Filed: Jun. 10, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6-10-2004 A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-3075 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 558. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/558 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opi
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 6-10-2004 A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 03-3075 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 558. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/558 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opin..
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Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-10-2004
A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 03-3075
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
Recommended Citation
"A.M. v. Luzerne Cty Juvenile" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 558.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/558
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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF Appeal from the United States
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 01-cv-01276)
No. 03-3075 District Judge:
Honorable A. Richard Caputo
A.M., by and through his next friend and
mother, J.M.K., Argued April 16, 2004
Appellant
Before: RENDELL, STAPLETON and
v. LAY*, Circuit Judges.
LUZERNE COUNTY JUVENILE (Filed June 10, 2004)
DETENTION CENTER,
a department of Luzerne County,
Pennsylvania; Marsha L. Levick
*SANDRA M. BRULO, individually Lourdes M. Rosado [ARGUED]
and in her official capacity Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia
as chief administrator of the Luzerne 1315 Walnut Street, 4th Floor
County Juvenile Detention Center; The Philadelphia Building
LOUIS P. KWARCINSKI, individually Philadelphia, PA 19107
and in his official capacity Counsel for Appellant
as deputy chief probation officer in
charge of the Luzerne County Sean P. McDonough [ARGUED]
Juvenile Detention Center; Dougherty, Leventhal & Price
JEROM E PRAWDZIK, in his 75 Glenmaura National Blvd.
individual capacity; Moosic, PA 18507
CHRISTOPHER TRAVER, in his Counsel for Appellees Luzerne
individual capacity; County Juvenile Detention Center,
CHRISTOPHER PARKER, in his Sandra Brulo, Louis P. Kwarcinski,
individual capacity; Elaine Yoziak, Christopher Traver,
MICHAEL CONSIDINE, in his Christopher Parker, Michael
individual capacity; Considine, and Jerome Prawdzik
MARK PUFFENBERGER, M .D.,
in his official capacity;
ELAINE YOZVIAK, R.N., in her
individual capacity
*Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit
*(Amended per Clerk's Order dated Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by
8/14/03) designation.
James A. Doherty, Jr. [ARGUED] adjudicated delinquent and awaiting final
Scanlon, Howley, Scanlon & Doherty disposition and placement, and remained
321 Spruce Street there until August 19, 1999.1
1000 Bank Towers
Scranton, PA 18503 While at the Center, A.M. was
Counsel for Appellee physically assaulted by other juvenile
Mark Puffenberger, M.D. residents 2 on numerous occasions. On July
26, 1999, A.M. reported that other
residents had, among other things, spit on
him, punched him in the arm, put his head
OPINION OF THE COURT in a garbage can, and thrown urine on his
bed. An incident report completed by one
of the Center’s child-care workers, dated
LAY, Circuit Judge. August 1, 1999, states that A.M . was hit
on the back of the head with a ping-pong
A.M ., by and through his next paddle thrown by another resident.
friend and mother, J.M.K., filed suit under Another incident report, dated August 2,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law against 1999, relates that A.M. sustained a wound
the Luzerne County Juvenile Detention to his chest. The wound would not stop
Center (the “Center”) and several of its bleeding, and A.M. was taken to the
administrators and staff, alleging they hospital for treatment. Other incident
violated his substantive due process rights reports were completed by the Center’s
by failing to protect him from harm while child-care workers on an almost daily basis
he was detained at the Center. The District between August 2 and August 16, 1999.
Court granted summary judgment in favor These reports reveal that other residents
of all Defendants and declined to exercise punched A.M. in the face, hit him, choked
supplemental jurisdiction over the him, “whipped” him in the eye with a
remaining state law claims. A.M. appeals. towel, and threatened him with physical
For the reasons that follow, the District harm. The assaults left A.M. with multiple
Court’s order granting summary judgment bruises over his body, puncture wounds,
will be reversed in part and affirmed in black eyes, and swollen lips. The assaults
part.
1
At the time of his detention, A.M . was
I. BACKGROUND
thirteen years old, 4'11" tall, and about 92
pounds.
On July 12, 1999, A.M. was
arrested in Lake Township, Pennsylvania, 2
The parties consistently refer to the
for indecent conduct. He was taken to the youths detained at the Center as
Center, a secure detention facility for “residents.” For ease of reference, we will
children alleged to be delinquent or use the same designation.
2
also caused A.M . to suffer humiliation, Dr. Gitlin’s diagnosis of A.M. included a
fear, and emotional distress. Global Assessment Functioning scale of
20-30 out of a possible 100, indicating
Prior to his detention, A.M. had behavior that is “considerably influenced
eleven prior psychiatric inpatient by delusions or hallucinations or serious
hospitalizations for behavior problems, impairment in communication or judgment
was seeing a psychiatrist in the . . . or inability to function in almost all
community, and had been taking areas.” Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
medication to treat his Attention Deficit of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. 2000). Dr.
Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”). A.M. Gitlin stated that it was medically
suffered from several other mental and necessary for A.M. to have a highly
behavioral disabilities, including anxiety planned day, 7 days a week, 365 days a
disorder, depressive disorder, atypical year, and for A.M. to receive medication
bipolar disorder, and intermittent explosive on a continual basis in order to reduce his
disorder. The Center’s administrators and impulsiveness and motor restlessness. Dr.
supervisors were made aware of these Gitlin entered an order for A.M. to receive
facts upon A.M.’s admission to the Center the medication dexedrine, and A.M. began
or shortly thereafter. A.M.’s mental and receiving the medication on July 24, 1999.
behavioral problems were reflected in his After Dr. Gitlin’s evaluation of A.M., and
behavior at the Center, which included during the remainder of his detention, no
teasing and provoking other residents. mental health professional was called in to
After A.M.’s admission to the Center, he see A.M. or consult with the Center’s staff
initially did not receive any medication for about A.M.’s behavior, despite the
his ADHD because the Center could not ongoing difficulty child-care workers were
obtain the necessary authorization to refill having with him.
his prescription.
During A.M.’s detention, the
On July 23, 1999, a psychiatric Center’s administrators directed that A.M.
evaluation was performed on A.M. by Dr. should be placed on the girls’ side of the
Paul Gitlin for the purpose of assessing Center for a majority of the day. However,
A.M.’s current mental health treatment child-care workers periodically failed to
needs. During the evaluation, A.M . abide by this directive, which resulted in
complained to Dr. Gitlin about the A.M. being placed with boys who had
treatment he was subjected to by other previously assaulted him. On one
residents, and Dr. Gitlin observed that occasion, A.M. was sent from the girls’
A.M. had a bruise on his arm. Dr. Gitlin side to the boys’ side because he was
noted that A.M. had a long history of “getting on the nerves” of a child-care
mental health and behavioral problems and worker on the girls’ side.
that A.M . was having difficulty at the
Center because of his untreated ADHD.
3
On August 19, 1999, A.M. other children at Northwestern.
appeared in the Luzerne County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, for a In July of 2001, A.M., by and
disposition hearing. At the conclusion of through his next friend and mother,
the hearing, the court committed A.M. to commenced a § 1983 and state tort action
Northwestern Intermediate Treatment against the Center and the following
Facility (“Northw estern”) in administrators and staff: Sandra Brulo, the
Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, for Center’s chief juvenile probation officer,
an indeterminate period of time. who acted as the Center’s chief
administrator; Louis Kwarcinski, the
On the day of his admission to Center’s depu ty chief of juvenile
Northwestern, John DeAngelo, a counselor probation; Jerome Prawdzik, the detention
at Northwestern, saw that A.M. was supervisor at the Center; Chris Traver,
bleeding from a puncture wound on his Michael Considine, and Chris Parker,
chest. When DeAngelo asked A.M. about former child-care workers at the Center;
the wound, A.M. told him that he had been Elaine Yozviak, a former registered nurse
stabbed with an unknown object while at at the Center; and Mark Puffenberger,
the Center. A.M. went on to describe to M.D., a physician who provided contract
DeAngelo other physical assaults visited services to the Center. The suit alleged
upon him by residents of the Center. that the Defendants violated A.M.’s
DeAngelo proceeded to complete an substantive due process rights under the
incident report concerning the alleged Fourteenth Amendment to be free from
physical assaults. DeAngelo reported that harm and to receive appropriate medical
A.M. told him staff at the Center knew treatment while in their custody.
about the assaults but did not do anything
to stop them. In addition to the incident
report, DeAngelo completed a Report of II. DISTRICT COURT OPINION
Suspected Child Abuse, dated August 26,
1999, in which he recounted A.M.’s After discovery, the Defendants
allegations of abuse while at the Center moved for summary judgment. The
and inaction by the Center’s staff. The District Court granted the Defendants’
Report states that A.M. feared this type of motion on June 30, 2003. In its
abuse would continue at each of his future Memorandum accompanying the order
placements. DeAngelo and another granting summary judgment, the District
member of the Northwestern staff Court addressed each of A.M.’s claims
observed that A.M.’s eyes were black and against the Defendants.
blue when he arrived at Northwestern and
that A.M. appeared to be very scared. Count One. Count One of A.M.’s
Northwestern staff indicated that A.M. complaint alleged that the Center and
expressed fear that he would be hurt by Brulo and Kwarcinski, in their official
4
capacities, were liable for failing to protect The District Court granted summary
A.M. from harm and failing to treat him, judgment in favor of Dr. Puffenberger on
and that Dr. Puffenberger was liable in his A.M.’s claims that Dr. Puffenberger failed
official capacity for failing to treat A.M . to develop adequate medical policies for
the Center. The District Court assumed,
A.M. alleged several deficiencies for purposes of summary judgment, that
on the part of the Center, Brulo, and Dr. Puffenberger was responsible for
Kwarcinski as the basis for liability on developing such policies. However, the
Count One. The first allegation concerned District Court held that summary judgment
deficient hiring and staffing practices. The was appropriate because there was no
District Court granted summary judgment direct causal connection between A.M.’s
in favor of Brulo and Kwarcinski on this injuries and the allegedly deficient medical
allegation, after concluding that A.M. policies.
