Filed: Aug. 13, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2123 BRIAN SAWYER, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JIM R. ASBURY, individually and in his capacity as a Deputy with the Wood County Sheriff's Department, Defendant – Appellant, and WOOD COUNTY COMMISSION, a political subdivision in the State of West Virginia, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (6:10-cv-01256) Argued:
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2123 BRIAN SAWYER, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JIM R. ASBURY, individually and in his capacity as a Deputy with the Wood County Sheriff's Department, Defendant – Appellant, and WOOD COUNTY COMMISSION, a political subdivision in the State of West Virginia, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (6:10-cv-01256) Argued: ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2123
BRIAN SAWYER,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIM R. ASBURY, individually and in his capacity as a Deputy
with the Wood County Sheriff's Department,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
WOOD COUNTY COMMISSION, a political subdivision in the State
of West Virginia,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Joseph R. Goodwin,
District Judge. (6:10-cv-01256)
Argued: May 17, 2013 Decided: August 13, 2013
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Ellen Lipton
HOLLANDER, United States District Judge for the District of
Maryland, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Hollander wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Gregory joined.
ARGUED: Wendy Elizabeth Greve, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN &
POE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. John Hague
Bryan, JOHN H. BRYAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Union, West Virginia, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Katie L. Hicklin, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN,
BROWN & POE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
ELLEN LIPTON HOLLANDER, District Judge:
This appeal concerns events that occurred at the Wood
County Detention Center in West Virginia, while Brian Sawyer was
detained following his arrest in connection with a domestic
disturbance. During his detention, Sawyer sustained a broken
nose after Wood County Deputy Sheriff Jim Asbury used physical
force upon him. The interaction was recorded on closed-circuit
video, without sound, and that video is central to the case.
As a result of the incident, Sawyer sued Asbury in federal
court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming (among other
things) that Asbury’s use of excessive force violated Sawyer’s
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The jury returned a verdict in Asbury’s favor. Concluding that
the video clearly established Asbury’s use of excessive force,
the district court granted Sawyer’s motion for judgment. See
Sawyer v. Asbury, 861 F. Supp. 2d 737 (S.D.W. Va. 2012). In
addition, the district court found that Asbury was not entitled
1
to qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 & 1367(a). Our jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
3
I.
In October 2010, Sawyer filed suit against Deputy Asbury,
in both his individual and official capacities. 2 Sawyer’s
Amended Complaint (JA 15) contained two claims against Asbury
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, Sawyer asserted a claim
of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
arising out of Deputy Asbury’s arrest of Sawyer at his home in
October 2009, and another claim of excessive force, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, based on Deputy Asbury’s conduct at
the detention center.
Following discovery, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Deputy Asbury in his official capacity as
to all counts, and in favor of Deputy Asbury in his individual
capacity as to the excessive force claim arising from Sawyer’s
arrest. However, the court denied summary judgment with respect
to the individual-capacity Fourteenth Amendment claim relating
to the occurrence at the detention center. 3
2
Sawyer also sued Asbury’s employer, the Wood County
Commission, but the district court granted summary judgment in
its favor. That ruling is not contested on appeal.
3
On appeal, Deputy Asbury challenges the summary judgment
ruling as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim to the extent that
the district court denied him qualified immunity. However, a
party may not “appeal an order denying summary judgment after a
full trial on the merits[.]” Ortiz v. Jordan, ___ U.S. ___, 131
S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011). Accordingly, our review concerning
qualified immunity is limited to the district court’s rulings
(Continued)
4
At the trial in April 2012, the jury heard the testimony of
Sawyer and Asbury, as well as Sergeant Larry D. Kearns and
Lieutenant David Massey, who were at the detention center at the
relevant time. In addition, the video recording was played for
the jury “several times at different speeds with freeze frames
on occasion.” 861 F. Supp. 2d at 743. 4 At the time of the
incident, Asbury was not aware of the video camera in the room.
JA 171.
The evidence showed that Deputy Asbury proceeded to
Sawyer’s home on October 29, 2009, in response to a domestic
disturbance call from Sawyer’s girlfriend. Sawyer admitted that
before his arrest he had consumed “a couple Klonopin” and “a
couple beers.” JA 115-16. While Deputy Asbury was placing
Sawyer under arrest, Sawyer attempted to kick Asbury. But,
during trial. In undertaking this review, we look to “‘the
trial record, not the pleadings nor the summary judgment
record.’” Id. (citation omitted).
4
At the outset of trial, the district court gave the jury
the following stipulated instruction regarding the video, JA111:
[T]he video recording you are about to see is from a
security camera that is motion-activated. As a
result, the video will skip slightly and the playback
will pause or be slower than real-time in parts. The
security camera does not record audio, so that is not
available to us.
5
Asbury “saw the kick coming” and avoided it. As a result,
Sawyer struck the door of the residence. JA 208. 5
After Asbury arrested Sawyer, Asbury put Sawyer into his
police vehicle and drove him to the detention center. Both
Sawyer and Asbury testified that, during the drive to the
detention center, Sawyer was “running [his] mouth” to Asbury.
