WALTERS, J.

Oregon law requires that "[i]n civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), of the Oregon Constitution; ORCP 59 G(2). In this negligence case, defendant admitted liability, and a jury of twelve was asked to decide the issues of causation and damages. The jury completed a special verdict form and unanimously agreed that defendant had caused damage to plaintiff. At least three-fourths of the jurors (i.e., nine of twelve) also agreed to award plaintiff specific amounts of economic and noneconomic damages. However, the same nine jurors did not agree on the amounts of economic and non-economic damages awarded. The trial court accepted the verdict and entered judgment for plaintiff, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Kennedy v. Wheeler, 258 Or.App. 343, 309 P.3d 196 (2013). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The facts relevant to the issue before us are procedural and uncontested. Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger.1 Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had "admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you * * * is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff." The court defined both economic and non-economic damages for the jury and then instructed it that, "[i]f you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover economic damages, you must award some noneconomic damages." The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form "according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court." The court explained that "[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question."

As completed by the jury, the verdict form provided as follows:

The court clarified that the number "12" in response to Question 1 indicated that all twelve jurors had agreed on that response. The court then read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, "yes, sir." Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was "your vote," ten jurors said "yes." Jurors one and three said "no." When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was "your vote," nine jurors said "yes"; jurors two, three, and twelve said "no."

The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, "I don't think there's nine agreeing, if I counted right." The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on non-economic damages. The following colloquy then ensued:

The trial court then discharged the jury. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record. At that point, defendant explained more fully:

Defendant then filed a written objection to entry of judgment and a motion for new trial, arguing that the verdict was invalid under Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), of the Oregon Constitution and ORCP 59 G(2), both of which provide that "[i]n civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion based on two independent "findings." First, the court found that defendant had failed to make a timely objection to the jury's verdict. Second, the court found that the jurors' vote on causation was unanimous, that at least nine of those twelve jurors had agreed on the measure of economic damages awarded, and that at least nine of those twelve jurors had agreed on the measure of noneconomic damages awarded. The court concluded that the law did not require the same nine jurors to agree on the amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded and that the jurors' concurrence on causation and damages was therefore sufficient. The court then entered a general judgment providing that trial of the case had resulted in a verdict for plaintiff against defendant. The judgment included a monetary award for the total of the economic and noneconomic damages that the jury had awarded — $365,386.

Defendant appealed, assigning error to the court's receipt of the verdict and entry of judgment.2 Defendant argued, as she had below, that the verdict was unconstitutional and violated ORCP 59 G(2), that the verdict was therefore invalid, and that the judgment based on that verdict must be reversed.

In her answering brief, plaintiff asserted both procedural and substantive arguments. She contended that defendant had failed to object to the verdict with sufficient clarity before the jury was dismissed and that the issue was therefore unpreserved. She also argued that Oregon law does not require that the same nine jurors agree on economic and noneconomic damages. Defendant argued that the court could and should reach the merits of the substantive issue that the case presented.

The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's preservation argument, but focused on a different procedural issue — the "law of the case" doctrine — that the court concluded resolved the case in defendant's favor. The court reasoned as follows:

258 Or.App. at 349-50, 309 P.3d 196.

On review in this court, defendant characterizes the Court of Appeals decision as a decision on subconstitutional grounds and adopts its "law of the case" analysis.3 We begin with that procedural issue and then take up the substantive question whether Oregon law requires that the same nine jurors agree on the specific sums of economic and noneconomic damages awarded.

I. LAW OF THE CASE

This court has described the "law of the case" doctrine as precluding relitigation of an appellate court holding after remand and on subsequent appeal:

State v. Pratt, 316 Or. 561, 569, 853 P.2d 827 (1993) (quoting Simmons v. Wash. F.N. Ins. Co., 140 Or. 164, 166, 13 P.2d 366 (1932)). The policies underlying that doctrine "essentially parallel those served by the doctrines of stare decisis and res judicata * * *, i.e., consistency of judicial decision, putting an end to litigation of matters once determined, and preserving the court's prestige." Koch v. So. Pac. Transp. Co., 274 Or. 499, 511-12, 547 P.2d 589 (1976) (citing Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967 Utah L Rev. 1 (1967)).

