OPINION

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

At issue in this appeal is whether Michael Calabretta's prior state conviction for eluding in the second degree qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines," or "U.S.S.G."). In light of Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), we hold that the District Court plainly erred in considering the state conviction to be a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. We will vacate Calabretta's sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

On March 15, 2013, Calabretta pleaded guilty to a two-count superseding information, charging him with conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846, and with conspiracy to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). Calabretta was subject to a five-year mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the stipulated charges in the plea agreement.

In advance of sentencing, the parties and the District Court received a copy of the Presentence Report (the "PSR"), which included Calabretta's Criminal History Category and Total Offense Level. The PSR considered multiple prior state convictions in calculating Calabretta's Criminal History Category, including a 1990 conviction for "Death by Auto" and a 1994 conviction for "Eluding in the Second Degree." The PSR also considered those two convictions to constitute "crimes of violence" pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and accordingly designated Calabretta as a "career offender" under the Guidelines.1 Application of the career offender Guideline increased Calabretta's Criminal History Category from III to VI, and increased his Total Offense Level from 29 to 31. With the career offender Guideline, Calabretta's recommended Guidelines sentencing range was 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. Had the career offender Guideline not applied, his recommended Guidelines sentencing range would have been 108 to 135 months.

At sentencing, the District Court adopted the PSR's calculation of Criminal History Category VI and Total Offense Level of 31, which included the application of the career offender Guideline. After considering the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ("section 3553(a)"), the District Court imposed a sentence of 120 months on each count to be served concurrently. Calabretta's sentence thus reflected a 68-month downward variance from the advisory Guidelines sentencing range.

In imposing Calabretta's sentence, the District Court extensively discussed Calabretta's earlier criminal convictions. The District Court noted that Calabretta became "involved in this particular scheme approximately five years after he was released from jail on his prior convictions and ... [he] should have learned [his] lesson." Appendix ("App.") 141. The District Court also indicated that "a very substantial sentence is required," in part, to "get through to [Calabretta] that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming by becoming a drug dealer is not reforming." App. 142. Additionally, the District Court denied Calabretta's request for a two-level reduction in his offense level, in anticipation of an amendment to the Guidelines. The District Court noted that Calabretta would be ineligible for a sentencing reduction under the amendment "given [his] prior criminal record." App. 132.

On September 11, 2014, the District Court entered the final judgment of conviction and sentence, which reflected the 120-month term of imprisonment imposed. Calabretta timely appealed.

II.2

At his sentencing, Calabretta did not challenge whether his state conviction for eluding in the second degree is a "crime of violence," so we will review the District Court's determination of that issue for plain error. To establish plain error, Calabretta must show that (1) the District Court erred; (2) the error was clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; and (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary course means that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010); United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 313-14 (3d Cir.2014). If all three elements are established, then the Court may exercise its discretion to award relief. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). That discretion should be exercised only in cases where the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2013).

III.

Calabretta argues that the District Court plainly erred in treating his conviction for eluding as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, and that his case should be remanded for resentencing.3 The Guidelines define a "crime of violence" as:

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The Government has conceded that Calabretta's eluding conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" only under what is known as the "residual clause" of the Guideline — as "otherwise involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."4 See Gov't Letter Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (Aug. 12, 2015).

A.

While Calabretta's appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), which held that an identically worded residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") was unconstitutional. Under ACCA, defendants are subject to a more severe punishment if they have three or more previous convictions for a "violent felony" — which included, under the statute's residual clause, "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Supreme Court precedent prior to Johnson had required courts to use a "categorical" approach to determine whether a crime fell within ACCA's residual clause. See Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). The categorical approach prescribed that courts "picture the kind of conduct that the crime involves in `the ordinary case,' and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury." Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)).

