Filed: Feb. 17, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2-17-2004 Major League Umpires v. Amer League Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 02-1103 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "Major League Umpires v. Amer League" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 953. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/953 This decision is brought to you for free and open acc
Summary: Opinions of the United 2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 2-17-2004 Major League Umpires v. Amer League Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential Docket No. 02-1103 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004 Recommended Citation "Major League Umpires v. Amer League" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 953. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/953 This decision is brought to you for free and open acce..
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Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-17-2004
Major League Umpires v. Amer League
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 02-1103
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004
Recommended Citation
"Major League Umpires v. Amer League" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 953.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/953
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PRECEDENTIAL THE MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRES
UNITED STATES COURT OF ASSOCIATION
APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT v.
THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF
Nos: 02-1103/1124/1276 PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS;
_______________ THE NATIONAL LEAGUE
OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
THE MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRES CLUBS; OFFICE OF THE
ASSOCIATION COMM ISSIONER OF BASEBALL
v. (D.C. No. 01-cv-02790)
THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS; BASEBALL; AMERICAN LEAGUE
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS; CLUBS; NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS
BASEBALL
v.
(D.C. No. 01-cv-02790)
MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRES
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF ASSOCIATION; WORLD UMPIRES
BASEBALL; AMERICAN LEAGUE ASSOCIATION
OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
CLUBS; NATIONAL LEAGUE OF (D.C. No. 01-cv-02816)
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS
Office of the Commissioner of Baseball;
v. American League of Professional
Baseball Clubs; National League of
MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRES Professional Baseball Clubs
ASSOCIATION; WORLD UMPIRES Appellants No. 02-1124
ASSOCIATION _______________
(D.C. No. 01-cv-02816)
The Major League Umpires Association,
Appellant No. 02-1103
THE MAJOR LEAGUE UMPIRES Howard L. Ganz, Esquire
ASSOCIATION Neil H. Abramson, Esquire (Argued)
Appellant No. 02-1276 Daniel R. Halem
Proskauer Rose LLP
v. 1585 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
THE AMERICAN LEAGUE OF
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS; Steven R. Wall, Esquire
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF Michael S. Burkhardt, Esquire
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS; Megan E. Shafer, Esquire
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
BASEBALL 1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
________________
Counsel for Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 01-cv-02790, OPINION
01-cv-02816)
District Judge: ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
This appeal involves a labor dispute
between Major League Baseball and its
Argued on December 9, 2002 umpires, the majority of whom resigned in
protest over what they viewed as
Before: *BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH objectionable polic ies w hich th e
and SMITH, Circuit Judges Commissioner of Baseball sought to
__________________ implement during the 1999 season.
* Judge Becker’s term as Chief Although all of the resigning umpires
Judge ended on May 4, 2003. eventually attempted to rescind their letters
of resignation, the events that followed left
(Opinion filed: February 17, 2004) a substantial number of them unemployed.
The twenty-two unemployed umpires
Patrick C. Campbell, Jr., Esquire subsequently filed grievances that were
(Argued) submitted to an arbitrator.
Phillips & Campbell, P.C.
314 North Middletown Road The District Court confirmed the
Lima, PA 19037 Arbitrator’s determination that the dispute
fell within the scope of the arbitration
Counsel for Appellant/Cross Appellee clause of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), and further confirmed Commissioner’s Office. Specifically, the
the Arbitrator’s disposition of the MLUA believed that Commissioner Selig
grievances of nineteen of the umpires. In was attempting to implement various new
their appeals, both sides challenge the policies that violated the CBA between the
confirmation of the portions of the Award MLUA and the Leagues. 1
unfavorable to them. In addition, the
Leagues contend that the dispute was not To resolve its disputes with the
arbitrable in the first instance. For the Leagues, the MLUA attempted to force the
reasons stated below, we will affirm the Leagues to negotiate with it over the
judgment of the District Court. proposed new policies by organizing a
mass resignation of its members. The
I. Factual Background MLUA apparently believed that, by
electing to pursue a mass resignation
The Major League Umpires Association strategy as opposed to a strike or other
(MLUA or Association) represents form of work stoppage, it could avoid
umpires employed by both the American violating the no-strike clause contained in
League of Professional Baseball Clubs and the CBA 2 and force the Leagues to bargain
the National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs. The American and 1
National Leagues together comprise what These policies included proposals to
is commonly referred to as Major League (1) evaluate the consistency of individual
Baseball (MLB). Each League has its own umpires’ interpretation of the strike zone;
president, operates as a separate entity, and (2) utilize a computerized “pitch
employs its own umpires. Generally simulator” to improve umpire training;
speaking, the Commissioner of Baseball (3) use MLUA umpires to officiate an
broadly oversees the operation of the exhibition game to be played in Cuba
Leagues and participates in decisions without engaging in separate negotiations
affecting the game as a whole. However, with the MLUA, as was purportedly the
control over the employment and traditional method of addressing issues
discipline of umpires has historically surrounding exhibition games; and (4)
rested with the respective League enlist the aid of club general managers to
presidents. “chart” pitches in an effort to determine
whether umpires were properly
The dispute at issue arose during interpreting the------------------ strike
the 1999 baseball season over what the zone. The MLUA viewed these
MLUA perceived as an attempt by the proposals as violations of the existing
Commissioner of Baseball, Allan H. CBA.
