Filed: Sep. 05, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4958 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JASON LEMAR MEDLYN, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00006-H-1) Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per cur
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4958 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JASON LEMAR MEDLYN, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00006-H-1) Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curi..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4958
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JASON LEMAR MEDLYN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00006-H-1)
Submitted: August 28, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Mark R. Sigmon, GRAEBE HANNA & SULLIVAN, PLLC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jason Lemar Medlyn pled guilty, in accordance with a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess a stolen
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012)
(Count One); possession of firearms in a school zone, and aiding
and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q), 924(a)(2), 2
(2012) (Count Three); and possession of firearms and ammunition
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012)
(Count Five). Medlyn was sentenced to consecutive terms of
sixty months on Count One, sixty months on Count Three, and 120
months on Count Five, for a total term of 240 months’
imprisonment. Medlyn timely appealed.
Medlyn’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether Medlyn’s sentence
was reasonable, whether venue was proper in the Eastern District
of North Carolina for Count Three, and whether counsel was
ineffective for inadequately explaining the potential sentence
Medlyn faced and failing to challenge venue for Count Three or
object to the presentence investigation report. Medlyn was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did
not file such a brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the
appeal based on a waiver-of-appellate-rights provision in the
plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
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We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver.
United States v. Copeland,
707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied,
134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). “We generally will enforce a
waiver . . . if the record establishes that the waiver is valid
and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury,
670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s
waiver is valid if he agreed to it “knowingly and
intelligently.” United States v. Manigan,
592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Medlyn knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal his
sentence, except for claims of ineffective assistance or
prosecutorial misconduct not known to Medlyn at the time of his
guilty plea. We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion
to dismiss and dismiss the appeal of his sentence to the extent
that his claims do not rest on grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Because the waiver does not preclude our review of
Medlyn’s convictions or his challenges to his sentence based on
ineffective assistance, we deny the motion to dismiss in part.
Turning to Medlyn’s challenge to venue for Count
Three, the issue is waived because counsel did not object to
venue in the district court. United States v. Ebersole,
411
F.3d 517, 527-28 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stewart, 256
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F.3d 231, 238 (4th Cir. 2001). The remainder of Medlyn’s claims
assert ineffective assistance of counsel. Such claims “are
generally not cognizable on direct appeal.” United States v.
Benton,
523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.
King,
119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Instead, to allow for
adequate development of the record, a defendant must ordinarily
bring his ineffective assistance claims in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2012) motion.
King, 119 F.3d at 295. However, we may
entertain such claims on direct appeal if “it conclusively
appears from the record that defense counsel did not provide
effective representation.” United States v. Richardson,
195
F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Because Medlyn’s alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not conclusive on
the record, we decline to address them in this appeal.
Pursuant to Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
for meritorious, nonwaived issues and have found none. We
therefore affirm in part and dismiss in part. This court
requires that counsel inform Medlyn, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United State for further
review. If Medlyn requests that such a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that the petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the
motion was served on Medlyn. We dispense with oral argument
4
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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