PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge.
Plaintiff Nadgia Dixon brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of a
Dixon has been employed by Oxygen since February 2006. Dixon Decl. ¶ 2; Talbert Decl. ¶ 3. Shortly after Dixon's employment began, she was promoted to her current position of production coordinator. Dixon Decl. ¶ 2. Dixon continued her employment with Oxygen after NBCU's predecessor entity
NBCU utilizes an alternative dispute resolution procedure called Solutions. On April 29, 2009, Dixon received an email regarding Solutions that was sent to all NBCU employees. Dixon Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C; Talbert Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. B. At the time the email was sent, General Electric Company ("GE") owned a majority stake in NBCU (which in turn owned Oxygen). Talbert Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7; Talbert MTS Decl. ¶ 3. The email began:
Talbert Decl. Ex. B (emphasis in original). The email went on to explain that the program previously had been in place for GE's and NBCU's senior leadership teams, and that it would "now be rolled out to all non-union employees in the U.S...." Id. The email directed "[a]ll NBCU employees who meet the above criteria" to ensure that they are familiar with the program and instructed them to, no later than June 30, 2009, access a PowerPoint presentation that served as a training course on the Solutions program. Id. The training course also included a link to the version of the Solutions manual current as of April 29, 2009. Talbert MTS Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. A (the "2009 Manual").
On May 11, 2009, Dixon received another email regarding Solutions, this time from Christina Guzzo, Oxygen's Human
Dixon attests that she never accessed the link to the Solutions manual and therefore never saw the manual until this lawsuit was commenced. Dixon Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. However, on July 1, 2009, Dixon did complete the PowerPoint training course on the Solutions program. Talbert Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. D. That course gave an overview of Solutions terms and procedures, and included several slides particularly relevant here. One slide explained that although most GE employees had previously entered into agreements to submit their claims to binding arbitration, rather than going to court, "[s]ome employees ... were previously exempted from this requirement.... Now those employees will also be required to bring claims to binding arbitration rather than to court.... With the introduction of Solutions, these distinctions between employees are being eliminated." Id. Ex. C, at 4 (emphasis in original). Another slide explained that Solutions will apply to certain "employees working in the U.S.... receiving this training who continue their employment with the Company after July 1, 2009. This means that by choosing to continue to work for the Company after July 1, 2009, you are agreeing to be covered by Solutions after July 1, 2009." Id. at 6. Finally, another slide explained that "Covered Claims" are those "arising out of the employment relationship, asserted by or against the Company, that a court would have authority under applicable law to resolve." Id. at 8. Among the listed examples are "[w]age-hour claims." Id. The presentation stated that Covered Claims "cannot be brought to court and will not be heard by a jury" and that they can "only be pursued on an individual basis through Solutions, meaning that no class or collective actions are permitted." Id. at 7 (emphases in original).
Consistent with the summaries in the presentation that Dixon viewed on July 1, 2009, the 2009 Manual defines "Covered Employees" as "U.S.-based ... current... employees ... not represented by a labor union who are or were employed by the Company (including any of its subsidiaries or affiliates that have adopted the procedure), as identified by your business or component in Appendix A." 2009 Manual, at 4. Appendix A lists NBCU — although not Oxygen — as one such entity. Id. at 26. "The Company" is further defined in the 2009 Manual to include "GE, any subsidiaries, affiliates, joint ventures, and parents thereof that have adopted the procedure...." Id. at 4. The 2009 Manual expressly exempts Universal Parks and Resorts and Universal Orlando — two wholly owned, indirect subsidiaries of NBCU, see Talbert Reply Decl. ¶ 3 — from Solutions. 2009 Manual, at 4.