failed to show a direct causal link between
A.M.’s injuries and the alleged hiring of Count Two. Count Two alleged
e m pl o ye es without the requisite that Brulo, Kwarcinski, and Prawdzik were
educational degree or the alleged liable in their individual capacities for
understaffing of the Center. The second failing to protect A.M. from harm and
allegation concerned inadequate training failing to treat him. The claims against
of the Center’s staff. The District Court Brulo, Kwarcinski, and Prawdzik in Count
granted summary judgment on this Two were based on their failure to develop
allegation because A.M. failed to present policies and their failure to adequately
e v i d e n c e f r o m w h i c h d e l ib e r a te supervise the Center’s child-care workers.
indifference could be inferred. The third Because the District Court found that no
allegation concerned the lack of a written child-care workers under the supervision
policy or protocol to ensure youth safety. of these Defendants violated A.M.’s
The District Court granted summary constitutional rights, it granted summary
judgment to Brulo and Kwarcinski on this judgment in favor of Brulo, Kwarcinski,
allegation because there was no direct and Prawdzik in their individual
causal link between the lack of a policy capacities.
and A.M.’s alleged injuries. The final
allegation concerned the lack of policies Count Three. Count Three alleged
and procedures to address the mental and that Prawdzik, Traver, Parker, and
physical health needs of residents. On this Considine were liable, in their individual
allegation, the District Court held that capacities, for failing to protect A.M. from
there was no evidence to suggest that the harm. A.M.’s claims against Prawdzik,
Defendants’ actions were deliberately Considine, Traver, and Parker were based
indifferent. on allegations that the child-care staff
failed to intervene soon enough when
violence between A.M. and other residents
5
began to develop and failed to take A.M . viewing “the underlying facts and all
for medical care. reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing
Regarding A.M.’s claims that the the motion.” Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63
child-care staff did not intervene soon F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary
enough, the District Court compared the judgment is appropriately granted where
situation to a prison disturbance and there is no genuine issue as to any material
considered whether the staff acted fact and the moving party is entitled to
“maliciously and sadistically to cause judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
harm.” See Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d P. 56(c). However, summary judgment
335, 345 (3d Cir. 2000). In the District should not be granted where there is a
Court’s view, there was no evidence that “genuine” dispute about a material fact,
the staff acted maliciously or sadistically. “that is, if the evidence is such that a
With regard to the alleged failure of the reasonable jury could return a verdict for
staff to take A.M. to the nurse on certain the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
occasions, the District Court held that the Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
evidence did not support a conclusion that (1986).
this was done with deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need of A.M ., since he B. Substantive Due Process
sustained mostly bruises from the
altercations. In order to maintain a § 1983 claim,
“a plaintiff must show that the defendant
Count Four. Count Four alleged deprived him of a right or privilege
that Dr. Puffenberger and Yozviak were secured by the Constitution or laws of the
liable in their individual capacities for United States while acting under color of
failing to treat A.M. The District Court state law.” Williams v. Borough of West
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir.
Puffenberger and Yozviak, concluding that 1989). Analysis of a § 1983 claim begins
any omissions by Yozviak did not amount by identifying the “exact contours of the
to a wanton infliction of pain and the underlying right said to have been
evidence against Dr. Puffenberger violated” and then determining “whether
suggested, at most, negligence. the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a
constitutional right at all.” Nicini v.
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000);
III. DISCUSSION County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 841 n.5 (1998).
A. Standard of Review
There appears to be no dispute
We review the District Court’s between the parties that A.M. has a liberty
grant of summary judgment de novo, interest in his personal security and well-
6
being, which is protected by the presents a situation where “forethought
Fourteenth Amendment. See Youngberg about [a resident’s] welfare is not only
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-19 (1982). feasible but obligatory.”
Id. We therefore
The question thus becomes whether A.M. conclude that this case is properly
has adduced sufficient facts from which a analyzed using the deliberate indifference
reasonable jury could conclude that the standard. The circumstances of this case
Defendan ts’ conduct constituted a present a situation where the persons
violation of his constitutional rights. To responsible for A.M. during his detention
answer this question, we must “determine at the Center had time to deliberate
what level of conduct is egregious enough concerning his welfare. See Leamer v.
to amount to a constitutional violation and Fauver,
288 F.3d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 2002).
. . . whether there is sufficient evidence We now turn to the claims against each of
that [the Defendants’] conduct rose to that the Defendants.
level.”
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 809.
1. Claims Against Yozviak
When executive action is at issue, a and Dr. Puffenberger
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
right to substantive due process may be As to the claims in Count One and
shown by conduct that “shocks the Count Four against Dr. Puffenberger and
conscience.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47. Yozviak, we sustain the District Court’s
Negligent conduct is never egregious grant of summary judgment in their favor.
enough to shock the conscience, but We find no error in the District Court’s
conduct intended to injure most likely will grant of summary judgment in favor of
rise to the level of conscience-shocking. Yozviak on A.M.’s claim that she is liable
See
id. at 849. In between these two for failing to treat him. Like the District
extremes is a middle range of conduct Court, we find no evidence in the record to
known as deliberate indifference, which support A.M.’s claims that Yozviak acted
may rise to the level of conscience- with deliberate indifference in her alleged
shocking in certain circumstances.
