Edward L. Morris, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
On July 19, 2019, the above-captioned adversary proceeding came on for trial before the Court. Plaintiffs James Henry Wilson and Sharonda Nicole Wilson (the "
Having considered the Wilsons' Complaint, Arbors' Answer and Counterclaim, the Wilsons' Reply to Counterclaim,
The Court has jurisdiction of this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 and the Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings Nunc Pro Tunc (Miscellaneous Rule No. 33) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Venue of the proceeding in the Northern District of Texas is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409. The proceeding constitutes a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) the Court has the statutory authority to enter a final judgment in this proceeding and based upon the nature of the causes of action at issue there are no Stern-based Constitutional limitations
1. Arbors is the owner of an apartment complex located at 2809 Parkview Lane in Bedford, Texas. In 2016, the Wilsons entered into an agreement with Arbors for the lease of Apartment 3125 at the complex (the "
2. On or about September 27, 2017, the Wilsons renewed their lease of the Apartment by entering into a new lease agreement with Arbors (the "
3. Pursuant to the 2017 Lease, the Wilsons were obligated to make monthly rent payments of $1,142 by the first of each month. No grace period for such payment was provided and the lease expressly stated that the failure to pay rent by the first of the month would constitute a material
4. Shortly after execution of the 2017 Lease, the Wilsons began to regularly fall behind in the timely payment of rent. Thus, on or about December 22, 2017, after the Wilsons had failed to pay their December 2017 rent on time, Arbors filed a sworn complaint in Texas state court for the eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment and for the recovery of December 2017 rent. A hearing was scheduled in the action for January 10, 2018.
5. On January 9, 2018, prior to the eviction hearing, the Wilsons filed their joint voluntary petition for relief under chapter 13 of the of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby initiating the Bankruptcy Case and causing the eviction action to be stayed pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions.
6. On January 25, 2018, the Wilsons filed their proposed chapter 13 plan in the Bankruptcy Case, wherein the Wilsons proposed to assume the 2017 Lease and cure the outstanding lease arrears.
7. Between February 2018 and September 2018, the Wilsons often failed to pay rent by the first of the month as required by the 2017 Lease, instead paying by the second or third of the month. During this time frame, Arbors elected to accept the payments (with applicable late fees) instead of declaring a default.
8. Prior to the end of the definitive lease term of the 2017 Lease, Arbors provided the Wilsons the opportunity to again renew their lease. Arbors notified the Wilsons of such opportunity in writing. According to Eileen Rigsby ("
9. Desiring to remain in the Apartment, the Wilsons went to the leasing office of the complex on September 13, 2018 to complete the lease renewal paperwork. At that time, Arbors offered a new lease (the "
10. In October 2018, prior to commencement of the new lease term, the Wilsons again failed to pay rent by the first of the month. This time Arbors decided to take action and on October 3, 2018, filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay to pursue the eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment (the "
11. On October 24, 2018, the Court
12. In conformity with the Court's direction, the Floyd Firm prepared the proposed order. In contravention of the
13. The Wilsons paid their October 2018 rent by the October 25, 2018 deadline and their November 2018 rent by the November 2, 2018 deadline.
14. First, despite having offered the 2018 Lease to the Wilsons and obtained their acceptance of the same, Arbors decided to pivot after-the-fact and take the position, without notice to the Wilsons, that Arbors never actually legally agreed to the new lease. Specifically, Rigsby testified at trial that because the 2018 Lease was never formally countersigned by an authorized agent of Arbors, Arbors was not bound to it. Thus, under the premise that the lease had not been renewed, Arbors issued a notice to the Wilsons on November 6, 2018 titled "ADVANCE NOTICE OF LEASE TERMINATION AT END OF LEASE TERM OR RENEWAL PERIOD" pursuant to which Arbors gave notice to the Wilsons "to vacate at end of lease term or renewal period," referencing "TAA Lease Contract dated 10/19/2016," and of the non-renewal of the "TAA Lease Contract end[ing] on November 9th, 2018."
