Filed: Jun. 24, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 14-4758 _ ISAAC K. FULLMAN, Appellant v. THOMAS KING KISTLER; MATTHEW SHUPENKO; JEFFREY HEFFRICH; JEFFREY T. HITE; CAPT. JOHN PERRYMAN; LT. M. GORDON; JEANNA ANANEA; KARLA MCCOOL; BRYAN CRAMER _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01740) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 27,
Summary: NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _ No. 14-4758 _ ISAAC K. FULLMAN, Appellant v. THOMAS KING KISTLER; MATTHEW SHUPENKO; JEFFREY HEFFRICH; JEFFREY T. HITE; CAPT. JOHN PERRYMAN; LT. M. GORDON; JEANNA ANANEA; KARLA MCCOOL; BRYAN CRAMER _ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01740) District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann _ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 27, 2..
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-4758
___________
ISAAC K. FULLMAN,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS KING KISTLER; MATTHEW SHUPENKO; JEFFREY HEFFRICH;
JEFFREY T. HITE; CAPT. JOHN PERRYMAN; LT. M. GORDON; JEANNA
ANANEA; KARLA MCCOOL; BRYAN CRAMER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01740)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2015
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Isaac Fullman appeals pro se from the District Court’s December 3, 2014 order
dismissing, with prejudice, his civil rights complaint filed in Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-
01740.1 For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
In 2010, the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania, convicted
Fullman of, inter alia, driving under the influence (“DUI”) and driving while his license
was suspended or revoked. Fullman was sentenced to a prison term of ten days to two
years for the DUI offense, with a concurrent 90-day prison term for driving while his
license was suspended/revoked. Fullman’s efforts to attack that judgment on direct
appeal and state court post-conviction review were unsuccessful.
Beginning in September 2012, Fullman filed a host of pro se civil complaints in
the District Court. A little background about these other complaints is helpful to
understanding the origin of the case at issue here. Each complaint concerned the traffic
stop that led to his DUI arrest, his criminal proceedings, and/or events that arose while he
was in prison serving his sentence. In that last category, Fullman alleged (as he did in his
complaint here), that (1) he did not receive credit for the one day that he had spent in the
custody of the Philadelphia Police Department, (2) he was not paid for the prison job that
1
On that same day, the District Court dismissed a complaint filed by Fullman in another
case (Civil Action No. 4:14-cv-01739). We address his appeal from that judgment in a
separate opinion. See C.A. No. 14-4757.
2
he held in April and May 2012, and (3) a pair of his socks were lost and not replaced by
the prison. Going forward, we will refer to these allegations as Claims 1, 2, and 3.
In March 2013, the District Court dismissed all but one of Fullman’s cases (Civil
Action No. 4:12-cv-01879) so that he could file one, all-inclusive complaint. In doing so,
the District Court indicated that Fullman could not obtain injunctive relief with respect to
Claim 1 because he was no longer in custody. Furthermore, the court concluded that
Claims 2 and 3 failed to state a viable claim because his pleadings indicated that he had
been afforded meaningful post-deprivation administrative remedies.
Shortly thereafter, Fullman filed his amended complaint in No. 4:12-cv-01879.
The United States Magistrate Judge who was assigned to the case observed that
this amended complaint is actually less complete than the
initial flawed pleadings filed by [Fullman]. For example, the
amended complaint contains no single case caption, and no
clear or comprehensive recital of the defendants Fullman
wishes to sue. Instead, the amended complaint appears to
simply summarize the nine prior complaints, each of which
was found to be flawed in a number of respects by the court.
(Mag. J. Report & Recommendation issued in Civ. Action No. 4:12-cv-01879 on May 16,
2013, at 2-3.) After reiterating some of the flaws found in Fullman’s earlier complaints
(but not the aforementioned flaws concerning Claims 1 through 3), the Magistrate Judge
“recommended that the defective claims and improper parties named in the [amended]
complaint be dismissed with prejudice.” (Id. at 14.) The Magistrate Judge further
recommended that “[s]ince Fullman’s amended complaint otherwise defies
comprehension or description, it is recommended that any remaining claims be
3
dismissed, but without prejudice to one final effort by Fullman to file a proper amended
complaint.” (Id. at 14-15.)