Id. at failure to disseminate information to the
849-50. The question of whether conduct Center’s staff about A.M.’s mental health
amounting to deliberate indifference is history or take other steps in response to
sufficient to “shock the conscience” the information.
requires an “exact analysis of [the]
circumstances” in a given case.
Id. at 850. Likewise, we find no error in the
District Court’s grant of summary
The deliberate indifference standard judgment in favor of Dr. Puffenberger.
“is sensibly employed only when actual The evidence reveals that Dr. Puffenberger
deliberation is practical.” Id. at 851. As in is a general physician who was under
a prison setting, we believe the custodial contract with the Center to perform a
setting of a juvenile detention center medical evaluation of each resident,
7
including a physical examination, within constitutional violation. Bd. of County
forty-eight hours of admission. Dr. Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okla. v.
Puffenberger saw A.M. on only one Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A
occasion when he conducted the physical plaintiff can establish causation by
examination, and the record does not “demonstrat[ing] that the municipal action
include any evidence that Dr. Puffenberger was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as
was asked, or required, to conduct a to its known or obvious consequences.”
psychiatric evaluation of A.M. Even if we
Id. at 407.
assume for the purposes of summary
judgment that Dr. Puffenberger had some A.M. has identified the following
responsibility for formulating policies for policies or customs of the Center as
the Center, our review of the record leads providing a basis for liability: (1) deficient
us to the conclusion that A.M. failed to hiring and staffing policies and practices;
present sufficient facts that any failure of (2) lack of an adequate training program
Dr. Puffenberger with respect to his duties for the Center’s child-care workers in
rose to the level of deliberate indifference. critical areas such as de-escalating
conflicts between youths and managing
2. Claims Against the Center and youth behavior generally; (3) lack of
Brulo and Kwarcinski in established protocols to ensure youth
Their Official Capacities safety, including the management of
problematic youth behavior, de-escalation
A.M. asserts claims against Brulo of conflicts, and identification and
and Kwarcinski in their official capacities, protection of children at risk of
based on their status as policymakers for victimization; and (4) lack of established
the Center, and the Center itself. A suit policies to address the mental and physical
against a governmental official in his or health needs of youth residents.
her official capacity is treated as a suit
against the governmental entity itself. See The District Court did not focus on
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A whether A.M. had produced evidence of
governmental entity, like the Center, the existence of the alleged policies or
cannot be liable under a theory of customs. Instead, the District Court
respondeat superior or vicarious liability. directed its analysis to whether there was a
See Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social direct causal link between the alleged
Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). policies or customs and the harms suffered
Rather, in order for a governmental entity by A.M . See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d
(gen ericall y r e f e r re d t o a s a 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating a
“municipality”) to be liable for the § 1983 plaintiff must “establish that the
violation of a constitutional right under government policy or custom was the
§ 1983, the plaintiff must identify a policy prox imate cause of the inju ries
or custom of the entity that caused the sustained”). In the District Court’s view,
8
evidence of a causal connection was the residents was inadequate. Christopher
lacking. Our review of the record leads us Traver testified that he had to supervise as
to hold there exist sufficient facts to many as ten residents at one time, and he
prevent the grant of summary judgment submitted a resignation letter in which he
such that a jury should make the ultimate complained that only one child-care
determination as to the violation of the worker would be left with the residents
alleged policies or customs, as we discuss while he would be directed to complete
more fully below. Once evidentiary proof tasks unrelated to supervising the
is adduced, the issue of proximate cause is residents, such as cleaning and other
best left to the determination of a trier of janitorial-type duties.
fact. See id.
There is also evidence in the record
Deficient Hiring and Staffing that the Center was having problems with
the supervision of residents by child-care
A.M. presented evidence that a workers at or around the time A.M. was a
number of the Center’s child-care workers resident. For example, there are letters of
did not meet state standards for r e p r im a n d f r o m t h e C e n te r ’ s
educational training. Under state law, the administrators to individual child-care
Center’s child-care workers had to workers, rebuking those workers for
possess, at a minimum, either an Associate failing to adequately supervise the
Degree in one of the social sciences or residents and failing to follow certain
exceptional ability in lieu of the academic security measures.
credentials. 55 Pa. Code § 3760.55(b).