15. Inasmuch as the notice referenced both a prior 2016 lease no longer in effect and the 2017 Lease, creating a level of confusion and uncertainty, and given the fact that the Wilsons had already executed the new 2018 Lease, and that the parties' ongoing leasing relationship had been addressed in connection with the Lift Stay Hearing, the Wilsons reasonably believed that the notice had been issued in error and disregarded it. Indeed, in submitting the proposed order — signed with approval by the Floyd Firm on behalf of Arbors — with the new monthly rental rate of $1,199 under the 2018 Lease and obtaining the Court's acceptance of the same in entering the Lift Stay Order,
16. The second ill-advised action taken by Arbors involved the charging of rent in excess of the terms of the 2018 Lease. Specifically, from and after November 10, 2018 (being the end of the definitive lease term of the 2017 Lease) Arbors charged rent at the $1,399 month-to-month rate previously noticed to the Wilsons in connection with the lease renewal process instead of the $1,199 monthly rental rate agreed upon under the 2018 Lease and acknowledged as applicable in the Lift Stay Order. Based upon Arbors' application of the $1,399 monthly rental rate, and despite Arbors' pretrial stipulation that the Wilsons timely paid November and December 2018 rent,
17. On December 31, 2018, the Wilsons obtained money orders aggregating $1,278.73 for January 2019 rent and associated additional lease charges — $1,199 for rent plus $79.73 for the additional lease charges.
18. When the Lee Firm contacted the Floyd Firm to discuss the matter, the Floyd Firm informed the Lee Firm that the payment was refused for two reasons: (1) because it was for less than the full amount due; and (2) because it was late. In relation to the first point, properly applying the monthly rental rate of $1,199 under the 2018 Lease, the Wilsons in fact tendered the full amount of their January 2019 rent on January 2, 2019. Therefore, the first basis for refusal of the rent was improper. In relation to the second point, under the terms of the Lift Stay Order, the Wilsons were entitled to a one-time, five-day grace period to cure. Here, as previously mentioned, Arbors took the position that the Wilsons had already lost that benefit by failing to pay rent at the $1,399 level in November and December 2018. Properly applying the monthly rental rate of $1,199 from and after November 10, 2018, however, the Wilsons in fact paid the full amount of their November
19. Notwithstanding same, on January 9, 2019, Arbors filed a sworn complaint with the Justice Court, Precinct 3, in Tarrant County, Texas, for the eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment and for unpaid rent, alleging that the Wilsons had failed to pay the full balance of rent due in November 2018, December 2018 and January 2019 (the "
20. Upon learning of the Eviction Action, the Lee Firm communicated to the Floyd Firm that Arbors' continuing pursuit of the Eviction Action would be in violation of the automatic stay. The Wilsons also filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the action to try to prevent it from moving forward. Nevertheless, on January 29, 2019, Arbors proceeded to prosecute the complaint for eviction, and having convinced the state court that the automatic stay was no longer in force, obtained entry of a default judgment against the Wilsons for possession of the Apartment and for unpaid rent in the amount of $1,475.89 (the "
21. On the same day, the Wilsons timely appealed the Default Judgment to the Texas County Court at Law in Tarrant County, Texas, thereby initiating a de novo proceeding (the "
22. Arbors' filing and prosecution of the Eviction Action was in violation of the automatic stay.
23. As a result of Arbors' actions, the Wilsons have suffered the following actual compensatory damages:
24. Arbors began to misapply the $1,399 per month rental rate effective November 10, 2018. Based upon Arbors' representations to the state court of the applicability of the $1,399 rate, the state court awarded $1,475.89 in damages to Arbors under the Default Judgment for unpaid rent through and including January 2019. Consequently, upon initiation of the Eviction Appellate Proceeding, the Wilsons were required to post a $1,500 cash bond with the state court as security for the damages awarded.
25. Thereafter, beginning in February 2019 and continuing through and including November 2019, the Wilsons have been required to make payments of $1,399 per month into the state court registry in order to retain possession and use of the Apartment pending the outcome of this adversary proceeding and the Eviction Appellate Proceeding. Thus, applying the proper monthly rental rate of $1,199 under the 2018 Lease, the Wilsons have been required to overpay rent by $200 per month during this ten-month time frame, for a total of $2,000. However, the Wilsons have also incurred additional lease charges
27. Next, the Wilsons have also incurred the following court costs, aggregating $285.20, that they were required to pay in connection with the Eviction Appellate Proceeding: $20 transcript fee;
28. Arbors asserts that the court costs could have been avoided had the Wilsons simply appeared at the eviction hearing and defended themselves. Such assertion lacks all merit and improperly attempts to shift the burden of assuring Arbors' compliance with the automatic stay to the Wilsons. The Wilsons timely filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the Eviction Action to prevent the action from moving forward. Such notice would have stopped the Eviction Action from moving forward but for Arbors' actions taken to convince the state court that the automatic stay was no longer in force pursuant to the Lift Stay Order.
