MARK D. CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants maliciously prosecuted him and violated his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and due process by pursuing unfounded criminal charges against him. Defendants Darin Lux ("Lux") and Darin Tweedt ("Tweedt") (collectively, "State Defendants") move to dismiss the claims against them or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement (#35). For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends granting State Defendants' motion in part and denying it in part.
On May 16, 2012, Plaintiff, a former lieutenant with the Central Point Police Department ("CPPD"), was put on leave after the initiation of a personnel investigation into his conduct while working as the leader of the Southern Oregon High-Tech Crimes Task Force ("Task Force"). Plaintiff alleges CPPD Captain Kristine Allison ("Allison") initiated the investigation and did so under false pretenses.
On May 16, Plaintiff was called into Allison's office and was handed a letter titled "Paid Administrative Leave." Compl. ¶ 67. He asserts Allison provided him no opportunity to read and internalize the letter and she refused to answer Plaintiff's inquiry as to why he had been placed on leave or whether he was under criminal investigation. Plaintiff opines that the letter contained signature lines for Allison, for Assistant Central Point City Manager Chris Clayton ("Clayton"), and for Plaintiff himself, and "bore the statement `Signature acknowledges receipt and understanding of requirements[.]'" Compl. ¶ 68. He contends "no one . . . actually signed the memo." Compl. ¶ 68.
The purported reason for the personnel investigation was Plaintiff's alleged dishonesty as to the length of time he claimed it would have taken for the Task Force to forensically examine a laptop involved in an ongoing murder case. Plaintiff's complaint asserts, however, that, "at Allison's behest," the inquiry quickly turned into "a full-scale investigation into his conduct with the [Task Force]," whereby "Allison and her acolytes" not only put Plaintiff on paid leave but worked "in total secrecy" to "build" a criminal case against him. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 65. According to the complaint, on May 15, 2012, Allison referred Plaintiff to the Oregon State Police ("OSP") "for the alleged crime of Tampering with Public Records"; however, on May 17, in a meeting with Allison, OSP detectives, including Lux, declined to pursue this referral, "stating that no crime had been committed." Compl. ¶ 66.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains Allison kept him on paid leave and provided no explanation for doing so, and, in fact, escalated the investigation, "searching for any other angles they might pursue to develop some type of criminal case against [Plaintiff]." Compl. ¶ 76. Plaintiff alleges CPPD searched his office, laboratory space, department vehicle, his locker, and demanded he tum over passwords, all under the pretenses that an administrative investigation was being conducted, "even though Allison, Day, [Defendant Michael] Anderson and [Defendant City of] Central Point knew full well" that the intent was to gather further evidence for a criminal investigation. Compl. ¶ 78.
Plaintiff contends CPPD's "aimless `investigation' . . . led to the massive spoliation and destruction of evidence" due to CPPD's mishandling or alteration of "every digital device that [Plaintiff] had returned upon being placed on administrative leave." Compl. ¶ 79. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges that an unknown individual placed a call from a cell phone Plaintiff had returned; that an unknown individual from CPPD turned on Plaintiff's office desktop computer and attempted to access his Dropbox account without a search warrant; and that a MacBook Pro, which Plaintiff had returned after being placed on leave, was accessed and browsed—at Allison's behest—"in a forensically unsound manner, causing the destruction and alteration of access logs and other digital evidence on the laptop." Compl. ¶ 82. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that CPPD "repeatedly attempted to hack into [his] personal GoDaddy website account," despite knowing it was his personal account, because CPPD wanted to renew the Task Force's domain name. Compl. ¶ 85.
Due to CPPD's investigation, on June 9, 2012, Plaintiff states Allison wrote a letter to Lux requesting that OSP open a second criminal investigation into Plaintiff, asserting Plaintiff had deleted files from the aforementioned MacBook Pro while on leave.