Employment applications produced for The above evidence is at least
certain child-care workers reveal that these sufficient to create a fact issue as to
workers did not possess the requisite whether the Center had a policy or custom
educational degree and there is no of deficient hiring and staffing. In
evidence that they had the credentials that addition to this evidence, A.M. submitted
would render them otherwise qualified for the unrebutted testimony of a corrections
the job. expert, Paul DeMuro, who opined that the
problems with inadequate supervision of
More significantly, A.M. presented residents directly contributed to the
evidence from which it may be inferred abusive treatment A.M. endured at the
that the Center failed to ensure that there Center. The District Court did not discuss
were enough child-care workers on duty to this evidence, but we believe the evidence
appropriately supervise youth at all times. provides a causal link between the hiring
Although Brulo testified in her deposition and staffing policies and A.M .’s injuries.
that the Center complied with staffing As long as the causal link between the
ratios, other evidence suggests that the alleged policy or custom and the
number of child-care workers supervising constitutional injury is “not too tenuous,
9
the question whether the municipal policy violation of constitutional rights, that the
or custom proximately caused the policymakers of the city can reasonably be
constitutional infringement should be left said to have been deliberately indifferent
to the jury.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 to the need.”). The deficiency of a
F.2d 845, 851 (3d Cir. 1990). Based on municipality’s training program must be
this standard, we conclude the evidence of closely related to the plaintiff’s ultimate
the causal connection between these injuries. Id. at 391.
policies and A.M.’s injuries presented a
jury question. The record discloses the following
with respect to the training of the Center’s
Inadequate Training child-care workers. Child-care workers
received a three-day orientation after they
Analysis of substantive due process were hired, which essentially involved on-
claims requires full consideration of all the the-job training with respect to such issues
circumstances of a given case. See Lewis, as the Center’s physical plant and fire
523 U.S. at 850. Therefore, the evidence safety. Brulo testified that the orientation
of deficient hiring and staffing policies included training on dealing with
must be considered in context with the behavioral issues, but she did not identify
evidence A.M. submitted concerning the any specific training in this area. Brulo
lack of an adequate training program for also spoke generally about training in the
the Center’s child-care workers. A.M. areas of mental health and dealing with
contends the Center failed to train its children, but she failed to describe with
child-care workers with respect to de- any specificity the training program for
escalating conflicts between youth, child-care workers.
managing youth behavior generally,
dealing with sex offenders, and identifying Kwarcinski testified that the entire
and protecting youth in the population who staff of the Center received training on
would be easily victimized. dealing with physical threats to their own
safety and threats from bombs or weapons.
A municipality may be liable for Although Kwarcinski testified that staff
failing to train its employees if that failure received training on defensive tactics in
amounts to deliberate indifference. See dealing with conflicts between residents,
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, he stated that there was no training on how
389-90 (1989) (explaining that failure to to de-escalate conflicts between youths or
train may amount to a policy or custom identify children that could be easily
that is actionable under § 1983 when “in victimized by other residents in the Center.
light of the duties assigned to specific Other testimony indicates that child-care
officers or employees[,] the need for more workers received training in CPR and first
or different training is so obvious, and the aid but did not receive training in de-
inadequacy so likely to result in the escalating youth conflicts or identifying
10
and protecting youths that could be easily County, 520 U.S. at 409-10 (“[A] high
victimized. degree of predictability may also support
Against this evidence, A.M. an inference of causation -- that the
presented the unrebutted testimony of his municipality’s indifference led directly to
corrections expert, DeMuro. DeM uro the very consequence that was so
opined that the Center did not have an predictable.”).
adequate training program for its staff and
did not meet nationally recognized In our view, the evidence supports
standards for training, which included an inference that the potential for conflict
having forty hours of pre-service training. between residents of the Center was high.
In DeMuro’s opinion, the Center’s failure Taken as a whole, we believe the evidence
to train its staff and follow other concerning the Center’s failure to train its
recognized standards for the operation of child-care workers in areas that would
juvenile detention facilities directly reduce the risk of a resident being deprived
contributed to the inappropriate treatment of his constitutional right to security and
of A.M. while he was detained. well-being was sufficient to prevent the
grant of summary judgment. In other
The Center suggests that the words, we cannot hold that the Center
numerous incident reports filed by child- “was not deliberately indifferent to the risk
care workers demonstrate that A.M.’s as a matter of law.” Berg v. County of
failure-to-train claim cannot be sustained. Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 277 (3d Cir.
However, we fail to see the logic in this 2000). Viewing the record in the light
argument. Rather than support the most favorable to A.M., we conclude the
Center’s position, we see how a jury could evidence concerning the Center’s training
view the incident reports as additional program presents a genuine issue of
evidence of the lack of training for the material fact as to the sufficiency of that
child-care workers. Several of the incident program and whether the inadequacies in
reports indicate that child-care workers the program bear a causal relationship to
watched conflicts between A.M. and other A.M.’s injuries.
residents escalate without intervening,
resulting in physical injury to A.M. Lack of Policies to Ensure Youth Safety
Viewing the incident reports in the light
most favorable to A.M., they demonstrate On appeal, A.M. argues he
the need for more or different training of presented sufficient evidence from which
child-care workers to deal with residents a reasonable jury could infer that the
like A.M., who have significant behavioral Center’s lack of established policies and
and mental health problems. The incident procedures to ensure youth safety may
reports also support an inference that have caused his injuries “at least in part.”
