NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff/landlord Crestbury Estates Urban Renewal, LLC appeals from an October 31, 2013 Special Civil Part order vacating a default judgment of possession which had been entered against defendant/tenant Jessica Moye on September 19, 2013, for nonpayment of rent. We affirm.
This appeal arises from the following facts. Plaintiff participates in the Section 8, Moderate Rehabilitation Program, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f(b) and 24 C.F.R. 882.101 to 882.810, which authorizes local public housing agencies to enter into housing assistance payment contracts with private housing owners who lease to low-income families. Under this program, the contract rents paid to plaintiff, as the owner of the property, are subject to an annual review and adjustment. 24 C.F.R. 882.410.
Defendant had resided in her apartment with her children since May 2009. Prior to May 2013, defendant had no rent payment obligation. Although not clear from the record, the parties do not dispute that defendant's portion of the rent was established to be $58 per month, effective May 2013. Defendant paid May rent, however, she made no further payments because she lost her income in June. She requested an interim reexamination of her rent obligation due to her change in income. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.515(b).
On August 22, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for a judgment of possession based upon nonpayment of rent. According to the complaint, defendant owed the sum of $1035, consisting of rent of $58 for the months June and July, $892 for August, and $27 in court costs. The rent for August represented the full amount because the reexamination of defendant's income had not yet been completed. The complaint stated that the demand would increase to $1927 to include September's unpaid rent if payment was not received before September 1.
The trial date was set for September 19. Defendant failed to appear, resulting in the entry of a default judgment of possession. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a). Plaintiff requested a warrant of removal on September 26 and it issued on October 8. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57. Once served, defendant obtained an order to show cause (OTSC) to stay execution of the warrant pending her request for assistance from the Camden County Board of Social Services (CCBSS). On October 17, defendant appeared pro se and informed the court that CCBSS denied her rental assistance. The court denied her request for a "payment plan," and, finding no basis to vacate the judgment of possession, permitted plaintiff to proceed with the eviction.
That same day, defendant retained the services of South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., which ascertained that the interim reexamination of defendant's rent obligation had been completed in September. The review maintained defendant's rental obligation at $58 per month, thereby reducing her outstanding rental balance to $317.1 Defendant deposited the funds into court, and filed a second OTSC, returnable October 31, requesting to vacate the judgment.
During oral argument, plaintiff acknowledged that it was aware that defendant's portion of the rent had been reduced at the time of trial in September, but argued that defendant never claimed to have the funds to satisfy the judgment. Defendant argued that the court should vacate the judgment because once the rent had been modified defendant acquired the funds and deposited the funds into court. The court, aware that defendant's unit received a Section 8 housing subsidy and that defendant only had a $58 monthly rent obligation beginning in May, ruled that the rent payments deposited into court by defendant "will be accepted by the landlord, and the matter will have to be dismissed." The judge, however, cautioned that the consideration being extended to defendant would not be repeated if another action for nonpayment were to be filed in the future. Thereafter, the court vacated the judgment of possession.2 This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff claims only that it was reversible error for the trial court to have vacated the judgment without any facts in the record to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Defendant urges us to affirm the trial court's decision because plaintiff's acceptance of defendant's rent payment constituted a waiver of the right to evict based on nonpayment of rent. We have considered these issues in light of the record, the applicable legal precedents, and the arguments raised by counsel and conclude there is no basis to reverse the trial court order.
The summary dispossess statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 to-61, was designed to provide landlords with a quick and simple remedy for possession. Carr v. Johnson, 211 N.J.Super. 341, 347 (App. Div. 1986). It was also designed to secure enforcement of a tenant's rental obligation in actions for nonpayment of rent. Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 281 (1994).
Pursuant to Rule 6:6-1, a motion to vacate a judgment of possession may be brought under Rule 4:50-1. "A motion under Rule 4:50-1 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court," and its ruling "will be left undisturbed unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion." Little, supra, 135 N.J. at 283. A court commits "an abuse of discretion when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "A court should view `the opening of default judgments . . . with great liberality.'" Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (quoting Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J.Super. 313, 319, (App. Div.), aff'd, 43 N.J. 508 (1964)).
A motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(e) "on the ground that it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application must be supported by evidence of changed circumstances." Little, supra, 135 N.J. at 285 (citation omitted). The moving party "bears the burden of proving that events have occurred subsequent to the entry of a judgment that, absent the relief requested, will result in `extreme' and `unexpected' hardship.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). That requirement is necessary to outweigh the courts' interest in the "finality of judgments." Id. at 286.
Though intended to be used sparingly, the Court permits use of Rule 4:50-1(f) in exceptional situations "to provide relief from judgments . . . in which, were it not applied, a grave injustice would occur." Id. at 289.
Applying these principles, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the judgment of possession. The judge first learned that defendant's rent obligation had been reduced from $1927 to $317 after judgment had been entered. At that time, the court also learned that defendant had no prior rent obligation until May, and that she deposited the overdue amount with the court. We are satisfied that the trial court considered these facts, learned after the entry of the judgment, as exceptional and changed circumstances, as contemplated under Rule 4:50-1(e). Due to the adjustment to defendant's rent obligation, plaintiff was no longer entitled to the sum stated in the complaint, but rather, a significantly lesser amount that defendant was able to satisfy. Under Rule 4:50-1(f), it would be inequitable to enforce the judgment of possession and require defendant, a recipient of a Section 8 housing subsidy, to pay more than six times what was owed to plaintiff. Such a result bespeaks a "grave injustice." Little, supra, 135 N.J. at 289.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to vacate the judgment of possession.
Affirmed.