29. Sharonda Wilson testified that she was forced to miss work in order to complete the paperwork and otherwise take the steps necessary to initiate the Eviction Appellate Proceeding. Her unchallenged testimony was that she missed a total of 5 hours of work at an hourly rate of $17.21 per hour which resulted in her having lost wages of $86.05.
30. Finally, the Wilsons also seek the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in having the Lee Firm represent them in connection with this adversary proceeding. Eric Maskell ("
31. Maskell explained that the matter was staffed with one attorney (Maskell) at a rate of $300 per hour, one senior paralegal at a rate of $150 per hour, and one standard paralegal at a rate of $125 per hour. Such rates are reasonable and customary within this District for the type of services performed by the Lee Firm. Among other things, Maskell's hourly rate compares quite favorably with the $450 per hour rate charged to Arbors by its counsel.
32. Maskell further explained that the team expended a total of 52 hours in rendering services up to the time of trial, and that he had projected 8 hours of trial time utilizing the entire team, resulting in total fees of $11,962.50 based upon the above rates. This equates to a blended rate of approximately $157.40 per hour for the team.
33. Given the nature of this adversary proceeding, the issues in dispute between the parties, the content of the Complaint and other pretrial filings prepared on behalf of the Wilsons, and the compilation of the exhibits introduced into evidence on behalf of the Wilsons, the Lee Firm's expenditure of 57.6 hours in representing the Wilsons through the conclusion of trial is reasonable and was necessary.
34. Based upon the same considerations and based upon the result obtained by the Lee Firm on behalf of the Wilsons in this adversary proceeding, an award of $9,374.90 in attorneys' fees is reasonable. And while Rigsby testified that, in her opinion, the amount of attorneys' fees sought by the Wilsons is unreasonable,
35. Separately, Maskell also provided uncontested testimony that the Lee Firm incurred $78.65 in actual and necessary court costs in connection with the engagement.
36. Thus, by virtue of Arbors' actions, the Wilsons have sustained additional damages in the aggregate amount of $9,453.55 for the reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the Wilsons in pursuing this action.
37. Arbors' conduct in commencing and pursuing the Eviction Action to judgment was unquestionably egregious. The very fact that, after submitting the proposed order to the Court which the Court accepted and entered as the Lift Stay Order, Arbors sought to substantiate a default on the part of the Wilsons based upon the charging of a rental rate ($1,399 per month) in conflict with the rate agreed upon by the parties under the 2018 Lease and acknowledged to be applicable to the Wilsons under the order ($1,199 per month) smacks of bad faith. Arbors only magnified and perpetuated this bad faith in thereafter commencing the Eviction Action based upon the manufactured default and in representing to the state court that the higher, inapplicable rental rate applied. Then, when squarely confronted by way of heated exchanges between counsel with a challenge to the propriety of the Eviction Action and an assertion that the action was in violation of the automatic stay, instead of dismissing the action or at least putting the action on hold until clarification could
38. Given the high degree of the reprehensibility of Arbors' conduct in this case, the amount of the actual compensable damages incurred by the Wilsons, as outlined above, and the level of penalties imposed in comparable cases,
39. For the reasons set out above, the Wilsons' filing and prosecution of this action was clearly not frivolous. Therefore, there is no basis upon which to award any attorneys' fees to Arbors on account of its Counterclaim.
Arbors' defense in this case is largely dependent upon its assertion that it never agreed to the 2018 Lease and, correspondingly, the $1,199 monthly rental rate set forth in the 2018 Lease. Therefore, the Court must first address the enforceability of the 2018 Lease.