“Bud” Selig, to strip the League presidents 2
The no-strike clause of Article XIX
of supervisory power over umpires and to
of the CBA states, in relevant part, that
c e n t r al i z e t ha t p o we r in th e
“the Association agrees that there shall
3
because the voluntary resignation of its addition, each of the fifty-seven resigning
members would trigger the Leagues’ umpires executed a personal services
obligation to pay the resigning umpires agreement with the newly created
approximately $15 million in severance Professional Umpire Services, Inc. These
compensation. Fifty-seven of the MLUA’s agreements stated, in relevant part, that the
sixty-eight members agreed to participate umpire would render services “exclusively
in the mass resignation; twenty-three from for the Corporation and/or for the Person
the American League and thirty-four from with whom the Corporation agrees to
the National League. On July 15, 1999, provide Umpire Services.”
each of the resigning umpires sent a letter
to his respective League president stating Articles of incorporation were filed
that he resigned his position effective for Professional Umpire Services on July
September 2, 1999. Umpires with more 9, 1999, but the company never
than ten years on the job also demanded countersigned the personal services
severance pay due under the CBA as a agreements or conducted any business. It
result of voluntary termination.3 In appears the MLUA planned to use the
company as a means of providing the
Leagues with umpiring services in the
be no strike nor other concerted work event that the labor dispute was not
stoppage during the period of this resolved by the time the resignations took
Agreement and further that it will use its effect on September 2.
best efforts to cause each umpire
faithfully to carry out their obligations as On July 22, Commissioner Selig
employees.” met with American League President Gene
3 Budig and National League President
The relevant portion of each letter
Leon ard C oleman in Milwaukee,
stated as follows:
Wisconsin, in an effort to determine how
best to respond to the resignations. After
Effective September 2,
some discussion, the Leagues decided not
1999, I hereby resign from
to negotiate with the MLUA.
my employment from the
[American or National]
There are conflicting versions of
League pursuant to Article
what transpired at this meeting. The
VIII.D of the Basic
Agreement between the
American League of
Professional Baseball Association dated January
Clubs, the National League 1, 1995. [W here
of Professional Baseball applicable:] I hereby
Clubs and the Major demand my voluntary
League Umpires termination pay.
4
MLUA contends that there was no Pennsylvania seeking to establish the
immediate threat to the continuing resigning umpires’ rights to termination
operation of MLB, as the resignations did pay and benefits.
not become effective until several weeks
after the meeting. It further argues that Through a combination of new
Commissioner Selig essentially forced the hires and resignation rescissions, the
League presidents to begin hiring American League returned to full staff by
replacement umpires in an effort to July 26. In contrast, relatively few
manufacture a claim of detrimental National League umpires had rescinded
reliance and to break the union. The their resignations as of that date, and
Leagues counter that they viewed the mass National League President Coleman hired
resignation strategy as a violation of the five more replacement umpires. On July
CBA’s “no-strike” clause, and therefore 27, the remaining thirty-two National
began hiring replacement umpires to League and six 5 American League umpires
ensure the continued operation of MLB attempted to rescind their resignations en
during the upcoming League playoffs and masse. However, because of the new hires
World Series. and previous resignation rescissions, only
nineteen National League positions
By the end of the day on July 22, remained open. As stated above, all of the
the Leagues had hired a total of twenty American League positions had been filled
replacement umpires (eight in the National by that date
League and twelve in the American
League).4 As a result, it soon became clear Because he had no positions left to
to MLUA members that the mass fill, American League President Budig
resignation strategy was a failure. Many simply refused to allow any of the final six
began to rescind their letters of American League umpires to rescind their
resignation. Despite the capitulation of resignations.6 National League President
some of its members, however, the MLUA
continued to exert pressure on the 5
Leagues. On July 23, it filed a declaratory The District Court listed the names of
judgment action in the Eastern District of seven AL umpires who tried to rescind
on July 27, but the Arbitrator put the
number at six. Again, we have adopted
the Arbitrator’s number.
4
The District Court puts the number at
6
17 (8 in the NL and 9 in the AL). These umpires received a letter from
However, the Arbitrator found 12 American League President Budig
replacements in the AL, and thus 20 stating, in relevant part:
overall. As the Arbitrator was the fact-
finder in this case, we have adopted his On July 15, 1999, I
number. received from your union,
5
Coleman faced a more difficult situation,
as he was forced to determine which of the
remaining thirty-two National League
the Major League
umpires would be permitted to rescind
Umpires’
their resignations. In order to make this
Association, a letter
determination, he invoked Article VIII A
from you dated July
of the CBA, which provides in its second
14, 1999, resigning
paragraph that “[a]ll umpires shall be
from your
selected or retained in the discretion of the
employment as an
League Presidents on the basis of merit
umpire with the
and the skill of the umpire to perform to
American League. I
Major League standards.” Applying this
deeply regret that
provision at least in part, Coleman selected
you decided to take
nineteen umpires from the thirty-two and
part in this
permitted those nineteen to rescind their
concerted
letters of resignation. Coleman then
resignation plan
accepted the resignations of the remaining
instigated by the
thirteen National League umpires.
Major League
Umpires’
By the end of this imbroglio,
Association.
twenty-two of the fifty-seven MLUA
However, you have
members who participated in the mass
left me with no
resignation scheme, nearly one-third of the
choice but to accept
Association’s total membership, were
your resignation and
unemployed (nine from the American
to fill the vacancy
that your resignation
has created along
with the other submitted by an
vacancies that were American League
created by this mass umpire that was not
resignation strategy. rescinded.
The hiring process
is now complete. Thank you for your service
The American to the American League
League has hired a and I personally wish you
permanent employee the best in your future
to fill the vacancy endeavors.
created by your
resignation and each
resignation
6
League and thirteen from the National proceedings, the Arbitrator issued his
League). All twenty-two of these umpires Opinion and Award on M ay 11, 2001. The
filed grievances under the CBA. Arbitrator sustained the grievances and
ordered the reinstatement of two American
II. Procedural History League umpires (Coble and Kosc), and
seven National League umpires (Darling,
The MLUA filed its Demand for Hohn, Tata, Pulli, Poncino, West, and
Arbitration of the grievances on August Vanover) with full back pay and benefits.
