Filed: Sep. 25, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-25-2008 Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3781 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 488. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/488 This decision is brought to you for free and open
Summary: Opinions of the United 2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 9-25-2008 Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 07-3781 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 Recommended Citation "Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 488. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/488 This decision is brought to you for free and open ..
More
Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-25-2008
Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3781
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"Veeder Root Co v. Local 6521 United" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 488.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/488
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-3781
.
VEEDER ROOT COMPANY,
a Subsidiary of Danaher Corporation
vs.
LOCAL 6521 UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY,
RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL
AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00409J)
District Judge: The Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 12, 2008
Before: McKEE, SMITH, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 25, 2008)
____________
OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Local 6521 United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing,
1
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International (“Union”) appeals an order
of the District Court vacating an arbitration award. We will reverse.
Plaintiff/appellee Veeder-Root Company (“Veeder-Root”) is a private
company with a plant located in Altoona, Pennsylvania, where it manufactures products
including magnetostrictive probes used in underground storage tanks. The probes are
produced by bargaining unit employees represented by the Union under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement.
The CBA grants Veeder-Root the right to “establish production quality
standards for employee performance, including allowances, under any accepted method or
procedure in industrial engineering practices, and to make, at any time, motion, time or
methods studies required for the efficient operation of its business.” Moreover, the
company may establish “new or revised standards” to adapt to various changed
circumstances. New or revised standards “shall be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedures of this Agreement . . ..”
The CBA also provides:
“Direct labor production standards shall be arbitrated by the
submission of the disputed standard by the parties to an
impartial arbitrator qualified in industrial engineering
practices. Such arbitrator shall, without formal hearing,
establish a fair and equitable standard based upon the
provisions of the Agreement, relevant and material standards
data made available to him, and his observation of the job,
2
and the parties shall be bound by his decision.”
In 1998, Veeder-Root established a rate of 3.5 pieces per hour for
assembling the magnetostrictive probes. Based upon the results of time studies, the
company increased the production rate in April 2004 to 5.0 pieces per hour.
After the union protested the new rate, the dispute went to arbitration. The
parties stipulated that the issue to be determined by the arbitrator was “whether or not the
standard established and set by the Company is fair and reasonable or whether it is not
reasonable in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Agreement.”
The arbitrator sustained the union’s grievances, finding that the 5.0 pieces
per hour standard is not fair and reasonable and is not reasonable in accordance with the
CBA. The arbitrator reviewed testimony and documentary evidence, but did not observe
the assembly of the probes or establish a new standard rate of production.
Veeder-Root then appealed to the District Court, which vacated the
arbitration award because the arbitrator failed to “establish a fair and equitable standard”
as required by Paragraph 11.06 of the CBA and did not observe the job in question. The
Union now appeals.
We have a very limited role in an appeal from “the decision of an arbitrator
appointed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.” Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v.
Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers Int’l Union Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d
809, 815 (3d Cir. 2004).
3
We do not review an arbitrator’s decision for legal error, id., and will
uphold an award “so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement” and is not the arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice.” USWA v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
“[O]nly where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by
principles of contract construction and the law of the shop, may a reviewing court disturb
the award.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union,
73 F.3d 1287, 1295 (3d Cir.
1996) (quoting Super Tire Eng’g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676,
721 F.2d 121,
124 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Parties to a collective bargaining agreement “may . . . agree to allow an
arbitrator to go beyond the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement. . . . by
agreeing, separately, to submit specific issues to arbitration.” High Concrete Structures,
Inc. of N.J. v. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers Local 166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1218
(3d Cir. 1989). In High Concrete Structures, we rejected an employer’s argument that an
arbitrator violated an anti-revision clause in a CBA and upheld an award because the
question the parties submitted was broad enough to grant the arbitrator the authority to
revise the agreement and the alteration was rationally related to the issue submitted.
Id. at
1216-19.
We explained that since “[a]n agreement to arbitrate is itself merely a
contract . . . the court must look not only at the text of the collective bargaining agreement
4
but also at the agreed submission.” Id. at 1219. We also determined that the arbitrator’s
interpretation of the question submitted should be granted the same broad deference given
to the interpretation of the agreement.
Id. Thus, “the terms of the submission may
empower an arbitrator to resolve disputes that go beyond the four corners of a collective
bargaining agreement.” Id.; see also Larocque v. R.W.F., Inc.,
8 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir.
1993).
Here, the submission of the parties asked the arbitrator to determine
“whether or not the standard established and set by the Company is fair and reasonable or
whether it is not reasonable in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Agreement.”
The arbitrator apparently concluded that the submission limited his assignment to
answering the question submitted by the parties and therefore he did not “establish a fair
and equitable standard” as required by the CBA.
The arbitrator’s authority was controlled by both the terms of the
submission and the CBA. See High Concrete Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219.
In carrying out his duties the arbitrator did not base his determination on his “own brand
of industrial justice.” Enterprise Wheel &
Car, 363 U.S. at 597. Instead, he expressly
relied on the standards set out in the CBA, which required new performance standards to
be capable of being met at a performance level of 100, the equivalent to daywork pace at
100%. The arbitrator noted that “[t]he parties to the Labor Agreement recognized the
principle and theory of using normal pace in the development of standards when they
5
adopted [the CBA].” He ultimately determined that the employer’s new production rate
did not satisfy that standard because it was based on inadequate time studies.
The arbitrator reached his well-reasoned decision after considering
testimony and documentary evidence and evaluating it in light of his extensive experience
as an industrial engineer and knowledge of time study standards. His failure to observe
the job does not affect the integrity of the award because the employer agreed to the
limited submission.
The award was within the terms of the submission and drew its essence
from the terms of the CBA. The arbitrator’s decision properly reflected the realities of
the collective bargaining process. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (In reviewing an arbitration, “it must be remembered that
grievance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of
collective bargaining.”).
We will reverse the District Court’s order vacating the arbitrator’s award
and enter judgment for the Union.
6