On August 1, 2012, CPPD sent out a press release notifying the public that Plaintiff was under criminal investigation and that the investigation was being conducted by OSP and Oregon's Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Plaintiff, who had since moved to Nevada to pursue other employment, maintains this is the first time he learned of the criminal investigation.
According to Plaintiff, he fully cooperated with the criminal investigation, even voluntarily submitting to, and passing, multiple polygraphs, which were submitted to OSP, along with "a memorandum regarding additional forensic evidence that further corroborated [him]." Compl. ¶ 101. Eight months later, however, and despite an OSP officer's memorandum "admit[ing] that the defense's evidence" matched Plaintiff's articulation of the facts, Plaintiff says "a DOJ Assistant Attorney General [] under Defendant Tweedt's supervision suddenly informed [Plaintiff's] attorneys by email that DOJ intended to charge [him] with computer crime and official misconduct." Compl. ¶ ¶¶ 102-03. Plaintiff contends the assistant attorney general conceded in the e-mail that no evidence existed suggesting Plaintiff deleted anything other than his personal passwords and personal data from any CPPD computer; however, the assistant attorney general also "falsely asserted . . . that [Plaintiff] admitted he had received notice he was not supposed to access any department computers while on administrative leave." Compl. ¶ 103.
As OSP's criminal investigation proceeded, Plaintiff alleges Defendants recognized their case was groundless and "knew they lacked a critical piece of information": "a signed copy of the administrative leave memo, which would have been the only evidence that [Plaintiff] had agreed to CPPD and Central Point's terms of his administrative leave"—i.e., that he refrain from accessing department computers while on leave. Compl. ¶ 105. "Despite their clear exculpatory content," OSP and DOJ secured a secret indictment against Plaintiff in February 2014, charging him with a felony computer crime and two misdemeanors—one a computer crime, and the other official misconduct. Compl. ¶ 111. Plaintiff alleges that this indictment was based solely on the false allegation that he had deleted personal passwords from a department computer without authorization shortly after going on leave.
A few weeks later, Plaintiff participated in a settlement conference wherein "[p]hone records reveal that, just minutes before that settlement conference, Defendant [Brian] Day sent a text message to OSP detective [Bryan] Scott including a never-before-seen image of an administrative leave memo bearing Allison and Clayton's signatures." Compl. ¶ 117. Plaintiff alleges forensic evidence demonstrates that the image of the never-before-seen memorandum was taken nineteen minutes before the settlement conference and "was never seen by anyone prior to the settlement conference, never noted in any DOJ or OSP report, and certainly never produced to the defense in discovery." Compl. ¶ 118. Tweedt participated in this settlement conference.
As the case moved forward, Plaintiff alleges he was denied discovery to which he was legally entitled and only provided exculpatory evidence "the evening before the omnibus motions hearing in the criminal case." Compl. ¶ 120. "Indeed," Plaintiff opines, "the Defendants (through DOJ and Tweedt) produced some of this exculpatory discovery only at 11:00pm that night." Compl. ¶ 120.
On May 8, 2015, after two days of hearings, the state trial court dismissed all charges against Plaintiff and did so with prejudice, holding that Plaintiff was denied due process because forensic investigators failed to preserve the MacBook Pro at issue in the case and potentially destroyed exculpatory evidence. The trial court also found that exculpatory evidence was "apparent before it was destroyed by the Defendants, and that their destruction of the evidence had been done in `bad faith.'" Compl. ¶ 127.
Plaintiff contends this years-long criminal prosecution was done maliciously; without probable cause; and with "reckless, conscious, and outrageous indifference" to Plaintiff's welfare, in violation of his rights to free speech, equal protection, and due process. Compl. ¶ 138. State Defendants move to dismiss these claims as it pertains to them only, contending (1) that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against both Lux and Tweedt, and (2) that Tweedt is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss will be granted where the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted `tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.'" Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "if there is a `lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'" Id. (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the allegations of material fact as true and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges "Tweedt was employed as chief counsel in DOJ's criminal division at all relevant times, and actively supervised and directed the activities of the Assistant Attorneys General who prosecuted [Plaintiff]"; and he similarly alleges "Lux was employed by OSP at all relevant times, and actively supervised and directed the activities of the detectives conducting the investigation." Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, despite possessing clear exculpatory evidence, OSP and DOJ—acting "through" Lux and Tweedt—filed "groundless felony and misdemeanor charges against [Plaintiff] in the spring of 2014." Compl. ¶ 3.
