PEARCE, Justice:
¶ 1 Asset Acceptance LLC appeals the district court's order quashing its writ of garnishment on the Unclaimed Property Division (Administrator).
¶ 2 Asset Acceptance obtained a default judgment against a debtor for his unpaid credit card debt. In an attempt to satisfy the judgment, Asset Acceptance applied for a writ of garnishment against Administrator to obtain unclaimed property held by Administrator but purportedly belonging to the debtor. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 64D (setting out the procedures for the issuance of a writ of garnishment). The district court issued
¶ 3 Administrator moved to quash the writ, arguing it could not be enforced against Administrator, an entity of the State. Administrator maintained that the State's governmental immunity and the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (the Immunity Act) bar the garnishment of property held by the State. The district court granted Administrator's motion to quash, concluding that Utah law does not require Administrator to comply with the writ of garnishment. Asset Acceptance appeals.
¶ 4 Asset Acceptance argues that Administrator must comply with the writ because governmental immunity does not apply in this situation, and, even if it did, that the Immunity Act waives any immunity Administrator might otherwise possess. Asset Acceptance also argues that its writ of garnishment is authorized by Utah Code section 78B-5-808 and the Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of a prior version of that statute in Funk v. Utah State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992).
¶ 5 These arguments require us to review the district court's order to determine if the court properly analyzed and applied various statutes. We review the district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness and afford no deference to the district court's decision. DePatco, Inc. v. Teton View Golf Estates, LLC, 2014 UT App 266, ¶ 6, 339 P.3d 126; see also Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998).
¶ 6 "Sovereign immunity — the principle that the state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent — was a well-settled principle of American common law at the time Utah became a state." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah 1983). Utah case law has long recognized that sovereign immunity generally prohibits actions against the State unless it has expressly waived its immunity. See Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah. 483, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913) ("[I]n the absence of either express constitutional or statutory authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained.").
¶ 7 The Utah Legislature codified the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the Immunity Act. See Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, ¶ 55, 356 P.3d 1172 ("Prior to the enactment of [the Immunity Act] in 1965, the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented a citizen from suing a state governmental entity for any act considered to be a function of government."). In defining the Immunity Act's scope, the Legislature has provided that the Immunity Act's "waivers and retentions of immunity" apply to "all functions of government, no matter how labeled," and in a separate subsection, that the Immunity Act "governs all claims against governmental entities or against their employees or agents arising [from the employee's or agent's official capacity]." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101(2)(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2014). The Immunity Act further states, "Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function." Id. § 63G-7-201(1).
¶ 8 Thus, absent a waiver, the State's governmental immunity prohibits Asset Acceptance from seeking to judicially compel
¶ 9 Asset Acceptance argues that not only has the State waived its governmental immunity with regard to the garnishment in this case, but that its garnishment is also authorized by the Immunity Act's general waiver of immunity in Utah Code section 63G-7-301(2)(a) for certain types of suits. Administrator counters that it is immune from Asset Acceptance's garnishment due to Utah Code section 63G-7-603's reservation of immunity from judicial actions taken through certain processes.
¶ 10 "Because we will not alter the meaning of a statute by judicial fiat, we must try to interpret it in accordance with the legislature's intent." Flowell Elec. Ass'n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump, LLC, 2015 UT 87, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d 91. "When we are faced with two statutes that purport to cover the same subject, we seek to determine the legislature's intent as to which applies." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997). In doing so, we "follow the general rules of statutory construction, which provide both that `the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute,'" id. (citation omitted), and "that when two statutory
¶ 11 Section 63G-7-301(2)(a) provides that immunity is waived "as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). Section 63G-7-603(2) provides, "Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity." Id. § 63G-7-603(2) (2014).
¶ 12 Section 63G-7-603 is the more specific statute. It provides that the precise action attempted by Asset Acceptance — garnishment — may not issue against a governmental entity. Id. In contrast, section 63G-7-301 addresses a much broader range of potential actions, including any action to recover or obtain possession of personal property. See id. § 63G-7-301(2)(a) (Supp. 2015). Thus, section 63G-7-603 applies here, preventing the issuance of Asset Acceptance's garnishment.