In the law review article cited in Koch, the author explains that "law of the case" is a concept that may arise in a number of different contexts "in which a ruling or decision has been made in a case and the same legal problem arises a second time in the same case." Vestal, 1967 Utah L Rev. at 4. In this case, defendant argues that that concept applies not only to preclude relitigation of an appellate court decision on remand but also to preclude reexamination of a trial court decision on a direct appeal. More specifically, in the context of this case, defendant argues that, when instructing the jury, the trial court essentially ruled that the same nine jurors must agree on the sums of economic and noneconomic damages awarded; accordingly, therefore, the trial court was required to adhere to that legal determination when the jury returned a verdict that was inconsistent with that ruling. Defendant also contends that the trial court's decision precludes plaintiff from arguing for a different interpretation of Oregon law on appeal and ties this court's interpretive hands as well. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the "law of the case" doctrine does not apply in these circumstances.

First, we are not persuaded that the trial court actually made a decision that the same nine jurors must agree on the amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded. The trial court instructed that the same nine jurors must "agree on each answer" on the verdict form. That form contained two questions. Question 1 asked whether defendant's negligence was a cause of damage to plaintiff. Question 2 asked the amount of plaintiff's damages and provided blank spaces for the jury to fill in the amounts of economic and noneconomic damages. Read together, one interpretation of the jury instructions and the verdict form was that they required only that nine of the twelve jurors who answered "yes" to Question 1 also agree on and fill in the blanks in Question 2. Another interpretation, however — that adopted by the Court of Appeals and argued here by defendant — is that the instructions and verdict form required that at least the same nine jurors who agreed to the sum specified for economic damages (if any) also agree to the sum specified for noneconomic damages (if any). We conclude that that second interpretation is not supported by the record.

In particular, after the court polled the jury, defendant told the court that "I don't think there's nine agreeing, if I counted right," and that "there were only the same eight." The court responded that "there was [sic] nine out of the twelve that voted for the unanimous verdict" and discharged the jury. Thus, it appears that, when the court instructed the jury and received its verdict, it understood its instructions to have the first of the two potential meanings that we have posited — i.e., that nine of the twelve who voted yes in response to Question 1 must also agree to Question 2. It was only when defendant later stated her exception for the record that the trial court understood defendant's theory to be that the same nine jurors had to agree on both types of damages. But even then, the court did not understand defendant to argue that that requirement arose from the court's instructions. The court told defendant that if that was her theory, she would have to raise it on appeal, because the court did not understand the "statute" to require such concurrence. Defendant responded that that was her objection. She did not tell the court that, regardless of what a statute, the constitution, or the rules of civil procedure required, the court's instructions required the same nine jurors to concur on both types of damages. From that record, we cannot conclude that, when the trial court instructed the jury, it made a deliberate ruling or decision that the same nine jurors must agree on the specific amount of economic and noneconomic damages awarded.

Furthermore, even if the trial court had made an initial determination that the same nine jurors must agree on economic and noneconomic damages, the trial court was not precluded from reconsidering that decision after the jury's deliberations had begun. A trial court may revise its instructions to clarify them or to address more specifically an issue that it previously had addressed more generally. See State ex rel. Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752, 756, 644 P.2d 1082 (1982) ("[A] court is not barred from changing a ruling which it believes to be erroneous if neither party has been prejudiced beyond simply ending up on the losing side of the ruling."). Had defendant advised the trial court of her interpretation of its instructions or had the trial court understood that its instructions were subject to more than one interpretation, the trial court would not have been bound by its prior instructions. It could have revised them and instructed the jury accordingly.4

Because the trial court's instructions in this case were susceptible to more than one interpretation and defendant did not inform the court of her interpretation or give the court or plaintiff an opportunity to consider whether reinstruction was necessary or appropriate, those instructions do not constitute a ruling of the trial court that establishes the "law of the case."

Just as importantly, the "law of the case" doctrine does not make a trial court's ruling binding on an appellate court. Thompson v. Coughlin, 329 Or. 630, 635 n. 5, 997 P.2d 191 (2000). In Thompson, the court observed that, although a ruling from the Court of Appeals operated as "law of the case" as to the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it did not bind the Supreme Court, which never had addressed the issue. See Vestal, 1967 Utah L Rev. at 20 ("After all, appellate courts exist to correct the errors made by inferior courts, so that it would seem to be illogical to say that a court can make a legal decision which is not subject to review.").