It is important to distinguish Plaintiff's first claim for relief, which is solely for malicious prosecution, from his second. Plaintiff's first claim alleges only that Defendants maliciously prosecuted him; there is no additional allegation that Defendants violated any civil rights. Malicious prosecution is a state-law tort. Westwood v. City of Hermiston, 787 F.Supp.2d 1174, 1205 (D. Or. 2011). Consequently, Oregon law governs Plaintiff's first claim for relief.
Plaintiff's second claim for relief, by contrast, is that Defendants maliciously prosecuted him and, in doing so, deprived him of constitutional rights. This is what is referred to as a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, which requires the establishment of (1) the state-law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) "an intent to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Accordingly, then, the only issue in Plaintiff's first claim for relief is whether Defendants, including State Defendants, violated the state-law tort of malicious prosecution. In determining whether Plaintiff sufficiently pleads facts to make out this claim, the Court looks to the elements necessary to make out a malicious prosecution claim in Oregon.
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim in Oregon, a plaintiff must prove:
Waldner v. Dow, 128 Or.App. 197, 200 (1994) (quoting Rose (Betty) v. Whitbeck, 277 Or. 791, 795, mod., 278 Or. 463 (1977)). "`If any element is left unproven, Plaintiff's case must fail.'" Id.
Here, Plaintiff sets forth facts demonstrating the initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings against him; his ultimate acquittal; injury; and a lack of probable cause in the form detailed facts demonstrating knowledge by those prosecuting the case—which, according to the complaint, included State Defendants—that they lacked a signed copy of the administrative leave memo, "which would have been the only evidence that [Plaintiff] . . . agreed to refrain from accessing computers," Compl. ¶ 105, and thus the only evidence reasonably demonstrating his guilt. See Gustafson v. Payless Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 269 Or. 354, 357 (1974) ("For the defendant to have probable cause it must have both a reasonable belief in the guilt of the accused as well as a subjective belief").
Plaintiff also plausibly suggests State Defendants were actively responsible for the institution and continuation of the criminal proceedings. "A person who plays an active role in continuing an unfounded criminal proceeding may be liable for malicious prosecution." Waldner, 128 Or. App. at 201 (internal citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff expressly alleges Tweedt "actively supervised and directed the activities of the Assistant Attorneys General who prosecuted [Plaintiff]." Compl. ¶ 10. And he alleges that OSP, through Lux, opened the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff on June 12, 2012; acted with DOJ in "filing groundless felony and misdemeanor charges against [Plaintiff]"; and that Lux "actively supervised and directed the activities of the detectives conducting the investigation of [Plaintiff]." Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff therefore plainly alleges both State Defendants participated in the criminal proceedings against him.
Finally, Plaintiff also plausibly suggests malice. In Gustafson, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that, while proof of malice is essential to an action for malicious prosecution, "a finding of malice" can be inferred "based upon lack of probable cause." 269 Or. at 366. In fact, the court specifically pointed to its finding in Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 226 Or. 556 (1961), where it "held the absence of probable cause was sufficient to enable the jury to find malice." Gustafson, 269 Or. at 366-67. As stated, Plaintiff plausibly suggests a lack of probable cause; he alleges DOJ and OSP—led by State Defendants—knew they lacked a signed copy of the administrative memo, a critical piece of evidence necessary for their case, even pointing to specific quotes and discussions by members of OSP and DOJ discussing this lack of evidence.