JA 118 (Sawyer); JA 171 (Asbury). For example, Sawyer told
Asbury that Asbury “was a tough guy because he put his hands on
someone while they’re cuffed”; claimed that Sawyer “knew where
[Asbury] lived”; stated that Sawyer was “going to kick
[Asbury’s] ass”; and asked Asbury if “he ever wonder[s] what his
wife’s doing while he’s out working these late hours.” JA 118-
19 (Sawyer); JA 171 (Asbury). 6 The parties agree that Sawyer’s
stream of invective continued as Sawyer proceeded into the
detention center. They also agree, however, that Sawyer did not
engage in any physical misconduct, such as kicking, spitting,
rocking the police vehicle, or physically resisting the
deputies’ directives.
As reflected on the video and as described in the trial
testimony, the deputies escorted Sawyer, in handcuffs, into the
5
Based on Sawyer’s conduct during the arrest, he was
prosecuted in West Virginia state court on charges of assaulting
a police officer and pleaded guilty to that offense.
6
Sawyer did not know Asbury’s marital status. JA119. In
fact, Asbury was unmarried. JA209.
6
processing room at the detention center. Once inside, Sawyer
complied with Sgt. Kearns’ directive to sit on a cement bench
attached to the wall. Sawyer was then instructed to stand so
that Deputy Asbury could remove his handcuffs. Again, Sawyer
complied. Thereafter, Asbury directed Sawyer to face the wall
and place his hands on it, so that Asbury could perform a pat-
down. Sawyer complied, and Deputy Asbury conducted the pat-
down. During these events, Sawyer continued his invective
against Asbury, although Asbury conceded that Sawyer’s demeanor
was “diminished” from the hostility he displayed in the police
vehicle. JA 174.
The video shows that, during the pat-down, Sawyer turned
his head to look back at Asbury and to speak to him, but kept
his hands on the wall. All three deputies characterized
Sawyer’s action in turning his head as a “target glance,” which
the deputies described from their training and experience as a
“danger cue,” indicating (in Sgt. Kearns’ description) that the
suspect is “looking back to see the position of the officer, or
what the officer might have, or what the officer’s doing in
preparation for some kind of an act against the officer.” JA
206; see also JA 229; JA 255. Nevertheless, Sawyer did not take
any physically aggressive action toward the deputies. And,
despite the “target glance,” the deputies did not place Sawyer
back in handcuffs.
7
After Asbury completed the frisk, Sawyer again sat on the
cement bench. JA 176. However, Sawyer crossed his legs and
arms, a posture that Asbury and Sgt. Kearns both regarded as
“defiant.” JA 176; JA 229. It is undisputed, and readily
apparent from the video, that while Sawyer was seated on the
bench and Asbury stood directly in front of him, the two engaged
in a heated verbal argument for about thirty seconds. The other
deputies observed the events from a distance of a few feet.
Sawyer and Asbury were gesticulating with their hands, and
both admitted that they were using “abrasive” and inappropriate
language. JA 179. Asbury claimed that during this exchange he
told Sawyer, three times, to stand so that he could be
fingerprinted and photographed, but Sawyer did not do so,
instead sitting back with his arms and legs crossed. Asbury is
seen on the video pointing repeatedly with his right hand at his
own left chest, in the area of his badge. The parties agree that
around this time, Sawyer stated that he would “take [Asbury’s]
badge off [his] chest and shove it up [his] ass.” JA 178.
At this point, the video shows that Deputy Asbury lunged at
Sawyer, who was still seated. With his left hand, Asbury
grabbed Sawyer’s right arm, which was in mid-gesture. With his
right hand, Asbury seized Sawyer by the throat, and forced him
back against the wall, pushing back and upward on Sawyer’s neck.
8
Although the video indisputably shows that Asbury seized
Sawyer by the neck, Asbury denied placing his hands on Sawyer’s
neck. JA 183. Instead, he claimed that he “placed [his] hand
upon [Sawyer’s] chest in the upper chest area.” Id. On cross-
examination, Asbury acknowledged that he had testified at his
deposition that he placed his hand on Sawyer’s “upper chest and
throat area.” JA 186.
Sgt. Kearns and Lt. Massey both testified that Asbury
seized Sawyer by the neck. But, they claimed that Asbury was
attempting to use “pressure point control tactics” on Sawyer’s
neck, and denied that Asbury was “choking” Sawyer. JA 232
(Kearns); see also JA 259 (Massey). Notably, Asbury did not
testify that he attempted to use a pressure point control tactic
on Sawyer at any time during the incident.
Sgt. Kearns believed the “pressure point” had “to do with a
thumb up along the jawbone by the ear, something in that area.”
JA 232. He described the pressure point control tactic as “a
pain compliance technique” and stated: “[W]hen someone has that
on you it’s causing pain and you try to get away from it.” JA
232. But, Kearns denied that the purpose of such a technique is
to cause pain or injury, explaining: “[I]t’s in an effort to get
them to do what you want them to do. You -- you apply the
pressure to cause pain and you must tell them what to do; and
when they comply, then you stop.” JA 233. However, he could
9
not recall whether Asbury told Sawyer what to do while applying
the pressure point tactic. Id.