In June 2013, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
in part and rejected it in part. The court agreed that dismissal was appropriate, but
disagreed that further leave to amend should be granted. The court explained that the
amended complaint would be dismissed with prejudice in its entirety “because Fullman
has already been granted one opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim, but,
nevertheless, still failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and because
he failed to comply with this Court’s [instructions in its March 2013 order for filing an
amended complaint] . . . pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).” (Dist. Ct. Order issued in
Civ. Action No. 4:12-cv-01879 on June 12, 2013, at 2.) 2 The court’s order itself,
meanwhile, simply stated that “[t]he action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 41(b).” (Id. at 3.)
Fullman did not appeal from the District Court’s June 2013 order. Instead, in
September 2014, he filed the complaint at issue here, reiterating Claims 1 through 3. The
Magistrate Judge recommended that this new complaint be dismissed with prejudice,
concluding that it was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. On December 3,
2014, the District Court adopted that recommendation. Fullman now appeals from that
latest order.
II.
2
Rule 41(b) provides for the involuntary dismissal of an action where the plaintiff “fails
to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
4
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Fullman’s complaint. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm on any basis supported by
the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe,
650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “prevents
parties from relitigating an issue that has already been actually litigated.” Peloro v.
United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir. 2007). This doctrine applies when “‘(1) the
issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that
issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and
(4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.’”
Id. at 175 (quoting
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co.,
63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir.
1995)). There might be some question whether all of these elements are satisfied here. 3
We need not resolve that question, however, because (1) the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is not jurisdictional, see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP,
615 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 2010), and (2) Claims 1 through 3 otherwise fail.
3
As indicated above, neither the District Court nor the Magistrate Judge specifically
discussed Claims 1 through 3 when reviewing Fullman’s omnibus amended complaint.
Additionally, the court’s June 2013 dismissal of that pleading with prejudice was driven,
at least in part, by Fullman’s failure to comply with the court’s earlier order.
Accordingly, there may be a colorable argument that any determination as to Claims 1
through 3 was not “essential” to that dismissal. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n,
288 F.3d 519, 527 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[I]n determining whether the
issue was essential to the judgment, we must look to whether the issue was critical to the
judgment or merely dicta.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Recall that Claim 1 alleges that Fullman’s sentence was not credited for the one
day that he spent in the Philadelphia Police Department’s custody. To the extent that he
wishes to obtain an injunction directing the award of that credit, the proper vehicle for
seeking that relief would have been a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See
Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-86 (3d Cir. 2001). However, the time to file such a
petition has passed, as he is no longer in custody. See Maleng v. Cook,
490 U.S. 488,
490-91 (1989) (per curiam). To the extent that he seeks money damages, Claim 1 is
barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Williams v. Consovoy,
453 F.3d
173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that, in Heck, “the Supreme Court held that where
success in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of
conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination
of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or
sentence”); see also
id. at 177-78 (rejecting argument that Heck’s favorable termination
rule does not apply when the § 1983 plaintiff is no longer in custody).
Claims 2 and 3 allege that Fullman was deprived of certain property (i.e., a pair of
socks and payment for his prison job). “‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of
property’ by prison officials does not violate the Due Process Clause ‘if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.’” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 210
(3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)). Fullman has
indicated that post-deprivation administrative remedies were afforded to him, but he has
not alleged facts demonstrating that those remedies were not meaningful. Accordingly,
Claims 2 and 3 fail to state a viable due process claim. See
id. Furthermore, given that
6
the District Court previously notified Fullman of the flaw in these claims and he failed to
remedy it, there was no need for the court to grant him further leave to amend these
claims. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002)
(explaining that leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile).
In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s December 3, 2014 order.
Fullman’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
7