But in Johnson, the Supreme Court overruled its earlier cases — Sykes and James — that required courts to use the categorical approach to determine whether a crime was included in ACCA's residual clause. Rather, the Supreme Court invalidated, as unconstitutionally vague, ACCA's residual clause. The Supreme Court held that defendants were denied due process of law when their sentences were increased after application of ACCA's residual clause because the "indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges." Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557. The Court ruled that the indeterminacy inherent in both inquiries under the categorical approach — (1) imagining the conduct in "the ordinary case" of a crime, and (2) imagining the "serious potential risk" of that "ordinary case" — was, at least in combination, unconstitutionally vague.5 Id. at 2557-58. The Court also noted the practical results of prior jurisprudence interpreting the residual clause: numerous splits among the federal courts regarding the type of inquiry for determining what a crime is in "the ordinary case," and ultimately, which crimes fall within the residual clause. Id. at 2560. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that "[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison ... does not comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process." Id.

B.

Under the plain error standard, we must first consider whether the District Court committed an error when it considered the eluding conviction as a "crime of violence" in determining Calabretta to be a career offender under the Guidelines. Both the Government and Calabretta argue that, under Johnson, the identically worded "residual clause" of § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines is likewise invalid. This question, however, is one for the courts — not the parties — to decide. "Confessions of error... do not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function.... [O]ur judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 58, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

We hold that the "residual clause" in § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague.6 This holding flows from our prior case law wherein we have interpreted the "crime of violence" definition in the Guidelines identically to the "violent felony" definition in ACCA.7 For example, in United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507 (3d Cir.2009), we considered whether a second degree misdemeanor escape offense under Pennsylvania law qualified as a crime of violence under the residual clause of section 4B1.2. The case was remanded to us by the Supreme Court to be considered further in light of Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009), an ACCA decision dealing with whether the offense of failing to report for incarceration was a violent felony. See Hopkins v. United States, 555 U.S. 1132, 129 S.Ct. 995, 173 L.Ed.2d 285 (2009). We applied Chambers and held that while the Supreme Court in that decision "was not called upon to construe the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, the definition of a violent felony under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the definition of a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines that authority interpreting one is generally applied to the other." 577 F.3d at 511 (footnote omitted). In addition, we observed that the validity of our holding was "demonstrated by the Supreme Court's remand order in this case." Id.

More recently, in United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.2014), we considered whether a simple assault was a crime of violence under the Guidelines residual clause of section 4B1.2. Notably, the case was back before a panel of our Court after being remanded by the Supreme Court in light of its decision in Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) — a decision, like Chambers, involving application of the identical "violent felony" provision of ACCA. See Marrero v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2732, 186 L.Ed.2d 930 (2013). Our analysis relied upon numerous cases decided under ACCA. 743 F.3d at 394-401. We held that although those cases "involved sentencing enhancements under [ACCA] rather than the career offender Guideline, they nevertheless bind our analysis." Id. at 394 n. 2 (emphasis added). We explained that "`[p]recedent... requires the application of case law interpreting "violent felony" in ACCA to "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. 4B1.2[] because of the substantial similarity of the two sections.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir.2008)).

This approach of similarly interpreting the two residual clauses remains appropriate for the case before us now. Prior to Johnson, courts in this circuit were instructed to use the same categorical approach under both residual clauses for determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence — that is, "whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender." Marrero, 743 F.3d at 395 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). But in Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the indeterminacy inherent in the categorical approach, under ACCA, denied defendants due process by "den[ying] fair notice to defendants" and "invit[ing] arbitrary enforcement by judges." 135 S.Ct. at 2557.

It is apparent that if ACCA's residual clause "invites arbitrary enforcement," id. so does the residual clause in § 4B1.2. The process by which a sentencing court determines whether a prior conviction is a "crime of violence" is the same process that the Supreme Court held to be fraught with indeterminacy under ACCA. And the result of this indeterminate process — whether or not a defendant is designated a career offender under § 4B1.2 — will shift the "benchmark" or "framework" of the district court's sentencing determination by changing the recommended sentencing range. See Peugh v. United, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2072, 2083, 186 L.Ed.2d 84 (2013) (indicating that the advisory Guidelines serve as a "framework" for "anchor[ing]" sentencing decisions with the purpose of achieving "uniformity" in sentencing); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (indicating that the Guidelines, although advisory, "should be the starting point and the initial benchmark" in order to "secure nationwide consistency" in sentences imposed). See also Pawlak, 822 F.3d at 906 ("Peugh reflects the Court's judgment that the Guidelines are subject to constitutional challenges because the Guidelines are the mandatory starting point for sentencing determinations and district courts can be reversed for failing to correctly apply them despite the judges' discretion to deviate from the recommended range. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Peugh rests on the very same principles of fair notice and avoiding arbitrary enforcement underlying the doctrine of due process.") (citations omitted). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) ("The Commission, in promulgating guidelines... shall promote the purposes set forth ... with particular attention to the requirements ... for providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities."). This takes us back to first principles in sentencing, under which we require that courts calculate a defendant's Guidelines range as the first step in any sentencing, prior to application of the sentencing factors set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006). "[W]hen the starting point for the § 3553(a) analysis is incorrect, the end point, i.e., the resulting sentence can rarely be shown to be unaffected." United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir.2008). Thus, a defendant's recommended sentence (and ultimate sentence imposed) will likely be affected by how the sentencing court determines whether a prior conviction, viewed only in the abstract and not with reference to real-world facts, is a "crime of violence" under the § 4B1.2 residual clause.