In all other relevant respects, the 2009 and 2011 Manuals are identical. Both state that the Solutions procedure "creates a binding obligation on Covered Employees and the Company for the resolution of employment disputes." 2011 Manual, at 2; 2009 Manual, at 2. Both state that:
2011 Manual, at 7; 2009 Manual, at 7. Both define "Covered Claims" as "all claims that arise out of or are related to an employee's employment ... where a court in the jurisdiction in question would otherwise have the authority to hear and resolve the claim[,]" including specific examples such as claims "relating to compensation." 2011 Manual, at 5; 2009 Manual, at 5. Finally, although the two versions of the manual differ in their precise definition of "The Company" as related to Covered Employees, both specifically exempt two NBCU subsidiaries, but not Oxygen, from coverage. 2011 Manual, at 4 n. 2; 2009 Manual, at 4 n. 2.
On November 2, 2011, Dixon and other NBCU employees received an email notifying them of the changes to Solutions reflected in the 2011 Manual. Talbert Reply Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. A. That email explained that "[e]mployees who were previously covered by Solutions will continue to be covered by the procedure." Id. The email attached the 2011 Manual, and a document summarizing the changes. Id. Exs. A-C.
At no point has Dixon attempted to resolve her claims pursuant to the Solutions procedure. Talbert Decl. ¶ 10. She attests that she understood Solutions to be optional to her, because an employee handbook that she received from NBCU states, under the heading "Dispute Resolution," that "[e]mployees are encouraged and
On October 12, 2012, Dixon filed her Complaint. Dkt. 1. On February 19, 2013, defendants moved to compel arbitration. Dkt. 8 ("Def. Arb. Br."). On March 18, 2013, Dixon opposed that motion. Dkt. 16 ("Pl. Arb. Br."). On April 8, 2013, defendants filed a reply. Dkt. 21 ("Def. Arb. Reply Br.").
On March 28, 2013, Dixon filed a motion for conditional collective action certification under the FLSA. Dkt. 19-20. On April 15, 2013, defendants opposed that motion. Dkt. 26-27, 30-31. On April 22, 2013, Dixon filed a reply. Dkt. 32.
In their motion to compel arbitration, defendants initially relied on a version of the Solutions manual dated September 17, 2010. See Talbert Decl. Ex. B (the "2010 Manual"). After Dixon argued that this manual did not apply to her, defendants included in their reply papers the 2011 Manual, the November 2, 2011 email that transmitted it to employees, and the document that explained the changes made to the 2011 Manual. See Talbert Reply Decl. Exs. A-C.
"A district court enjoys broad discretion ... to consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief, [and] to rely on evidence submitted with the reply papers." Compania Del Bajo Caroni (Caromin), C.A. v. Bolivarian Rep. of Venez., 341 Fed.Appx. 722, 724 (2d Cir.2009) (summary order) (citing Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2005)); accord Bayway Refining Co. v. Oxygenated Marketing & Trading A. G., 215 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.2000). Although "[i]t is plainly improper to submit on reply evidentiary information that was available to the moving party at the time that it filed its motion and that is necessary in order for that party to meet its burden," Revise Clothing, Inc. v. Joe's Jeans Subsidiary, Inc., 687 F.Supp.2d 381, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), a court may choose to admit such evidence where the opposing party will suffer no prejudice. Id.; see Pagan v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 287 F.R.D. 139, 144 (E.D.N.Y.2012).
Here, defense counsel has candidly admitted that the failure to attach the correct version of the Solutions manual
Defendants move to compel arbitration, arguing that the parties entered a binding arbitration agreement, i.e., Solutions, that covers Dixon's claims, when Dixon continued her employment beyond July 1, 2009, the program's effective date. In opposing this motion, Dixon argues that (1) she is not bound by Solutions, see Pl. Arb. Br. 12-22; and (2) the collective action waiver provision in Solutions is unenforceable, see Pl. Arb. Br. 5-12. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that "[a] written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "This provision establishes `a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'" CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 665, 669, 181 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)); see Arciniaga v. Gen. Motors Corp., 460 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[I]t is difficult to overstate the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.").
