CHARLES A. SHAW, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on defendant Abbott Laboratories, Inc.'s ("Abbott") motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The motion is fully briefed and ready for decision. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied.
In this products liability action, plaintiffs Thomas and Beth Forbes and their minor son B.F. ("plaintiffs") assert claims against Abbott arising out of injuries resulting from B.F.'s exposure in utero to the medicine Depakote. Beth Forbes began taking Depakote two years before B.F.'s birth to treat her bipolar disorder. Plaintiffs allege B.F. was diagnosed with spina bifida as a result of his mother's ingestion of Depakote during pregnancy.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Abbott in seven counts, only two of which remain: Strict Liability—Failure to Warn (Count I) and Negligence—Failure to Warn (Count III). In both of these counts, plaintiffs seek an award of punitive damages. Abbott moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages, stating they have failed to present sufficient evidence to support such a claim under Missouri law.
The standards applicable to summary judgment motions are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court shows "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In passing on a motion for summary judgment, this Court is required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and the Court must give the non-moving party the benefit of any inferences that can logically be drawn from those facts.
Beginning in 1999, Beth Forbes began suffering from mental illness, for which she received medical treatment. During a June 2002 hospitalization, she was diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder/manic depression.
In or around April 2003, Beth Forbes came under the care of Dr. Raziya Mallya ("Dr. Mallya"), a psychiatrist, who began treating Mrs. Forbes for her bipolar disorder. Starting in April 2003, Dr. Mallya prescribed Depakote Extended Release ("Depakote") tablets, as well as Geodon and Wellbutrin, for treatment of Mrs. Forbes' bipolar disorder. Dr. Mallya prescribed Depakote as a mood stabilizer.
In January 2005, Mrs. Forbes became pregnant with B.F. She testified that she had been taking Depakote at that time for treatment of her bipolar disorder. Mrs. Forbes stopped taking Depakote after she found out that she was pregnant with B.F.
In September 2005, Beth Forbes gave birth to B.F. B.F. has been diagnosed with spina bifida as well as some other conditions that plaintiffs claim are secondary to spina bifida, namely: hydrocephalus, Chiari type II malformation, club feet deformity, bilateral hip dislocations, tethering of spinal cord (now untethered), sensorineural hearing loss in right ear, and neurogenic bowel and bladder leading to incontinence of feces and urine. Plaintiffs claim all of B.F.'s physical limitations stem from and are attributable to B.F.'s spina bifida.
At all relevant times when Mrs. Forbes was taking Depakote from 2003 to 2005, Depakote's label included specific warnings regarding the risk of spina bifida due to in utero exposure. The Depakote prescribing information (often referred to as "the label") included a block box warning in all caps that warned of the risks of neural tube defects. The black box provided:
(Abbott SOF ¶ 15.)
A ten-paragraph warning in the "Usage in Pregnancy" subsection of the 2003 and 2004 Depakote labels provided in relevant part:
(Abbott SOF ¶¶ 16-17.)
In its motion, Abbott seeks summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages, stating that the claim fails as a matter of law because the Depakote labeling has always contained safety information about the risks of spina bifida, the precise injury suffered by B.F. Plaintiffs respond that they are entitled to punitive damages because they have presented substantial evidence that demonstrates Abbott acted with conscious disregard and reckless indifference for the safety of B.F.
Under Missouri law the test for punitive damages is a strict one.
Abbott argues that at the time Mrs. Forbes was prescribed Depakote, the label included a FDA-mandated black box warning regarding teratogenicity, and specifically warned of the risk of spina bifida, the very injury suffered by B.F. Because Abbott warned of the known risks and of the harm suffered by plaintiff, it argues that it cannot be found to have acted outrageously due to evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have presented evidence, however, that Abbott knew as early as the 1980s that (1) there was a cause and effect relationship between Depakote and serious birth defects; (2) if used in women of childbearing age, Depakote should only be used with effective contraception; (3) the risk of spina bifida in children exposed to Depakote in utero is a 10 to 20 fold increase over the background rate; and (4) Depakote can produce multiple congenital malformations in the same child. Plaintiffs submit evidence that Abbott strategically diluted Depakote's warning and disseminated misleading information regarding the risks posed by Depakote. Plaintiffs also submit evidence that Abbot's failure to warn of the full extent of Depakote's teratogenic danger was profit-driven. Plaintiffs' evidence of Abbott's alleged dilution of Depakote's warning and its dissemination of misleading information associated with Depakote use during pregnancy creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Abbott's actions rose to a level of culpable behavior.
Abbott's contention that it could not be subject to punitive damages because the FDA expressly approved the marketing and labeling of Depakote is not dispositive. In
Here, the fact that the FDA approved the marketing of Depakote and allowed for it to be prescribed to women of child-bearing age for treatment of bipolar disorder weighs against the submission of the punitive damages claim to the jury, but it does not foreclose it.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it remains a disputed issue whether Abbott knew or had reason to know that there was a high degree of probability that its conduct would result in injury. The Court will deny Abbott's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages.
For the foregoing reasons, Abbott has not established a right to summary judgment with respect to the issue of punitive damages.
Accordingly,