Our holding also flows from our prior case law that considered constitutional vagueness challenges to the Guidelines. For example, in United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 78 n. 4 (3d Cir.2011), we held that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) was not unconstitutionally vague because it gave "a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct to which it applies" and did not "authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." See also United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 319-20 (3d Cir.1992) (holding that U.S.S.G § 2D1.1(c)(6) is not void for vagueness), superseded by Guideline on other grounds, U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 487 (eff. Nov. 1, 1993), as recognized in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir.1999). Our case law is supported by the Supreme Court's recognition that the Guidelines are sufficiently law-like to be subject to certain limits imposed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Peugh, 133 S.Ct. at 2082 (holding that erroneously applying amended Guidelines that are advisory but still increase a defendant's recommended sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the "change in law presents a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes" (quotation marks omitted)). See also United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the rule of lenity applies to the Guidelines).

We note, however, that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has declined to apply the vagueness doctrine to the advisory Guidelines. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1194-95 (11th Cir.2015) (holding that the § 4B1.2 residual clause was not invalid after Johnson). But the court in Matchett focused only on whether the advisory Guidelines could deny fair notice to a criminal defendant, and not whether a criminal defendant is protected against arbitrary enforcement in an advisory Guidelines sentencing system. See id. at 1194. We conclude, for the reasons previously discussed, that regardless of whether defendants are entitled to "fair notice" under an advisory Guidelines system,8 the due process concerns over arbitrary enforcement are implicated here. See United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 (10th Cir.2015) ("If one iteration of the clause is unconstitutionally vague, so too is the other.... Because the Guidelines are the beginning of all sentencing determinations, and in light of the unavoidable uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause, we hold that the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) is void for vagueness." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson supports our conclusion. In its discussion of arbitrary enforcement, the Supreme Court cited to cases involving the § 4B1.2 residual clause to demonstrate that ACCA's residual clause is "nearly impossible to apply consistently." See Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2560 (citing United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir.2013); United States v. Whitson, 597 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.2010) (per curiam); United States v. McDonald, 592 F.3d 808 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir.2009)). In addition, the Supreme Court vacated the sentences of some offenders who were sentenced under the residual clause of the Sentencing Guidelines, and remanded to the courts of appeals for further consideration in light of Johnson. See United States v. Maldonado, 581 Fed. Appx. 19 (2d Cir.2014), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2929, 192 L.Ed.2d 966 (2015); Beckles v. United States, 579 Fed. Appx. 833 (11th Cir.2014), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2928, 192 L.Ed.2d 973 (2015). As noted earlier, this type of Supreme Court action is significant. See Hopkins, 577 F.3d at 511.

We hold that the residual clause of the career offender Guideline, like ACCA's residual clause, is infected with "hopeless indeterminacy," Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2558, and is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.9 Therefore, we conclude that the District Court erred in determining that Calabretta was a career offender.10

C.

Second, the error here is plain. An error that is plain is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute," Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770), at the time of appellate consideration, see Henderson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1121, 1130-31, 185 L.Ed.2d 85 (2013). Although our Court has not ruled on the precise question as to whether the residual clause of section 4B1.2 is void for vagueness,11 we have previously entertained similar challenges, see Maurer, 639 F.3d at 78 n. 4, and we have held that Supreme Court cases construing ACCA "bind our analysis" of the career offender Guideline, Marrero, 743 F.3d at 394 n. 2. Therefore, as Johnson was decided while Calabretta's appeal was pending, and as our Court has consistently construed the career offender Guideline similarly to ACCA, the error here is plain.12

D.