27, 1999. On August 30, the MLUA It denied the grievances of all of the
sought an injunction from the United remaining American and National League
States District Court for the Eastern umpires. Both sides subsequently filed
District of Pennsylvania to prevent the actions in the Eastern District of
Leagues from dismissing the twenty-two Pennsylvania seeking to vacate the
umpires whose resignations had been portions of the Award unfavorable to
accepted and were due to take effect on them. In addition, the Leagues challenged
September 2. The District Court held a the Arbitrator’s denial of their motion to
hearing on September 1. Following this dismiss the dispute as non-arbitrable.
hearin g , the parties executed a
Memorandum of Understanding stating
that the MLUA would withdraw its The District Court held that the
complaint and that the parties would Leagues had properly preserved their
submit the matter to an arbitrator. The objection to arbitrability. It nevertheless
Memorandum of Understanding also confirmed the Arbitrator’s conclusion that
permitted either side to “raise in such the dispute was arbitrable. As for the
arbitration whatever procedural and merits of the parties’ arguments, the
substantive arbitrability arguments . . . the District Court confirmed the Arbitrator’s
parties may have.” conclusion that the Leagues were entitled
to hire replacement umpires in reliance on
In November 1999, the Leagues, the letters of resignation submitted by the
contending that the dispute at issue did not grievants, as well as confirming his
fall within the scope of the CBA’s determination that American League
arbitration provision, moved to dismiss the President Budig was not required to accept
grievances. The Arbitrator denied this the six resignation rescissions submitted
motion on November 26, 1999. Both sides on July 27 in view of the fact that the
were represented by counsel during the American League was fully staffed by that
arbitration proceedings, which included date.
seventeen days of testimony over the
course of approximately one year. The District Court further
confirmed the Arbitrator’s application of
Following completion of the the Article VIII “merit and skill” criteria to
7
the determinations made with respect to all III. Jurisdiction and Standard of
but three of the National League umpires, Review
and his decision, following this
application, to require the National League The District Court reviewed the
to reinstate seven umpires (Darling, Hohn, Arbitrator’s Award pursuant to § 301 of
Tata, Pulli, Poncino, West, and Vanover) the Labor Management Relations Act of
who satisfied this criteria despite the fact 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185. We have
that all National League positions had jurisdiction over the parties’ cross-appeals
been filled. Finally, the District Court of the District Court’s final order pursuant
confirmed the Arbitrator’s conclusion that to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
three additional National League umpires District Court’s ruling is plenary, and we
(Davidson, Gregg, and Hallion) need not apply the same test applied by the District
be reinstated because they failed to satisfy Court. Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Local
the Article VIII merit and skill criteria.7 Union No. 272 of the Int’l Bhd. of Elec.
On appeal, both sides contend that the Workers, AFL-CIO (Pennsylvania Power
District Court erred in confirming the II), 276 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2001).
portions of the Award unfavorable to
them. Additionally, the Leagues assert IV. Discussion
that the dispute at issue does not fall
within the scope of the CBA’s arbitration A. Scope of Judicial Review of
provision so that it was not arbitrable in Arbitration Awards
the first instance.
We begin our analysis by
examining the general legal principles
governing federal courts’ review of
arbitration awards. The first step in any
such review involves an examination of
the sources of the arbitrator’s authority.
7 See Matteson v. Ryder System, Inc., 99
The District Court also confirmed the
F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the
Award as to two American League
Federal Arbitration Act, a district court
umpires (Coble and Kosc) and vacated
may vacate an arbitration award if, inter
the portion of the Award that upheld the
alia, ‘the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
National League’s discharge of three
or so imperfectly executed them that a
other umpires (Nauert, Dreckman, and
mutual, final, and definite award upon the
Holbrook) with less than five years’
subject matter submitted was not made.’”)
experience. All five initially appealed
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). Simply
this ruling, but have since settled their
stated, “an arbitrator may not venture
dispute. Thus, their claims are no longer
beyond the bounds of his or her authority,”
before us, and we do not address them
which is defined not only by the terms of
here.
8
the CBA, but also by the scope of the review the arbitrator’s
issues submitted by the parties. Id. Thus, decision on the merits
“[i]t is the responsibility of the arbitrator in despite allegations that the
the first instance to interpret the scope of decision rests on factual
the parties’ submission, but it is within the errors or misinterprets the
courts’ province to review an arbitrator’s parties’ agreement . . . .
interpretation.”
Id. at 113. When an arbitrator resolves
disputes regard ing th e
In conducting this review, “‘the application of a contract,
deference that is accorded to an and no dishonesty is alleged,
arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective the arbitrator’s
bargaining agreement should also be ‘improvident, even silly,
accorded to an arbitrator’s interpretation of factf indin g ’ d o e s n ot
the issue submitted.’” Id. (quoting Mobil provide a basis for a
Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers reviewing court to refuse to
Union,
679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1982)). enforce the award.
This is so because (1) “a more searching
judicial review of submissions . . . would Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v.
undermine the congressional policy of Garvey,
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (internal
promoting speedy, efficie nt, and citations and quotations omitted). We
i n e x p e n s iv e resolu t i o n o f l a b or should uphold an arbitration award that
grievances”; (2) “interpretation of a “draws its essence from the collective
submission must often occur in the context bargaining agreement” because “the
of the collective bargaining agreement parties to the collective bargaining
itself ,” thereby result i n g in an agreement ‘bargained for’ a procedure in
in c o n si stency if the arbitrator ’ s which an arbitrator would interpret the
interpretation of the CBA receives agreement.” National Ass’n of Letter
deference but his or her determination of Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal
the scope of the submission does not; and Serv.,
272 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2001)
(3) “requiring courts to engage in a close (noting that a court should uphold an
examination of the submissions to arbitration award) (citing Eastern Assoc.
arbitrators would put a considerable strain Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531
on judicial resources.”
Id. (citing Mobil U.S. 57, 62 (2000)); United Indus.
Oil, 679 F.2d at 302). Workers v. Gov’t of the V.I.,
987 F.2d
162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a
Our role in reviewing the outcome court may not “overrule an arbitration
of the arbitration proceedings is not to decision because it finds an error of law”);
correct factual or legal errors made by an Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No.
arbitrator. 1269, United Mine Workers of Am., 896
Courts are not authorized to F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that,
9
because “the parties have bargained for the as the [arbitration] panel did and
arbitrator’s decision, ‘it is the arbitrator’s reexamine the evidence under the guise of
view of the facts and of the meaning of the determining whether the arbitrators
contract that they have agreed to accept. exceeded their powers.”). Rather,
An award may fairly be said to “draw[] its arbitration awards enjoy a strong
essence from the bargaining agreement if presumption of correctness that may be
the interpretation can in any rational way overcome only in certain limited
be derived from the agreement, viewed in circumstances, as described above.
light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties’ intention.” With this standard in mind, we turn
United Transportation Union Local 1589, now to the specific claims at issue here.