Arbors takes the position that because the 2018 Lease was never signed by any of its authorized representatives, the lease is unenforceable. In this regard, the Texas Statute of Frauds provides that a lease of real estate for a term longer than one year is not enforceable against a party unless the lease is in writing and signed by such party.
This, however, is not the end of the story. The secondary question is whether Arbors is nevertheless bound to the 2018 Lease on the basis of its conduct in offering the lease to the Wilsons, obtaining the Wilsons' acceptance and execution of the lease, and including the lease's new $1,199 rental rate in the proposed order submitted to the Court and entered as the Lift Stay Order. In this regard, Texas law recognizes that under certain circumstances promissory estoppel may act to except a contract from the unenforceability provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
MetroplexCore, LLC v. Parsons Transp., Inc., 743 F.3d 964, 977 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. 1965) (in turn quoting Restatement of Contracts § 90)).
"Under Texas law, `[t]he requisites of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability of reliance thereon by the promisor, and (3) substantial reliance by the promisee to his detriment."
Based upon the evidence presented, the Wilsons have successfully satisfied their burden of establishing each of the elements of promissory estoppel. First, in offering the 2018 Lease to the Wilsons, obtaining their electronic signatures thereon, and returning a copy of the lease to them for safekeeping, Arbors evidenced its promise to countersign the lease and treat it as binding upon the parties from and after November 10, 2018. Second, by virtue of the above-described actions of Arbors, the Wilsons' reliance on such promise was clearly foreseeable by Arbors. Such foreseeability was further strengthened by Arbors' incorporation of the 2018 Lease rental
Turning to the substantive claims asserted by the Wilsons, the Wilsons initially claim that Arbors is liable for abuse of process based upon its counsel's submission to the Court of the proposed order, which failed to incorporate all of the terms of the Court's Oral Ruling, without first obtaining the approval of the Wilsons' counsel. In particular, the Wilsons assert that the proposed order was incomplete in failing to incorporate the November 2, 2018 deadline fixed by the Court under the Oral Ruling for the Wilsons' payment of November 2018 rent. The Wilsons claim that such action was damaging because, under the terms of the Lift Stay Order entered by the Court based upon the proposed order, Arbors was conceivably able to take the position that the Wilsons defaulted in the timely payment of November 2018 rent and was, thus, thereafter able to pursue eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment when the Wilsons failed to pay January 2019 rent by January 1, 2019. While Arbors has no real explanation for its counsel's failure to incorporate all of the terms of the Oral Ruling and failure to comply with the Court's direction with respect to submission of the proposed order, it asserts that the omission was nevertheless harmless and not actionable. The Wilsons further assert that Arbors' actions "in failing to comply with or seek relief from the automatic stay" also constitute an abuse of process.
"`Process' is traditionally defined as the writ, summons, mandate, or other process which is used to inform the defendant of the beginning of judicial proceedings against him and to compel his appearance in court.... In a narrow sense, process refers to individual writs issued by the court during or after judicial proceedings."
Focusing first on the Wilsons' assertion that Arbors' conduct in "failing to comply with or seek relief from the automatic stay" constituted an abuse of process, such assertion lacks merit for the very simple reason that no "process" is identified within the assertion. Turning next to issues concerning the proposed order, under certain circumstances, the submission of a proposed order accepted and entered by a court may constitute a form of "process." And where the proposed order includes relief against an opposing party that was clearly not granted by the court or includes terms effectively negating relief that the court expressly granted to the opposing party such conduct may rise to the level of an abuse of process. Here, however, while the Floyd Firm failed to incorporate the entirety of the Court's Oral Ruling — having omitted reference to the November 2, 2018 deadline for the Wilsons' payment of November 2018 rent — and also failed to honor the Court's directive with respect to obtaining approval of the form of the order prior to its submission, the Court does not find such conduct to rise to the level of an abuse of process. Among other things, the Wilsons have failed to satisfy the burden of proving that the submission of the proposed order with the noted omission and without counsel approval was, in and of itself, undertaken with any ulterior motive or purpose on the part of Arbors. Additionally, based upon the fact that Arbors is not claiming a rent payment default based upon the timing of the Wilsons' November 2018 rent payment, the Wilsons have failed to prove that they have suffered any damage. As previously explained, the timing of the November 2018 rent payment is not the basis upon which Arbors acted. Arbors has admitted that the Court established a November 2, 2018 deadline for the payment of November rent and that the Wilsons made payment by such deadline.