Third, the error affected Calabretta's substantial rights. "[T]o have affected a defendant's substantial rights, a plain error must have caused the defendant prejudice, in that it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.'" United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770). The Supreme Court recently held that "[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range — whether or not the defendant's ultimate sentence falls within the correct range — the error can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error." Molina-Martinez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1345, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016). The Government, however, "remains free to point to parts of the record — including relevant statements by the judge — to counter any ostensible showing of prejudice the defendant may make." Id. at 1347 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, "in the ordinary case a defendant will satisfy his burden to show prejudice by pointing to the application of an incorrect, higher Guidelines range and the sentence he received thereunder. Absent unusual circumstances, he will not be required to show more." Id.

Despite conceding that Calabretta is no longer a career offender, the Government maintains that the error did not affect Calabretta's substantial rights. The Government points to the District Court's downward variance and the District Court's explanation that "`a sentence of 120 months ... is the minimum sentence sufficient to secure the purposes of sentencing that are set forth in [section] 3553'" as indications that the District Court would have imposed the same sentence irrespective of the Guidelines range. See Gov't Letter Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) (July 28, 2015) (quoting App. 143). We disagree with the Government's contentions. The record in this case does not "show ... that the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range." Molina-Martinez, 136 S.Ct. at 1346.

There are indications in the record that the application of the career offender enhancement did affect Calabretta's sentence. The District Court placed significant emphasis on Calabretta's criminal history and his lack of "reform." App. 141-43. The sentencing court noted that Calabretta was "not a stranger to the criminal justice system," that he "should have learned [his] lesson" from his prior convictions, and that his eluding conviction, in particular, "compounded" his lack of reform. App. 141. After focusing on Calabretta's prior convictions, the District Court indicated its belief that "a very substantial sentence is required," in part, "to get through to [Calabretta] that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming by becoming a drug dealer is not reforming." App. 142. We do not think any of those observations inapt, but we cannot divine whether the District Court would have placed such emphasis on Calabretta's criminal history and his eluding conviction, had he not been designated a career offender convicted of multiple, prior "crimes of violence."

Additionally, the District Court denied Calabretta's request for a two-level reduction in his offense level based on anticipated amendments to the Guidelines that lowered the offense level for certain narcotics offenses.13 In denying Calabretta's request, the District Court noted that Calabretta, as a career offender, would be ineligible for a sentence reduction under the amended Guidelines. App. 131-32. We cannot intuit whether the District Court would have granted the request if Calabretta were not a career offender, but we note that the District Court did grant such a request for two of Calabretta's co-defendants who were not designated career offenders with no objection from the Government.14 See Gov't Br. at 9 n.6. And had the District Court granted the reduction, Calabretta's recommended Guidelines range would have been 87 to 108 months. Calabretta's 120-month sentence, then, would constitute a 12-month upward variance from that Guidelines range.15

Moreover, we emphasize the sheer magnitude of the disparity between Calabretta's correct Guidelines range and his erroneously-enhanced Guidelines range. Designated a career offender, Calabretta had a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment. Absent that enhancement, his range was calculated as 108 to 135 months of imprisonment — or perhaps 87 to 108 months of imprisonment with a Guidelines range reduction in anticipation of Amendment 782. The difference amounts to years of additional time in prison. By contrast, the Supreme Court held in Molina-Martinez that an erroneous Guidelines calculation that affected the defendant's range by seven months constituted plain error. 136 S.Ct. at 1344. The size of the miscalculation here thus weighs strongly in favor of the conclusion that the error affected Calabretta's substantial rights.

We hold that the Guidelines miscalculation here is sufficient to show a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different absent the error. We cannot assume here that the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the career offender designation. To assume so — particularly when the record suggests that Calabretta's criminal history played a role in the ultimate sentence imposed — would "place us in the zone of speculation and conjecture." United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir.2013) (quotation marks and alteration marks omitted) (applying harmless error review). Therefore, Calabretta has demonstrated that the District Court's error affected his substantial rights.