recurrent harm to A.M. at the hands of
Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851. In this regard,
other residents was predictable. See Bryan A.M. focuses primarily on the Center’s
11
lack of a written policy or procedure for question on whether the Center’s failure to
reviewing and following up on incident establish a written policy and procedure
reports. for reviewing and following up on incident
reports amounts to deliberate indifference,
There is contradictory testimony in we conclude that a reasonable jury could
the record regarding who was responsible conclude from the evidence that by failing
for reviewing incident reports and deciding to establish such a policy the Center
what course of action should be taken in disregarded an obvious consequence of its
response. Brulo and Kwarcinski believed action, namely, that residents of the Center
Jerome Prawdzik was responsible for could be at risk if information gleaned
reviewing all incident reports in the first from the incident reports was not reviewed
instance, investigating them, and giving and acted upon. Similarly, a reasonable
feedback to the child-care workers. jury could infer that the failure to establish
However, Prawdzik testified that incident the policy was causally related to the
reports would first go to Kwarcinski, who constitutional violations of which A.M .
would decide which reports should go to complains. See Natale v. Camden County
Prawdzik. Prawdzik indicated that either Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 585 (3d Cir.
Brulo or Kwarcinski had responsibility for 2003) (holding that a reasonable jury could
deciding what course of action should be conclude that a governmental entity’s
taken in response to the incident reports. failure to establish a policy to address the
immediate medication needs of inmates
DeM uro testified that the Center was deliberately indifferent).
had diffuse accountability and poor
communication in key areas such as Lack of Policies Regarding Residents’
reviewing and following up on incident Physical and Mental Health Needs
reports. In his opinion, deficiencies like
these illustrated that the Center had The District Court granted summary
seriously flawed policies and procedures judgment in favor of the Center, Brulo,
that contributed to A.M.’s injuries and and Kwarcinski on A.M.’s claim that the
abusive treatment. In addition to relying lack of policies or procedures to address
on this testimony, A.M. asserts that a the physical and mental health needs of
written policy clarifying the roles and residents led to a violation of his
r e s p o n si b i li t ie s of th e C e n t e r ’ s constitutional rights. The District Court
administrators and staff with respect to the concluded that there was insufficient
incident reports would have at least evidence that the Center was deliberately
minimized the chance that A.M. would be indifferent to A.M.’s medical needs, and
inappropriately placed with youth who had insufficient evidence that any policy or
previously assaulted him. custom of not providing mental health care
worsened A.M.’s condition or otherwise
Although this issue presents a close caused him constitutional injury.
12
that the Center was deliberately indifferent
We first address the District Court’s to his serious mental health needs.
c o n c l u s io n t h a t A .M . p r e s e n te d
insufficient evidence to suggest that the A.M. presented evidence that the
Center was deliberately indifferent to his Center’s administrators were aware, upon
serious medical needs. In this regard, the his admission, that he had serious mental
District Court applied the deliberate health and behavioral problems, which
i n d i f ference standard for Eighth required medication and psychiatric care.
Amendment claims brought by prisoners There is conflicting evidence in the record
against prison officials for failure-to-treat. regarding whether the Center ever
A.M. takes issue with the application of contacted A.M.’s treating psychiatrist to
this standard, noting that he was not a discuss his medication and treatment
convicted prisoner but merely a juvenile needs. A.M. also presented evidence that
detainee. Given his status as a detainee, after Dr. Gitlin’s evaluation of him on July
A.M. maintains his claims must be 23, 1999, no other mental health
a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h e F o u r te e n t h professionals were consulted or asked to
Amendment. treat A.M., despite the ongoing difficulties
the Center was having in managing his
We do not dispute that A.M.’s behavior. Rather than attending to the
claims are appropriately analyzed under underl y in g m e n t a l h e a lth iss u es
the Fourteenth Amendment since he was a contributing to the difficulties in managing
detainee and not a convicted prisoner. A.M ., the Center viewed him as merely a
However, the contours of a state’s due behavior problem.
process obligations to detainees with
respect to medical care have not been A.M. presented the unrebutted
defined by the Supreme Court. See City of testimony of his psychiatric expert, Dr.
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, Annie Steinberg, who stated that the
244 (1983). Yet, it is clear that detainees Center did not provide appropriate
are entitled to no less protection than a treatment for A.M.’s pre-existing mental
convicted prisoner is entitled to under the health condition while he was a resident.
Eighth Amendment. See id.; see also According to Dr. Steinberg, the Center did
Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 344. In Estelle v. not “mon itor, or recogn ize th e
Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme exacerbation of [A.M.’s] psychiatric
Court held that a prisoner may state a symptoms, warning signs and the need for
cause of action under § 1983 upon modifications to the intervention, or
showing that a prison official was demonstrate the fundamental principles
deliberately indifferent to his serious relevant to the care of juveniles.” (J.A. at
illness or injury.
Id. at 104-05. It is under 108a.)
this standard that we assess whether A.M.
has presented sufficient evidence to show We conclude the evidence A.M.
