Filed: Oct. 16, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-4588 _ GIANT EAGLE, INC., Appellant v. UNITED FOOD & COMMERICAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 23 _ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. Civ. Action No. 12-00987) District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 26, 2013 _ Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. (Opinion Filed: October 16, 2013) _ OPINION _
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 12-4588 _ GIANT EAGLE, INC., Appellant v. UNITED FOOD & COMMERICAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 23 _ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (D.C. Civ. Action No. 12-00987) District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab _ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 26, 2013 _ Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. (Opinion Filed: October 16, 2013) _ OPINION _ S..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 12-4588
______________
GIANT EAGLE, INC.,
Appellant
v.
UNITED FOOD & COMMERICAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 23
______________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 12-00987)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 26, 2013
______________
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: October 16, 2013)
______________
OPINION
______________
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Giant Eagle, Inc. (―Giant Eagle‖) appeals an order of the District Court enforcing
a labor arbitration award in favor of United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
23 (the ―Union‖). In his award, the arbitrator found that the collective bargaining
agreement (the ―Agreement‖) required Giant Eagle to obtain the consent of the Union in
order to increase the wages of individual employees and the failure to do so violated the
Agreement. Giant Eagle argues that the arbitrator both ignored the plain language of the
Agreement and impermissibly considered an issue that the parties did not submit to him
when he found the Union’s consent was required. We will affirm.
I.
As we write principally for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential
facts and procedural history. Giant Eagle is a supermarket chain with stores in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, and Maryland. The Union was the exclusive
collective bargaining representative for, among other entities, certain units of Giant Eagle
employees at the Edinboro, Pennsylvania store.
In early 2011, Giant Eagle gave wage increases and higher starting wages to
certain employees of the Edinboro store. The Union filed a grievance, stating that Giant
Eagle had failed to notify the Union before it increased the wages. An arbitration hearing
was held and the arbitrator thereafter issued an award, finding that the language of the
Agreement was ambiguous but that the parties’ negotiation history and past practices
showed that Giant Eagle had violated the Agreement by granting individual employees
wage increases without obtaining the Union’s approval. The arbitrator directed Giant
Eagle to rescind those wages.
Giant Eagle then filed a complaint in the District Court to vacate the award and the
Union filed a counterclaim to enforce it. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The District Court granted the Union’s motion, finding support for the
arbitrator’s conclusion that the language was ambiguous and that consent was required in
2
order to provide the higher pay. This appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1337. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
review over a district court’s order resolving cross motions for summary judgment and
apply the same standard as the district court. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s
Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996).
There is a strong presumption under the Federal Arbitration Act in favor of
enforcing arbitration awards. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). An award is presumed valid and is subject to attack only on
the grounds listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10,1 or if enforcement of the award is contrary to public
policy. W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
1
9 U.S.C. § 10 states, in relevant part:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
3
Therefore, our review of an arbitration award is quite narrow and we must give
substantial deference to the arbitrator’s award. Id. at 765. We generally ―enforce an
arbitration award if it was based on an arguable interpretation and/or application of the
collective bargaining agreement, and may only vacate it if there is no support in the
record for its determination or if it reflects a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally
unsupported by principles of contract construction.‖ Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). If an arbitration award meets this standard, we will not disturb the award ―even
if [we] find[] the basis for it to be ambiguous or disagree[] with [the arbitrator’s]
conclusions under the law.‖ Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied–Indus., Chem.,
and Energy Workers Int’l Union Local No. 2–991,
385 F.3d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Giant Eagle seeks to vacate the arbitration award on two grounds: (1) that the
arbitrator’s decision ignored the plain language of the Agreement; and (2) that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding an issue the parties did not submit to him.
A.
We must first decide whether the arbitrator’s conclusion is supported, in any way,
by a rational interpretation of the Agreement. Under the deferential standard, we would
only disturb the arbitrator’s finding if it did not ―draw its essence‖ from the Agreement.
United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir.