E.

The Supreme Court has recently reminded us that "[u]nder the Olano framework, appellate courts retain broad discretion in determining whether a remand for resentencing is necessary."16 Molina-Martinez, 136 S.Ct. at 1348. But that broad discretion should not be exercised reflexively when the other elements of the plain error standard are met. Olano, 507 U.S. at 737, 113 S.Ct. 1770 ("[A] plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy the [plain error standard], for otherwise the discretion afforded by the [standard] would be illusory."); see United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 288-89 (5th Cir.2010) ("The discretion inherent in the plain-error standard is not tantamount to caprice, nor is it to be exercised because of sympathy or lack thereof for a particular individual or the public's or a judge's opinion as to the seriousness or heinous nature of a particular crime."). Our discretion is properly exercised in case-specific circumstances where an error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quotation marks omitted). That considerable standard has been met in this case.

Calabretta's advisory Guidelines sentencing range would have been substantially lower if he had not been labelled a career offender. If the District Court had applied a two-level reduction in offense level in anticipation of Amendment 782 — like it did with two of Calabretta's co-defendants — then Calabretta's sentence represents a 12-month upward variance from the applicable Guidelines range. Nor is this a situation where the District Court made clear that Calabretta's career offender status did not have an effect on his sentencing range. At his sentencing hearing, the District Court repeatedly emphasized Calabretta's criminal history and lack of reform following his prior convictions.17 Therefore, we cannot presume that the District Court would have likely imposed the same sentence had Calabretta not been designated a career offender. It is possible — perhaps even likely, given the below-Guidelines sentences of Calabretta and those of his co-defendants — that the District Court still would have imposed a below-Guidelines sentence under the correct Guidelines range.18

We are convinced that if we were to affirm Calabretta's sentence, which was imposed against the backdrop of a legally incorrect career offender designation and a significantly higher Guidelines range, it would indeed seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Madrid, 805 F.3d at 1212 ("[W]hen the correct application of the sentencing laws would likely significantly reduce the length of the sentence, circuit courts have almost uniformly held the error to implicate fundamental fairness issues." (quotation marks omitted)); cf. Tai, 750 F.3d at 320 ("[W]e exercise our discretion to correct the error because it increased the sentence without the necessary fact finding and thereby affected the integrity of the proceedings."). Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion to award Calabretta relief.

IV.

In sum, Calabretta has demonstrated the requisite elements to establish plain error, and we will exercise our discretion to award appropriate relief. We will thus vacate Calabretta's sentence and remand for resentencing.

FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The majority holds that Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), invalidates the residual clause of United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.2, removing Michael Calabretta's status as a career offender. I agree with this portion of the majority's opinion.1

But, that is where my agreement with the majority ends, as based on the sentencing record, the majority also finds that the District Court plainly erred when it considered Calabretta's now-removed career offender status in imposing its sentence. Though I agree that Johnson should apply in this case and that Calabretta no longer meets the career offender criteria, I disagree that the District Court's careful and thoughtful analysis at sentencing, which concluded in a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, was plainly erroneous. I dissent specifically to address the erosion of the doctrine of plain error review in our Circuit.

Michael Calabretta is no smalltime marijuana dealer, just selling some of his stash to a few friends to support a habit or to make ends meet. Rather, for more than two-and-a-half years, he participated in an extensive cross-country conspiracy that distributed over 100 kilograms of marijuana and he personally laundered more than ten million dollars in drug sale proceeds.

In spite of this formidable backdrop, Calabretta asks us to find that the District Court plainly erred when it imposed a 120 months' sentence, a sentence that was well below the career offender Guidelines range and can only be viewed as an act of leniency — the maximum leniency the District Court felt was deserved. We should not grant his request because, as the District Court clearly found, Calabretta's sentence was the "minimum sentence sufficient." J.A. 143.

If a defendant fails to timely object at the time a sentence is pronounced, as Calabretta failed to, the unpreserved issue is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2014). In order to satisfy the first three prongs of plain error, an appellant must establish that an error occurred, that the error was clear or obvious, and the error affected his substantial rights. If those requirements are met, we move to the fourth prong and determine if the "error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). If after a fact-intensive analysis we determine that the fourth prong has been established, we have the discretion to remedy the error. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009).