The video indicates that, after Asbury lunged at Sawyer and
seized him by the throat, Sgt. Kearns and Lt. Massey walked to
either side of Asbury and Sawyer. Asbury drew his hand back as
if to strike Sawyer, but what he did with his hand is not
captured on the video, because the video skips at that point. A
moment later, however, the video clearly shows that Asbury drew
his fist back a second time and struck Sawyer in the face.
Nevertheless, Asbury testified that he “did not punch Mr.
Sawyer,” JA 105, and “did not strike him.” JA 106. The other
two deputies also denied that Asbury hit Sawyer. See JA 245-46
(Kearns); JA 266 (Massey). Lt. Massey testified that he believed
that what appears to be a punch on the video was another
instance of Asbury attempting to touch a “pressure point” behind
Sawyer’s ear. JA 266.
According to the video, Asbury then grabbed Sawyer by the
neck, and the other two deputies laid hands upon Sawyer’s
extremities. Sawyer’s head and body rose higher. 7 After another
moment, Sawyer’s head and body rose above the deputies’ heads.
7
Sawyer testified that, at this point, he was “trying to
keep [his] tippytoes down to take the pressure off” of his neck.
JA 128. It is not possible to discern from the video how much
of Sawyer’s upward movement was due to the deputies pushing
Sawyer upward, as opposed to Sawyer’s attempt to find a foothold
on the floor to alleviate the pressure on his throat.
10
During this entire time, Asbury was holding Sawyer by the
throat. Thereafter, the deputies pulled Sawyer to the ground.
It is clear from the video, as well as from the testimony of
Sawyer and Asbury, that Sawyer’s face did not strike the ground
when the deputies pulled him down. See JA 132 (Sawyer); JA 190
(Asbury). Sawyer was face-down and the upper half of his body
was behind a corner and hidden from the view of the camera.
Deputy Asbury also was not visible to the video camera, although
the other deputies, who were grabbing and striking Sawyer in the
arms and legs, were visible. The deputies proceeded to restrain
Sawyer.
At trial, Sawyer claimed that Asbury punched him repeatedly
in the head while he was on the ground; Asbury denied it. The
video cannot resolve the dispute as to that portion of the
incident.
The video and the trial testimony showed that, after
restraining Sawyer on the ground for several seconds, and
placing him in handcuffs, the deputies left Sawyer handcuffed
and face down on the ground. As the deputies proceeded to other
business, Sawyer remained unattended on the ground for several
minutes. Eventually, Sawyer pulled himself to a seated
position, reclining against the wall. See JA 136-38; JA 193-94;
JA 249-251; JA 273-74.
11
Sawyer was bleeding from the nose, see JA 192; JA 273, and
at some point he asked to be taken to the hospital. JA 138.
Asbury transported Sawyer to the emergency room, where Sawyer
was diagnosed with a broken nose, along with bruising to his
face and extremities. Plaintiff’s hospital records and the
medical bill were entered into evidence, along with photographs
of Sawyer that depicted his injuries. JA 145.
At the close of the evidence, Sawyer moved for judgment as
a matter of law as to liability, and Asbury moved for a
“directed verdict” on the basis of qualified immunity. 8 Pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), the district judge reserved ruling on
Sawyer’s motion until after the jury returned its verdict. JA
277-78. In denying Asbury’s motion, the district judge said: “I
think it is a clearly established constitutional right that a
pretrial detainee is not to be subjected to willful, wanton and
outrageous punishment in the terms of a punch to the nose. Here
the nose is broken.” JA 278.
8
Deputy Asbury also moved for a “directed verdict” on the
same grounds at the close of plaintiff’s case. JA 220-22. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50 was revised in 1991 to change the nomenclature of
“directed verdict” to “judgment as a matter of law.” However,
the amendment did not “alter the substantive content of the
standard.” CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 9B FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2521, at 223 (3d ed. 2008, 2013 Supp.) (indicating
that a motion for directed verdict is synonymous with a motion
for judgment).
12
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Deputy Asbury.
Thereafter, Sawyer renewed his motion for judgment as to
liability, which the district court granted. See Sawyer v.
Asbury, 861 F. Supp. 2d 737 (S.D. W.Va. 2012).
In his opinion, the trial judge included a link to a
portion of the video posted on the district court’s website, see
http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/videos/, which the judge
incorporated by reference in his ruling. The district judge
also included in his opinion several still images taken from the
video. And, he provided a detailed description of the events
depicted on the video, id. at 739-43 (internal citations,
images, and footnote omitted), stating, in part:
The officers brought Mr. Sawyer into the processing
room.
* * *
Sergeant Kearns asked Mr. Sawyer to sit on a
cement bench attached to the wall. Mr. Sawyer sat
until Deputy Asbury had him stand while he removed the
handcuffs and searched him. . . . After the pat-down,
Mr. Sawyer sat back down.