1995). An award draws its essence from a collective bargaining agreement if its
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―interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of
its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.‖ Id. at 379-80
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We ―are not authorized to reconsider
the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors
of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.‖ United Paperworkers Int’l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). Instead, we ―ask merely whether the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement got what they bargained for, namely an arbitrator who
would . . . provide an interpretation of the contract that was rationally based on the
language of the agreement.‖ Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers of
America,
396 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2005).
The language at issue can be found in Article 14 of the Agreement:
ARTICLE 14 - Wages:
Wages shall be paid in accordance with Appendix ―A‖ 2 which is
attached hereto and is made a part of this Agreement.
14.1 Additional Compensation
The Company can increase starting rates, grant bonuses, individual
increases, and any other forms of incentives. The Company can establish a
profit sharing plan and/or an employee discount plan. The increases can be
done by department and/or store. The employer agrees to notify and/or
meet with the union to discuss these matters prior to implementation. All
of these changes can be done at the Company's sole discretion and any of
these changes may be rescinded and/or modified.
...
14.3 Excess Rates
2
Appendix ―A‖ lists the wage schedule for the different classes of employees, indicating
when these employees are due for wage increases.
5
The Employer shall not pay any wage rates in excess of those listed
in Appendix ―A‖ of this Agreement without first discussing with and
obtaining the approval of the Union, except as provided in 14.1.
App. Vol. II 117-19. Giant Eagle contends that this language is unambiguous. It
claims that Article 14.1 applies to wage increases by department, store, or
individuals and that it may grant such increases at its ―sole discretion.‖ Giant
Eagle asserts that Article 14.3, which omits any employer discretion, applies to
wage increases across all of its stores. The Union, meanwhile, contends that the
language is ambiguous because there is a direct conflict between the first and third
sentences of Article 14.1, wherein the first sentence permits the company to
increase compensation, but the third sentence seems to allow this only when done
―by department and/or store.‖
Here, the arbitrator considered the language and found it was ambiguous. This
conclusion was rational. First, Article 14.1 itself could rationally be viewed as internally
ambiguous. The first sentence of Article 14.1 allows for ―individual increases,‖ but the
third sentence states that the increases ―can‖ be done by ―department and/or store.‖ It is
not clear if the word ―individual‖ in the first sentence is referring to individual employees
or if it is referring to individual departments and stores.
Second, a review of Articles 14.1 and 14.3 also exposes a possible ambiguity. The
language in Article 14.3 sets a cap for wages the company could pay without obtaining
the Union’s approval, but then the Agreement provides an exception set forth in Article
14.1, which seems to allow increases in compensation at the store or department level in
the company’s ―sole discretion.‖ As applied, it could swallow the maximums set forth in
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the Agreement so long as the increases were given incrementally, on a store-by-store
basis, rather than by one single company-wide pronouncement. Wage increases without
the Union’s input would be permitted only if done for small groups at a time but would
be barred if done for everyone at once. This conflict between the two provisions may
reflect a second ambiguity. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d
1001, 1011 (3d Cir. 1980).
Because the arbitrator’s finding of ambiguity was rational, he was authorized to
look to outside sources to decipher the parties’ intent. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper
Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers, Local 7-0159, 309 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (8th
Cir. 2002) (collecting circuit cases for this principle). The arbitrator here looked at the
negotiation history and the past practices of the parties, including testimony from the
Union negotiators of the Agreement and twenty-one emails in which Giant Eagle asked
the Union for permission to give an individual employee an increase, all of which pointed
toward an understanding that the parties intended to give the Union the right to object to
individual wage increases. The District Court appropriately declined to disturb the
arbitrator’s conclusion that Article 14 is ambiguous and that it was proper for him to
consider the parties’ past conduct to find that the parties intended to have the Union
consent to wage increases for individual employees.
B.
The second issue before us is whether the arbitrator overstepped his authority by
reaching an issue that Giant Eagle asserts was not properly before him. Giant Eagle
contends that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he addressed the question of
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whether the Agreement required the Union’s consent to increases described in Article
14.1, instead of deciding only whether the Union was entitled to notice. To support its
contention, Giant Eagle argues that the grievance3 and demand for arbitration4 only stated
that Giant Eagle failed to notify the Union before granting higher rates of pay to less
senior members and did not mention the issue of obtaining the Union’s consent.