Here, the fourth prong has not been met. The District Court based its sentence on Calabretta's serious and extensive underlying and prior criminal conduct, not on his career offender status — and it specifically found that 120 months' incarceration was the minimum sentence it would impose. This is not an unfair sentence. Nor is it one that will affect the integrity or public reputation of the judiciary. Further, the majority's holding is troubling because the plain error test, specifically its fourth prong, requires stringent application. This holding will not only affect Calabretta but may affect future proceedings: a broadened plain error analysis will now apply in these cases. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to remand for resentencing.

I.

Calabretta has a significant criminal history, and he committed a serious crime. The District Court carefully considered these concerns and the other factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determined that, despite the career offender Guidelines range (that it erroneously found applied), a 120 months' sentence was sufficient but was the minimum sentence sufficient. Where the District Court provides this type of specificity, remand is not required.

In considering Calabretta's sentence under the fourth prong, we must remember that remand is a discretionary action that we may take only after a full review of the underlying facts. There is no basis for exercising our discretion where evidence otherwise overwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding or is conclusive. United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir.2001). Although a scant record cannot uphold a sentence based on an erroneous Guidelines range, "[t]he record in a case may show ... that the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range. Judges may find that some cases merit a detailed explanation of the reasons the selected sentence is appropriate." Molina-Martinez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1346, 194 L.Ed.2d 444 (2016). This rule of analysis, penned by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Molina-Martinez, is based on evidence that indicates the Guidelines are heavily relied upon by district courts in arriving at a sentence — in most cases.

The Supreme Court observed that in a majority of cases, absent a Government motion, district courts imposed sentences within the adopted Guidelines range.2 This case is an outlier. And, the record provides a clear picture of what the District Court intended. Calabretta was subject to, based on the incorrectly calculated Guidelines range, 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. If § 4B1.2 had not applied, Calabretta's Guidelines range would have been 108 to 135 months' imprisonment. Ultimately, Calabretta was sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range that would have applied without the career offender enhancement, receiving a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment. This sentence was outside of the career offender Guidelines range by almost six years and was not the product of a Government motion. Calabretta's sentence is thus in the minority of cases cited in Molina-Martinez and upholding it would not garner ridicule of this Court.

This is unlike a case our sister court grappled with after Molina-Martinez. In United States v. Hudson, 823 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.2016), the First Circuit found plain error where the defendant received a sentence that was within an erroneously calculated Guidelines range, despite the district court's consideration of the defendant's "quite serious" conduct and extensive criminal history. Id. at 18-19. The Hudson court made this finding, however, because the career offender Guidelines range was the "anchoring point" for the imposed sentence. Id. at 19-20. Here, the District Court was aware of the career offender Guidelines range; carefully reviewed Calabretta's substantial underlying conduct, criminal history, and the other statutory sentencing factors; and found that 120 months' incarceration — a sentence substantially lower than the career offender Guidelines range — was the "minimum sentence sufficient" to suit the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. J.A. 143. The career offender Guidelines range was not the anchoring point here, the District Court specifically chose to not apply it to the final sentence.

The majority focuses on the District Court's failure to specifically state how Calabretta's career offender designation affected the final sentence, but the record reveals that the District Court provided detailed reasons for how it arrived at the final sentence and why it did not apply the career offender Guidelines range.

Calabretta pleaded guilty to both a distribution offense and a money laundering offense, a plea that allowed him to escape a weightier sentence if the full import of his conduct in the distribution scheme had been considered. At sentencing, the District Court reviewed the underlying investigation which resulted in the recovery of over $1 million from Calabretta's residence, which was a small part of the earnings from the distribution scheme, and a log book that indicated that Calabretta was involved in laundering drug money through casinos. The District Court found it questionable that Calabretta's claimed income, which Calabretta said was gambling income, was not a part of the drug distribution scheme. Moreover, the District Court considered the need for deterrence given the purely monetary motivation that drove Calabretta's conduct, noting that Calabretta and his co-conspirators believed "that moving large amounts of marijuana was a good way to make lots of money and the record reflects that he did that." J.A. 140.

