Filed: Jan. 04, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-1679 GLEN FLETCHER, Plaintiff - Appellant, and LUCILLE FLETCHER; LUCY FLETCHER, Plaintiffs, v. PIZZA HUT OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee, and YUM! BRANDS, INCORPORATED, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, District Judge. (1:08-cv-00815-AJT-TCB) Argued: October 26, 2010 Decided: January 4, 2011 Before KEENAN and WYNN, C
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-1679 GLEN FLETCHER, Plaintiff - Appellant, and LUCILLE FLETCHER; LUCY FLETCHER, Plaintiffs, v. PIZZA HUT OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee, and YUM! BRANDS, INCORPORATED, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, District Judge. (1:08-cv-00815-AJT-TCB) Argued: October 26, 2010 Decided: January 4, 2011 Before KEENAN and WYNN, Ci..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1679
GLEN FLETCHER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
LUCILLE FLETCHER; LUCY FLETCHER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PIZZA HUT OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
YUM! BRANDS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:08-cv-00815-AJT-TCB)
Argued: October 26, 2010 Decided: January 4, 2011
Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Bobby R. BALDOCK,
Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Senior Judge Baldock joined.
ARGUED: Douglas Bell Wessel, WESSEL LAW OFFICES, Reston,
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles Michael Sims, LECLAIRRYAN, PC,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tracy Taylor Hague,
Joanna L. Faust, LECLAIRRYAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal in a personal injury case arises from an
automobile accident in which the plaintiff, Glen Fletcher,
suffered injuries when his vehicle was struck by a car driven by
Rene Ayala, who drove into an intersection in violation of a red
traffic signal. Ayala is not a party to this case. Fletcher
brought this action against Pizza Hut of America, Inc. (Pizza
Hut), alleging that Pizza Hut was directly and vicariously
liable for Fletcher’s injuries based on the presence of a car,
owned by a Pizza Hut delivery driver, which was disabled in a
traffic lane at the intersection where the accident occurred.
After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Pizza
Hut.
On appeal, Fletcher raises numerous issues that we do not
reach, because we conclude as a matter of law that Ayala’s
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident,
superseding any alleged negligence on the part of Pizza Hut or
its employees. We therefore affirm the district court’s
judgment.
I.
In 2008, Fletcher filed a complaint against Pizza Hut in a
state court in Virginia, seeking monetary damages for injuries
he suffered as the result of the automobile accident. Alleging
3
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), Pizza Hut
removed the action to a federal district court in the Eastern
District of Virginia.
In his complaint, Fletcher alleged that Nancy Karickhoff, a
Pizza Hut employee and the driver of the disabled vehicle,
created a traffic hazard by leaving her inoperable vehicle in a
left-turn lane leading to the intersection where the collision
occurred. Among his allegations of direct and vicarious
liability, Fletcher contended that Pizza Hut and its manager
breached various duties that arose before Karickhoff’s car
stalled near the intersection, including a duty to inspect and
maintain Karickhoff’s vehicle and a duty to refrain from
assigning delivery duties to employees with a history of driving
unsafe vehicles. Fletcher also contended that Pizza Hut and its
manager breached other duties after Karickhoff’s car became
disabled, including the duty to assist Karickhoff in removing
her vehicle from the road.
Fletcher further alleged in his complaint that Pizza Hut
was vicariously liable for Karickhoff’s acts and omissions.
Fletcher asserted that Karickhoff acted negligently before her
car stalled by failing to maintain and safely operate the
vehicle, and acted negligently after her car became disabled by
abandoning it and by failing to remove the vehicle from the
roadway as soon as possible.
4
Pizza Hut filed a motion for summary judgment, contending
that any negligent acts by Pizza Hut or its employees were not a
proximate cause of the accident. Pizza Hut argued that Ayala’s
negligence, in driving around the Karickhoff vehicle and into
the intersection against the red traffic signal, superseded any
alleged negligence by Pizza Hut or its employees and was the
sole proximate cause of the accident. The district court denied
Pizza Hut’s motion, stating that, based on the record, the court
was unable to conclude as a matter of law that Pizza Hut’s
alleged negligence did not contribute to the accident.