While Mr. Sawyer was seated on the bench, the
video shows Mr. Sawyer and Deputy Asbury exchanging
words and Deputy Asbury motioning upward, as if he was
asking Mr. Sawyer to stand back up. Mr. Asbury also
patted his chest while facing Mr. Sawyer. During the
exchange, Mr. Sawyer remained seated on the bench and
his lower back remained against the wall.
Shortly after patting his chest, Deputy Asbury
attacked Mr. Sawyer, violently grabbing him around the
throat with his right hand.
As Deputy Asbury was choking Mr. Sawyer with his
right hand, the other officers in the room began to
13
move towards Deputy Asbury. Then Deputy Asbury pulled
his arm back. The tape skips and does not show the
completed arm movement.[ ]
Once the other officers reached Deputy Asbury’s
side and began holding Mr. Sawyer, Deputy Asbury
pulled his right fist back again. The video clearly
shows Deputy Asbury punching Mr. Sawyer in the face,
with the force of his blow knocking Mr. Sawyer’s face
to the side.
The officers then took Mr. Sawyer to the
floor . . . . Mr. Sawyer was left on the ground for a
period of time until he managed to sit up.
In granting Sawyer’s renewed motion for judgment as to
liability and a new trial as to damages, the district court
stated, in relevant part, id. at 738, 745-46 (internal citations
and emphasis omitted):
[T]he jury did what they thought was right but simply
got it wrong . . . but that is what judges are for.
* * *
The video indisputably captures Deputy Asbury’s
excessive use of force on Mr. Sawyer at the Wood
County holding center. I have incorporated a part of
the videotape that was introduced at trial in this
order so that all may see that the jury did not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
Deputy Asbury on the issue of liability.
* * *
While courts are not to simply rubber stamp a
jury’s verdict, judges believe that judgment as a
matter of law is a power to be applied sparingly and
only in the most extraordinary circumstances. No
weighing of the evidence or credibility determinations
are permitted. I made none.
What the video shows cannot be reconciled with
the jury’s verdict. The video shows Deputy Asbury
grabbing the plaintiff by the throat. The video shows
Deputy Asbury punching the plaintiff in the face with
his fist. The video shows the officers leaving an
injured Mr. Sawyer lying on the holding center floor.
14
Mr. Sawyer walked into the holding center uninjured,
and he left with a fractured nose and battered face.
While Mr. Sawyer’s verbal threats against Deputy
Asbury were disgusting, they were still only words,
and a pretrial detainee’s words do not justify an
officer’s use of such force.
I find that no reasonable jury was at liberty to
disregard the video evidence showing Deputy Asbury
choking and punching Mr. Sawyer for no purpose other
than inflicting unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering. I find that Deputy Asbury thereby violated
Mr. Sawyer’s right under the Due Process Clause to be
free from excessive force while in pretrial detention.
On August 22, 2012, the district court entered a “Judgment
Order” in accordance with the parties’ request. 9 This timely
appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of Sawyer’s
Rule 50 motion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
9
Initially, Deputy Asbury filed a motion asking the
district court to enter partial final judgment, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), so that he could take an immediate appeal from
the district court’s liability ruling. Although the district
court denied that motion, Asbury noted an appeal, docketed in
this Court as Sawyer v. Asbury, No. 12-1775. Thereafter, Asbury
dismissed that appeal, and instead filed a Petition for Writ of
Prohibition, asking this Court to direct the district court to
reinstate the jury’s verdict and cancel the new trial as to
damages. See In re: Asbury, No. 12-1878. We denied the
petition.
The parties jointly moved for entry of a final judgment in
favor of Sawyer in the stipulated amount of one dollar, and
advised the district court that they “had reached a side
agreement concerning damages that is a high low agreement.” JA
325. Accordingly, the district court awarded Sawyer nominal
damages, noting that a “live controversy still exists between
the parties regarding the defendant’s liability.” Id.
15
to Deputy Asbury as the non-moving party and drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor. Buckley v. Mukasey,
538
F.3d 306, 321 (4th Cir. 2008). The reviewing court “may not
make credibility determinations or substitute [its] judgment for
that of the jury.” United States v. Kivanc,
714 F.3d 782, 795
(4th Cir. 2013). “We must affirm if a reasonable jury could
only rule in favor of [Sawyer]; if reasonable minds could
differ, we must reverse.” A Helping Hand, LLC v. Balt. Cnty.,
Md.,
515 F.3d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 2008).
Sawyer brought his excessive force claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. It establishes a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws” of the United States.
Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive
rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979)). Thus, “analysis of an excessive force claim brought
under § 1983 begins with ‘identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged
16
application of force.’” Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 445 (4th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
In Graham, the touchstone case with respect to excessive
force claims under § 1983, the Supreme Court rejected the notion
“that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are
governed by a single generic standard.” Id. at 393. The Court
held that claims for the use of excessive force in effectuating
an arrest or other seizure are governed by the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable” seizures; claims
of excessive force against a convicted prisoner are governed by
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishment”; and claims of post-arrest excessive force against
an arrestee or pre-trial detainee, as here, are governed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
before conviction “the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment.”