Moreover, the Wilsons and their counsel had an independent duty to review the Lift Stay Order, once entered, and to timely request relief from the order to the extent of any concerns as to its content. In this case, they failed to do so, allowing the Lift Stay Order to become final. Had the Wilsons taken timely action, the Lift Stay Order could have been amended to incorporate the omitted November 2018 rent payment deadline. For this additional reason, the Wilsons' abuse of process claim will be denied.
The primary focus of the Wilsons' Complaint is on Arbors' alleged violation of the automatic stay in commencing and prosecuting the eviction action against the Wilsons.
Starting with the question of whether the automatic stay was violated, upon the commencement of a chapter 13 bankruptcy case the automatic stay of section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code — a statutory injunction designed to protect the chapter 13 debtor and the debtor's estate — is immediately imposed.
A debtor's possessory interest in real property, including a leasehold interest, constitutes property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate subject to the protections of the automatic stay.
Pursuant to the Lift Stay Order, which was entered by the Court on November 8, 2018, the Wilsons were "to continue
Arbors argues otherwise predicated on the assertion that the proper monthly rental rate in November 2018, December 2018 and January 2019 was $1,399. Thus, because the Wilsons failed to pay rent of $1,399 in November and December 2018, Arbors asserts that these defaults triggered the one-time, five-day cure period prior to January 2019, such that upon the Wilsons' failure to pay their January 2019 rent by January 1, 2019, as well as the Wilsons' failure to pay rent in the amount of $1,399, relief from the automatic stay was triggered effective January 2, 2019. Because the predicate for Arbors' argument — namely, the applicability of the monthly rental rate of $1,399 instead of the monthly rental rate of $1,199 under the terms of the 2018 Lease as memorialized in the Lift Stay Order — is faulty, Arbors' assertion that relief from the automatic stay was triggered effective January 2, 2019 is likewise faulty. Consequently, Arbors' actions in commencing and prosecuting the Eviction Action were in violation of section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Turning to remedies, the Wilsons first request an award of both compensatory and punitive damages under section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 362(k) provides in relevant part that "an individual injured by any willful violation of [the automatic stay] shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages."
The Wilsons have satisfied each of these three elements. First, Arbors was clearly aware of the existence of the automatic stay at the time of its commencement and prosecution of the Eviction Action. Indeed, the events leading up to this dispute started with Arbors' request for relief from the automatic stay, which was conditionally denied subject to the Wilsons' continuing compliance with the rent payment obligations of the Lift Stay Order. Additionally, upon Arbors' refusal to accept the Wilsons' January 2019 rent payment, and even more forcefully after Arbors had initiated the Eviction Action, the Lee Firm had heated conversations with Arbors' counsel concerning the continuing enforceability of the automatic stay. Ultimately, the Wilsons even filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in the Eviction Action to prevent the proceedings from moving forward. Thus, there is no question about Arbors' knowledge of the stay. Moreover, the fact that Arbors was under the misguided belief that the stay had lifted under the terms of the Lift Stay Order is of no moment. The question is not whether Arbors had the subjective belief of the continuing applicability of the automatic stay to its actions, but rather whether Arbors was aware of the existence of the automatic stay.
Based upon the foregoing, section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code mandates the award of actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees.
Turning next to punitive damages, section 362(k) provides that such damages "may" be recovered by an individual injured by a willful violation of the stay "in appropriate circumstances."
As explained above, Arbors' conduct in commencing and pursuing the Eviction Action to judgment was unquestionably egregious warranting an assessment of punitive damages.
Pursuant to Count IV of the Complaint, the Wilsons request that Arbors also be found to be in contempt and sanctioned for its "flagrant disregard for 11 U.S.C. § 362 and this Court's [Lift Stay Order]" and for its "flagrant disregard of the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Rules through bad faith negotiations to resolve its violations of the automatic stay and this Court's order."