That is not to say, of course, that every trial court ruling is subject to appellate review. Defendant is correct that, when a party fails to object to a jury instruction, that party is foreclosed from appealing on the ground that the instruction was erroneous. Rules of appellate procedure preclude parties from raising issues on appeal that they did not raise in the trial court. ORAP 5.45 (error will not be considered on appeal unless claim was preserved in the lower court); see alsoState v. Wyatt, 331 Or. 335, 341, 15 P.3d 22 (2000) ("Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); State ex rel. Sam's Texaco & Towing v. Gallagher, 314 Or. 652, 663, 842 P.2d 383 (1992) (if party fails to object to jury instructions before jury retires, objection is waived). That preservation rule is not applicable here because plaintiff did not appeal from the trial court judgment or assign error to the jury instructions that the trial court gave. Rather, it was defendant who appealed from the trial court judgment. Consequently, defendant has not relied and does not rely on ORAP 5.45 or other preservation rules as a shield against an appeal by plaintiff. Instead, defendant seeks to use the trial court's jury instructions as a sword to keep plaintiff from responding to defendant's arguments about the reach of Oregon law and thereby limit this court's analysis of that issue.

To support her argument, defendant cites several cases in which this court has used the term "law of the case" in explaining its decisions. However, in those cases, the court did not use the term "law of the case" for the purpose that defendant urges. Rather, the court used the term to describe a party's obligation to preserve an issue for review, a jury's obligation to follow the instructions of the court, or the court's authority to presume that the jury has done so. For instance, in Fulton Ins. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Or. 206, 493 P.2d 138 (1972), superseded on other grounds by Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 330 Or. 376, 8 P.3d 200 (2000), the issue before the court was whether the trial court had erred in instructing the jury, over the defendant's objection, that an administrative rule required drivers to stop and remedy defective conditions in their vehicles. This court agreed with the defendant that the trial court had erred in giving the instruction, because there was no evidence in that case that permitted the jury to find that the defendant knew or could have known that his truck had developed a dangerous condition. Nevertheless, the court held that the error was harmless. The trial court also had instructed the jury that compliance with the administrative rule was excused "if the violation was caused by circumstances beyond the operator's control and if compliance was impossible." Id. at 223, 8 P.3d 200. This court presumed that the jury had followed that instruction and reasoned that, if the jury had found that the defendant had violated the administrative rule, the jury also must have found the violation to be excused: Under the undisputed evidence, compliance with the rule was impossible. Id. at 224, 8 P.3d 200.

In a footnote commenting on the wording of the excuse instruction, the court used the term "law of the case." The court stated:

Id. at 223 n. 5, 8 P.3d 200 (emphasis added). The court's purpose in dropping that footnote was to alert the bench and bar that, in Ainsworth, the court had disapproved the excuse instruction that the trial court had used in Fulton and that a different formulation was preferable. However, the court explained, its decision in Ainsworth did not affect the result that it reached in Fulton. In Fulton, the parties had not objected to the wording of the excuse instruction. Therefore, in conducting its harmless error analysis, this court could presume that the jury had followed the excuse instruction as given.

In Tou Velle v. Farm Bureau Co-op. Exchange, 112 Or. 476, 229 P. 83 (1924), this court also used the term "law of the case" to describe the effect of jury instructions on jury deliberations. In that contract case, the trial court had instructed the jury that if it found for the plaintiff, the plain-tiff's damages were $786.28 and the jury must fill in that amount of damages on the verdict form. After the jury had retired and deliberated, it sent out the following question:

Id. at 478, 229 P. 83. The court answered: "Reach such verdict as you think is right." Id.

The jury then returned a verdict for one-half of the amount of the uncontested damages. The defendant contended that the compromise verdict was invalid and not supported by the evidence. The plaintiff responded that the party against whom damages are awarded cannot contest their insufficiency. This court began its discussion by observing:

Id. at 480, 229 P. 83 (emphasis added); accord Columbia Co. v. Ross Island Co., 145 Or. 96, 108-109, 25 P.2d 911 (1933).