¶ 13 Moreover, Administrator's reading of the Immunity Act comports with our prior interpretation of section 63G-7-603. See Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, ¶¶ 13-14, 67 P.3d 1055. In Fisher, an attorney obtained a judgment for past-due child support and an award of future child support payments. Id. ¶ 2. His client sought the assistance of the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) to garnish her ex-husband's wages. Id. The attorney then filed an attorney lien on the funds ORS had collected. Id. ORS moved to quash the lien arguing, in part, that the Immunity Act did not permit such a lien. See id. ¶¶ 2, 7.
¶ 14 Specifically, ORS argued a prior (but identical) version of section 63G-7-603(2), which commands that "[e]xecution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity," precluded the lien. Id. ¶ 13 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We agreed, concluding that the funds the attorney sought to attach were "in the possession and control of ORS, a governmental agency that is immune from execution, attachment, or garnishment." Id. ¶ 14. Asset Acceptance does not discuss Fisher in its briefing.
¶ 15 Finally, Asset Acceptance argues that Utah Code section 78B-5-808 authorizes its garnishment in this action. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that a "common sense reading of [section 78B-5-808 shows] that the State is subject to garnishment
¶ 16 When interpreting a statute, "our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "When discerning the plain meaning of the statute, terms that are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such daily usage." O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[w]hen the meaning of [a] statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed." Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is ambiguous only when it is "susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations." Id. "A statute is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning. Rather, [a] statute is ambiguous [only] if it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons to have different meanings." Peeples v. State, 2004 UT App 328, ¶ 8 n. 3, 100 P.3d 254 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 17 Section 78B-5-808 provides,
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-808 (LexisNexis 2012).
¶ 18 Asset Acceptance argues that the operative language of section 78B-5-808 is its first clause, which provides for garnishment of "any credits or other personal property of, or owing any debt to, the defendant in any action." Id. Based on this broad language, it contends section 78B-5-808 provides for garnishment of both public employee and nonpublic employee property held by the State.
¶ 19 In contrast, Administrator contends that the district court's interpretation of section 78B-5-808 is correct; it asserts that the statute "makes clear that only a public official or employee may have his property garnished." Administrator reasons that the statute's broad statement "defendant in any action" is narrowed by "as a public official or employee" and that the broad statement "any credits or other personal property" is similarly narrowed by the later phrase "whether as salary or wages." According to Administrator, when the statutory language is read as a whole, it authorizes garnishment only against the salary or wages of a public official or employee.
¶ 20 We agree with Administrator and the district court. The only reasonable reading of the statute requires the State to respond to garnishments only if it is holding property owed as salary or wages to a public official or employee. When distilled to its component parts, the statute provides that the State is subject to "attachment, garnishment, and execution" when it "has in its possession or under its control" certain property of, or owing to, "the defendant in any action." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-808. And, most importantly, the statute narrows this potentially broad grant to only those situations where the property in the State's possession or control is held, "whether as salary or wages" and the defendant in the action is "a public official or employee." See id.
¶ 21 Asset Acceptance argues that the word "whether" and the words that follow it in section 78B-5-808 act only to illustrate certain descriptive examples of when a garnishment may be issued against the State. Based on this reading, Asset Acceptance argues that the statute has "broad application." We disagree. The statute's use of the word "whether" cannot reasonably be construed to
¶ 22 Asset Acceptance's argument is further undercut by the Legislature's actions following the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Funk v. Utah State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992). In Funk, First Security Bank obtained a writ of garnishment directing the Utah State Tax Commission to attach Funk's state tax refund. Id. at 819. After the Tax Commission complied with the writ, Funk filed suit against the Tax Commission, arguing that, as a state entity, the Tax Commission was immune from the garnishment and could not comply with the writ because no specific legislation authorized its compliance. Id.
¶ 23 The Funk court used a prior version of Utah Code section 78B-5-808 as the starting point for its analysis. See id. at 820. The then-applicable version of the statute authorized garnishments against the State when the property at issue was owing to "the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as a public official or employee, or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-15 (Michie 1987) (emphasis added). The supreme court held, "The `or otherwise' language and the phrase `the defendant in any action' indicate that the legislature intended the statute to have broad application." Funk, 839 P.2d at 820. The court concluded that, "[a]lthough the legislature can limit how and when the state may be subject to garnishment," the then-enacted statute authorized attachments, garnishments, and executions against both public and nonpublic employees. Id. at 821. It reasoned, "If the statute were intended to apply only to public employees, there would be no need to add `or otherwise.'" Id. at 820. Based upon this reading of the statute, Funk concluded that the statute "authorizes the [Tax] Commission to comply with a writ of garnishment of a state tax refund owing to nonpublic employees." Id. at 821.