Tweedt contends he is immune from liability for malicious prosecution, arguing, "State courts have long recognized that attorneys acting as prosecutors within the course of their employment" enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity. State Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 7. Plaintiff counters, maintaining Tweedt was performing investigatory or administrative functions in his role as the "supervis[or] and direct[or] [of] the activities of the Assistant Attorneys General who prosecuted [Plaintiff]" and therefore is only entitled to qualified immunity. Compl. ¶ 10.
As pleaded, Tweedt is entitled to absolute immunity for Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. Oregon has explicitly held that "prosecutors are immune from liability for civil damages on a malicious prosecution claim as a matter of state law." Beason v. Harcleroad, 105 Or.App. 376, 381 (1991) (citing Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 641, 654 (1924)); see also Heusel v. Multnomah Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, 163 Or.App. 51, 56-57 (1999) (noting that the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court "have consistently reiterated th[e] principle . . . that prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for malicious prosecution"). In Beason, the plaintiff sued defendants—prosecutors—for malicious prosecution and violations of his civil rights, alleging the malicious prosecution claim was "based solely on defendants' decision to initiate a criminal proceeding against plaintiff." Id. at 381. The court dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, explaining that the defendants were prosecutors, the claim is based only on their decision to initiate a criminal proceeding, and prosecutors have absolute immunity for such actions in Oregon. Id.
The court limited its holding, however, noting that, in Watts, a landmark case on prosecutorial immunity for malicious prosecution, "[t]he critical factual element of the tort there was the initiation of criminal proceedings." Id. at 384. Thus, the court concluded, "the content and timing of" the prosecutor's actions "are relevant to a court's resolution of whether that function has a sufficient relationship to judicial proceedings to afford a prosecutor quasi-judicial immunity." Id.
Here, as the complaint currently reads, Tweedt is entitled to absolute immunity. Plaintiff alleges Tweedt is liable for supervising and directing the prosecution of Plaintiff. As the court in Beason explained, the initiation of a criminal proceeding is a prosecutorial function, which entitles prosecutors to absolute immunity. Likewise, the continued supervision and direction of the criminal proceeding that Plaintiff alleges is plainly related to the judicial process. See id at 383 (stating that actions "closely related to the prosecutor's role as a public advocate in the judicial process . . . fall[] within the quasi-judicial function").
In fact, Plaintiff pleads no facts indicating Tweedt engaged in the type of investigative or administrative functions that would negate his absolute immunity. Specifically, in addition to alleging Tweedt oversaw Plaintiff's prosecution, Plaintiff alleges Tweedt "acceded to Allison's demands by filing . . . charges against [Plaintiff]"; that an assistant attorney general under his supervision e-mailed Plaintiff's attorneys notifying them he would be charged with computer crimes and official misconduct; that the DOJ division headed by Tweedt—though there is no allegation Tweedt himself was involved—filed a motion asking the trial court to prohibit Plaintiff from contacting the media; that Tweedt attended a judicial settlement conference; and that Tweedt's team failed to produce exculpatory evidence during the run-up to trial. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 103, 115, 117, 120. All of these allegations, interpreted in Plaintiff's favor, involve Tweedt's role as a public advocate for the state, undertaken in preparation for filing charges or for the initiation or pursuit of judicial proceedings; he was not "carrying out law enforcement activities" or "functions normally performed by a detective or police officer." Tennyson v. Children's Servs. Div., 308 Or. 80, 85 (1989); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Rather, he was acting in the role of a state advocate initiating, preparing, and prosecuting a criminal case. Tweedt is therefore immune from liability.
Nevertheless, it is possible that, through amendment, Plaintiff could cure this deficiency by adding sufficient facts to plausibly suggest Tweedt acted in an investigative function. Leave to amend should thus be granted. See Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) ("If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency").