The court could have reached the results that it did in Fulton and Tou Velle had it omitted reference to the "law of the case" and relied on established preservation principles to decide that a party may not obtain review of an instruction to which the party has not objected, Sam's Texaco, 314 Or. at 663, 842 P.2d 383, or that an appellate court must presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions, Purdy v. Deere and Company, 355 Or. 204, 227, 324 P.3d 455 (2014) (so stating).5

The term "law of the case" is best reserved for use in the context in which a party seeks to relitigate an appellate decision. See Vestal, 1967 Utah L Rev. at 21 (discussing application of "law of the case" to preservation issues and concluding that such usage "in reality stands apart from the other situations" in which "law of the case" applies). Use of the term to address other issues may confuse rather than clarify.

In this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that defendant preserved the issue of the meaning of the provision that "[i]n civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict."6 The "law of the case" doctrine does not limit plaintiff's argument or this court's analysis of that issue. Accordingly, we proceed to the substantive question presented.

II. JUROR CONCURRENCE

Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), and ORCP 59 G(2) both provide: "In civil cases three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict." Although the text of those provisions is identical, defendant is correct that our analysis must begin by looking to the meaning of the rule. State ex rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592, 617, 260 P.3d 448 (2011) (court's practice is to address rule before turning to statute or constitution). Thus, the initial question that we address is the intent of the Council on Court Procedures (Council) when it adopted ORCP 59 G(2). State v. Vanornum, 354 Or. 614, 620, 317 P.3d 889 (2013); A.G. v. Guitron, 351 Or. 465, 479, 268 P.3d 589 (2011); Waddill, 330 Or. at 382 n. 2, 8 P.3d 200. After undertaking that analysis, we then assess whether the Oregon Constitution imposes additional or more stringent concurrence requirements.

To discern the intent of the Council, "we use an analytical process that parallels the one we use to interpret statutes — that is, we examine text, context, and, if helpful, legislative history." Vanornum, 354 Or. at 620, 317 P.3d 889. The text of ORCP 59 G(2) instructs that a jury's verdict need not be unanimous, but may be supported by a vote of three-fourths of its members. Thus, for a jury of twelve, at least nine jurors must vote in favor of the jury's verdict. When a verdict includes more than one finding, however, ORCP 59 G(2) is less explicit. It could mean that at least nine jurors must vote in favor of each of the jury's findings, or it could mean that the same nine jurors must vote in favor of all or some subset of those findings. As applied to the facts of this case, the parties agree that ORCP 59 G(2) requires that at least nine jurors agree on the answers to each of the questions posed by the court, including the amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded. The parties disagree, however, about whether that rule requires that the same nine jurors agree on the amounts of those two types of damages. In considering which of those potential meanings the Council intended, we turn to the rule's context, including its enactment history. Vanornum, 354 Or. at 620, 317 P.3d 889 (so stating).

In 1978, the Council promulgated the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, including ORCP 59 G(2).7 In adopting ORCP 59 G(2), the Council incorporated verbatim the wording of a 1953 statute — former ORS 17.355(1) (1977), repealed by Or. Laws 1979 ch. 284, § 199. At the time that the 1953 statute was enacted, the Oregon Constitution also permitted, as it does now, three-fourths of a jury to render a verdict.8

ORCP 59 G(2) does not define the term "verdict," but ORCP 61 addresses the issue, defining both "general" and "special" verdicts.9 ORCP 61 A pertains to general verdicts and provides:

ORCP 61 B permits a court to require a jury to return only a "special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact," and provides that if the court omits an issue of fact raised by the pleadings or the evidence, the court may make a finding.10