13
presented was sufficient to survive health concerns to the staff. There were
summary judgment on whether the Center also the specific recommendations made
was deliberately indifferent to A.M.’s by Dr. Gitlin for managing A.M.’s mental
mental health needs. A reasonable jury health problems and behavior, which do
could conclude from the evidence that the not appear to have been read by the
Center knew about A.M.’s significant Center’s administrators, shared with the
mental health issues but was unprepared to child-care workers, or incorporated into a
take the steps necessary to address those plan for A.M .’s safety or treatment.
issues. We believe a genuine issue of Finally, Dr. Steinberg opined that the
material fact exists as to whether the Center’s failure to provide appropriate
Center’s failure to establish policies to treatment for A.M.’s pre-existing mental
address the mental health needs of health illnesses and protect A.M. from
residents like A.M. amounted to deliberate harm worsened A.M.’s mental health
indifference. condition. A.M. argues this testimony
demonstrates that the combination of his
We next turn to A.M.’s argument mental health con ditions and the
that he presented ample evidence that the circumstances surrounding his detention
Center’s lack of policies to address the created the direct harm that led to his
physical and mental health needs of injuries.
residents caused him harm. A.M.
presented the unrebutted testimony of We believe the evidence A.M.
DeMuro that the Center had a seriously adduced on the issue of whether the lack
flawed intake and assessment system, of policies to address the mental and
which failed to provide for the sharing and physical health needs of residents caused
dissemination of critical information about his injuries is “not too tenuous.”
his mental health history. DeMuro opined Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851. We therefore
that poor staff communication, particularly conclude that the issue of causation should
concerning the medical and mental health have been left to a jury.
Id.
needs of residents, contributed to A.M.’s
ongoing abuse by other residents. In In summary, based on the foregoing
addition to DeMuro’s testimony, A.M. reasons, we hold that the District Court
presented evidence that the Center never erred in granting summary judgment in
contacted his treating psychiatrist after his favor of the Center and Brulo and
admission and had no protocols to address Kwarcinski in their official capacities.3
when a resident’s treating psychiatrist was
to be contacted, what follow-up was to be
done once a resident received a mental 3
As stated earlier, the parties do not
health evaluation, and w ho was
appear to dispute that A.M. has a protected
responsible for comm unica ting
liberty interest in his personal security and
information about a resident’s mental
well-being. Implicit in this opinion is the
14
3. Claims Against Brulo, Kwarcinski, Kwarcinski in their roles as policymakers
and Prawdzik in Their Individual for the Center. Individual defendants who
Capacities are policymakers may be liable under
§ 1983 if it is shown that such defendants,
A.M.’s claims against Brulo, “with deliberate indifference to the
Kwarcinski, and Prawdzik in their consequences, established and maintained
individual capacities allege that they are a policy, practice or custom which directly
liable for developing inadequate policies caused [the] constitutional harm.”
and customs and failing to adequately Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882
supervise their subordinates. The District F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989). Evidence in
Court disposed of the claims against these the record show s that Brulo and
Defendants, concluding there was no Kw arcin ski had responsibility for
evidence to suggest that any person under developing policies and procedures for the
their supervision violated A.M .’s Center. Given our conclusion that A.M .
constitutional rights. Because A.M.’s presented sufficient evidence to present a
claims implicate these Defendants in their jury question on whether the Center’s
roles as supervisors, we address the claims policies and procedures caused his
in terms of supervisory liability. injuries, we conclude summary judgment
in favor of Brulo and Kwarcinski in their
There are two theories of individual capacities was inappropriate.
supervisory liability that are applicable to
this case. The first involves Brulo and The second theory of liability
provides that a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she
participated in violating the plaintiff’s
view that, given this protected interest, a
rights, directed others to violate them, or,
state-run juvenile detention center at least
as the person in charge, had knowledge of
has a duty to protect detainees from harm
and acquiesced in his subordinates’
(whether self-inflicted or inflicted by
violations. See Baker v. Monroe
others) and provide, or arrange for,
Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir.
treatment of mental and physical illnesses,
1995). Again, given our conclusion, as
injuries, and disabilities. A juvenile
discussed below, that A.M. presented
detention center is comparable to a prison,
sufficient evidence to prevent the grant of
which, in general, does not have as its
summary judgment on whether the child-
primary aim the treatment of mental or
care workers were deliberately indifferent
physical illnesses, injuries, or disabilities,
to A.M.’s constitutional rights, we believe
but nonetheless has a duty to care for and
summary judgment in favor of their
protect its inmates. On remand, the district
supervisors was inappropriate. The
court should more precisely define the
incident reports prepared by the child-care
duties the Center owes to its residents and
work ers provided notice to their
consider the scope of those duties.
