Filed: Mar. 16, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-2117 JOSE LUIS RAMOS, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware Corporation; MOLINA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; DOES, 1 through 10, Defendants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:12-cv-00856-GBL-JFA) Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: March 16
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-2117 JOSE LUIS RAMOS, an individual, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware Corporation; MOLINA INFORMATION SYSTEMS, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; DOES, 1 through 10, Defendants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge. (1:12-cv-00856-GBL-JFA) Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: March 16,..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2117
JOSE LUIS RAMOS, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MOLINA HEALTHCARE, INC., a Delaware Corporation; MOLINA
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, LLC, a California Limited Liability
Company; DOES, 1 through 10,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00856-GBL-JFA)
Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: March 16, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd joined.
ARGUED: Andrew Field Pierce, PIERCE & SHEARER LLP, Palo Alto,
California, for Appellant. John Joseph Michels, Jr., LEWIS
BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Gretchen Birkheimer, PIERCE & SHEARER LLP, for
Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, we consider whether the district court
erred in dismissing a civil action against the plaintiff’s
former employer, in which the plaintiff alleged claims of
discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful discharge under
various state and federal laws. Upon our review, we hold that
the district court did not err in determining that the
plaintiff’s pleadings were inadequate to state claims for
certain violations of California law, and claims of
discrimination based on race and national origin under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq. We also hold that the district court correctly
awarded summary judgment to the employer on the plaintiff’s age
discrimination and retaliation claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., based
on the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence regarding the
causation element of those claims. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
I.
In 2007, Jose Luis Ramos, a 55-year-old person of Puerto
Rican heritage, was hired by Unisys Corporation to work as an
executive architect in its Medicaid Information Systems Unit.
In May 2010, that division of Unisys Corporation was acquired by
2
Molina Healthcare, Inc. and Molina Information Systems, LLC
(collectively, Molina). Molina retained Ramos as an engineering
director, in which capacity he managed a team of about 40
employees.
According to Ramos, his supervisor at Molina, Timothy
Skeen, instructed Ramos to fire certain employees on his team
including Erich Friedrichs, an employee over the age of 55 whom
Skeen often disparaged as being “too old,” “slow,” and
“incompetent.” Because Ramos disagreed with Skeen’s assessment,
he refused to fire Friedrichs.
On several occasions beginning in the spring or summer of
2010, Ramos expressed concerns to April Krajewski, a human
resources manager at Molina, that Skeen’s desire to fire
Friedrichs was motivated by age-based animus. Krajewski replied
that termination of employment on the basis of age was
prohibited, and that she would investigate any complaints of
this nature.
In December 2010, Ramos began reporting to a new
supervisor, Timothy Brewer, with whom Ramos previously had
worked. Ramos alleged in his complaint that Brewer “disliked
persons of Hispanic descent” and once had stated to Ramos that
Brewer did not work in his home state of Arizona “because there
were ‘too many damn Mexicans there.’” Ramos also asserted that
both Brewer and Skeen “exhibited a strong dislike of Hispanic,
3
Chinese-American, and Taiwanese workers,” and, when making
hiring and promotion decisions, manifested “a strong preference
for younger employees, white Americans of southern extraction[,]
and independent contractors from India.”
Ramos further alleged that when Brewer became his direct
supervisor in December 2010, Brewer “immediately reassigned” all
the employees on Ramos’ team, “leaving [Ramos] with no projects
and no staff.” According to Ramos, Brewer stated that he made
the team reassignments based on Ramos’ refusal to fire
Friedrichs. Brewer, however, testified by deposition that he
told Ramos that the reassignments were part of an organizational
restructuring.
In January 2011, Brewer chose Ramos to lead a “massive”
project to upgrade software and relocate data servers (the
project). Brewer testified that he was not satisfied with
Ramos’ handling of the project, in part based on Ramos’
objection to the use of Indian contractors on the project. 1
Brewer also testified that throughout the course of the project,
1
Ramos also alleged in his complaint that around this time,
he had received information that senior managers at Molina were
taking “kick-backs” in exchange for the award of subcontracts,
and that he reported this information to his supervisors shortly
before the termination of his employment. However, on appeal,
Ramos clarified his position that it was his reports concerning
Skeen’s allegedly discriminatory behavior, not his reports about
kick-backs, that caused his termination.
4
he received complaints from colleagues who were “very concerned”
about continuing to work with Ramos and who thought that Ramos
acted in a derogatory manner toward other employees. Brewer
described a complaint he received from one employee, who stated
that Ramos “lost it” and “scream[ed] at the top of his lungs”
during a conference call. 2
According to Brewer, two events during the course of the
project drove his final decision to terminate Ramos’ employment.
