyson, 593 N.E.2d at 177-78 (emphasis and footnote omitted).

The essence of Ryan's argument on appeal is that the conditions of his appeal bond were so above-and-beyond those authorized by Indiana Code Chapter 35-33-9 that he is entitled to credit time for the time he spent under those conditions.7 But we cannot agree with Ryan's premise that he is entitled to credit time if the conditions of his release are onerous enough. Where the award or denial of credit time is plainly directed by statute, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct.App.2001). "However, those sentencing decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion." Id.

We read Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c) and Appellate Rule 18 to prohibit an award of credit time for the time a defendant is released from custody on an appeal bond. Again, Section 35-33-9-5(c) directs "the judgment of conviction shall be stayed" while a defendant is "released from custody under this chapter." And Appellate Rule 18 likewise provides for a stay from the judgment being appealed. It follows from these mandates to stay the judgment of conviction that the issuing court shall likewise stay—and the defendant shall not earn credit time toward—the defendant's sentence during his release on an appeal bond. Thus, the trial court here had no discretion in denying Ryan's motion for credit time—the court was required to simply apply the mandate of Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c). See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449.

This is not to say that Ryan was without a remedy to be relieved of the potentially unreasonable conditions of his appeal bond. But his remedy was to request immediate review of the trial court's imposition of those conditions. Indeed, within two weeks of his release, Ryan did request the trial court to reconsider the condition that he submit to random drug and alcohol screens, and the trial court agreed to remove that condition. Ryan could have also requested appellate review: the trial court's judgment on the appeal bond was, by way of Appellate Rule 18, immediately reviewable by the court on appeal.

In this respect, Ryan is not unlike a pretrial bailee. Indiana's appellate courts have long recognized that a judgment on pretrial bail is immediately appealable. See, e.g., Bozovichar v. State, 230 Ind. 358, 363, 103 N.E.2d 680, 682 (1952), overruled on other grounds, Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013). And waiting until after the defendant is convicted and sentenced to appeal the judgment on pretrial bail renders any questions regarding the propriety of that judgment moot and, therefore, typically not subject to review. See, e.g., Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259, 274 (Ind.1983).

Similarly, Ryan cannot sit idly by until the conditions of his release expire and then have this court review those conditions through a request for credit time. If Ryan believed the conditions of his release were unreasonable, he could—as he did—ask the trial court to reconsider some or all of those conditions. Or he could have requested this court to review those conditions. App. R. 18. But, upon the revocation of his appeal bond following the certification of our supreme court's opinion in Ryan I, any complaints Ryan had about the trial court's judgment on his appeal bond were rendered moot. See Alleyn v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1095, 1100 (Ind.1981). Thus, it is not proper for Ryan to have endured the conditions of his release and waited until his direct appeal was at an end only then to request credit time based on the conditions of his release. Cf. id. (holding that the relief requested on appeal—a new trial for of an allegedly erroneous appeal-bond judgment—was "not proper for the type of error alleged").

And we have rejected arguments similar to Ryan's in the context of pretrial bail. In particular, we have stated:

Lewis v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind. Ct.App.2009) (emphasis added), trans. denied. Likewise, when Ryan was released from incarceration on his appeal bond and not ordered to register as a sex offender, he accepted conditions that he now asserts to be the same as those generally applying to post-incarceration defendants who receive credit time. But, unlike those defendants, Ryan chose conditional liberty rather than to remain in jail or to register as a sex offender.8

Finally, we are not persuaded by Ryan's argument that the denial of his request for credit time will deter defendants from exercising their statutory right to petition the trial court for an appeal bond. To the contrary, to accept Ryan's argument would only discourage trial courts from exercising their discretion to grant defendants appeal bonds with conditions attached. And because Ryan had multiple avenues of review available to him regarding the conditions of his release, we reject his arguments that a denial of his request for credit time implicates due process or is fundamentally unfair.

In sum, we hold that Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c) and Appellate Rule 18 prohibit an award of credit time for the time a defendant is released on an appeal bond, regardless of the conditions of the defendant's release. Cf. Kindred v. State, 172 Ind.App. 645, 648-49, 362 N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (1977) (holding that the defendant had the right to surrender himself while released on his appeal bond in order to accrue credit time). We also hold that, insofar as Ryan's arguments require this court to review the conditions of his release on his appeal bond, Ryan's challenge is untimely. Ryan could have sought, but chose not to seek, immediate review of the conditions of his release pursuant to Appellate Rule 18. Having forfeited that remedy, Ryan's challenge to the conditions of his release is now moot. Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial of Ryan's motion for credit time.

Affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., and BARNES, J., concur.