The Council derived the text of ORCP 61 from several sources. In ORCP 61 A(1), defining the term "general verdict," the Council used wording identical to that used in former ORS 17.405 (1977), repealed by Or. Laws 1979, ch. 284, § 199, a statute that dated to the Deady Code.11 Similarly, in the first sentence of ORCP 61 A(2), requiring that the jury assess the amount of recovery, the Council incorporated the substance of former ORS 17.425 (1977), repealed by Or. Laws 1979 ch. 284, § 199, also adapted from the Deady Code.12 In the second sentence of ORCP 61 A(2), providing that a jury may assess the amount of recovery by designating no amount of recovery, the Council reversed this court's decision to the contrary in Fischer v. Howard, 201 Or. 426, 458, 271 P.2d 1059 (1954). See Fredric R. Merrill, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: 1984 Handbook 140 (1984) ("The last sentence of 61 A(2) allows a jury properly to return a verdict in favor of a plaintiff asserting a right to recover damages in the amount of `zero' damages. See Fischer v. Howard [.]"). Finally, in ORCP 61 B the Council provided more detailed treatment of special verdicts. Before the adoption of ORCP 61 B, former ORS 17.405 provided: "A special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the judgment to the court."

From that context, it appears that the parties are correct that a fundamental requirement of ORCP 59 G(2) is that at least three-fourths of the jury must vote in favor of each of the jury's written findings that form a basis for the trial court's judgment. Oregon law has long used the word "verdict" to describe both a jury's pronouncement in favor of one party or the other and its assessment of recovery (a general verdict) and a jury's written findings (a special verdict). Thus, when a jury's verdict includes an assessment of a monetary recovery under ORCP 61 A(2), at least nine jurors out of twelve must agree on that assessment. Although a jury may be entitled to award zero dollars in damages under ORCP 61 A(2), at least three-fourths of the jurors must vote for that result.

In this case, that fundamental requirement was satisfied. The jury's verdict was a special verdict. The jury did not make a pronouncement in favor of plaintiff; it made factual findings. At least nine jurors voted in favor of each of those findings, including the assessment of economic and noneconomic damages, and the court entered a judgment based on those findings. The judgment provided that the trial had "resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff" against defendant. The judgment also included, in a section labeled "Money award," a judgment for the total of the economic and noneconomic damages assessed by the jury. Thus, at least three-fourths of the jury voted in favor of each of the written findings included in the jury's special verdict that formed a basis for the trial court's judgment.

That does not, however, resolve the question on which the parties disagree. Defendant argues that ORCP 59 G(2) imposes additional concurrence requirements and urges us to consider our prior decisions construing Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), as further context for our interpretation of the rule. Because the texts of the two provisions are identical, we agree that such analysis is appropriate. See State v. Shaw, 338 Or. 586, 600, 113 P.3d 898 (2005) (discussing prior interpretations of earlier versions of a provision); Mastriano v. Board of Parole, 342 Or. 684, 693, 159 P.3d 1151 (2007) ("[W]e generally presume that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on those statutes.").

We begin with Clark v. Strain, 212 Or. 357, 319 P.2d 940 (1958). In Clark, the jury rendered a general verdict "in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of [$10,000]." Id. at 360, 319 P.2d 940. Polling of the jurors revealed that only eight jurors had agreed both that defendant was liable and that plaintiff had incurred damages of $10,000. A ninth juror had agreed that defendant was liable, but had disagreed on the amount of damages awarded. The trial court announced that the verdict was 8 to 4 and therefore invalid. The jurors then corrected the court, explaining that nine jurors had voted in favor of liability and nine also had voted in favor of the damages awarded. However, one of the nine who had voted for the award of damages had voted against liability. Despite the fact that that juror's decision was logically inconsistent — in that a plaintiff is entitled to damages only if a defendant is liable — the trial court accepted the verdict.

On review, the court noted that the jury had rendered a general verdict and cited former ORS 17.405 for its understanding that a general verdict is a "pronouncement on all issues." Id. at 364, 319 P.2d 940. The court reasoned that such a verdict must be "a document reflecting the integration of the minds of the jurors to such an extent that it, in fact, constitutes a legal verdict" and that the trial court's discussion with the jurors demonstrated that the jurors' verdict did not meet that standard. Id. To comport with Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), the court opined, the same legally required number of jurors must agree on the issues necessary to support a judgment for the plaintiff — in that case, liability and damages. Id. at 359, 364, 319 P.2d 940. The court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment.