¶ 24 Following Funk, the Legislature removed the words "or otherwise" from the statute. See Title 78 Recodification and Revision, ch. 3, § 840, 2008 Utah Laws 48, 437-38; cf. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-808 (LexisNexis 2008). Thus, prior to its amendment, the statute authorized garnishments against certain property owing to "the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as a public official or employee, or otherwise." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-15 (Michie 1987) (emphasis added). As amended, the statute provides for garnishments against certain property owing to "the defendant in any action, whether as salary or wages, as a public official or employee." Id. § 78B-5-808 (LexisNexis 2012). Through the amendment, the Legislature removed the language the Funk court relied upon to hold
¶ 25 Additionally, while we conclude the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and thus we are not required to look beyond the plain language of the statute, we also note that the statute's title, "Salaries of public officers subject to garnishment," comports with our reading of the statute. Id. And the statute's placement by the Legislature in Title 78B of the Utah Code — the judicial code — rather than in Title 63G — the general government code — suggests that it was not meant to have the broad effect attributed to it by Asset Acceptance. Had the Legislature intended to provide a broad grant of immunity from garnishment, it likely would have included the statute in the Immunity Act, located in chapter 7 of Title 63G of the Utah Code. While we do not rely directly on either of these factors in our decision, they nonetheless bolster our conclusion.
¶ 26 Thus, we conclude that Asset Acceptance's writ of garnishment against Administrator is not authorized by the plain language of Utah Code section 78B-5-808. We also hold that the Legislature's amendment to that statute supplants the applicability of the supreme court's holding in Funk to the current version of the statute.
¶ 27 Finally, it bears noting that, despite our ruling, the Utah Code provides Asset Acceptance with a path to obtain the property it seeks. The Unclaimed Property Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-4a-101 to-902 (LexisNexis 2014), provides a means for creditors to access the unclaimed property of third-party debtors. The Unclaimed Property Act provides that "the owner may receive from [Administrator] the principal amount turned over to the state." Id. § 67-4a-401. The Act defines "owner" as, among other things, "a creditor, claimant, or payee in the case of other intangible property." Id. § 67-4a-102(21)(c). Administrator therefore contends, "[A] creditor, which includes a judgment creditor like [Asset Acceptance], can simply file a claim for the debtor's unclaimed property claim. [Administrator] will satisfy the underlying unclaimed property claim ... up to the amount of the judgment or the amount of unclaimed property claim, whichever is less."
¶ 28 We conclude that neither the Immunity Act nor Utah Code section 78B-5-808 waives Administrator's governmental immunity with respect to the garnishment in this action. The Legislature's 2008 amendment to Utah Code section 78B-5-808 narrowed the scope of that statute and removed the language upon which the Utah Supreme
ORME, Judge (concurring):
¶ 29 I concur in the lead opinion. I confess that the alternative route to the same result outlined in the other concurring opinion also rings true.
¶ 30 But whether affirmance is mandated by the plain language of the key statute or by judicial precedent that reflects a misreading of several statutes, this simply is not good public policy. For the life of me, I cannot see why our Legislature would have any interest in protecting judgment debtors from making good on their just obligations. Stated the other way, I cannot see why our Legislature would want to hinder the State's citizens who hold valid judgments in their efforts to collect on those judgments. Yet that is the very upshot of the statutory scheme now in effect — at least as the statutory language has been interpreted by both of the state's appellate courts.
¶ 31 True, the current scheme does insulate state agencies from the modest inconvenience of preparing answers to garnishment interrogatories and, in appropriate cases, from the "trouble" of issuing and mailing a check payable to the successful garnishor. But this seems inconsequential in the face of the compelling competing interests, namely that the citizens of this State should make good on their just debts and that garnishment should be readily available as a tool in favor of judgment creditors to help make this happen.
