KAUGER, J:

¶ 1 Petitioner, Miami Business Services LLC (Miami), and Real Parties in Interest were involved in a joint venture. The law firm of Phillips Murrah, P.C. (Phillips) served as general counsel for Miami as well as Real Parties in Interest and their joint venture. Over the course of that joint venture, Fogg, one of the defendants, acted as the Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Miami and acted as the principal in the real party in interest business entities. While COO of Miami, Fogg sought counsel from Phillips regarding issues affecting Miami's operations and for work undertaken by Real Parties in Interest and the joint venture.

¶ 2 Miami terminated Fogg from her role as its COO in October, 2010. Subsequent to Fogg's termination, Miami brought suit against Real Parties in Interest, including Fogg, for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, and civil conspiracy. Phillips entered its appearance in the suit on behalf of the Real Parties in Interest. Miami then filed a motion to disqualify Phillips, claiming that Phillips had a conflict of interest which violated Rules 1.71 and 1.92 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, stemming from Phillips' involvement with both Miami and Real Party in Interest AGI.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 The trial court held a hearing on Miami's Motion for Disqualification of Phillips on August 17, 2012. Prior to the hearing, the parties filed several briefs on the disqualification issue. The affidavits, documents, and other factual materials attached to the parties' motions were discussed during the hearing. The trial court decided to take the matter under advisement and requested an in camera inspection of Phillips' billing records for the time that Fogg served as COO of Miami.

¶ 4 After reviewing the submitted documents, the judge overruled Miami's motion to disqualify Phillips in an order filed on September 11, 2012. The order did not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law, but it did list the briefs and documents reviewed by the trial court prior to making its decision.3

¶ 5 Miami appealed the trial court's denial of its motion on October 10, 2012. The Real Parties in Interest filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel was a non-appealable interlocutory order. On October 15, 2012, this Court issued an Order directing Miami to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of an appealable order, because an order denying a motion to disqualify an attorney appeared to be a non-appealable interlocutory order.

¶ 6 In response to this Court's show cause order, Miami argued that: 1) the order affected a substantial part of the merits of the case and thus qualified as a final order under 12 O.S.2011 § 953;4 2) that statutes granting a right to appeal must be liberally construed, and they should be construed for uniform application; and 3) the denial of the disqualification motion affected Miami's substantial right as much as an order granting disqualification would affect the party who loses its attorney. Miami contends that if an order disqualifying an attorney is appealable, then an order which refuses to disqualify an attorney should also be appealable.

¶ 7 On December 10, 2012, this Court issued an order denying Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal, and recast the cause as an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for writ of mandamus. This court ordered Miami to file an application, brief, and appendix in accordance with Rule 1.1915 of the Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules and ordered the case to proceed in accordance with that rule.

¶ 8 In its Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Miami argues that this Court possesses original jurisdiction over this matter based on its power over the practice of law in the state and over promulgating the Rules which set forth the standards for the practice of law in Oklahoma. Miami argues that a comment in the current version of Rule 1.96 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct is at odds with current Oklahoma case law regarding the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on a Motion for Disqualification of counsel. Miami contends that without findings or a detailed basis for the trial court's order denying disqualification of counsel, Miami is deprived of any substantive basis for appeal, and is left with no meaningful way to challenge the veracity of the process the district court employed, and no way to challenge the factual and legal findings that serve as the basis for the Court's ruling.

¶ 9 Arguing that no other remedy or relief is available, Miami asks this Court to issue a Writ of Mandamus to overturn the district court's September 11, 2012, Order Overruling Motions denying Miami's Motion for Disqualification and to direct the district court on the proper application of the current version of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct regarding the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to disqualify.

I.

THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL IS IMMEDIATELY REVIEWABLE BECAUSE IT IS A FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO 12 O.S.2011 § 953.