Id. at 395 & n.10. Accord
Orem, 523 F.3d at 446;
Taylor v. McDuffie,
155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1998).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment standard, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant “‘inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain
and suffering’ upon the detainee.” Carr v. Deeds, 453 F.3d 593,
605 (4th Cir. 2006) (citations and some internal quotation marks
omitted). “‘The proper inquiry is whether the force applied was
in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
17
harm.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 155 F.3d at 483) (internal
quotation marks omitted in Carr).
Moreover, no particular extent of physical injury is
required to establish an excessive force claim under the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559
U.S. 34 (2010), involving an excessive force claim brought by a
convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court
abrogated a requirement to prove more than a de minimis injury,
which the Fourth Circuit previously had applied in excessive
force cases.
Id. at 39. See, e.g.,
Taylor, 155 F.3d at 483;
see also
Orem, 523 F.3d at 447-48;
Carr, 453 F.3d at 605-06;
Riley v. Dorton,
115 F.3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied,
522 U.S. 1030 (1997). 10
10
Prior to Wilkins, we had required plaintiffs in excessive
force cases under either the Eighth or Fourteenth amendments to
establish that the defendant inflicted upon the plaintiff “‘more
than de minimis’” injury, or alternatively, inflicted either
force of “‘a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind’” or
pain of a nature such that the “‘pain itself . . . can properly
be said to constitute more than de minimis injury.’” Taylor,
155 F.3d at 483 (quoting Norman v. Taylor,
25 F.3d 1259, 1263 &
n.4 (4th Cir. 1994)(en banc), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1114
(1995)). Although Wilkins was an Eighth Amendment case, the
Supreme Court also disapproved the de minimis injury standard
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 38-39
(overruling Riley (Fourteenth Amendment), Taylor (Fourteenth
Amendment), and Norman (Eighth Amendment)). In the wake of
Wilkins, the trial judge correctly recognized that the de
minimis injury standard is no longer applicable in either Eighth
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment cases. See JA 222 (“The
Supreme Court has overruled the Fourth Circuit on that issue.
There is no doubt anymore about that.”).
18
In applying these principles to the facts, we must
determine whether, in the light most favorable to Asbury, the
district judge correctly concluded that Asbury used excessive
force. The lens of the video camera played a key role in the
district court’s decision, as it does here. The video clearly
shows that, at least once, Asbury struck Sawyer in the face
while two deputies began to hold him. Under binding Supreme
Court precedent, the video recording of the incident operated as
a legal constraint on the fact finding of the jury.
In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court
held that, when “opposing parties tell two different stories,
one of which is blatantly contradicted” by video evidence
contained in the record, “so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
. . . .”
Id. at 380. Rather than relying on “visible fiction”
propounded by the party whose account is contradicted by the
video evidence, a court should “view[ ] the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape.”
Id. at 381.
As we explained in Witt v. West Virginia State Police,
Troop 2,
633 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2011), the principle articulated
in Scott does not license a court to reject one side’s account
as a matter of law if the “documentary evidence, such as a
video,” merely “offers some support for [the other side’s]
version of events.”
Witt, 633 F.3d at 276 (emphasis in
19
original). Rather, the video controls only where it “‘blatantly
contradict[s]’” one side’s testimonial account. Id. (quoting
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). Nevertheless, “[i]ncontrovertible evi-
dence relied on by the moving party, such as a relevant
videotape whose accuracy is unchallenged, should be credited by
the court” when resolving a motion for judgment as a matter of
law, “if it so utterly discredits the opposing party’s version
that no reasonable juror could fail to believe the version
advanced by the moving party.” Zellner v. Summerlin,
494 F.3d
344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Scott in context of motion for
judgment as a matter of law). 11
A review of applicable case law under § 1983 leaves no
doubt that the district judge did not err in concluding that the
video irrefutably established that Asbury engaged in the use of
excessive force when he struck Sawyer in the face. 12 We explain.
11
Although Scott and Witt concerned motions for summary
judgment, “the standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors’
the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that ‘the
inquiry under each is the same.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)).
12
In light of this conclusion, we do not resolve whether
Asbury was justified in his alleged use of a “pressure point
control tactic” (i.e., seizing Sawyer by the neck) to secure
Sawyer’s compliance with his directives. The separate act of
striking the detainee in the face was an unlawful method for the
officer to obtain compliance with his orders.
20
In Orem v. Rephann, supra,
523 F.3d 442, while police
officers were transporting a handcuffed arrestee to jail, the
arrestee “yelled, cursed and banged her head against the police
car window . . . . Her jumping and banging around in the back
of the vehicle was so intense that the vehicle rocked.”
Id. An
officer opened the door of the vehicle and repeatedly instructed
the arrestee to “‘calm down’” and to “‘[s]top it,’” and
admonished the arrestee “to respect” the officers.
Id. The
arrestee directed profanity at the officer, who stated, “‘I’m
telling you, you’d better stop it,’” and then “shocked [the
arrestee] twice with a taser gun -- underneath her left breast
and on her inner thigh.”
Id. at 445. At the time, the arrestee
was in handcuffs and foot restraints.