With the foregoing in mind, and for reasons previously explained, Arbors' actions in commencing and prosecuting the Eviction Action against the Wilsons were in flagrant disregard of the automatic stay. Thus, the Wilsons have established grounds for a determination of civil contempt
As for the other grounds for contempt raised by the Wilsons, the Court finds no basis on which to hold Arbors in contempt for violation of the Lift Stay Order. The Lift Stay Order neither expressly compelled nor precluded any action on the part of Arbors. Instead, it conditionally denied Arbors' request for relief from the automatic stay subject to the Wilsons' continuing payment of rent. Similarly, the Court finds no basis on which to hold Arbors in contempt for "bad faith negotiations to resolve its violations of the automatic stay and the Court's order" because neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Lift Stay Order imposed an express obligation on Arbors to undertake any negotiations.
Finally, the Wilsons request that the Default Judgment be declared void and that the Court provide injunctive relief to compel Arbors' prospective compliance with the Bankruptcy Code in pursuing any further relief against the Wilsons. Because the Default Judgment was entered in violation of the automatic stay, there is no question that the Default Judgment is unenforceable against the Wilsons. That said, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are generally treated as voidable as opposed to void within this Circuit.
Because of the existence of the Default Judgment and Arbors' prior disregard of the stay, the Court finds that sufficient grounds have been established by the Wilsons for the issuance of injunctive relief (a) precluding Arbors from enforcing the Default Judgment against the Wilsons, (b) requiring Arbors, until the time of expiration of the automatic stay pursuant to the provisions of section 362(c)(1) and (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and notwithstanding any provisions in the Lift Stay Order to the contrary, to obtain the express approval of this Court before pursuing any action in furtherance of either the termination of the 2018 Lease (including renewals thereof in accordance with the automatic renewal provisions of paragraph 3 of the 2018 Lease) or the eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment, and (c) requiring Arbors to cooperate with the Wilsons in disposing of the Eviction Appellate Proceeding in a manner consistent with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Final Judgment that is entered by the Court in relation hereto, including, without limitation, that the Wilsons be credited with having timely made payment of their December 2019 rent and associated additional lease charges, effective as of the date of entry of the Final Judgment in this matter, by way of a credit against the amount of damages awarded against Arbors.
Based upon the foregoing, and in summary, the Court will separately issue a Final Judgment:
(1) Determining that Arbors' actions in commencing and prosecuting the Eviction Action against the Wilsons violated the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code;
(2) Determining that Arbors' actions in commencing and prosecuting the Eviction Action against the Wilsons in contravention of the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code constituted actionable civil contempt for which relief may be afforded to the Wilsons under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code;
(3) Determining that the Default Judgment is unenforceable against the Wilsons and voidable as a result of its entry in violation of the automatic stay provisions of section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code;
(4) Awarding the Wilsons compensatory damages against Arbors under section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, and as sanctions for civil contempt, in the amount of $12,046.07 less the amount of the 2/2019-11/2019 Additional Lease Charges (if, and to the extent, not already separately paid by the Wilsons);
(5) Awarding the Wilsons punitive damages against Arbors under section 362(k) of the Bankruptcy Code in the amount of $10,000.00;
(6) Awarding the Wilsons post-judgment interest at the applicable federal post-judgment statutory rate on the damages awarded (subject to the December 2019 rent and related additional lease charges credit detailed below) until paid;
(7) Enjoining Arbors from enforcing the Default Judgment against the Wilsons;
(8) Compelling Arbors (a) until the time of expiration of the automatic stay pursuant to the provisions of section 362(c)(1) and (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, and notwithstanding any provisions of the Lift Stay Order to the contrary, to obtain the express approval of this Court before pursuing any action in furtherance of either the termination of the 2018 Lease (including renewals thereof in accordance with the automatic renewal provisions of paragraph 3 of the 2018 Lease) or the eviction of the Wilsons from the Apartment, and (b) to cooperate with the Wilsons in disposing of the Eviction Appellate Proceeding in a manner consistent with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Final Judgment entered in this action, including, without limitation, that the Wilsons be credited with having timely made payment of their December 2019 rent and associated additional lease charges, effective as of the date of the entry of the Final Judgment, by way of a credit against the amount of damages awarded against Arbors; and
(9) Denying all other requested relief in the Complaint, as well as in Arbors' Counterclaim, with prejudice.