Meanwhile, the Union argues that the grievance more broadly claimed a violation of
Article 14 and that the issue of consent came up both during the arbitration hearing and in
the parties’ post-hearing briefs.5
3
In relevant part, the March 8, 2011 initial grievance states:
Violation of Contract Article: 14 and Appendix A
Brief Explanation/Details: Company failed to notify union in regards to
granting higher rates of pay for less senior members. Additionally, there
has been a lack of response from the Company during my investigation of
this issue.
App. Vol. II 132 (emphasis added).
4
The Union sent Giant Eagle a letter on June 7, 2011, officially demanding arbitration.
In relevant part, it states:
[T]his grievance is NOT SETTLED. Please be advised that Local 23 is
submitting this grievance to arbitration. The issue for arbitration is [Giant
Eagle] failed to notify the Union prior to granting experienced pay rates
resulting in less senior members making more than the senior
members . . . . [T]his letter is the Union’s final notice of its intent to
arbitrate this grievance.
App. Vol. I 15 (emphasis added).
5
The post-hearing brief from Giant Eagle included the following question:
Does the ―Additional Compensation‖ Language of Article 14.1 in the
Edinboro CBA clearly and unambiguously grant to Giant Eagle the right, in
its ―sole discretion,‖ to unilaterally ―increase starting rates, grant bonuses,
individual increases, and any other forms of incentives,‖ and, therefore
render the Union’s extrinsic ―evidence‖ that conflicts with the written
agreement unnecessary and irrelevant?
8
An arbitrator’s authority to decide issues extends only to the issues actually
submitted. Matteson v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 1996). We have
cautioned against ―attach[ing] too great significance to documents drafted early in the
dispute,‖ such as the initial grievance, and observed that the issues to be decided are
those reflected in the evidence and arguments of the parties at the arbitration hearing. Id.
at 115 (holding that an arbitrator stepped outside his authority when he decided an issue
that had been focused on earlier in a grievance process but not in the final hearing). In
keeping with our standard of review, we give deference to ―an arbitrator’s interpretation
of the issue submitted.‖ Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
Here, while the grievance and demand for arbitration speak only of a lack of
notice, the evidence at the hearing and the post-hearing briefs explicitly address the
consent issue. Cf. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir.
1986) (―[The parties] submitted to the arbitrators the very questions that [appellant] now
says should not have been answered.‖). During the hearing, each side produced
witnesses to testify about the purpose of Article 14’s language and whether it was
intended to require the Union’s consent. Additionally, each side’s post-hearing brief
discussed whether the Agreement language was ambiguous with regard to whether
consent was needed for individual increases. Faced with the evidence and post-hearing
App. Vol. II 40. The post-hearing brief from the Union included the following
question:
Whether the Employer violated 14.1 of the Labor Agreement by giving
individual employees wage increases without obtaining the approval of the
Union, and if so, what shall be the remedy?
App. Vol. II 3.
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briefs, the arbitrator found that the issue of obtaining the Union’s consent was a question
the parties had submitted. Furthermore, it only makes sense that the issue of consent was
also addressed because the grievance was based on an alleged violation of Article 14,
which includes language that speaks of both the company’s ―sole discretion‖ to give
wage increases and the need to secure the Union’s approval concerning wages.
Moreover, it is logical for the arbitrator to have considered notice and consent in this
context as it invokes changes to a key condition of employment, namely wages, in which
the Union would want to have input in order to, at a minimum, ensure its members are
treated equally. Thus, even if the initial issue could be viewed as having morphed from
notice to consent at the hearing, the language of Article 14 was the heart of the dispute
and the arbitrator was within the scope of his authority to interpret the issue as he did to
determine the full meaning of the Article. Therefore, his decision to consider the issue of
consent was rational and it was appropriate for the District Court to leave this aspect of
the award undisturbed, too.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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