To determine whether to send an action to arbitration, a court must determine (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope of the agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims are asserted, whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) if some but not all claims are arbitrable, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration. JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir.1998)); accord Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857-58, 177 L.Ed.2d 567 (2010) ("[C]ourts should order arbitration of a dispute only where the court is satisfied that neither the formation of the parties' arbitration agreement nor (absent a valid provision specifically committing such disputes to an arbitrator) its enforceability or applicability
Section 4 of the FAA provides that "[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 4. It is a "fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract." AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745, 179 L.Ed.2d 742 (2011) (quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776, 177 L.Ed.2d 403 (2010)). That is, "[a]rbitration is strictly `a matter of consent.'" Granite Rock, 130 S.Ct. at 2857 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989)). In determining whether an arbitration agreement has been entered into, the Court "applies a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment." Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.2003); accord Oppenheimer & Co. v. Neidhardt, 56 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not sufficient for the party opposing arbitration to utter general denials of the facts on which the right to arbitration depends.").
The FAA "requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to their terms." CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 669. "That is the case even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's mandate has been `overridden by a contrary congressional command.'" Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987)); accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) ("Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."). "If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the [statute], its legislative history, or an `inherent conflict' between arbitration and the [statute's] underlying purposes." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (citation omitted); see Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627, 105 S.Ct. 3346 ("[I]t is the congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable."). The burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of the judicial forum. See CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 669; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647; Shearson/Am. Exp., 482 U.S. at 227, 107 S.Ct. 2332.
Dixon argues that Solutions, even if otherwise enforceable, does not bind her to arbitrate her claims because (1) by its terms, Solutions does not apply to Oxygen employees, see Pl. Arb. Br. 12-18; and (2) Dixon never entered into an agreement to
The 2009 Manual defines "Covered Employees" to include non-union U.S.-based employees of "the Company (including any of its subsidiaries or affiliates that have adopted the procedure), as identified by your business or component in Appendix A." 2009 Manual, at 4. "The Company" is defined as "GE [and] any subsidiaries... thereof that have adopted the procedure." Id. Appendix A, in turn, lists such subsidiaries, including NBCU. Id. at 26. Dixon therefore argues that Solutions does not apply to her, because she is employed by Oxygen, not by NBCU.
The 2011 Manual, which updates the 2009 Manual, is consistent with this conclusion.
"[I]n deciding whether a contractual obligation to arbitrate exists, `courts should generally apply state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.'" Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir.2000)). "It is `well settled' under New York law that arbitration will not be compelled absent the parties' `clear, explicit and unequivocal agreement to arbitrate.'" Manigault v. Macy's East, LLC, 318 Fed. Appx. 6, 7-8 (2d Cir.2009) (summary order)
Here, Dixon received an email on April 29, 2009, that informed her that Solutions would be rolled out to NBCU employees. Talbert Decl. Ex. B. The email contained a link to a PowerPoint training course, which in turn included a link to the 2009 Manual. Id. Exs. B-C; Talbert MTS Decl. ¶ 4. Dixon attests that she never followed the link to the 2009 Manual, and did not view the manual until this litigation began. Dixon Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6. However, Dixon did complete the training course on Solutions. Talbert Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. D. That course consisted of the PowerPoint presentation which explicitly informed Dixon of the binding nature of the Solutions program and that it applied to her and her claims. See Talbert Decl. Ex. C, at 4-8. It further expressly stated that no class or collective actions would be permitted, id. at 7, and notified Dixon that "by choosing to continue to work for the Company after July 1, 2009, you are agreeing to be covered by Solutions after July 1, 2009." Id. at 6. Under these circumstances, Dixon's continued employment beyond July 1, 2009 constituted acceptance of the binding arbitration agreement contained in the 2009 Manual. See Manigault, 318 Fed.Appx. at 8 (employee bound by arbitration agreement where she failed to rebut presumption that she had received a mailing containing notice of arbitration agreement, and continued with her employment); Raniere v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 294, 307-08 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (employee bound by arbitration agreement where she continued employment after opening an email containing a link to a revised arbitration policy that included a collective action waiver, even though employee did not acknowledge receipt of the revised policy, had previously acknowledged receipt of a prior version of the arbitration policy which did not contain a collective action waiver, and court noted that "[o]pening an email that contains a link to a Handbook and arbitration policy, if that link is not followed, is more attenuated and potentially significantly so, than providing an acknowledgement of receipt"); Brown v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., No. 08-CV-3231 (JFB)(ETB), 2009 WL 1146441, at *7-8 & n. 3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2009) (employee bound by arbitration agreement where he (1) received a brochure and program description both informing him that continued employment constituted agreement to submit disputes to arbitration; (2) attended orientation session on arbitration program which similarly informed him that continued employment constituted agreement; and (3) continued to be employed past implementation date); Gonzalez v. Toscorp Inc., No. 97 Civ. 8158(LAP), 1999 WL 595632, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1999) (employee bound by arbitration agreement where he received policy and handbook and continued employment past effective date, even though he did not sign acknowledgment of receipt).