¶ 32 Very simply, the State, like any other person or entity holding funds owed to a judgment debtor that ought properly be shifted to that debtor's creditor, should be required to facilitate the transfer. I hope the Legislature will immediately reconsider the current policy that instead insulates debtors from the reach of our garnishment laws as concerns those debtors' funds in the possession of the State or one of its entities, whether those funds be in the form of a public employee's salary, unclaimed accounts owned by the debtor, or a state tax refund.
VOROS, Judge (concurring dubitante):
¶ 33 I do not read the Governmental Immunity Act as the majority opinion does. I do read Funk v. Utah State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 818 (Utah 1992), as the majority does, and I agree it requires affirmance here. But I question the soundness of Funk.
¶ 34 First, as to the Governmental Immunity Act.
¶ 35 Section 63G-7-101 states that the Act's immunities and waivers "govern[] all claims against governmental entities or against their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." Id. § 63G-7-101(2)(b) (emphasis added). Reasonable minds could disagree as to whether a garnishment served on the State Treasurer constitutes a "claim." But the Act does not apply to all claims, only those "arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority." And Asset Acceptance's garnishment does not arise out of the performance of any governmental employee's duties. So even if Asset Acceptance's garnishment did qualify as a "claim" against a governmental entity, it nevertheless does not fall within the plain language of section 63G-7-101.
¶ 36 I also agree with the Tax Commission that § 63G-7-603 "does not appear to apply to writs seeking third party funds." That section states, "Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity." Id. § 63G-7-603(2) (2008). But we interpret statutes "in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And this sentence addressing garnishment appears in Part 6 of the Act, which deals with "actions" (which require an undertaking of not less than $300), judgments "against a governmental entity," and the unavailability of punitive damages against the government — in short, lawsuits against governmental entities. In this context, the statement that "garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity" most plausibly refers to the situation where the government is the judgment debtor, not the garnishee. True, our opinion in Fisher reads section 63G-7-603 to prevent liens against property owned by third parties. See Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, ¶ 13, 67 P.3d 1055. But I find Fisher unpersuasive for the reason stated by the Tax Commission: Fisher "never explains how the Immunity Act could have applied to the proceedings. There was no claim arising out of a public employee's duties."
¶ 37 In sum, I do not agree that sections 63G-7-101(2), 63G-7-101(3), or 63G-7-603 apply to a garnishment targeting third party funds in the hands of the State. But because I read Funk as the majority opinion does, I vote to affirm the judgment of the district court.
¶ 38 That said, I doubt the soundness of Funk. Funk seems to address governmental immunity, but in fact applies section 78B-5-808. See Funk v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah 1992). That section does nothing more than make "salaries of public officers subject to garnishment" — that is in fact the title of the section. The section resides in the Judicial Code, far from the Governmental Immunity Act, in a chapter titled "Procedure and Evidence" and a part titled "Miscellaneous." It does not purport to be a waiver of governmental immunity; indeed, nothing in Part 8 seems to address governmental immunity. The sections surrounding section 808 address tender, money deposited in court, bonds, payment of costs by the State and counties, service of process, sureties on stay bonds, depositions, releases, and comparative negligence.
¶ 39 So while we read Funk as an interpretation of the limits of governmental immunity, really it interprets a statute with no apparent connection to governmental immunity. Nor does Funk ever cite the Governmental Immunity Act. It refers to governmental immunity only twice; both references describe the allegations of the complaint filed in that case. And in that case, as in this one, the Tax Commission took the position that nothing in the Utah Code prevented the State from releasing third party funds to judgment creditors pursuant to writs of garnishment. See Funk, 839 P.2d at 820.
¶ 40 Affirming this judgment will have significant real world implications. I agree with Judge Orme that, whatever its source, the policy we are constrained to implement in this case makes little sense. As Judge Orme notes in his concurring opinion, today's holding protects "judgment debtors from making good on their just obligations." Supra ¶ 30. And today's decision may extend that protection to thousands of such judgment debtors. Based on its reading of Funk — which we today reject — the Tax Commission routinely processes the very type of garnishments the State Treasurer here resists. In the past three fiscal years, the Tax Commission has received and responded to a total of 10,729 writs, resulting in 2,651 refunds garnished to the tune of $1,249,635. Today's opinion will, I fear, end that practice.