Id. at 443. The district
court denied summary judgment to the officer on the arrestee’s
Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, and we affirmed.
This Court rejected the officer’s claim that “his use of
the taser gun was not excessive because [the arrestee] was
unruly and uncooperative.” Id. at 446. Although we
acknowledged that “some action was necessary to calm [the
arrestee] and safely transport her,” we concluded that, in the
light most favorable to the arrestee, the officer’s “actions
were not a ‘good faith effort to restore order’ but, rather,
wanton and unnecessary.”
Id. This conclusion was based on
several factors, including that the arrestee “was handcuffed,
21
weighed about 100 pounds, . . . and was locked in the back seat
cage of [a police] car,”; that the officer tasered the arrestee
immediately after she used profanity toward him; that the
officer applied the taser to sensitive body areas; and, “after
shocking” the arrestee, the officer “commanded that she respect
the officers.” Id. at 447.
United States v. Cobb,
905 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1990), is
also instructive. There, four law enforcement officers were
criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (“the criminal
analog of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,”
id. at 788 n.6), for their use of
excessive force against a detainee who was being held in a
booking room after his arrest for public intoxication.
Id. at
785. The detainee “and the officers exchanged insults and a
heated argument ensued.” The officers “proceeded to beat [the
detainee] for almost two hours, insulting and ridiculing him the
entire time.”
Id. The arrestee “remained handcuffed throughout
the attack. At no point did he attempt to strike any of the
officers.”
Id.
We upheld the convictions of three officers for use of
excessive force, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights. In doing so, we approved as “fairly stat[ing]
the controlling law,”
id. at 789-90, the trial court’s jury
instructions, which stated, in pertinent part,
id. at 787:
22
A law enforcement officer is justified in the use
of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to effect arrest or hold someone in custody
and of any force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary to defend himself or another from bodily
harm.
Provocation by mere insulting or threatening
words will not excuse a physical assault by a law
enforcement officer. Mere words, without more, do not
constitute provocation or aggression on the part of
the person saying those words. No law enforcement
officer is entitled to use force against someone based
on that person’s verbal statements alone.
Of import here, we said: “The trial court was entirely
correct that words alone do not justify the excessive use of
force against a pretrial detainee.” Id. at 789. Accordingly,
we rejected the officers’ contention that “mere words by a
pretrial detainee can justify the use of physical force by a
police officer.”
Id.
Perhaps the most factually apposite of our prior cases is
Jones v. Buchanan,
325 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2003). In that case,
a handcuffed detainee in a processing room at a jail exchanged
“‘pretty foul language’” with a deputy, who then knocked the
detainee to the floor, jumped on him, and crushed his nose.
Id.
at 524. 13 We reversed the district court’s grant of qualified
immunity to the deputy, stating,
id. at 530 (citation omitted):
13
Jones was litigated under the Fourth Amendment, rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee in that case had
not been arrested. Rather, in an intoxicated state, he had
asked officers to “‘take [him] to jail so [he could] get sober”
(Continued)
23
To be sure, when Deputy Keller knocked Jones to
the floor and injured him, Jones concedes that he was
drunk, angry, and using foul language. However, mere
use of foul language, even a drunk’s loud use of such
language in a police station, does not justify an
objectively reasonable police officer knocking the
drunk down, jumping on him, and breaking his
nose. . . . [A] drunken plaintiff’s ‘screaming’ and
use of ‘foul language’ in a confined area . . .
constitutes a mere ‘nuisance’ and not an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others . . . .
We also noted that testimony that the officer had “hit
Jones ‘with his fist’” provided further “evidentiary support for
Jones’s contention that the level of force was excessive.” Id.
at 530 n.6. And, we stated: “Deputy Keller also cannot justify
his actions based on Jones’s slight physical movement –- simply
beginning to stand up,”
id. at 530 (emphasis omitted), where the
detainee “never pushed, kicked, or threatened anyone.”
Id.
Orem, Cobb, and Jones stand in marked contrast to Grayson
v. Peed,
195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999), in which we rejected a
claim of use of excessive force against a pretrial detainee. In
Grayson, officers arrested a man for possession of marijuana and
PCP after he was discovered with those substances while on the
floor of a mall restroom stating, “I love everyone.”
Id. at
in advance of a court appearance scheduled for the following
morning. 325 F.3d at 523. He was handcuffed “in keeping with
‘standing’ department policy for transporting persons to the
sheriff’s department.”
Id. Although we applied Fourth
Amendment principles, Jones is closely on point with this case
factually, and nothing in our analysis in Jones suggests that it
would have been decided differently under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
24
694. The man resisted arrest. Id. He was transported to a
detention center where, after being strip searched, he attempted
to escape his cell, causing a “struggle” to ensue with officers,
who subdued the detainee with pepper spray.
Id.
The next morning, the detainee “was again acting
belligerently,” sticking his arm through the food slot of his
cell.
Id. When one of the officers opened the door of the
detainee’s cell in an attempt to get the detainee to put his arm
back, the detainee jammed his own foot in the doorway of the
cell. A “five-man cell extraction team . . . pinned [the
detainee] face down. During the course of the struggle [the
detainee] was punched seven to nine times.”