Before trial, however, the district court dismissed all
direct and vicarious liability claims against Pizza Hut for the
acts of its manager, holding that Pizza Hut did not have a legal
duty to inspect Karickhoff’s vehicle, and did not have a duty to
assist Karickhoff in removing her disabled vehicle from the
road. The case proceeded to a jury trial on the sole remaining
issue of Pizza Hut’s vicarious liability for Karickhoff’s
allegedly negligent acts.
The evidence at trial showed that on the date of the
accident, Karickhoff was driving an automobile that she owned
and used in the performance of her work as a delivery driver for
Pizza Hut. Before the accident occurred, Karickhoff was
returning to the Pizza Hut store in Manassas, Virginia, after
completing a delivery. Karickhoff’s car had been experiencing
5
mechanical problems before the day of the accident and, although
she had made some minor repairs to the vehicle, she could not
afford to pay for additional suggested repairs. Neither
Fletcher nor Pizza Hut presented expert testimony at trial
regarding the cause of Karickhoff’s vehicle failure on the day
of the accident.
In the process of returning from her delivery assignment to
the Pizza Hut restaurant, Karickhoff’s car stalled in the
northbound left-turn lane of Sudley Road, where that highway
intersects with Coverstone Drive. At this intersection, Sudley
Road has three northbound “through” lanes and one left-turn
lane. In the southbound direction, Sudley Road has three
“through” lanes and two left-turn lanes. Each lane of traffic
in both directions is controlled by a separate traffic signal.
The traffic signals controlling the intersection operate in
the following sequence. After the signals governing the turn
lanes change from green arrows to red lights, the signals
governing the “through” lanes change from red lights to green
lights. Therefore, the traffic signals governing the turn lanes
never display green arrows at the same time that the signals for
the “through” lanes display green lights. The evidence also
showed that the traffic signals at this intersection were
operating in proper sequence on the day of the accident.
6
After Karickhoff’s car stalled in the left-turn lane, she
engaged the vehicle’s hazard lights, raised its hood, and pushed
the car as close to the median as possible. Although
Karickhoff’s vehicle did not obstruct the view of the traffic
signals for drivers located behind her vehicle, the car
continued to block most of the left-turn lane in the position
nearest the traffic signal.
Karickhoff left her car and walked to the nearby Pizza Hut
store to inform the manager that her car had become disabled.
The manager instructed Karickhoff to retrieve the Pizza Hut sign
from the roof of the car. Karickhoff complied with this
instruction, and brought the sign back to the store.
A few minutes later, Karickhoff returned to her disabled
car to speak with a police officer who had arrived on the scene.
After the police officer requested that a towing service remove
Karickhoff’s car, Karickhoff returned to the Pizza Hut store.
The evidence did not indicate that the police officer directed
traffic or took any other measures to ensure that the traffic
passed safely around Karickhoff’s vehicle. About seven minutes
after Karickhoff returned to the Pizza Hut store and forty-five
minutes after Karickhoff’s car initially stalled, the accident
occurred.
When Ayala stopped his car behind Karickhoff’s disabled
vehicle, the traffic signals governing the adjacent “through”
7
lane turned from red to green. As the traffic in the “through”
lanes began to move, Ayala navigated his car into the nearest
“through” lane to pass to the right of Karickhoff’s vehicle.
Ayala turned left onto Cornerstone Drive from the “through”
lane, crossing in front of Karickhoff’s vehicle, and collided
with Fletcher’s car, which had proceeded into the intersection
in the southbound “through” lane of Sudley Road.
Ayala testified that the last time he saw the traffic
signal governing the left-turn lane, the signal displayed a
green arrow. Ayala admitted, however, that he may have been
mistaken, and that the traffic signal for the left-turn lane may
have changed to red before he made the turn.
Several witnesses to the accident testified regarding their
observations at the accident scene. One witness, who was
driving a vehicle directly behind Ayala in the left-turn lane,
stated that when Ayala maneuvered his car around Karickhoff’s
stalled vehicle and through the intersection, the traffic signal
for the left-turn lane already had turned red. Another witness,
who was driving in the southbound “through” lane next to
Fletcher’s car, stated that the traffic signals governing the
southbound “through” lanes of Sudley Road displayed green lights
for several seconds before Ayala’s car entered the intersection.
A third witness, whose car was directly behind Fletcher’s
vehicle, also stated that the traffic signal governing the
8
southbound “through” lanes had “turned green” when he saw
Ayala’s car traveling “fairly fast” through the intersection.