In reaching that conclusion, the court discussed a California case, Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165, 196 P. 57 (1921), in which the same nine jurors had not agreed on the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages awarded.13 In Clark, the court distinguished Earl on the basis that the jury's decisions on the amounts of the two types of damages were "independent." Id. at 365, 196 P. 57.14

The court later applied Clark in considering the validity of a jury's special verdict and, in doing so, clarified the reasoning on which Clark rested. In Munger v. S.I.A.C., 243 Or. 419, 414 P.2d 328 (1966), the plaintiff had received a final permanent partial disability award to compensate him for a 35 percent loss of use of one arm as a result of a 1961 injury. The plaintiff later claimed that he was entitled to an additional award for an aggravation of that injury. The workers' compensation board denied the plaintiff's claim, and, on the plaintiff's appeal, the first question to the jury was whether the plaintiff had suffered an aggravation. Nine jurors answered "yes" to that question. A subsequent question asked the extent of the loss of use that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the 1961 injury. Nine jurors answered that the plaintiff had suffered a 70 percent loss of use. However, two of those nine jurors were among the jurors who had answered that the plaintiff had suffered no aggravation at all. The trial court refused to receive the verdict and this court affirmed. This court reasoned that the decision of the two jurors that the plaintiff had not suffered an aggravation was inconsistent with their finding that the plaintiff's loss of use was greater than the 35 percent established in 1961, id. at 422, 414 P.2d 328, and that, "[i]f the findings are inconsistent, a verdict based on them is invalid." Id. at 426, 414 P.2d 328. The court cited Clark and explained that "[t]he reasons for requiring a general verdict to be consistent are equally valid as to special verdicts in which answers to more than one question are necessary to establish liability." Id. at 425, 414 P.2d 328. The court concluded that

Id. at 423-24, 414 P.2d 328.

We assume that when the Council adopted ORCP 59 G(2), it was aware of the court's decisions in Clark and Munger and intended that its rule be consistent with the court's interpretation of the identically worded constitutional provision.15 Therefore, we understand ORCP 59 G(2) to require that, when a jury of twelve renders a special verdict and makes written findings in response to questions posed by the court, (1) at least nine jurors must agree on the answers that form a basis for the trial court's judgment; and (2) the votes of the jurors on those questions must be consistent. That is, the jurors' answers to questions necessary to a judgment may not demonstrate a logical inconsistency.16

Before we apply ORCP 59 G(2) to the facts of this case, however, we must consider whether Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), imposes additional or more stringent concurrence requirements than does that rule. Although the court construed that constitutional provision in Clark and Munger, it did not fully analyze it under the rubric of Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992). In Priest, we explained that in evaluating the meaning of a constitutional provision, we begin with the "specific wording" of the provision, then discuss the "case law surrounding it," and finally consider the "historical circumstances" of its adoption.

As we observed in discussing the identical text of ORCP 59G(2), the text of Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), does not explicitly impose a concurrence requirement other than by declaring that a "verdict" may be reached by the agreement of three-fourths of a jury. And, as we also explained in discussing ORCP 59 G(2), the statutes that were in existence in 1910 when the voters approved Article VII (Amended), section 5(7), used the term "verdict" to mean a jury's written findings necessary to the court's judgment. Therefore, the constitutional framers likely intended to impose a fundamental requirement that at least three-fourths of the jury must vote in favor of each such finding.

Whether the framers intended to impose additional concurrence requirements is not obvious from the text of that provision. However, the voters' pamphlet submitted with the measure is instructive. The proponents of the measure stated that "[t]he purpose of this amendment is * * * to prevent mistrials and hung juries, by allowing three-fourths of a jury to render a verdict in civil cases." Official Voters' Pamphlet, General Election, Nov. 8, 1910, 176-77. The proponents further noted that "[m]any states now allow a majority of the jury in civil cases to render a verdict" and that in such states "[u]sually three-fourths of the jury is required to render a verdict." Id. at 177. The proponents did not specify which states had adopted such provisions, but our research indicates that fourteen state constitutions permitted civil verdicts by non-unanimous juries in 1910.17 We have not discovered an appellate decision in any of those states that would have been available to the drafters of the Oregon provision in 1910 and that interpreted such provisions to require that the same jurors decide all issues necessary to the verdict. From the available history, it therefore is probable that the voters intended only to increase the efficiency of the court system by permitting jurors to render non-unanimous verdicts, not to impose complex concurrence requirements.