Plaintiff's second claim for relief is expressly brought pursuant to section 1983. Plaintiff alleges Defendants "pursued this malicious prosecution against [Plaintiff] in retaliation for and in order to deprive [him] of his" constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and due process. Compl. ¶ 139. State Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to articulate specific facts necessary to make out a claim against them and, in the alternative, that Tweedt is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The Ninth Circuit has held "that a § 1983 malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove that the defendants acted [maliciously] for the purpose of depriving him of a `specific constitutional right[.]'" Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). To prove this, the plaintiff "must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right." Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1189 (internal citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges all Defendants maliciously prosecuted him and did so in order to deprive him of his constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, and due process. Plaintiff does not identify which defendant is responsible for which act or constitutional transgression; however, as explained in Section I, he does specifically allege Tweedt and Lux actively supervised
Thus, as articulated in Section I, when construing all factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff—as the Court must on a motion to dismiss— Plaintiff plausibly alleges State Defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause. Consequently, the malicious prosecution portion of Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is satisfied.
The issue, however, arises when assessing Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants acted to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff's complaint, at thirty-nine pages, is detailed, yet Plaintiff's allegations pertaining to section 1983 are generally alleged against all Defendants, "without identifying which defendant is responsible" for what violation, or even which facts allegedly demonstrate an intent to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights. Fortaleza v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 642 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009). As such, Plaintiff fails to place either State Defendant on notice of the claim or claims being asserted against them. Id.
Indeed, unlike his malicious prosecution claim, where he specifically alleges facts detailing how the initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings against him came about; his ultimate acquittal; how he was injured; a lack of probable cause; and, critically, each State Defendant's individual role in initiating and continuing the allegedly unfounded criminal proceedings, Plaintiff's section 1983 claim neither specifies which actions signal an intent to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights nor how State Defendants themselves are responsible for such transgressions. A complaint that "contains only broad allegations which lump together defendants and do not identify which defendants are responsible for which specific wrong[,]" as here, is insufficiently pleaded, as it does not provide each individual defendant "`fair notice of'" their responsibility in the conduct alleged. Foth v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. CV 11-00114 DAE-BMK, LP, 2011 WL 3439134, at *5 (D. Haw. Aug. 4, 2011) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, NA., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)); see also Fortaleza, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 1020; Martushev v. City of Kenai, No. 3:10-cv-00035-JWS, 2011 WL 5517239, at *3-4 (D. Alaska Sept. 8, 2011).
Therefore, as it currently stands, Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is inadequately pleaded. Nevertheless, Plaintiff could cure this deficiency by adding sufficient factual detail to provide State Defendants with fair notice of the actions allegedly showing an intent to deprive Plaintiff of specific constitutional rights and State Defendants' involvement. Leave to amend should thus be granted. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401.
As with Plaintiff's state-law malicious prosecution claim, Tweedt maintains he has prosecutorial immunity and is therefore absolutely immune from Plaintiff's section 1983 claim. The Supreme Court has recognized two kinds of immunities afforded public officers under section 1983. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268. "Most public officials are entitled only to qualified immunity." Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978)). The Court has "recognized, however, that some officials perform `special functions' which, because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune when Congress enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability." Id. at 268-69 (quoting Butz, 438 U.S. at 508). "In determining whether particular actions of government officials fit within a common-law tradition of absolute immunity, or only the more general standard of qualified immunity, [the Court] ha[s] applied a functional approach," id. at 269 (internal citation and quotation omitted), looking at "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it[.]" Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976), the Supreme Court held that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for malicious prosecution claims. The Court, however, restricted its holding:
Id. at 430-31. Since Imbler, the Court has clarified "that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in giving legal advice to the police," or more generally for "investigative functions." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271, 273 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In delineating the line between investigative and prosecutorial functions, the Court has protected actions that are preliminary to the actual commencement of the criminal prosecution, noting that "`the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom,'" which are, nevertheless, "entitled to absolute immunity." Id. at 272 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, n. 33). In other words, "acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings . . ., and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity." Id. at 273. Such acts include professionally evaluating evidence assembled by the police and preparing for its presentation at trial or in front of a grand jury. Id.
