MEMORANDUM

A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 72) filed by Petitioner Shawn Luther Kelley ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se. For the reasons that follow, Petitioner's § 2255 Motion will be denied.

I. Background

A. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

On May 15, 2012, Petitioner was indicted for three Counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). (Doc. 1.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, on October 21, 2013, Petitioner pled guilty to all three Counts in the Indictment. (Docs. 48 & 53.) On January 23, 2014, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 100 months imprisonment on each of Counts I, II, and III, to be served concurrently. (Doc. 59.) Petitioner did not appeal his sentence.

On June 23, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant § 2255 Motion, raising one ground for relief pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). (Doc. 72.) Petitioner claims that the offense level used in calculating his sentencing guideline range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") was increased due to a robbery he committed in the year 2000. When liberally construed, Petitioner's Motion argues that his prior crime of robbery was found to be a "crime of violence" as defined under the "residual clause" in the Guidelines, and consequently his sentencing guideline range was increased based on an enhanced offense level as a career offender. Presumably, Petitioner contends that the offense level used in calculating his sentencing guideline range is inappropriate because the residual clause is unconstitutional under the vagueness principles set forth in Johnson, and Petitioner's prior crime of robbery does not otherwise constitute a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. Pursuant to Standing Order 15-6, the Court appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to represent Petitioner. (Doc. 73.) On July 15, 2016, the Federal Public Defender filed a motion to withdraw as counsel in proceedings related to Johnson, concluding that Petitioner was not sentenced as a career offender under the Guidelines. (Doc. 74.) The Court granted counsel's motion and stated that it would rule on Petitioner's § 2255 Motion in due course. (Doc. 75.) On August 3, 2016, the Court directed Petitioner to make a "Miller" election, providing him with an opportunity to withdraw his § 2255 Motion without prejudice. (Doc. 76.) The "Miller" Order specifically stated that if Petitioner failed to notify the Court about his decision within forty-five (45) days from the date of the Order, the Court would rule on his § 2255 Motion as filed. (Id. at 2.) To date, Petitioner has not contacted the Court since it issued its "Miller" Order.1

B. The Johnson and Beckles Decisions

The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), held that the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague, and an increased sentence imposed under that clause therefore violated the guarantee of due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The residual clause in the ACCA defined a "violent felony" as a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).2 The Court subsequently held that the Johnson decision announced a substantive rule that applied retroactively on collateral review. Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). In light of this decision, courts have been confronting whether provisions using similar or identical language as the ACCA's residual clause must also be struck down as unconstitutionally vague.

However, the Supreme Court recently held that its decision in Johnson does not authorize vagueness challenges to the Guidelines. Beckles v. United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2017 WL 855781, at *6 (Mar. 6, 2017). Accordingly, although the residual clause in the Guidelines used identical language as the ACCA's residual clause, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2),3 the Supreme Court expressly held that "the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) . . . is not void for vagueness." Beckles, 2017 WL 855781, at *6.

II. Legal Standard

"Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the Constitution." Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Section 2255 permits a prisoner sentenced by a federal court to move the court that imposed the sentence to "vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence" where: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

Section 2255(b) generally entitles a petitioner to a hearing on his motion, "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. . . ." See also Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts ("If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion and direct the clerk to notify the moving party."). Accordingly, a district court may summarily dismiss a motion brought under § 2255 without a hearing and without requiring a response from the Government where the "motion, files, and records, `show conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief.'" United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Hernandez, No. 3:CR-02-282, 3:CV-05-573, 2005 WL 3179920, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2005).

III. Discussion

Petitioner rests his § 2255 Motion on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson. (See Doc. 72, at 5 (raising only one ground for relief).) Specifically, Petitioner argues that the offense level used in calculating his sentencing guideline range was increased due to a prior "crime of violence"-a robbery he committed in 2000. (Id.)

However, even when liberally construed, Petitioner's Motion has no merit. As a preliminary matter, Petitioner pled guilty to three Counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).4 He was not sentenced under the ACCA or any other statute that is potentially susceptible to a vagueness challenge under Johnson. See In re Lott, 838 F.3d 522, 522-23 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.) (concluding Johnson had "no bearing" on petitioner's conviction for bank robbery under § 2113(a) because the statute "do[es] not contain language similar to the provision that the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally vague in Johnson"). Thus, Johnson has no application to Petitioner's conviction for three Counts of bank robbery.

Additionally, Petitioner was not sentenced as a career offender under the Guidelines. (See Presentence Report at 10, Doc. 77 (noting no Chapter Four Enhancements); T.R. 3:6-13, Doc. 68 (adopting the Guideline calculation set forth in the Presentence Report).) Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that his offense level was impacted by the residual clause in the Guidelines has no merit. Moreover, the Supreme Court has now expressly held that the Guidelines are not susceptible to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause, and, specifically, "that Johnson's vagueness holding does not apply to the career-offender provisions of the [Guidelines]." United States v. Ramos, ___Fed. Appx. ___, 2017 WL 894428, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2017) (citing Beckles, 2017 WL 855781, at *6).

As such, Petitioner's Johnson claim with respect to his sentencing guideline range fails on the merits, and his § 2255 Motion will be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the above stated reasons, Petitioner's § 2255 Motion (Doc. 72) will be denied. In proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, an applicant cannot appeal to the circuit court unless a certificate of appealability ("COA") has been issued. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a court may not issue a COA unless "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Restated, a COA should not be issued unless "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As reasonable jurists would not disagree with the resolution of Petitioner's § 2255 Motion, a COA will not issue.

An appropriate order follows.