When this court later decided Clark and Munger and interpreted Article VII, section 5(7), to require that the jurors' findings be consistent, it based those decisions on the need to have a jury's verdict function as a coherent whole. On further reflection and with greater attention to the historical circumstances existing at the time that that provision was adopted, we are not persuaded that it imposes more stringent concurrence requirements than those delineated in Clark and Munger and intended by the Council when it adopted ORCP 59 G(2).

The final step in our analysis is to apply ORCP 59 G(2) as we have construed it to the facts of this case. Defendant argues that, even if ORCP 59 G(2) does not require that the same nine of twelve jurors agree on all written determinations that a jury makes, it does require such concurrence as to the awards of economic and noneconomic damages because "economic damages are not recoverable in the absence of an award of noneconomic damages except in very limited circumstances which are not present in this case." In support of that contention, defendant cites Wheeler v. Huston, 288 Or. 467, 605 P.2d 1339 (1980).

Defendant is incorrect in her understanding of Wheeler. Wheeler does not make an award of economic damages dependent on an award of noneconomic damages. Rather, Wheeler addresses the problem posed by verdicts in which jurors who disagree about a defendant's liability arrive at an improper compromise and award only "special" damages.18 In Wheeler, the court explained that awards of only "special" damages had been deemed improper because they suggested that the jury had "stubbornly adhered to what was apparently a compromise verdict between some who found liability and others who found none." Id. at 471, 605 P.2d 1339 (quoting Hall v. Cornett, 193 Or. 634, 240 P.2d 231 (1952)). The court noted the difficulty of determining whether a jury had reached such an improper compromise, but decided not to abandon the effort. Instead, the court restated and adhered to the following rule:

Id. at 479, 605 P.2d 1339 (emphasis in original).

Here, plaintiff reiterates the criticism leveled at the rule discussed in Wheeler and argues that, because damages are no longer defined as "special" or "general," but instead are defined as "economic" and "noneconomic,"19 Wheeler does not represent current law and should be disavowed. However, even if Wheeler is still good law, the improper compromise that it prohibits is neither evident in this case nor a basis for imposing the juror concurrence requirement that defendant urges.

In this case, defendant admitted liability and all twelve jurors determined that defendant's negligence was a cause of some damage to plaintiff. The remaining issue for the jury's determination was the specific amounts of the economic and noneconomic damages plaintiff had suffered. We know, therefore, that the concern addressed in Wheeler — that jurors might have agreed to special or economic damages in spite of a decision that defendant was not liable — is not presented.

Further, we presume that each juror who voted to award plaintiff economic damages also decided that plaintiff was entitled to at least some amount of noneconomic damages. The trial court instructed the jury that "[i]f you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover economic damages, you must award some noneconomic damages," and we must presume that the jurors followed that instruction in answering the first question on the special jury verdict form. See Purdy, 355 Or. at 227, 324 P.3d 455 (requiring court to presume that jury followed trial court's instructions). Thus, we further presume that the jurors who disagreed with the noneconomic damages awarded disagreed only about the particular amount and not the fact of those damages. The jury verdict in this case does not demonstrate a compromise verdict in violation of the rule discussed in Wheeler.

Moreover, ORCP 59 G(2) addresses a different concern than that which was the subject of the court's decision in Wheeler. As we have explained, in a case in which a jury enters a special verdict, ORCP 59 G(2) requires that three-fourths of the jury agree on each of its written findings and that those findings be logically consistent. Under Clark, when the same nine out of twelve jurors do not agree on liability and damages their findings do not meet that standard. The same logical inconsistency is not apparent, however, when the same nine out of twelve jurors do not agree on the specific amounts of economic and noneconomic damages awarded. The law does not require a jury to award any specific amount of economic or noneconomic damages as a prerequisite to entry of a valid judgment for a plaintiff. ORCP 61 A(2). And logic does not require a connection between the amount of economic damages and the amount of non-economic damages awarded.20

In this case, at least nine jurors agreed on the sums of economic and noneconomic damages awarded and their verdict does not demonstrate a logical inconsistency similar to those that rendered the verdicts in Clark and Munger invalid. The jury's verdict did not violate ORCP 59 G(2) or the Oregon Constitution and the trial court was correct to accept it.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.