NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUMNERS, JR., J.A.D.

Plaintiff Reliable Medical Billing, LLC appeals from the Law Division's May 12, 2014 bench trial judgment dismissing its complaint, and July 11, 2014 order denying its motion for reconsideration/vacate judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

I.

In accordance with an oral agreement, in January 2011, plaintiff began providing medical billing collections for defendant Dr. Roger Borchardt, at the rate of seven percent of the total amount collected. Thereafter, in June, the parties' business arrangement soured, and defendant transferred billing duties to a different collection company without notifying plaintiff. It was not until sometime in September, when plaintiff received defendant's written notice that its services were terminated, that plaintiff discontinued its efforts to collect monies for defendant.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint seeking $200,689.95, for non-payment for monies actually collected, and for monies received by the other collection company based solely on plaintiff's prior collection efforts. Defendant counter-claimed for lost collectibles totaling $40,070.73, due to plaintiff's failure to properly process Medicare billing.

A court ordered arbitration hearing resulted in an award to plaintiff of $25,947.46. Defendant's request for a trial de novo was granted. R. 4:21A-6(b)(1).

During the one-day trial, plaintiff claimed entitlement to $16,830.26, plus interest and costs, for the balance owed from collecting $841,429 prior to the engagement of the other collection company.1 Plaintiff additionally sought unpaid compensation on monies collected by the subsequent collection company based on $4,345,009.27 in billings which plaintiff sought to collect during the period it worked for defendant.

At the close of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the motion, concluding there was sufficient evidence to deny a motion to dismiss, see R. 4:37-2(b), because there was "an amount of $16,660 owing." At the conclusion of the trial, the court requested written summation submitted by counsel.

On May 12, 2014, the trial court issued an order and a four-page written opinion dismissing plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim. The court determined that there was an "absolute failure of proof of how much of [p]laintiff's original billing was actually collected after its dismissal[]" because plaintiff did not submit documentary evidence in the form of Explanation of Benefits (EOB) pertaining to the billing collected after it received the termination notice. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's claim for monies collected after June 2011, when the other company took over. The court did not address the $16,830.26, the alleged unpaid compensation attributed solely to plaintiff's collection efforts prior to June 2011.2

Plaintiff filed a motion seeking reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2, and relief from judgment under Rule 4:50-1(c), alleging that defendant possessed the EOBs plaintiff needed for its proofs, but had concealed them from plaintiff and the court. The court denied plaintiff's motion on July 11, 2014, reasoning that plaintiff's claim that defendant hid the EOBs was not established at trial, and dismissed the claim because plaintiff failed to prove how much of the original billing was actually collected after its dismissal. Although plaintiff requested that it do so, the court again did not address the $16,830.26 plaintiff sought for monies collected prior to its dismissal. This appeal followed.

II.

Before us, plaintiff contends it sustained all the damages sought. Plaintiff argues that it submitted sufficient proofs to sustain all its sought after damages. Plaintiff also asserts that, despite the court's recognition when denying defendant's motion for directed verdict that it could find plaintiff was due $16,830.26, the court denied the claim at the conclusion of trial and post-trial motion without making findings of fact and law. Plaintiff argues that we should conclude it is entitled to that amount.

Alternatively, plaintiff seeks remand on the ground that it proved at trial defendant possessed the EOBs needed to establish damages on the amount collected by the other company due to plaintiff's efforts, but defendant did not provide the documents either before or during trial. Plaintiff further claims that defendant's failure to produce the EOBs constitutes spoliation of the evidence under Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 400-01 (2001), and the trial court erred by not providing plaintiff with a remedy to offset defendant's misconduct.

Our standard of review of the trial court's determinations following a non-jury trial is a limited one. Petrozzi v. City of Ocean City, 433 N.J.Super. 290, 316 (App. Div. 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 623 (2014). Accordingly, an appellate court must "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974)). Reviewing courts "should `not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were `so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Ibid. (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., supra, 65 N.J. at 484). Review on appeal "does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making independent factual findings; rather, our function is to determine whether there is adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial." Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J.Super. 342, 347 (App. Div. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).

We, however, owe no deference to the "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (citations omitted). We review such decisions de novo. 30 River Court E. Urban Renewal Co. v. Capograsso, 383 N.J.Super. 470, 476 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 483-84; Manalapan Realty, supra, 140 N.J. at 378).

As for a trial court's denial of a Rule 4:49-2 motion for reconsideration, we have determined that

Therefore, we will not disturb a judge's denial of a motion for reconsideration absent an abuse of discretion. See Id. at 289. Furthermore, with respect to a motion to vacate pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(c), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order for "fraud [,] . . . []misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Similar to a reconsideration motion, we review a court's determination of a motion to vacate under an abuse of discretion standard. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). There is "an abuse of discretion when a decision is `made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). Concerning plaintiff's claim for $16,830.26, related to collections received while plaintiff was still engaged by defendant, we are unable to determine whether the trial court erred. The court's written decisions following the trial and the motion for reconsider/vacate judgment do not mention its reasons for denying the claim. This is more glaring considering the court's comments when denying defendant's motion for directed verdict, that there was evidence to support the claim.

Our court's ability to resolve an appeal is largely dependent upon the court's compliance with its obligation to state findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. The court must articulate factual findings and correlate them with the principles of law. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). When that is not done, a reviewing court does not know whether the ultimate decision is based on the facts and law or is the product of arbitrary action resting on an impermissible basis. See Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J.Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 1986) (discussing the necessity for an adequate explanation of a judge's reasons that correlates the facts and legal conclusions).

We take no position whether plaintiff is entitled to the $16,830.26, except that the court must clearly set forth its reasoning in addressing the claim. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to specify factual findings and conclusions of law for its finding regarding plaintiff's claim for $16,830.26.

Turning to the balance of plaintiff's damages, we conclude there is no reason to disturb the court's judgment, which is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, that plaintiff has not met its burden of proving its damages. See Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422, 436 (1994) (burden is on plaintiff to prove damages). In doing so, we reject plaintiff's argument that the judgement should be vacated or reconsidered because of fraud or spoliation due to defendant's failure to provide EOBs. As defendant maintains, plaintiff could have obtained EOBs online or from the insurance companies on claims where plaintiff sought payment. Moreover, plaintiff never sought the documentation from defendant during discovery. Thus, there is no merit to plaintiff's argument that its lack of proofs is due to defendant's wrongdoing.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.