¶ 10 This Court has previously ruled that an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is a final order subject to appellate review under the terms of 12 O.S.2011 § 953.7 Historically under Oklahoma law, before the trial court can determine that an attorney should be disqualified based on conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information, it must hold an evidentiary hearing and make a specific factual finding in its order of disqualification that the attorney had knowledge of material and confidential information.8 When reviewing the order, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and carefully examine de novo the trial court's application of ethical standards.9

¶ 11 This court has long recognized the importance of a litigant's ability to hire and select her or his own counsel for legal services, acknowledging in Bancroft v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists, 1949 OK 216, ¶ 7, 202 Okla. 108, 210 P.2d 666, that even in a non-criminal matter respondent was still entitled to have counsel of his own choosing.10 In Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, 2007 OK 78, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 899, we stated regarding this right:

However, this court has additionally emphasized that the right to select one's own counsel is not absolute.11 As we explained in Arkansas, supra:

¶ 12 While disqualification of counsel is a drastic measure, it is used when necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. The standard for disqualifying counsel is whether real harm to the integrity of the judicial process is likely to result if counsel is not disqualified.12 This is a high standard to meet13 and the burden rests with the moving party to establish the likelihood of such harm by a preponderance of the evidence.14 If disqualification is to be based on an alleged conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information, then we have required the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings that the attorney whose disqualification is sought had knowledge of material and confidential information.15

¶ 13 If preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is sufficient reason for the appellate court to review a motion granting disqualification, it should also serve as sufficient reason to review a motion denying disqualification. The importance of a person's right to the counsel of their choice should not be underestimated, but neither should the right of an opposing party to question the appropriateness of that counsel if such questioning is warranted. This is especially true in circumstances where in the absence of an option to appeal, a case will go to trial, a judgment will be rendered, and then an appellate court after the fact might determine that the trial court committed an error by denying a motion to disqualify, requiring the entire proceeding to begin anew and resulting in an unjustified waste of judicial resources and taxpayer dollars.

¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court addressed the rationale behind the appealability of disqualification orders subject to review under federal rules.16 Ordinarily, an order denying disqualification may not be appealable because sometimes, the propriety of a district court's denial of a disqualification is difficult to assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be evaluated, which is normally after final judgment.17 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognizes that when a party is harmed irreparably by the denial of disqualification, that party may seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review and, in the exceptional circumstances for which it was denied, a writ of mandamus from the appellate court might be available.18

¶ 15 Under this rationale, a party seeking disqualification should at least have the opportunity to show that, at this stage in the litigation, they may be harmed irreparably by the denial of disqualification. If the denial of disqualification is reviewed by the appellate court and affirmed, then the moving party has the opportunity to show, after the final judgment is rendered, that the attorney whose disqualification was sought did in fact impact the cause.

¶ 16 It makes no sense to waste the time and money of the judiciary and the litigants on protracted litigation when the irreparable harm caused by not disqualifying counsel for a party is clearly demonstrated at the outset. This Court has a long history of rejecting the unnecessary waste of judicial resources.19 Allowing a party to immediately appeal the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel helps to reduce the problematic waste of judicial resources by determining at the outset of litigation whether disqualification is proper, alleviating the need to wait until a trial has already concluded before the issue is raised on appeal, resulting in an entirely new trial if on appeal the trial court's denial of disqualification is found to be improper.

¶ 17 Even though denial of a motion to disqualify does not put either party into a position where they must immediately select new counsel, throwing a wrench into litigation, it still substantially affects the rights of the moving party. The moving party has the same right to fair judicial process as does the party whose choice of counsel is questioned, and if that choice is for whatever reason improper, the moving party has the right to have the situation corrected and their rights are substantially affected if the trial court fails to do so. As such, we hold that the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is an immediately appealable final order pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 953, in the same manner and for the same reasons as an order granting a motion to disqualify opposing counsel.20

¶ 18 Having decided that that the denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is an immediately appealable final order pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 953, in the same manner and for the same reasons as an order granting a motion to disqualify opposing counsel, we must stress that motions to disqualify counsel for failure to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct are not to be used as procedural weapons.21 In order to ensure fairness and prevent misuse of motions to disqualify for tactical purposes, it may be necessary for the trial court to stay proceedings pending appeal of an order granting or denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel, and the trial court should strongly consider exercising its discretion to do so. In the present matter, the trial court entered an order at the joint request of the parties staying discovery pending the review and final resolution of this issue, sustaining the status quo of the litigation.

II.