51 F.3d at 379-80 (internal quotations
omitted). B. Arbitrability
Moreover, an award may be vacated In addressing the threshold question
if the arbitrator demonstrates manifest of arbitrability, we first must determine
disregard for the CBA. See Newark whether the CBA empowers the Arbitrator
Morning Ledger Co. v. Newark to settle questions of substantive
Typographical Union Local, 797 F.2d 162, arbitrability, i.e., “whether a particular
165 (3d Cir. 1986). Manifest disregard for dispute is subject to the parties’
the CBA is established when the contractual arbitration provision(s).” Bell
arbitrator’s award is “‘totally unsupported A t l a n t i c -P e n n s y lv a n i a , I n c . v .
by principles of contract construction.’” Communications Workers of Am., 164
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1999). As we have
Union,
993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993) previously held, “[a]bsent a clear
(quoting News Am. Publications v. expression to the contrary in the parties’
Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, c ontr a ct, subs tanti ve arb itrability
918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1990)). determinations are to be made by a court
and not an arbitrator.” Id. at 200.
In reviewing an arbitration award, Therefore, contract language submitting
courts “do not sit to hear claims of factual the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator
or legal error by an arbitrator as an “must be clear and unmistakable.”
appellate court does in reviewing decisions PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d
of lower courts.” Tanoma Mining Co., 896 1372, 1379 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993).
F.2d at 747 (citing United Paperworkers
Int’l Union v. Misco,
484 U.S. 29, 37-38 Here, however, the Leagues
(1987)); see also Mutual Fire, Marine & conceded before the District Court that the
Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., issue of arbitrability was properly
868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding
that “[i]t is not this Court’s role . . . to sit
10
submitted to the Arbitrator. 8 We do not therefore have to decide whether it was
proper for the Arbitrator to determine
arbitrability, merely whether he ignored
8 the plain language of the CBA in his
In response to the District Court’s
determination of arbitrability. See
query about its standard of review of the
National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 272 F.3d
arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability,
at 186. In doing so, we are obliged to give
counsel for the Major Leagues
that decision “the same deference due an
responded:
arbitrator’s decision on the merits.”
United Indus. Workers, 987 F.2d at 167.
MR. GANZ: If there is no
Thus, the Arbitrator’s determination of
rational – there has to be a
arbitrability must be affirmed “as long as it
rational basis for the
‘draws its essence’ from the collective
arbitrator’s determination,
bargaining agreement.” Pennsylvania
that he had authority, and
Power Co. v. Local Union # 272 of the
that basis must draw its
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO,
essence from the collective
886 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted
bargaining agreement.
above, this requires only that the
Arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA be
THE COURT: Okay. So
rationally “derived from the agreement,
there has to be a rational
viewed in light of its language, its context,
basis for the arbitrator’s
and any other indicia of the parties
decision that this matter
intention.” United Transportation Union
was subject to arbitration.
Local 1589, 51 F.3d at 380 (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
MR. GANZ: Correct,
Your Honor.
In presenting the issue to the
Arbitrator in their motion to dismiss, the
THE COURT: Okay. So it
Leagues contended that the dispute was
isn’t just my reading of the
not arbitrable because Article VIII of the
agreement, I have to give
CBA gives the League Presidents the
deference to the arbitrator
authority, following a hearing, to issue a
to that extent?
“final and binding” decision regarding the
termination of an umpire.9 The MLUA on
MR. GANZ: That’s
correct. It was for the
arbitrator in the first 27, 2001, at pp. 17-18.
instance, certainly, and you
9
to review that. . . . Article VIII provides in relevant part
in Section A, Tenure:
Transcript of Oral Argument, November
11
the other hand maintained that the dispute fell within the broad scope of the general
arbitration provision contained in Article
XV of the CBA.10
[1] In the event an umpire
Following his review of the text of
with five or more years of
Articles VIII and XV, the Arbitrator
service is discharged by a
denied the Leagues’ motion to dismiss,
League President, the
ruling instead that, although the first
umpire and the
paragraph of Article VIII A vested
representative of the
substantial authority in the League
Association shall be
presidents regarding the termination of
entitled to an explanation
umpires, the second paragraph placed two
of the reasons for his
specific limitations on that authority. First,
discharge and the umpire
this “substantial authority” was “limited to
shall be entitled at his
issues concerning the ‘merit and skill of
request to hearing before
the umpire to perform to Major League
the League President at
standards’,” and, second, it had to be
which time the discharge
exercised without “discrimination or
shall be subject to full
review and re-examination
by the League president.
10
The decision of the League Article XV provides, in relevant
President after such part:
hearing shall be final and
binding. In the event of a dispute
concerning a claimed
[2] All umpires shall be violation of the provisions
selected or retained in the of this Agreement by either
discretion of the League party thereto the matter
Presidents on the basis of shall be referred to the
merit and the skill of the League President involved
umpire to perform to Major and a representative of the
League standards. With Association; and if an
respect to all such members agreement is not reached
of the regular staff, there by these two individuals
shall be no discrimination within ten days the matter
or recrimination on the part shall be referred to an
of any party to this arbitrator mutually agreed
Agreement. upon as sole neutral
arbitrator to finally
(paragraph numbering added). determine the matter.