Finally, Lucy Fletcher, Fletcher’s wife, who was driving the
vehicle in which Fletcher was a passenger, testified that after
the traffic signal governing her southbound “through” lane
turned green, she drove her car straight into the intersection.
After Fletcher presented his evidence, Pizza Hut moved for
a directed verdict. The district court granted the motion in
part, concluding that Fletcher’s evidence was insufficient to
prove that Pizza Hut or its employees acted negligently before
Karickhoff’s car stalled, or that any such conduct was a
proximate cause of the accident. After this ruling, the only
issues remaining for the jury’s consideration were whether
Karickhoff acted negligently after her car stalled, and whether
any such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
At the close of all the evidence, the district court
instructed the jury on several different principles, including
negligence, proximate causation, and superseding causation. The
jury returned its verdict in favor of Pizza Hut. Completing a
special verdict form, the jury concluded that Karickhoff had not
acted negligently after her car became disabled.
In accordance with the jury verdict, the district court
entered judgment in favor of Pizza Hut. Fletcher filed a motion
9
for a new trial, which the district court denied. Fletcher
timely noted this appeal.
II.
On appeal, Fletcher asserts that the district court
committed numerous errors. Among these alleged errors, Fletcher
contends that the district court erred in dismissing before
trial his claim that Pizza Hut was both directly and vicariously
liable for the acts of its manager. Fletcher also argues that
the district court erred in excluding from the jury’s
consideration his claim that Karickhoff acted negligently before
her car became disabled. Additionally, Fletcher raises several
arguments relating to the district court’s refusal of various
jury instructions, including a requested instruction addressing
the allegedly prejudicial statements made by Pizza Hut’s counsel
during closing argument.
In its brief and during oral argument, Pizza Hut addressed
each of Fletcher’s contentions. However, Pizza Hut urges that
we affirm the district court’s judgment on an alternate basis,
namely, that, as a matter of law, Ayala’s negligence was the
sole proximate cause of Fletcher’s injury. According to Pizza
Hut, Ayala’s reckless conduct entirely superseded any potential
negligence on the part of Pizza Hut or its employees.
10
In response to Pizza Hut’s proximate causation argument,
Fletcher contends that the negligent acts and omissions of Pizza
Hut and its employees created a continuing, dangerous condition,
and that Ayala’s conduct arose from that dangerous condition.
Fletcher asserts that this dangerous condition required drivers
in the left-turn lane, who were positioned behind Karickhoff’s
disabled vehicle, to disobey either the traffic signal governing
the “through” lane or the signal controlling the left-turn lane.
Accordingly, Fletcher argues that Karickhoff’s negligent conduct
set in motion Ayala’s negligent acts, and that Ayala’s
negligence was not a superseding cause of the accident.
Upon consideration of these arguments, we agree with Pizza
Hut that this appeal should be resolved on the ground that, as a
matter of law, Ayala’s negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the accident. Pizza Hut advanced this proximate causation
argument in the district court in both its motion for summary
judgment and its motion for a directed verdict. Therefore,
despite the fact that the jury returned a verdict for Pizza Hut
on different grounds, Pizza Hut was not required to file a
cross-appeal to preserve this issue for our consideration. See
Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982)(explaining that an
appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record to
support the judgment and need not file a cross-appeal).
Additionally, we have explained that courts of appeal may affirm
11
a judgment on any ground appearing in the record. Toll Bros.,
Inc. v Dryvit Sys., Inc., 432 F.3d 564, 572 (4th Cir. 2005); MM
v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty.,
303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.
2002).
III.
The district court considered this negligence action under
its diversity jurisdiction, and properly concluded that the
substantive law of Virginia is controlling. See Volvo Const.
Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., 386 F.3d 581, 599-600
(4th Cir. 2004). The record before us presents a textbook case
of superseding causation under Virginia law. Therefore, we
begin our analysis by stating the applicable principles of
proximate causation.
A proximate cause of an event is an act which, in natural
and continuous sequence produces the event, and without which
that event would not have occurred. Kellermann v. McDonough,
684 S.E.2d 786, 793 (Va. 2009). Under certain conditions, a
proximate cause may also be a superseding cause. Williams v.