First, Brewer stated that Ramos threatened not to attend certain
key meetings on the project so that Brewer “would see how
important [Ramos] was.” Second, Brewer testified that he
received information that Ramos had initiated a “very
belligerent” encounter with another employee. Brewer stated
that he ultimately fired Ramos due to his “lack of performance,”
“inability to deliver on [the] project,” and negative
interactions with other employees that put both the company and
the project “at risk.”
Ramos denied that either of the above two events described
by Brewer had occurred. Ramos maintained that he had not
received any job-related criticism or complaints regarding the
2
We note, however, that a colleague who worked “side-by-
side” with Ramos submitted a declaration stating that Ramos “was
not belligerent or inappropriate in any way on any of the phone
calls” in which the colleague participated.
5
way he treated his fellow employees. Ramos further noted that
he had received an email from Brewer in February 2011, stating
that Brewer “greatly appreciate[d]” Ramos’ work and wanted to
demonstrate his “support of [Ramos] and the project [Ramos was]
running.”
In March 2011, however, Molina terminated Ramos’
employment. Ramos alleged that he was not told initially that
his termination was for cause, and he assumed that he was being
laid off because Molina had offered him severance pay. Later,
Ramos learned that he had been fired for cause, and that his
position had been filled by a younger, non-Hispanic employee.
Ramos filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which issued Ramos a “right to sue” letter in
December 2011.
In March 2012, Ramos filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging
claims of age discrimination and retaliation under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
(collectively, the ADEA claims), claims of race and national
origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. (collectively, the civil rights claims), and various
discrimination, retaliation, and “whistleblowing” claims under
California law (collectively, the state law claims). The
6
district court in California found that because Ramos’ complaint
was “silent on the location where the instances of employment
discrimination occurred,” Ramos had not demonstrated a
“significant connection to California.” The court therefore
transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia, where
the record showed that Ramos lived, worked, and was fired by
Molina.
Upon the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the district court found that the
complaint sufficiently stated claims for age discrimination and
retaliation under the ADEA, but dismissed without prejudice the
state law claims and the civil rights claims. The court found
that the state law claims failed to include facts demonstrating
that Ramos “lived, worked, and actively was engaged with
supervising employees . . . in California,” notwithstanding
Ramos’ submission of a declaration alleging that he lived and
worked in California “off and on” during his employment with
Molina. The court also noted that the “conclusory” allegations
forming the civil rights claims failed to draw a connection
between animus involving race or national origin and any adverse
employment action.
After the parties conducted discovery on the two remaining
ADEA claims, the district court granted summary judgment on
those claims in Molina’s favor. Initially, the court found that
7
Ramos had failed to meet his prima facie burden of proof on
either claim. With respect to the age discrimination claim, the
court noted that Ramos did not present any evidence showing that
he had met his employer’s legitimate expectations at the time he
was fired and, therefore, had failed to show that age was the
“but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. Similarly,
with regard to the retaliation claim, the court found that Ramos
had failed to produce evidence establishing a causal connection
between his reports to Krajewski about Skeen’s age-based animus
and any adverse employment action.
The district court further concluded that even if it were
to assume that Ramos had met his prima facie burden on the
claims of age discrimination and retaliation, he nevertheless
had failed to rebut as pretextual Molina’s reasons for
terminating his employment. Ramos timely appealed from the
district court’s judgment.
II.
We first address the district court’s dismissal of Ramos’
state law claims and civil rights claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
In reviewing the court’s dismissal of those claims, we consider
the factual allegations in Ramos’ complaint as true and review
any legal issues de novo. See Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 324 F.3d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 2003).
8
A.
Ramos’ complaint contains several claims asserted under
California law. Those claims include allegations of
discrimination, failure to investigate discrimination, and
retaliation in violation of the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (CFEHA), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq.; wrongful
discharge under the California Labor Code, see Cal. Lab. Code
§ 1102.5; and discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation
of California public policy.
Ramos argues that the district court improperly dismissed
these state law claims by relying on materials outside the
complaint to find that he failed to allege a sufficient
connection to California. Ramos contends that he sufficiently
pleaded the required nexus to California by alleging that he was
a California resident, and that the district court improperly
considered a declaration submitted by Molina stating that Ramos
lived and worked in Virginia during the course of his
employment.
We conclude that the district court did not err in
dismissing Ramos’ state law claims. The California laws and
public policy invoked by Ramos in his complaint have not been
construed by California courts as applying extraterritorially.
See Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 633
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the CFEHA does not “apply to
9
non-residents employed outside the state when the tortious
conduct did not occur in California”); see also N. Alaska Salmon
Co. v. Pillsbury, 162 P. 93, 94 (Cal. 1916) (“Although a state
may have the power to legislate concerning the rights and
obligations of its citizens with regard to transactions
occurring beyond its boundaries, the presumption is that it did
not intend to give its statutes any extraterritorial effect.”).