12
recrimination.” In view of this of Article VIII makes no mention of
determination, the Arbitrator concluded arbitration or of Article XV, the Arbitrator
that, “to the extent that the Presidents should have concluded that there was no
terminated or accepted the resignations of agreement to arbitrate the dispute at issue
the 22 umpire grievants, as the case may here.
be, the issue of whether this decision was
an abuse of discretion or was performed in We have reviewed the applicable
a discriminatory or recriminatory manner, provisions of the CBA in light of the
is subject to arbitration.” Rulings arguments of the parties and see no basis
Concerning Employer’s Motion to Dismiss for vacating the Arbitrator’s finding of
et al. (Rulings) at 3. In confirming the arbitrability. Although we may question
Arbitrator’s decision, the District Court the clarity of the Arbitrator’s ruling with
held that, “because the parties contracted respect to this issue, we do not conclude
to arbitrate disputes concerning any from the record before us that the
‘claimed violation’ of the Agreement, and Arbitrator considered the issue before him
because the current dispute concerning the to be a simple Article VIII termination of
selection or retention of umpires is such a the umpires. Rather, in rejecting the
‘claimed violation,’ the arbitrator properly Leagues’ motion to dismiss, the Arbitrator
exercised jurisdiction.” Major League found the arbitrable issue to be one
Umpires Ass’n v. American League of involving a determination of relative
Professional Baseball Clubs, No. 01-2790, “merit and skill” and as well as the
slip op. at 12 (E.D.Pa . Dec. 13, 2001). possible abuse of discretion or exercise of
discriminatory or recriminatory animus in
On appeal, the Leagues contend the respective League Presid ents’
that the issue sought to be arbitrated by the decisions regarding the “terminat[ion] or
MLUA was whether the Leagues violated accept[ance] [of] the resignations of the 22
the CBA by “terminating” the twenty-two umpire grievants.” Rulings at 3. The
umpires in question. They further assert reference by the Arbitrator to “merit and
that the CBA does not provide for skill” and to “disc rim inato ry or
arbitration of this issue, and that it recriminatory animus” brings us down to
therefore is not arbitrable. Instead, they the second paragraph of Section A of
argue that, in order to be arbitrable, a Article VIII. It is, however, the first
dispute must “concern[] a claimed paragraph of the Section A that speaks of
violation of the provisions of th[e] “final and binding” review by the League
[CBA].” (quoting Article XV of the CBA). President of umpire discharges.
The Leagues urged that Articles VIII and
XV contain two mutually exclusive From the foregoing, we conclude
dispute resolution mechanisms; because that the Arbitrator’s initial finding of
the MLUA relied primarily upon Article arbitrability was premised on alleged
VIII and the dispute resolution provision violations of the CBA, involving selection
13
of umpire candidates which selection did consideration of the arbitrability issue in
not involve merit and skill, and further the Arbitrator’s Award. The Arbitrator
premised on the Arbitrator’s determination quoted Article XV, the CBA’s general
that he must consider whether there had dispute resolution provision, for the
been discriminatory or recriminatory proposition that “[t]he dispute resolution
animus. He determined that such types of language of the agreement gives me the
violations did not fall under the limited jurisdiction to resolve disputes concerning
review provision of the first paragraph of ‘claimed violations of the provisions of
Article VIII A. By default, then they this agreement,’”and then noted that,
would fall within the broad scope of the “[w]hile there may be conflicting views
general dispute resolution mechanism concerning the propriety of the actions
contained in Article XV. Thus, the taken by both sides in this case, the sole
Arbitrator’s finding of arbitrability was not question in this case concerns whether the
conditioned upon a finding that the reasons actions taken were appropriate under the
for the terminations required explanation terms of the collective bargaining
prior to the exercise of the final and agreement.” Opinion and Award at 71. In
binding review of the League Presidents, this reference to the “terms” of the CBA,
as provided for in the first paragraph of the conclusion is evident that the
Article VIII A. The review required from Arbitrator is considering not just the
the nature of the alleged violations would League Presidents’ discharge review
encompass more than the “explanation of authority of the first paragraph of Article
the reasons for . . . discharge” set out there VIII A but also the “no discrimination or
and would therefore expand beyond the recrimination” language of the second
bounds of the “final and binding” authority paragraph. From this it follows that the
of the League Presidents provided for in Arbitrator rationally determined that his
that first paragraph. In sum, we conclude consideration of whether there had been a
that the Arbitrator did not ignore the plain violation of the CBA extended beyond a
language of the CBA, see National Ass’n review of the reasons for discharge of an
of Letter Carriers, 272 F.3d at 186, or umpire by the League President as set out
demonstrate manifest disregard for the in the first paragraph of Article VIII A.
CBA, see Newark Morning Ledger
Co.,
797 F.2d at 165, when he determined that We find further reinforcement of
violations of the provisions of the second this conclusion in the fact that the
paragraph of Article VIII A were covered Arbitrator, in his Award, determined that
by the arbitrability provisions of Article the grievant umpires had resigned their
XV rather than by the specific review of positions, rather than having been
discharges provided for in the preceding terminated. For this reason, the Arbitrator
first paragraph of Article VIII A. concluded that the “limitations” for
terminated umpires found in Article VIII
This conclusion is reinforced by the A did not apply. We presume that in
14
referring to the “limitations” for Turning then to the merits of the
terminated umpires of Article VIII A and underlying dispute, we begin with the
their inapplicability to the case before him, Arbitrator’s conclusion that the actions of
the Arbitrator had in mind Article VIII A’s the umpires amounted to actual
“final and binding” review of umpire resignations, as opposed to a mere threat
discharges by League Presidents, found in or notification of future resignations, so
the first paragraph. that the Leagues acted properly in hiring
replacements. The MLUA challenges this
As noted above, an arb itrator’s determination, contending that this ruling
finding of arbitrability draws its essence amounted to manifest disregard of the law,
from the CBA if it can be rationally was not supported by the record, and failed
“derived from the agreement, viewed in to draw its essence from the CBA. The
light of its language, its context, and any MLUA urges that, because no umpire
other indicia of the parties’ intention.” actually relinquished his position prior to
United Transportation Union Local 1589, September 2, no umpire can be said to
51 F.3d at 379-80 (internal quotations have “resigned.” Thus, because the
omitted). Here, the Arbitrator’s denial of umpires did not resign, the Leagues’
the Leagues’ motion to dismiss was based refusal to accept the umpires’ rescissions
on a determination that the question of their resignations amounted to a
whether there had been an abuse of discharge in violation of the CBA. The
discretion and discrimination and MLUA further claims that there is no
retaliation was not constrained by the evidence in the record to support the
limitations of the first paragraph of Article Leagues’ claims of detrimental reliance.
