Filed: Sep. 04, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-1130 KEANNA LOMAX, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. WEINSTOCK, FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, P.A., Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:13-cv-01442-CCB) Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 4, 2014 Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublishe
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-1130 KEANNA LOMAX, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. WEINSTOCK, FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, P.A., Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:13-cv-01442-CCB) Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 4, 2014 Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1130
KEANNA LOMAX, on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WEINSTOCK, FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, P.A.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:13-cv-01442-CCB)
Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 4, 2014
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
E. David Hoskins, Max F. Brauer, THE LAW OFFICES OF E. DAVID
HOSKINS, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. David M.
Ross, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Keanna Lomax appeals the district court’s order
dismissing her amended complaint without prejudice to permit
arbitration. Lomax’s complaint alleged violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, the Maryland Consumer Debt
Collection Act, and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Fed. R. Civ. P.]
12(b)(1).” Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658
F.3d 402, 408 (4th Cir. 2011). Lomax has the burden of proving
subject matter jurisdiction. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cnty.
Comm’rs,
523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008). We also review de
novo a district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Montgomery Cnty.,
684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing standard of
review). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
Lomax argues that the plain language of the
arbitration agreement precludes arbitration of her claims
against Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, P.A. Although the
district court declined to determine whether federal law or
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Maryland state law governed, we conclude that, under either,
Lomax’s argument fails. Under Maryland law, “a ‘broadly worded’
arbitration clause triggers the ‘significant relationship
test.’” Griggs v. Evans, 43 A.3d 1081, 1088 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2012). Likewise, “[w]e have consistently held that an
arbitration clause encompassing all disputes ‘arising out of or
relating to’ a contract embraces ‘every dispute between the
parties having a significant relationship to the contract
regardless of the label attached to a dispute.’” Wachovia Bank,
Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt,
445 F.3d 762, 767 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging,
Inc.,
96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996)). Our review of the record
leads us to conclude, as the district court found, that Lomax’s
claims have a “significant relationship” to the retail
installment contract as they involve the parties’ obligations
under the contract.
We also agree with the district court that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel applies. Under federal law, “a
nonsignatory to an arbitration clause may, in certain
situations, compel a signatory to the clause to arbitrate the
signatory’s claims against the nonsignatory despite the fact
that the signatory and nonsignatory lack an agreement to
arbitrate.” Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. Long, 453 F.3d 623,
627 (4th Cir. 2006). “One such situation exists when the
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signatory is equitably estopped from arguing that a nonsignatory
is not a party to the arbitration clause.” Id. “[E]stoppel is
appropriate if in substance the signatory’s underlying complaint
is based on the nonsignatory’s alleged breach of the obligations
and duties assigned to it in the agreement.”
Id. at 628
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Likewise,
under Maryland law, “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel
permits non-signatories to enforce an arbitration provision
. . . when a signatory must rely on the terms of the written
agreement [containing the arbitration clause] in asserting [its]
claims.”
Griggs, 43 A.3d at 1092 (internal quotation marks and
footnote omitted). Because Lomax relies on the retail
installment sales contract in an attempt to collect damages, she
is equitably estopped from disclaiming the contract’s
arbitration provision.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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