Finally, Dixon appears to argue that she cannot be bound by Solutions because she did not understand it to apply to her. See Dixon Decl. ¶ 3 ("I understood... that Solutions was voluntary for me."). Her misunderstanding is apparently based on a statement in an NBCU employee handbook which says that "[e]mployees are encouraged and may be required to resolve disputes with the Company by means of the procedures set forth in Solutions." Id. Ex. B. However, the use of the term "may" in this handbook does not support the proposition that Solutions did not apply to Dixon; it simply reflects that not all employees and not all claims are covered by Solutions. The explicit terms of the manuals that Dixon received, and the descriptions provided in the training course she completed, gave Dixon ample notice that she was required to utilize Solutions. See, e.g., 2011 Manual, at 2 ("This Procedure ... creates a binding obligation on Covered Employees and the Company for the resolution of employment disputes."); 2009 Manual, at 2 (same); Talbert Decl. Ex. C, at 4-6. Moreover, in addition to the clear language of the training course, the very fact that Dixon was required to (and did) complete the course renders the inference she purports to have drawn unreasonable. In light of the clear language communicating to Dixon that she was a covered employee whose continued employment would constitute a binding
Dixon also argues that, even if the terms of Solutions purport to bind her to arbitrate her claims, the provision of Solutions that purports to waive collective action rights — such as the FLSA collective action claim Dixon asserts here — is unenforceable per se.
Employees cannot waive the FLSA's substantive guarantees by private agreement. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1527, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) ("The FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract."); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945) ("No one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act."); Bormann v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 401 (2d Cir.1989) ("[P]rivate waiver of claims under the [FLSA] has been precluded by such Supreme Court decisions as [Brooklyn Sav. Bank]."). The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the issue whether an employee's right to proceed collectively under the FLSA can be waived in an arbitration agreement. See Torres v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 920 F.Supp.2d 368, 373-74 (E.D.N.Y.2013); Raniere, 827 F.Supp.2d at 310.
This Court joins the vast majority of courts in holding that the right to proceed collectively under the FLSA can be waived in an arbitration agreement. The decision in Raniere runs contrary to recent Supreme Court precedent: Plaintiffs may be held to their agreement to arbitrate their substantive claims, even where certain procedural rights, such as the ability to proceed as a class or collectively, are unavailable in arbitration. See, e.g., Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748 ("Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (upholding waiver of identical collective action provision in Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"));
Although an employee has the "right" to bring an action on behalf of any employee and the "right" to become a party plaintiff to such an action, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), the statute does not specify whether these rights are substantive or procedural. The Supreme Court has recently expressed skepticism whether the FLSA's collective action provision is substantive. See Genesis, 133 S.Ct. at 1530, 1532 (observing that, unlike a Rule 23 class, collective action certification "does not produce a class with an independent legal status, or join additional parties to the action. The sole consequence of conditional certification is the sending of court-approved written notice to employees, who in turn become parties to a collective action only by filing written consent with the court.... Whatever significance `conditional certification' may have in § 216(b) proceedings, it is not tantamount to class certification under Rule 23."); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480 (1989) (referring to identical collective action provision of ADEA as granting the court "the requisite procedural authority to manage the process of joining multiple parties"). Consistent with this, the Second Circuit has described the FLSA's collective action right as a "procedural mechanism[]" for pursuing substantive FLSA claims. Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 244 (2d Cir.2011); accord Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (Lynch, J.) ("It is far more natural to see the opt-in provisions of the FLSA, like the class action rules they resemble, simply as procedural mechanisms for vindication of the substantive rights provided by the FLSA."). Therefore, because "the right to proceed collectively is procedural, [it] can be waived." Ryan, 924 F.Supp.2d at 563; cf. Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir.2013) (finding no substantive statutory right for a private plaintiff to bring a pattern-or-practice claim under Title VII, and holding that "there can be no entitlement to the ancillary class action procedural mechanism").