VIII A. We conclude that such a
determination can rationally be derived In response, the Leagues justify
from the CBA. their decision to begin hiring replacement
umpires for the following reasons: (1) the
Whether, if faced with the initial inclusion of the phrase “I hereby resign my
determination, we would have come to the employment” in each of the resignation
same decision is immaterial. There is no letters at issue; (2) the demand for
basis from which to conclude that the “voluntary termination pay” by each
Arbitrator’s finding of arbitrability fails to umpire with more than ten years’ service;
draw its essence from the CBA, as it may (3) MLUA General Counsel Richard
logically be derived from the text of that Phillips’ statements to the media, which
agreement. See Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113. unequivocally indicated that the MLUA
Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s members had resigned and would not
confirmation of the Award with respect to
arbitrability.
C. Detrimental Reliance
15
rescind their resignations;11 (4) the Leagues were justified in hiring
execution by each resigning umpire of an replacement umpires.
employment contract with Professional
Umpire Services, Inc.; and (5) the filing by We have reviewed the record below
the MLUA of an action in the Eastern and find no basis for disturbing the award
District of Pennsylvania seeking to with respect to this issue. Under the
establish the Leagues’ obligation to make standards of review of arbitration
the severance payments required by the decisions set out above in Part IV A, the
CBA in the event of voluntary termination. Arbitrator’s conclusion that the umpires
The Leagues assert that on this record the resigned and that the Leagues were
Arbitrator properly determined that the justified in hiring replacement umpires is
well supported by the facts of record and
for that reason there is no basis for
11 reversing it. See Tanoma Mining Co., 896
The following exchange between
F.2d at 748. Simply put, the Arbitrator
Phillips and an interviewer from the
considered the MLUA’s arguments and,
television sports channel “ESPN”
based on the facts and his interpretation of
provides an example of such statements:
the CBA and applicable law, found that
the letters constituted resignations rather
Phillips: There’s not a
than notices of intent to resign. He
threat to resign. They have resigned;
therefore concluded that the Leagues acted
they have formally resigned their
appropriately by hiring replacements in
positions. It’s not a threat. And they
reliance upon these representations.
have all signed contracts with a
professional services corporation. And,
The District Court found that this
the first thing that they will do is they
conclusion “was not a manifest error of
will receive the in excess of $15 million
law.” Slip op. at 13. We agree. As noted
in severance that baseball owes them.
above, because “the parties have bargained
for the arbitrator’s decision, it is the
Interviewer: Can the
arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the
resignations be rescinded, and - - -
meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept.” Tanoma Mining Co.,
Phillips: No.
896 F.2d at 747 (internal quotation
omitted). Thus, we will affirm the District
Interviewer: Can there be
Court’s confirmation of the Award with
peace between the umpires and major
respect to this issue.
league baseball achieved over the next
couple of weeks in some kind of
negotiation?
Phillips: No.
16
D. The Arbitrator’s Application of current “merit and skill” language was
Article VIII’s “Merit and Skill” Criteria inserted into the CBA as a result of the
1979 incident for the express purpose of
The MLUA next challenges the preventing the Leagues from trimming the
Arbitrator’s determination concerning the umpire ranks by taking action against
standards that National League President those who participate in work stoppages.
Coleman was required to apply in making
his staffing decisions following the In light of the history of the merit
rescission of the remaining resignations on and skill provision, and because National
July 27. Specifically, in accordance with League President Coleman admitted
the MLUA’s position that the letters during his testimony before the Arbitrator
constituted notices of intent to resign that he never applied the merit and skill
rather than actual resignations, the MLUA criteria to either those umpires who never
contends that the combination of new hires resigned or those newly hired, the MLUA
and resignation rescissions resulted in a argues that his actions violated the plain
situation in which the National League language of the CBA. Further, because
was overstaffed and National League American League President Budig never
President Coleman, in determining whom applied the merit and skill criteria in the
to retain, should have compared the “merit first instance, the Association asserts that
and skill” of the rescinding umpires not he too violated the CBA and that the
only as between those umpires but also as Award, which the MLUA contends
to the “merit and skill” of the new hires effectively allows each League to employ
and that of those umpires who had never a different decision-making process, fails
resigned. The MLUA urges that the to draw its essence from the CBA.
Arbitrator’s countenance of Coleman’s
failure to do so results in a decision which We again reject the MLUA’s
fails to draw its essence from the CBA. arguments. As a preliminary matter, in
view of the unequivocal no-strike clause
In support of this argument, the contained in the CBA, we find troubling
MLUA analogizes the present situation to the assertion that the merit and skill
the one that existed in 1979 when its criteria was inserted in order to protect
members refused to execute their striking umpires. Indeed, if we were to
individual employment contracts at the read Article XIX of the CBA as
beginning of the baseball season despite prohibiting strikes while Article VIII
the existence of a no-strike clause. There, nevertheless protects striking umpires, we
the striking umpires were permitted to would have a very tortured interpretation
return to work once the situation was of the contract.
resolved. This resulted in overstaffing, as
replacement umpires had been hired in the Moreover, even if there were some
meantime. The MLUA claims that the arguable merit to the M LUA’s attempt to
17
analogize this situation to the job action Arbitrator sustain ed so me o f the
taken by its members in 1979, the grievances and denied others. He ordered
Arbitrator rejected its argument with the reinstatement of National League
respect to this issue. See Opinion and Umpires Darling, Hohn, Poncino, Pulli,
Award at 88-89. Instead, he found that, Tata, West, and Vanover (the Darling
unlike the situation that existed in 1979, Group), but denied the grievances and
the 1999 work stoppage at issue here upheld Coleman’s acceptance of the
involved: (1) the actual severing of the resignations of Umpires Davidson, Gregg,
em p l o y m e n t r e l a ti o n s h ip thr ough and Hallion, (the Davidson Group), as well
resignation; (2) the hiring of permanent as Umpires Nauert, Dreckman, and
replacements; and (3) no decision by the Holbrook (the Nauert Group). The
League presidents to increase the size of Leagues now contend that the District
their respective umpire staffs. Id. This Court erred in confirming the Arbitrator’s
conclusion does not constitute a manifest construction and application of Article
disregard for either the CBA or the VIII in making these determinations.