Joynes,
677 S.E.2d 261, 264 (Va. 2009).
A superseding cause is an intervening act that severs the
potential link of proximate causation between an initial act of
negligence and the resulting harm, thereby relieving the initial
negligent actor of any liability. Id. By entirely supplanting
12
an initial act of negligence, a superseding cause alone causes
the plaintiff’s injury and is the only proximate cause of that
injury. Id.; Williams v. Le, 662 S.E.2d 73, 77 (Va. 2008);
Jenkins v. Payne,
465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (Va. 1996).
When a superseding cause occurs, the condition created by
the initial act of negligence becomes merely a “circumstance of
the accident,” and the initial negligent actor is “legally
insulated” from liability. Hubbard v. Murray, 3 S.E.2d 397, 401
(Va. 1939). An intervening act may not be deemed a superseding
cause, however, if the intervening act was set in motion by the
initial act of negligence.
Joynes, 677 S.E.2d at 264; Philip
Morris Inc. v. Emerson,
368 S.E.2d 268, 277 (Va. 1988).
Within this conceptual framework, we assume, without
deciding, that Pizza Hut, directly or vicariously through its
employees, acted negligently and consider whether such
negligence became a mere circumstance of the accident as a
result of Ayala’s intervening negligent acts. In other words,
we must decide whether Ayala’s actions so eclipsed any
negligence by Pizza Hut or its employees that, as a matter of
law, Ayala’s actions became the sole proximate cause of the
accident.
During his testimony, Ayala admitted that the traffic
signal for the left-turn lane may have changed to red before he
crossed from the adjacent “through” lane into the intersection.
13
We consider Ayala’s admission in conjunction with the testimony
of the witness located directly behind Ayala’s car in the left-
turn lane, who stated that Ayala moved his car around
Karickhoff’s vehicle and into the intersection against the red
traffic signal governing the left-turn lane. We also consider
the undisputed testimony of other witnesses that the traffic
signals governing the southbound “through” lanes on Sudley Road
had turned green before Ayala drove his car into the
intersection.
Based on this testimony, Ayala acted negligently because he
disobeyed the red traffic signal governing the left-turn lane,
and failed to ensure that he could safely turn left into the
intersection. See Va. Code § 46.2-833 (red traffic signal
indicates moving traffic shall stop and remain stopped except in
direction indicated by lighted green arrow). Because Ayala’s
actions produced the collision and, without his actions, the
accident would not have occurred, Ayala’s negligence was, as a
matter of law, a proximate cause of the collision between his
car and Fletcher’s vehicle. See Kellermann, 684 S.E.2d at 793.
The undisputed testimony also showed that Ayala was aware,
or by the exercise of ordinary care should have been aware, of
the danger created by Pizza Hut or its employees. Despite this
awareness, Ayala, disobeying the traffic signal and entering the
intersection against oncoming traffic, committed an independent
14
act of negligence that entirely supplanted any prior negligent
act by Pizza Hut or its employees. Ayala’s acts of negligence
thus rendered the condition created by Pizza Hut or its
employees a mere circumstance of the accident, legally insulated
from liability by Ayala’s independent acts of negligence. See
Hubbard, 3 S.E.2d at 401.
In reaching this conclusion, we find no merit in Fletcher’s
argument that the location of the disabled car required Ayala to
disobey the red traffic signal. Ayala could have proceeded
straight on Sudley Road in one of the “through” lanes, or could
have waited in the left-turn lane behind the disabled vehicle
until it was towed. These lawful options conclusively
demonstrate that Ayala’s negligent acts were not set in motion
by any negligence on the part of Pizza Hut or its employees.
Therefore, Ayala’s actions were a superseding cause of
Fletcher’s injury and, as such, were the sole proximate cause of
that injury. See Joynes, 677 S.E.2d at 264.
For these reasons, we hold that, as a matter of law,
Ayala’s negligence entirely supplanted any negligence on the
part of Pizza Hut or its employees. See id. Therefore, on this
15
independent basis, we conclude that the record supports the
district court’s judgment, which we hereby affirm. *
AFFIRMED
*
Based on this conclusion, we need not consider Fletcher’s
arguments relating to the district court’s holdings limiting the
theories of liability presented to the jury, the court’s various
decisions regarding jury instructions, or the allegedly
prejudicial closing argument by counsel for Pizza Hut. Our
holding that Ayala’s negligence, as a matter of law, was the
sole proximate cause of the accident renders these other issues
moot.
16
