Filed: Dec. 01, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 09-0897-ag Pranata v. Holder BIA A 096 266 278 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDE
Summary: 09-0897-ag Pranata v. Holder BIA A 096 266 278 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1 AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDER..
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09-0897-ag
Pranata v. Holder
BIA
A 096 266 278
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMARY ORDERS
FILED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1
AND FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1. IN A BRIEF OR OTHER PAPER IN WHICH A
LITIGANT CITES A SUMMARY ORDER, IN EACH PARAGRAPH IN WHICH A CITATION APPEARS, AT LEAST
ONE CITATION MUST EITHER BE TO THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE NOTATION:
“(SUMMARY ORDER).” A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF THAT SUMMARY ORDER
TOGETHER WITH THE PAPER IN WHICH THE SUMMARY ORDER IS CITED ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL UNLESS THE SUMMARY ORDER IS AVAILABLE IN AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE WHICH IS
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PAYMENT OF FEE (SUCH AS THE DATABASE AVAILABLE AT
HTTP://WWW.CA2.USCOURTS.GOV/). IF NO COPY IS SERVED BY REASON OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
ORDER ON SUCH A DATABASE, THE CITATION MUST INCLUDE REFERENCE TO THAT DATABASE AND THE
DOCKET NUMBER OF THE CASE IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS ENTERED.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 1 st day of December, two thousand nine.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 KINTORO PRANATA,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 09-0897-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: H. Raymond Fasano, New York, New
24 York.
1 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
2 General; John S. Hogan, Senior
3 Litigation Counsel; Achiezer
4 Guggenheim, Trial Attorney, Office
5 of Immigration Litigation, United
6 States Department of Justice,
7 Washington, D.C.
8
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
11 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
12 is DENIED.
13 Petitioner Kintoro Pranata, a native and citizen of
14 Indonesia, seeks review of the February 5, 2009 order of the
15 BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Kintoro Pranata,
16 No. A 096 266 278 (B.I.A. Feb. 5, 2009). We assume the
17 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
18 procedural history of the case.
19 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
20 abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s
21 admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v.
22 Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v.
23 Doherty,
502 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1992)). We find that the BIA
24 did not abuse its discretion in denying Pranata’s motion to
25 reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, it had issued a final
26 order of removal in May 2005, but Pranata did not file his
2
1 motion until September 2008, well beyond the 90-day
2 deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time
3 limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed
4 circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in
5 the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such
6 evidence is material and was not available and could not
7 have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”
8 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA
9 properly found that Pranata’s motion did not qualify for
10 such an exception, and that he did not otherwise demonstrate
11 his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu,
12 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).
13 Pranata argues that our decision in Mufied v. Mukasey,
14
508 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), requires the BIA to articulate
15 precise legal standards for analyzing whether a petitioner
16 has established a pattern or practice of persecution in his
17 or her home country. As a preliminary matter, Pranata’s
18 reliance on Mufied does not excuse his late filing, as the
19 regulations do not provide that an untimely motion to reopen
20 may be excused on these grounds. 8 C.F.R.
21 § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Furthermore, in Mufied, we remanded
22 because neither the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) nor the BIA
3
1 considered Mufied’s pattern or practice claim. Mufied, 508
2 F.3d at 91. Here, on the other hand, the BIA directly
3 addressed the claim, finding that Pranata failed to
4 establish materially changed country conditions “with
5 respect to this issue of a pattern or practice of
6 persecution of Christians of Chinese ethnicity or any other
7 ethnicity in Indonesia.” Accordingly, remand under Mufied is
8 not required here.
9 Pranata also argues that the BIA did not adequately
10 consider his evidence of materially changed country
11 conditions in Indonesia. Contrary to Pranata’s argument,
12 the BIA considered the evidence, including 53 documents,
13 8 exhibits, an affidavit, and a State Department Report,
14 before rejecting Pranata’s claim. The BIA noted that “the
15 government of Indonesia generally respects freedom of
16 religion,” citing the 2007 State Department International
17 Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia. The BIA also found
18 that the remaining evidence Pranata submitted did not
19 reflect a meaningful change in country conditions. Pranata
20 is essentially requesting that the BIA analyze and discuss
21 in its decision each piece of evidence he submitted.
22 However, the BIA is not required to “expressly parse or
4
1 refute on the record each individual argument or piece of
2 evidence offered by the petitioner,” see Jian Hui Shao, 546
3 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008), as long as it “has given
4 reasoned consideration to the petition, and made adequate
5 findings.” Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d
6 Cir. 2006). Because we cannot find that the BIA’s decision
7 “provide[d] no rational explanation, inexplicably depart[ed]
8 from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or
9 contains only summary or conclusory statements ,” the BIA did
10 not abuse its discretion in denying Pranata’s motion to
11 reopen. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
265 F.3d
12 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
14 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
15 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
16 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
17 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
18 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
19 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
20 Circuit Local Rule 34(b).
21 FOR THE COURT:
22 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
23
24
25 By:___________________________
5