Nothing in the FLSA is to the contrary. The statute's plain text requires that an employee affirmatively opt in to any collective action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought."). It follows that the ability to proceed collectively is an option that an individual may waive — either by simply declining to opt in, or by agreeing to arbitration that precludes collective action. See Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052-53; Torres, 920 F.Supp.2d at 374-75; cf. CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 671 (collecting Supreme Court cases holding that statutory right to bring a claim in court does not preclude individual's ability to waive that right in arbitration agreement).
To the extent the legislative history is relevant, although the statute's text is plain, see, e.g., BedRoc Ltd. v. U.S., 541 U.S. 176, 183, 124 S.Ct. 1587, 158 L.Ed.2d 338 (2004), it does not demonstrate congressional intent to preclude waiver of FLSA collective action claims. See Torres,
"The overarching purpose of the FAA... is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings." Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748. Had Congress intended to override this purpose in the FLSA, "it would have done so in a manner less obtuse than what [Dixon] suggests." CompuCredit, 132 S.Ct. at 672.
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted.
The FAA provides that, where the asserted claims are "referable to arbitration," the court shall "stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had." 9 U.S.C. § 3. Defendants nevertheless ask this Court to dismiss, rather than stay, the case, because all of Dixon's claims are subject to arbitration. See Def. Arb. Br. 19. Defendants are correct that "where all of the issues raised in the Complaint must be submitted to arbitration, the Court may dismiss an action rather than stay proceedings." Arrigo, 704 F.Supp.2d at 305 (citation and alteration omitted); Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F.Supp.2d 477, 491 (S.D.N.Y.2008); see Salim Oleochemicals v. M/V Shropshire, 278 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir.2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (implying that district court has discretion to dismiss rather than stay case, by stating that "[w]e urge district courts in these circumstances to be as clear as possible about whether they truly intend to dismiss an action or mean to grant a stay"). However, the Second Circuit has noted that the decision between dismissal and stay has implications for the speed with which arbitration may begin, because a dismissal is an appealable order, whereas a stay is not. See Salim Oleochemicals, 278 F.3d at 93. Because "[u]nnecessary delay of the arbitral process through appellate review is disfavored, ... [d]istrict courts should continue to be mindful of th[e] liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements when deciding whether to dismiss an action or instead to grant a stay." Id. (citations omitted). Courts in this district have heeded this admonition and chosen to stay proceedings, even where urged to dismiss. See, e.g., Duraku v. Tishman Speyer Props., Inc., 714 F.Supp.2d 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (Cote, J.); Douce v. Origin ID TMAA, No. 08 Civ. 483(DLC), 2009 WL 382708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2009). To promote expeditious resolution of this dispute, the Court stays this action pending arbitration.
Dixon has also moved for conditional certification of a FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). However, Dixon — the only plaintiff to opt-in to this lawsuit to date — has agreed to arbitrate her FLSA claims, and has waived
For the reasons stated in the foregoing, defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted. Dixon's motions to strike and for conditional collective action certification are denied. This case is stayed pending the completion of arbitration. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions pending at docket numbers 7, 19, and 24, and to place this case on the suspense docket. The parties are directed to jointly submit a letter to the Court on November 28, 2013 and every 180 days thereafter, updating the Court on the status of arbitration.
SO ORDERED.