ADOPTION OF THE OKLAHOMA RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.9, COMMENT 3 DID NOT REMOVE THE REQUIREMENT OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE IF AN ATTORNEY SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED FOR A CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

¶ 19 In Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, 2007 OK 78, 171 P.3d 899, we held that the standard for granting a motion to disqualify counsel is whether real harm to the integrity of the judicial process is likely to result if counsel is not disqualified.22 Before the trial court can determine that an attorney should be disqualified based on conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information, it must hold an evidentiary hearing and make a specific factual finding in its order of disqualification that the attorney had knowledge of material and confidential information.23 This evidentiary hearing is required before any decision on whether to disqualify the attorney can be made.24

¶ 20 In issuing its September 11, 2012, ruling denying Miami's Motion to Disqualify Counsel, it appears the trial court did not conduct the evidentiary hearing required by Piette v. Bradley & Leseberg, 1996 OK 124, ¶ 2, 930 P.2d 183 and Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra. Instead, the trial court opted for an in camera review of Phillips' billing documents, prior to issuing a conclusory ruling that included no written findings of fact.

¶ 21 The reason for the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to ruling on Miami's motion appears to be confusion over whether changes made to Rule 1.9 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct conflict with the evidentiary hearing procedure required by Piette v. Bradley & Leseberg, supra, and Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra. The Court approved certain modifications to the ORPC on April 17, 2007,25 prior to deciding Arkansas State Bank v. Phillips, including a third comment to Rule 1.9 which provides in pertinent part:

Miami argues that this comment might negate the need for an evidentiary hearing and specific findings of fact indicating a conflict of interest exists before an attorney may be disqualified for a conflict of interest.

¶ 22 Miami cites two federal cases from the Northern District of Oklahoma in support of its proposition that Rule 1.9, Comment 3 alters the requirement of an evidentiary hearing: Leslie v. Fielden, 10-CV-320-TCK-TLW, 2011 WL 1655969 (N.D.Okla. May 2, 2011) and Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 599 F.Supp.2d 1287 (N.D.Okla.2008). In Accounting Principals, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., supra, the court discussed the impact ORPC 1.9, comment 3 might have on Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra, noting:

Still, the court explained how the requirements of Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra, could be met without the moving party being required to reveal precise confidential information:

Leslie v. Fielden, supra, confirmed that, as far as the Northern District is concerned, the adoption of ORPC Rule 1.9, Comment 3 means that a moving party need not come forward with evidence of actual confidential information possessed by counsel in order to seek disqualification.29 We do not agree. ¶ 23 We are not bound by the Comments to the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, though they may be persuasive.30 The Comments do not add obligations to the ORPC, but rather provide guidance.31 The Comments to the ORPC are analogous to those of the U.C.C., which are also non-binding but have served as interpretive tools.32 It is the text which controls. As noted in the ORPC section on scope:

The two federal cases cited by Miami are not dispositive. This Court is not bound by the decisions of federal courts when our holding is based on Oklahoma law which provides bona fide, separate, adequate and independent grounds for our decision.34 In Oklahoma, the nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate the practice and ethics, licensure, and discipline of legal practitioners is solely vested in this Court.35 We hold that the requirement for an evidentiary hearing for motions to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information was not altered by the adoption of ORPC Rule 1.9, Comment 3, adopted after this Court's decision in Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra.

¶ 24 For one to enjoy the opportunity of meaningful appellate review, it is essential that the facts relied upon by the trial court appear in a record that is available in one's quest for corrective relief.36 Because we hold today that denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is an immediately appealable order pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 953,37 a trial court considering such a motion must follow the procedure set forth in Piette v. Bradley & Leseberg, supra and Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, supra. Before ruling whether an attorney should be disqualified based on conflict of interest or improper possession of confidential information, it must hold an evidentiary hearing.38 The trial court must then make a specific factual finding in its order of disqualification or its order denying disqualification that the attorney either had, or did not have, knowledge of material and confidential information.39 If the ruling is appealed, we will then, when reviewing the order, review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and carefully examine de novo the trial court's application of ethical standards.40

CONCLUSION

¶ 25 The denial of disqualification of counsel is an immediately appealable final order pursuant to 12 O.S.2011 § 953.41 The trial court is still required to submit written findings or create a record setting forth its factual and legal support for its ruling when making its decision to deny a motion to disqualify counsel in the same manner it would if it were granting such a motion.42 Otherwise, a petitioner appealing the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel is denied any substantive basis for their appeal and no meaningful way to challenge the factual and legal findings that serve as the basis for the trial court's ruling. The trial court's order denying disqualification of counsel is vacated, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS ASSUMED; PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS GRANTED.

REIF, V.C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., concur.

COLBERT, C.J., WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, JJ., dissent.