15
supervisors that A.M. was being assaulted A.M. contends the Fuentes standard
by other residents and had severe behavior is inapplicable in this case because it
problems. While there is some evidence applies to the use of force by prison
that Brulo, Kwarcinski, and Prawdzik took officials in a single instance of prisoner
some disciplinary action with respect to unrest where there is a need to act quickly.
certain child-care workers, A .M.’s In contrast to a single instance of prisoner
evidence that they took little or no action unrest, A.M. points out that he was
to protect him is sufficient to present a assaulted by other residents on numerous
genuine issue of material fact as to their occasions over a five-week period of
knowledge of and acquiescence in the detention, many times in the presence of
conduct of the child-care workers. child-care workers. A.M . argues that it is
inappropriate to apply the deferential
Based on the foregoing, we hold malicious and sadistic standard in a case
that the District Court erred in granting such as his where there were almost daily
summary judgment in favor of Brulo, physical altercations between A.M. and
Kwarcinski, and Prawdzik in their other residents. A.M. urges that his case is
individual capacities. more appropriately judged by the
deliberate indifference standard. We
4. Claims Against Prawdzik, Considine, agree.
Traver, and Parker
This case does not appear to us as
The District Court granted summary one in which the child-care workers were
judgment in favor of these former child- required to make split-second decisions to
care workers and their immediate maintain or restore order through the use
supervisor on A.M.’s claim that they of excessive physical force. Cf. Hudson v.
repeatedly failed to protect him from harm. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992)
On appeal, A.M. argues the District Court (holding that the core judicial inquiry in
applied the incorrect standard for assessing cases where prison officials are accused of
their liability. As noted above, the District using excessive force in the prison
Court relied on the standard for assessing disturbance context is “whether force was
claims of excessive use of force by prison applied in a good-faith effort to maintain
officials in the prison disturbance context. or restore discipline, or maliciously and
See
Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 345 (holding that sadistically to cause harm”). Instead, the
excessive force claims in the context of a evidence in this case presents a situation in
prison disturbance require a subjective which child-care workers and their
inquiry into whether the force was applied immediate supervisor had the opportunity
in a good-faith effort to restore or maintain over a five-week period to see a pattern of
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically physical assaults against A.M. emerging,
to cause harm). consult amongst each other concerning the
appropriate response to this pattern, and
16
develop a plan to protect A.M. from We conclude that the District Court
assaults by other residents. should have analyzed A.M.’s claims
against the child-care workers and their
Other courts have applied the immediate supervisor using the deliberate
deliberate indifference standard in cases indifference standard. The deliberate
where prison officials failed to protect an indifference standard in this context
inmate from attack by another inmate. requires evidence that the Defendants were
See, e.g., Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk
913 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the of harm to A.M. and did nothing to
deliberate indifference standard to claim prevent it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
that prison officials failed to act on rumors U.S. 834 (1994). 4 Applying this standard,
that Hispanic inmates were planning to we believe the evidence, viewed in the
attack Black inmates); Williams v. light most favorable to A.M., is sufficient
Mueller,
13 F.3d 1214, 1216 (8th Cir. to present a jury question on whether the
1994) (explaining application of the child-care workers and their immediate
deliberate indifference standard to a prison supervisor were deliberately indifferent to
official’s obligation to protect inmates A.M.’s right to security and well-being.
from harm by other inmates); Walker v. See
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 816 (Rendell, J.,
Norris,
917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. dissenting) (“whether or not a defendant’s
1990) (applying the deliberate indifference conduct amounts to deliberate indifference
standard to claim that prison officials has been described as a ‘classic issue for
failed to prevent one inmate from stabbing the fact finder’ and ‘a factual mainstay of
and killing another inmate). actions under [§] 1983’”) (quoting
Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 577
While this circuit has not spoken (7th Cir. 1998)).
directly on this issue, we have held that a
corrections officer who witnesses but fails The evidence, in particular the
to intervene in the beating of an inmate by
other officers is culpable if the officer had
a “reasonable opportunity” to intervene but 4
We note that the claim in Farmer was
refused to do so. Smith v. Mensinger, 293
based on the Eighth Amendment, not the
F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002). Although
Fourteenth Amendment. However, as we
Mensinger is not directly on point, it
previously discussed, the contours of a
nonetheless provides support for our
state’s due process obligations to detainees
conclusion that the District Court erred in
have not been defined. See Doe v.
applying the malicious and sadistic
Washington County, 150 F.3d 920, 922
standard of Fuentes to A.M.’s claims
(8th Cir. 1998). We reiterate that
against the child-care workers and their
detainees are entitled to no less protection
immediate supervisor.
than a convicted prisoner. See id.;
Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 344.
17
numerous incident reports, supports
A.M.’s contention that the child-care
workers failed to intervene when
altercations between A.M. and other
residents began. More troubling is
evidence that suggests child-care workers
would allow A.M. to get beaten up
because they were sick of him and he
deserved it. In our view, this evidence is
sufficient to prevent the grant of summary
judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the
District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Prawdzik, Considine,
Traver, and Parker must be reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we will AFFIRM the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Elaine Yozviak, in her individual
capacity, and Dr. Mark Puffenberger, in
his individual and official capacities.
However, we will REVERSE the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Center, Sandra Brulo and
Louis Kwarcinski, in their official and
individual cap acitie s, and Jerome
Prawdzik, Chris Traver, Chris Parker, and
Michael Considine, in their individual
capacities, and REMAND the case for
further proceedings.
18