As for Calabretta's prior criminal conduct, the District Court found especially alarming the fact that Calabretta had "two dead people whose deaths are directly attributable to [his], frankly, incredible conduct" of drag racing and road rage. J.A. 141. The District Court also considered Calabretta's eluding offense, where he drove up an exit ramp the wrong way, as well as other car thefts and burglaries that Calabretta had committed, which were not predicate offenses under § 4B1.2. Calabretta's serious criminal history was bolstered by the fact that he committed the drug distribution offense only five years after he was released from jail on his prior convictions.

The District Court did not focus on Calabretta's career offender status. To the contrary, it specifically determined not to sentence him within the career offender range: "[T]he top of [the Guidelines range] was 235 months.... If I sentence you to the top of that [G]uidelines range, you'd be getting out when you were an old man." J.A. 143. The District Court instead focused on the specific case at hand — Calabretta's significant criminal history and culpability in the underlying offense. It found that it was "satisfied that a very substantial sentence is required here in order to, first of all, deter others who might be inclined to make millions of dollars quickly and easily from doing it; secondly, to get through to [Calabretta] that if [he] thought [he] had reformed, reforming by becoming a drug dealer is not reforming." J.A. 142. This led the District Court to find that a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment was the "minimum sentence sufficient" — a sentence that was well below the career offender Guidelines range.

The majority faults this dissent for its focus on the District Court's "minimum sentence sufficient" language. The District Court's "minimum sentence sufficient" statement, however, followed the District Court's admonition that it would not sentence Calabretta within a Guidelines range that would lead to his release when he was an old man. The Guidelines range that the District Court chose not to apply, to meet that goal, was the career offender Guidelines range. It is therefore more than reasonable to focus on the "minimum sentence sufficient" language because it followed the District Court's finding that it was not going to sentence Calabretta within the career offender Guidelines range.

Based on the record before us, there is no plain error. Affirming Calabretta's sentence would not undermine the integrity of this Court. The District Court provided a detailed explanation of the imposed sentence, a sentence unconnected from the Guidelines. The District Court weighed Calabretta's potential for recidivism, and we should not ignore that consideration when conducting plain error review, especially where the sentence is far removed from the career offender Guidelines range. United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 652 (5th Cir.2010) (considering the defendant's continued violations of the law in upholding his sentence even though the district court had conducted an erroneous Guidelines calculation at sentencing).3

The sentence imposed by the District Court fell within the now-applicable Guidelines range. The majority argues that the potential applicability of Amendment 782,4 which would make Calabretta's 120 months' sentence fall outside of the Guidelines range, should change the analysis in this case. But it does not. Calabretta's Guidelines range would be 87 to 108 months after applying Amendment 782. Calabretta would be eligible to receive a sentence of 87 months' imprisonment if the District Court, through its discretion, found that sentence to be appropriate. The majority asserts that because of this amended Guidelines range, the District Court could also decide to impose a sentence as low as 60 months, the mandatory minimum sentence for Calabretta's charged conduct. We cannot predict what the District Court will do. The majority is attempting to undertake such a prediction while, at the same time, arguing that I am undergoing a speculative analysis by relying on the District Court's actual words during sentencing. The majority cannot have it both ways.

The large disparity between the prior applicable Guidelines range and the sentence imposed, a variance sentence without a Government motion, supports a finding under Molina-Martinez that the District Court gave a fair sentence that was unaffected by the career offender designation. Instead, the sentence was motivated by Calabretta's own conduct and was the "minimum sentence sufficient" to deter such conduct in the future. Still, the majority cites two of our opinions and a Tenth Circuit opinion in support of its position that such a finding would be "speculative." These cases — United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381 (3d Cir.2013), United States v. Tai, 750 F.3d 309 (3d Cir.2014), and United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204 (2015) — actually support affirmance.

Zabielski was determined under a harmless error analysis and is distinguishable from our analysis here, which is more stringent. Even if generally applicable, we held that "an error is more likely to be harmless when it is clear from the record that the district court decided to vary from the advisory Guidelines range." Zabielski, 711 F.3d at 388. It is clear from the sentencing record, for the reasons above, that the District Court was not considering the career offender Guidelines range. The majority's assertion that affirming would be based on "speculation" is unsubstantiated.