Id. The detainee
“continued to act violently” until the officers “placed him in
four-point restraints.”
Id. A few minutes later, the detainee
lost consciousness.
Id. Although medics checked the detainee’s
pulse on two occasions and observed that “he was okay,” the
detainee suddenly ceased breathing.
Id. Attempts at CPR were
unsuccessful and the detainee died.
Id.
In the § 1983 suit that followed, brought on behalf of the
detainee’s estate, we affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the officers. In light of the
detainee’s physical resistance and attempts to escape his cell,
we ruled that the officers’ “restraining measures were necessary
to subdue” the detainee.
Id. at 696. Therefore, we determined
25
that the “force applied by [the] officers was ‘in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline,’ and did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Unlike Grayson, in this case the video clearly reveals that
Sawyer did not attempt any violent, unruly, or evasive act
before Deputy Asbury hit him in the face. As in Orem, Carr, and
Jones, the officer’s assault here was provoked by the detainee’s
verbal tirade and/or his intransigence and failure to heed
instructions.
To be sure, the detainees in Orem, Carr, and Jones were all
in handcuffs when they were assaulted by officers, whereas in
this case, Sawyer was not handcuffed when Asbury struck him.
This distinction is not determinative, however. We did not
state in Orem, Carr, or Jones that the officer’s use of force
was excessive because the detainee was in handcuffs. Nor did we
suggest that, but for the handcuffs, the force would not have
been excessive. Rather, as we reasoned in Jones, the handcuffs
were significant because, “if [the detainee] was handcuffed
behind his back,” it was “hard to see how he would pose an
immediate threat to anyone.” 325 F.3d at 529. In this case,
the video dispels any need to speculate as to whether Sawyer
posed an immediate threat to the officers: it shows that Deputy
Asbury, rather than Sawyer, was the aggressor.
26
We recognize that “the agents of the state are permitted to
exercise a certain degree of force in order to protect the
interests of society.” Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382
(4th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vac’d on other grounds,
490 U.S. 1087
(1989). In the Fourteenth Amendment context, an officer may use
the force needed in a “‘good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,’” but the officer may not use force “‘maliciously or
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’”
Carr, 453
F.3d at 605 (citation omitted).
In the light most favorable to Asbury, he was faced with a
detainee who was verbally defiant and uncooperative in response
to Asbury’s lawful order to stand, and Asbury resorted to
“pressure point control tactics” to obtain compliance. Even if
the jury credited the testimony of Kearns and Massey, to the
effect that Asbury was using “pressure point control tactics”
when he seized Sawyer by the neck, and even if the use of such
“pressure point control tactics” was not excessive under the
circumstances, that did not end the parties’ contact. Asbury
then proceeded to strike Sawyer in the face, just as the other
deputies had begun to restrain Sawyer.
Sawyer’s failure to comply with Asbury’s order to stand did
not justify Asbury in striking Sawyer in the face. A detainee’s
refusal to comply with an officer’s lawful order, without more,
is not a license to “take the gloves off.”
27
Moreover, Asbury knew that Sawyer was unarmed, as he had
just frisked Sawyer. Nor did the deputies’ testimony that
Sawyer engaged in “target glances” during the pat down support
Asbury’s decision to strike Sawyer. It is plain that, if the
“target glances” had actually caused any of the deputies to be
concerned that Sawyer was about to become violent, they would
not have removed Sawyer’s handcuffs or would have put him back
in handcuffs at that time.
In sum, under the facts of this case, Asbury’s deployment
of a blow to the head of Sawyer, a detainee, in response to mere
insulting words and noncompliance with the deputy’s orders, was
excessive. Such conduct did not constitute a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline. The district court understood
the import of the video evidence, which indisputably shows that
Deputy Asbury used force that was excessive under the
circumstances. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting Sawyer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
III.
The district court also determined that Deputy Asbury was
not entitled to qualified immunity, and Asbury challenges that
ruling on appeal. We review de novo the court’s denial of
motion for judgment. Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d
188, 201 (4th Cir. 2002).
28
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects police
officers and public officials from claims of constitutional
violations ‘for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their
actions.’” Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 661 (4th Cir.)
(quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 789 (2012). “Qualified
immunity extends to protect officials ‘who commit constitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could
reasonably believe that their actions were lawful.’” Williams
v. Ozmint,
716 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Henry v.
Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___,
132 S. Ct. 781 (2011)); accord Durham v. Horner,
690 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 2012).
The qualified immunity analysis involves two inquiries: (1)
whether the facts alleged, “[t]aken in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201; and (2) whether the right at issue “‘was clearly
established in the specific context of the case -- that is,
[whether] it was clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct
in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.’”
Merchant, 677 F.3d at 662 (citation omitted). The
“two inquiries . . . may be assessed in either sequence.”