On the other hand, "When a prosecutor performs the investigate functions normally performed by a detective or police officer"—such as searching for clues or corroborating evidence that might sufficiently lead to a probable-cause finding—"it is `neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect [the prosecutor and not the officer].'" Id. at 273-74 (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974)). Thus, if a prosecutor acts in such a manner, "he is entitled only to qualified immunity." Id at 273 (internal citation omitted).
Here, as explained, Plaintiff fails to articulate facts indicating Tweedt engaged in investigative functions. Plaintiff alleges Tweedt is liable for supervising and directing the prosecution of Plaintiff; however, as explained, the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution are quintessentially prosecutorial functions, which the Supreme Court has held entitle prosecutors to absolute immunity. And, as the Court explained in Section I, Plaintiff nowhere alleges facts plausibly evidencing Tweedt engaged in the type of investigative functions that would vitiate his absolute immunity. In fact, all of the allegations involve Tweedt's role as an advocate for the state, undertaken in preparation for filing charges or for the initiation or pursuit of judicial proceedings; there are no allegations plausibly suggesting he engaged in investigative functions normally performed by a law enforcement officer. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 103, 115, 117, 120.
Accordingly, based on the complaint as it currently reads, Tweedt is entitled to absolute immunity, and his motion to dismiss should be granted on that basis. Nevertheless, it is possible that, through amendment, Plaintiff could cure this deficiency by adding sufficient facts to plausibly suggest Tweedt acted in an investigative function to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights and thus that he is not entitled to absolute immunity. Leave to amend should therefore be granted. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401.
Finally, State Defendants contend that, should any claims in the complaint survive, the surviving claims should be made more definite and certain pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. I2(e). Because the Court recommends dismissing other claims, the Court analyzes this motion only in regard to the single malicious prosecution claim that survives against Lux.
A motion to make more definite is only appropriate when the complaint is "so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice to himself." Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff's thirty-nine-page complaint details each element of a state-law claim for malicious prosecution; he touches on the initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings against him, his ultimate acquittal, the injury he suffered, detailed facts demonstrating knowledge by those prosecuting and investigating the case that the charges were groundless, and Plaintiff expressly alleges Lux's direct involvement in opening the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff on June 12, 2012, as well as the fact that Lux "actively supervised and directed the activities of the detectives conducting the investigation." Compl. ¶ 11. If Lux believes he did not have such direct involvement or that the allegations are generally false, he need only deny them.
Thus, the Court is satisfied Lux—the only State Defendant against whom Plaintiff states a claim for relief—has received adequate notice of the basis for Plaintiff's claim and is satisfied that the complaint provides sufficient factual detail to allow a responsive pleading. Therefore, State Defendants' motion to make more definite should be denied.
Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends denying in part and granting in part State Defendants' motion to dismiss (#35). First, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's claim against Tweedt—though not against Lux—for state-law malicious prosecution. Based on the facts as pleaded, Tweedt is entitled to absolute immunity as it pertains to this claim; however, as explained, Plaintiff could conceivably cure this defect through the inclusion of additional facts. Next, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against both State Defendants. Plaintiff does not adequately articulate which facts demonstrate an intent to deprive him of his constitutional rights, nor does he identify State Defendants' individual involvement in any such transgressions, aside from broadly alleging all Defendants are liable. This defect can, however, be cured by adding sufficient facts to put State Defendants on notice of the actions showing an intent to deprive Plaintiff of specific constitutional rights and State Defendants' role in them, thus warranting leave to amend. Finally, State Defendants' motion for a more definite statement should be denied for the reasons articulated above.
This Report and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due no later than fourteen (14) days after the date this recommendation is filed. If objections are filed, any response is due within fourteen (14) days after the date the objections are filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6. Parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