Tai is unhelpful to the majority for the same reasons. We held in Tai that where the record fails to provide guidance as to why a particular enhancement was provided, and the proper fact finding regarding that enhancement is not undertaken, this Court may find that the integrity of the proceedings are affected. Tai, 750 F.3d at 319-20. Under such circumstances, this Court cannot speculate as to what facts were considered by the district court. Id. at 320. Again, the record here provides guidance. The District Court reviewed the underlying circumstances, disregarded the career offender Guidelines range, and sentenced Calabretta well below the erroneous range.

Finally, in Madrid, the Tenth Circuit applied Johnson to Madrid, a defendant that had erroneously been found to be a career offender. The court focused on Madrid's sentence of 188 months, a sentence at the lowest end of the erroneous career offender Guidelines range. The court found that the fourth prong had been met because the "correct application of the sentencing laws would likely significantly reduce the length of the sentence" because the now-applicable Guidelines range was 92-115 months. Madrid, 805 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted). The facts are distinguishable here. Calabretta was subject to a sentence within the lower, applicable Guidelines range and the District Court chose to forego a career offender sentence, opting to instead sentence Calabretta to 120 months, the "minimum sentence sufficient."

This Court should not fall into a trap of finding that every sentence that applied § 4B1.2's residual clause requires a remand. I am not suggesting that the fourth prong will never be met if Johnson is applied to others who were incorrectly found to be career offenders. But the sentence that Calabretta received is neither unfair nor will it undermine confidence in the judiciary. Consequently, I cannot assent to the majority finding otherwise.

II.

Given the record before us, I believe the majority fails to adhere to this Court's duty to narrowly apply the plain error rule, especially once it reaches the fourth prong. We must be forward thinking and look not only at the underlying proceeding but also to how future judicial proceedings will be affected by our plain error analysis in each case. United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 457 n.22 (5th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., dissenting). The majority's conclusion that the fourth prong has been met in this case will affect future judicial proceedings by broadening the application of plain error review. Review which has already been eroding.5

This prong must be applied vigorously even where an error is found because of an intervening Supreme Court decision. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 737 (10th Cir.2005) (discussing the applicability of Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). Consequently, it is important to carefully consider the fourth prong because "[r]eversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it." Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (citation omitted).

This public ridicule and encouragement of abuse of process is precisely what we must be aware of in ordering remand in this case. Even if Calabretta's substantial rights were affected, this "cannot, `without more,' satisfy the fourth prong of the plain-error analysis, ... and the Supreme Court has instructed that we are authorized `to correct only particularly egregious errors' on plain-error review." United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 931 (3d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (internal citation omitted)).

In sentencing matters, this means that we must consider the effect that a too low or too high sentence may have. For instance, a sentence that is too-low will deny the public of its entitlement to a sufficient sentence, but one that is too-high will deny a defendant a certain amount of freedom. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir.2005). Here, the District Court specifically stated that imprisonment of 120 months was the "minimum sentence sufficient" based on Calabretta's criminal history and his underlying conduct while discounting the career offender Guidelines range. Calabretta received leniency at the sentencing phase, a leniency that he likely did not deserve, but the District Court made clear this was the only break that Calabretta was entitled to.

It is hard to determine what record, if not the one here, would not meet the majority's standard for plain error. A district court will now be required to specifically say, no matter what happens in the future, the sentence imposed is the only sentence it would give within its discretion. I do not believe that we should implement this rule. We must be especially cognizant of this consideration and ensure that plain error is found only in "exceptional circumstances [for] particularly egregious errors," is "used sparingly," and is not collapsed into a harmless error analysis. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d at 433, 435. When applying the specific facts in this case, I believe that the majority has lost sight of the stringent test we must apply.

III.

I dissent in order to caution this Court to review how the facts in this case will impermissibly broaden the doctrine of plain error review. The District Court's reasoned analysis at sentencing, and careful consideration of the correct sentence for a weighty drug dealer, requires Calabretta's sentence of 120 months' imprisonment to stand, and remand, accordingly, should not be granted.