Id.
at 661-62; accord Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
29
As to the first inquiry, our analysis demonstrates that,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to Deputy Asbury,
his conduct indisputably violated Sawyer’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
The second inquiry, concerning whether the right at issue
was clearly established, is “assessed in light of the legal
rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the time” of the
conduct at issue. Messerschmidt v. Millender, ___ U.S. ___, 132
S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2012) (citation and some internal quotation
marks omitted). “To be clearly established, a right must be
sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would [have
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’ In
other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory
or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Reichle v. Howards,
___ U.S. ___,
132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2078, 2083 (2011)) (some
internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In determining whether a right was clearly established, we
“‘ordinarily need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme
Court, this court of appeals, and the highest court of the state
in which the case arose,’” 14 as of the date of the conduct in
14
The parties have not cited any pertinent case law from
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, and our own
research has uncovered none.
30
issue. Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 597
F.3d 163, 176 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. 392 (2010). And, the “‘nonexistence of a
case holding the defendant’s identical conduct to be unlawful
does not prevent denial of qualified immunity,’” because
“‘qualified immunity was never intended to relieve government
officials from the responsibility of applying familiar legal
principles to new situations.’” Wilson v. Kittoe,
337 F.3d 392,
403 (4th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Thus, “officials can
still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in novel factual circumstances.” Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S.
730, 741 (2002).
Arguably, the de minimis injury standard, discussed supra,
remains relevant to Deputy Asbury’s qualified immunity defense,
because the incident at the detention center took place in
October 2009, and the Supreme Court did not decide Wilkins,
559
U.S. 34, until February 2010. Therefore, at the time of the
underlying events, the de minimis injury standard was part of
the clearly established law of this circuit.
Nevertheless, that standard was readily satisfied here.
Under clearly established law in October 2009, a broken nose was
well within the range of injuries considered more than de
minimis. Compare Orem, 523 F.3d at 447-48 (holding “electric
shock, pain,” and “sunburn-like scar” from taser application
31
more than de minimis); Young v. Prince George’s Cnty., 355 F.3d
751, 758 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding “‘contusion, cut to [the]
lips, bruises, lesions to [the] wrist, and a strained neck and
back’” more than de minimis); Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty.,
302 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir. 2002) (where police officers did not
physically injure arrestee, but left him “tied up [to a metal
pole in a shopping center parking lot] in a dark and deserted
location in the middle of the night” such that he “did not know
when or if anyone would come to rescue him or who might discover
him” and “in the months following the incident he had trouble
sleeping and was scared to leave his home,” the “resulting
injury was more than de minimis”); with
Taylor, 155 F.3d at 484
(holding “temporary swelling and irritation” of the jaw and
mucous membranes and “‘abrasions about the wrists and ankles’”
from handcuffs and leg irons was de minimis).
We recognize that “‘police officers are often forced to
make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving,’” and thus “the facts must be
evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the
scene, and the use of hindsight must be avoided.” Waterman v.
Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 476–77 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Graham,
supra, 490 U.S. at 397) (internal citations omitted). “Not
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in
the peace of a judge’s chambers,” transgresses clearly
32
established constitutional rights. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Nevertheless, qualified immunity does not protect an officer
“‘who knowingly violate[s] the law,’” Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S.
224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986)), or an officer who makes an objectively unreasonable
mistake.
Henry, supra, 652 F.3d at 535. “If the law was clearly
established, [a qualified] immunity defense ordinarily should
fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know
the law governing his conduct.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S.
800, 818–19 (1982).
With respect to qualified immunity, we are presented here
with a situation similar to the one we encountered in Orem,
where the incident was captured on a dashboard camera. See id.
at 444 n.2. In evaluating whether the unlawfulness of an
officer’s use of a taser was clearly established from the
perspective of a hypothetical “reasonable officer,” the Orem
Court said: “[W]e need not use hindsight or conjure up a pseudo-
‘reasonable officer’ because, two other presumably ‘reasonable
officers’ were at the scene.”
Orem, 523 F.3d at 448. We noted
that the other officers on the scene never attempted to use a
taser or physical force to subdue the arrestee.
In this case, the video shows that, when Asbury lunged at
Sawyer and seized him by the neck, two other officers were
standing several feet away, and neither reacted in such a way as
33
to suggest that Sawyer had suddenly exhibited threatening or
volatile behavior. Indeed, the other deputies stood still for
two seconds as Asbury seized Sawyer by the neck, and then they
walked without urgency to Sawyer and grabbed him, just as Asbury
struck Sawyer in the face. The conduct of the two deputies is a
powerful indicator that a need to deploy violent force was not
apparent to a reasonable officer.
Our substantive analysis of Deputy Asbury’s conduct in
striking Sawyer in the face is drawn entirely from pre-2009 case
law and does not involve any novel extension of precedent. It
was clearly established in October 2009 that “words alone do not
justify the excessive use of force against a pretrial detainee.”
Cobb, supra, 905 F.2d at 789. Our precedent made it clear to
any reasonable officer that “mere use of foul language . . .
does not justify an objectively reasonable police officer
knocking [an arrestee] down, jumping on him, and breaking his
nose.”
Jones, supra, 325 F.3d at 530. Accordingly, the
district court’s rejection of Deputy Asbury’s qualified immunity
defense was legally correct.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
34
