NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ESTHER SALAS, District Judge.

1. Pro se Plaintiff Jeremiah McKenzie sued the Army and Air Force Exchange Service ("AAFES") and several individuals associated with the AAFES, alleging that, while employed with the AAFES, he suffered bullying and workplace violence when his "coworkers would constantly make up stories that [he] was not doing [his] job and giving [him] a hard time." (D.E. No. 1 ("Compl.") at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that AAFES management and staff "made up a false story that he had guns, bombs [and] automatic weapons," and that these false statements caused him to lose his job and led to his arrest and ban from all military bases in Europe. (Id.).

2. Defendant United States of America1 ("Defendant") moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (See D.E. No. 18-1 ("Def. Mov. Br.)). Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion.2 (See D.E. No. 23). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion and dismisses Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

3. "It is a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against the United States unless Congress, via a statute, expressly and unequivocally waives the United States' immunity to suit." United States v Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000).3 The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the United States seeking monetary damages based on the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant." See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

4. Pursuant to the FTCA, a claimant seeking monetary damages may not file a tort claim against the United States "unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Medina v. City of Phila., 219 F. App'x 169, 172 (3d. Cir. 2007). In other words, the claimant must exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the appropriate federal agency before initiating suit. "The filing of an administrative claim with the appropriate agency is referred to as `presentment.'" Medina, 219 F. App'x at 172. Under the FTCA, there is a two-year limit on presentment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Finally, a plaintiff carries the burden of proof to establish presentment of his or her claim to the appropriate federal agency. See Medina, 219 F. App'x at 172.

5. The FTCA's presentment procedures are strictly construed. See Livera v. First Nat'l State Bank of New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1194-95 (3d Cir. 1989); Medina, 219 F. App'x at 172. And "[f]ailure to observe the requirements of the [FTCA] mandates dismissal." See Peterson v. United States, 694 F.2d 943, 945 n.5 (3d Cir. 1982). Accordingly, if a plaintiff commences a suit without first exhausting administrative remedies, his suit must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1993); see also Medina, 219 F. App'x at 171-72 ("Because the FTCA permits suits against the Government by private parties, its presentment requirement and limitation periods are considered jurisdictional.").

6. Here, Plaintiff does not allege in his Complaint that he exhausted his administrative remedies, nor does he address this argument in his opposition. Furthermore, Defendant submitted a supporting declaration from Colonel Patrick J. Wells, Chief of the United States Air Force's Claims and Tort Litigation Division, setting forth various records searches and other procedures undertaken by Colonel Wells to determine whether Plaintiff ever presented an administrative tort claim to the Air Force.4 (D.E. No. 18-2, Declaration of Colonel Patrick J. Wells ("Wells Decl.") at 1-2). Based on these searches, the Wells Declaration concludes that "there is no record indicating that a tort claim has ever been submitted to the Air Force or AAFES" by Plaintiff. (Id. at 2).

7. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating compliance with the FTCA's presentment requirement. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant must be dismissed.5 See Bender v. Hargrave, No. 15-6936, 2015 WL 7574763, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2015) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies).

8. Defendant additionally argues that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the FTCA's intentional-torts exception. (See Def. Mov. Br. at 8). Section 2680(h) of the FTCA provides an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also Vanderklok v. United States, 142 F.Supp.3d 356, 360 (E.D. Pa. 2015). So, to the extent Plaintiff alleges claims covered by § 2680(h)—including, for example, claims for slander, libel, false arrest, or malicious prosecution—those claims are barred by the FTCA. See, e.g., Izzo v. U.S. Gov't, 138 F. App'x 387, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of defamation claim as barred by § 2680(h) of the FTCA).6

9. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate order follows.