applicable law. See Neward Morning
Ledger,
Co., 797 F.2d at 165. Thus, we Because Coleman elected not to
see no basis for disturbing the District exercise his discretion to increase the size
Court’s confirmation of this aspect of the of the National League staff, he was forced
Award. to find a method to determine which
nineteen umpires would be permitted to
E. The Arbitrator’s Resolution of the rescind their resignations and which
Claims of Individual Umpires thirteen would have their resignations
accepted. In so doing, he sought input
As discussed above, by the time the from the MLUA’s counsel, who simply
remaining thirty-two National League insisted that all decisions be made on the
umpires attempted to rescind their basis of seniority, which would have
resignations on July 27, National League guaranteed that all resigning MLUA
President Coleman, through new hires and members would be rehired and the new
prior resignation rescissions, had already replacement umpires released. Coleman
filled nineteen of the thirty-two vacant rejected this suggestion.
positions. Because of the limited
vacancies, he had to accept the Without any other guidance for
resignations of thirteen of the National making such determinations, Coleman
League umpires. He chose to accept the decided to use the merit and skill criteria
resignations of the following umpires: from Article VIII A of the CBA to select
Darling, Hohn, Poncino, Pulli, West, Tata,
Vanover, Davidson, Gregg, Hallion,
Nauert, Dreckman, and Holbrook, all of
whom filed grievances. In his Award, the
18
which resignation rescissions to accept. 12 ruling on the Darling Group was the
Arbitrator’s belief that Coleman’s decision
As stated above, in applying this to reject their rescissions was based solely
merit and skill provision to the thirty-two on the number of available positions, not
National League umpires who attempted to on merit or skill, and that this ran afoul of
rescind their resignations on July 27, the terms of Article VIII. Although the
C o l e m a n accepted only nineteen Arbitrator concluded that the League
rescissions. The thirteen National League President had substantial discretion in
umpires not permitted to rescind fell into employment decisions regarding the tenure
either the Darling, Davidson, or Nauert of umpires, he found that Article VIII
Groups. limited this discretion by requiring the
League President’s decision to be based on
With respect to the Darling and the “merit and skill” to perform to Major
Nauert Groups, Coleman refused to allow League standards. The Arbitrator
them to rescind their resignations because therefore concluded that the discretion
of the limited number of unfilled positions. exercised by the League presidents “is not
However, in refusing to allow the limitless,” and that such decisions “must
Davidson Group to rescind their be one[s] that can be reasonably articulated
resignations, Coleman articulated various and related to issues of merit and skill and
reasons why he believed each member of not arbitrary or capricious.” Opinion and
the group lacked the merit and skill Award at 90. The Arbitrator therefore
necessary to perform to Major League concluded:
standards.
In reviewing these
After reviewing Coleman’s explanations in light of the
decisions to refuse reinstatement, the broad discretion given to
Arbitrator upheld him on the Davidson and League Presidents, it is this
Nauert groups but reversed Coleman’s Arbitrator’s view that Mr.
refusal to rescind the Darling Group’s Coleman must articulate an
resignations. The primary basis for the explanation that has some
relationship to the merit and
skill of that Umpire as well
12 as the other factors that he
The relevant language in Article
considered. If Mr. Coleman
VIII A, paragraph 2, is “[a]ll umpires
was unable to articulate a
shall be selected or retained in the
basis, then I must conclude
discretion of the League Presidents on
that he abused his
the basis of merit and the skill of the
discretion. The mere
umpire to perform to Major League
statement that he had to find
standards.” See footnote 9 for the full
the “numbers” required to
text of Article VIII A.
19
fill the positions is an his authority and failed to draw its essence
arbitrary consideration and from the CBA. Simply stated, they allege
must be overruled. the Arbitrator impermissibly created his
own standard of review for merit and skill
Id. (footnote omitted). determinations out of whole cloth. In
response, the MLUA contends that a
However, the Arbitrator upheld reviewing court should look only to the
Coleman’s decision to refuse to allow the Arbitrator’s Award, and not his reasoning,
Davidson Group to rescind because in determining whether it draws its essence
Coleman articulated a merit- or skill- from the CBA.
related basis for the refusal. Finally, the
Arbitrator concluded that the members of In reviewing this portion of the
the Nauert Group did not have more than Award, the District Court noted its concern
five years experience and thus were not over the Arbitrator’s determination with
entitled to the limited protections offered respect to this issue. The court
by Article VIII. Opinion and Award at 93- nevertheless, citing Steelworkers v.
94. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960), and ARCO-Polymers,
The Leagues challenge the Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756 (3d
Arbitrator’s interpretation and application Cir. 1982), confirmed this portion of the
of Article VIII. Specifically, the Leagues Award because the court believed binding
contend that the Arbitrator exceeded his precedent prevented it from vacating an
authority and that the Award failed to draw award simply because of the existence of
its essence from the CBA in two respects. ambiguity in the Arbitrator’s reasoning.
First, they read the Award as concluding Although the court noted the confusing
that Article VIII is applicable only in nature of the Award, it ultimately
situations involving the selection or concluded that the Arbitrator “did interpret
retention of umpires. They also read the the Agreement and did manifest fidelity to
Award as holding that the umpires at issue his proper role as to the National League
in this case voluntarily resigned and were umpires to whom he applied the merit and
not entitled to the protections afforded by skill standard of Article VIII A. Slip op. at
Article VIII. The Leagues therefore 17. The District Court further noted that,
contend that the Arbitrator’s application of because it believed the Arbitrator had
the Article VIII merit and skill criteria reached the proper conclusion, the
results in a logical inconsistency. reasoning which provided the basis for its
conclusion was irrelevant.
Second, the Leagues assert that the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review We are in accord with the District
applied by the Arbitrator to Coleman’s Court’s conclusion that it may not vacate
merit and skill determinations exceeded an award based solely on an ambiguity in
20
an arbitrator’s opinion. See Roadway draws its essence from the CBA.
Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d
287, 301 (3d Cir. 2001). However, we Simply stated, the Arbitrator’s
agree with the Leagues’ assertion that the interpretation of the CBA was as follows:
District Court erred in stating that the (1) Article VIII creates minimal
reasoning of the Arbitrator is entirely protections from termination for umpires
irrelevant. See
id. (holding that “a court with more than five years of service; (2)
may conclude that an arbitrator exceeded because the umpires at issue in this case
his or her authority when it is obvious resigned, none were entitled to the
from the written opinion”); Newark protections of Article VIII in the first
Morning
Ledger, 797 F.2d at 167 n.6 instance regardless of the number of years
(holding that a court is not required “to of service; (3) even though Article VIII
disregard what an arbitrator says in order was not directly applicable in this case,
to justify what the arbitrator does”). National League President Coleman
Nevertheless, we do not find this error to invoked it in determining which nineteen
be essential to the court’s resolution of this of the thirty-two final resignation
matter. We therefore reject the Leagues’ rescissions to accept (a decision that
invitation to use it as a basis for disturbing essentially involved the “selection” of
the District Court’s confirmation of this individuals from among the pool of
portion of the Award. At bottom, the resigned umpires, thereby arguably making
Leagues’ primary contention is that the the appli cation of A rticle VIII
Award is inconsistent. More specifically, appropriate); (4) once Article VIII was
they contend the Arbitrator employed invoked, Coleman was required to adhere
varying and questionable logic in first to its terms in making his determinations
determining that Article VIII did not with respect to which rescissions to accept;
govern the dispute because the umpires (5) adhering to Article VIII meant
had resigned (as opposed to being articulating a reason that bore “some
terminated), but then nevertheless relationship to the merit and skill of th[e]
requiring National League President umpire,” for each decision reached with
Coleman to employ the Article VIII skill respect to the thirteen umpires not
and merit criteria appropriately and permitted to rescind their letters of
consistently once he chose to invoke it. resignation; (6) because Coleman failed to
meet this standard with respect to the
The Leagues’ argument is Darling Group, those umpires must be
unpersuasive. Regardless of whether reinstated; (7) because Coleman did meet
another interpretation of the CBA would this standard with respect to the Davidson
make more sense, or whether we or the Group, the grievances of those umpires
District Court would reach a different were denied; (8) however, because the
result if reviewing this case de novo, the Nauert Group failed to qualify for this
Arbitrator’s reading is logical and clearly protection in the first place, the members
21
of that group could essentially be fired at result within a short period of time and at
will. relatively minimal expense. See, e.g.,
Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113 (noting “the
Although we acknowledge that the congressional policy of promoting speedy,
quality of the Arbitrator’s reasoning leaves efficient, and inexpensive resolution of
something to be desired, we see no basis labor grievances”); Remmey, 32 F.3d at
for judicial intervention. The Arbitrator’s 146 (noting that “the ‘twin goals of
interpretation is discernable, coherent, and arbitration’” are “‘settling disputes
draws its essence from the CBA. Given efficiently and avoiding long and
the limited scope of our review, nothing expensive litigation’”) (quoting Folkways
more is required. Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d
108, 111 (2d Cir. 1993)). However, the
In closing, we cannot help but note possibility of receiving inconsistent or
that, at their core, many of the claims incorrect rulings without meaningful
raised by both sides in this litigation appellate review of the merits is one of the
amount to little more than requests for risks such parties must accept when they
judicial review of the merits of the Award. choose arbitration over litigation. Where,
We reiterate that such review is inimical to as here, an award that is questionable
the public policy underlying the limited nevertheless falls within the broad
role assigned to the federal courts in the discretion granted to arbitrators, it must be
area of arbitration. See Pennsylvania confirmed.
Power II, 276 F.3d at 178 (“The rationale
for the court’s limited role is to ensure that V. Conclusion
the federal policy of encouraging
arbitration of labor disputes is not For the reasons stated above, we
subverted by excessive court intervention will affirm the final judgment of the
on the merits of an award.”); Remmey v. District Court.
PaineWebber, Inc.,
32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“Limited judicial review is Becker, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
necessary to encourage the use of
arbitration as an alternative to formal In my view, the dispute that the
litigation . . . . A policy favoring Arbitrator, the District Court, and the
arbitration would mean little, of course, if majority of this panel go to such lengths to
arbitration were merely the prologue to resolve was never arbitrable in the first
prolonged litigation.”). place. These tribunals are all agreed that
the umpires resigned – a mass resignation
It is beyond question that arbitration of a significant portion of the bargaining
proceedings are a valuable method of unit. None of the umpires was terminated
dispute resolution, as they offer a means or discharged. As I see it, under these
by which parties may obtain a binding circumstances, there was no violation
22
either of the basic agreement or of the first judgment of the District Court and remand
paragraph of Article VIII A that could with directions to dismiss the complaint.
trigger the arbitration clause. Moreover,
even if one were to ignore the fact of the
resignations, the matter would still not be
arbitrable because as I read that clause, it
confers upon the League Presidents the
unfettered (“final and binding”) right to
discharge an umpire with five or more
years of service.13 The language could not
be clearer, and the exercise of conflating
the second paragraph of Article VIII A –
which deals with retention on the basis of
merit or skill, and the proscription against
discrimination or recrimination – with the
first paragraph of Article VIII A does not
carry the day because the first paragraph
deals with a wholly different situation – a
mass resignation.
This result is not changed by the
standard of review. As I read the record,
Major League Baseball agreed to submit
the question of arbitrability to the
arbitrator while preserving its right to
challenge his determination. While this
converts our normal de novo standard of
review (of the arbitrability decision) into a
deferential one, see United Indus. Workers
v. Gov’t of V.I., 987 F.2d 162, 167-68 (3d
Cir. 1993), that does not change the result
because, in my opinion, the determination
that the dispute was arbitrable was
manifestly erroneous, and did not draw its
essence from the agreement. I therefore
respectfully dissent, and would vacate the
1.
Any argument based on the five year
clause has dropped out of the case because
the umpires with less than five years
experience have settled.