Instead, the holdings of the California courts reflect the
constitutional principle that, generally, when “a State has only
an insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or
transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981). Thus,
for Ramos’ complaint to have stated facially plausible claims to
relief under California law, the complaint had to contain
sufficient facts connecting the parties and their alleged
misconduct to California. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
We agree with the district court that the allegations in
Ramos’ complaint lack the necessary factual connection.
Although Ramos alleged that he was a California resident, his
complaint did not indicate whether he lived or worked in
California during his employment with Molina when the allegedly
discriminatory, retaliatory, and otherwise wrongful conduct
occurred. See Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court,
10
968 P.2d 539, 554 n.20 (Cal. 1999) (“The presumption against
extraterritoriality is one against an intent to encompass
conduct occurring in a foreign jurisdiction in the prohibitions
and remedies of a domestic statute.”) (emphasis in original).
Additionally, contrary to Ramos’ contention, the district
court did not rely on documents outside the complaint in
dismissing the state law claims. Instead, the court restricted
its analysis to the facts stated in the complaint, concluding
that Ramos “has not set forth facts demonstrating that he lived,
worked, and actively was engaged with supervising employees
in . . . California at the time of the adverse employment
action.” Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed
Ramos’ state law claims.
B.
Ramos next argues that the district court erred in
concluding that the civil rights claims failed to establish a
causal connection between his supervisor’s alleged
discriminatory animus and the adverse action terminating his
employment. Ramos contends that, when construed in the light
most favorable to him, his allegation that his supervisors
“dislike[d]” Hispanic workers supported “inferences” that his
employment was terminated because of his race or national
origin. Again, we disagree with Ramos’ argument.
11
In the employment discrimination context, a plaintiff must
sufficiently allege facts that support the elements of the
plaintiff’s claim. In particular, to state claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e-2, Ramos was required to allege
sufficient facts to show that the defendants terminated his
employment “because of” his race or national origin. Coleman v.
Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190-91 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 195
(4th Cir. 2009).
The district court correctly found that this required
element of Ramos’ wrongful termination claim was not supported
by the factual allegations in his complaint. Apart from some
conclusory allegations of causation, Ramos merely alleged that
Brewer once made a derogatory statement about Hispanics and that
Ramos’ supervisors generally disliked Hispanics. Moreover,
Ramos failed to supply any connection between these allegations
and the termination of his employment. To the extent that Ramos
urges us to draw “inferences” in his favor based on his
allegations, we conclude that any such “inferences” are
unwarranted, given the complete lack of factual support in the
record that his supervisors considered his race or national
origin in deciding to terminate Ramos’ employment. See Coleman,
626 F.3d at 191 (affirming dismissal of a complaint that “does
not assert facts establishing the plausibility” of a conclusory
12
allegation of discrimination). Therefore, we hold that the
district court did not err in dismissing Ramos’ civil rights
claims.
III.
We turn to address the district court’s award of summary
judgment to Molina on the ADEA claims. We review the court’s
decision de novo, applying the same legal standards as the
district court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to Ramos, the
nonmoving party. Turner v. United States, 736 F.3d 274, 280
(4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
A.
We first address Ramos’ claim of age discrimination under
the ADEA, which provides a cause of action against an employer
for “discharg[ing] any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing]
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Ramos argues that
the district court erred in concluding that he failed to
establish the required element under the ADEA that age was the
13
“but-for” cause of the adverse employment action. See Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
Evidence of but-for causation may be direct or
circumstantial. Id. at 177-78. In this case, in which the
evidence of such causation is circumstantial, we analyze the
plaintiff’s claim under the burden-shifting framework of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See
Mereish v. Walker,
359 F.3d 330, 334-35 (4th Cir. 2004); see
also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133,
141 (2000) (noting that the courts of appeals, including the
Fourth Circuit, “have employed some variant of the framework
articulated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that are
based principally on circumstantial evidence”). Under this
framework, the plaintiff first must prove a prima facie case of
discrimination, which includes as an element that the plaintiff
“was performing [his] job duties at a level that met [his]
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse
employment action.” 3 Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.,
Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
3
Molina does not dispute that Ramos satisfied his burden of
establishing the other elements of a prima facie case of age
discrimination, which requires proof that the employee is “a
member of a protected class,” that he “suffered adverse
employment action,” and that “the position remained open or was
filled by similarly qualified applicants outside the protected
(Continued)
14
When the plaintiff’s evidence satisfies the elements of a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Id. If the employer satisfies this burden of
production, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason
was a mere “pretext” for discrimination.
Id. To make such a
showing of pretext, the employee must demonstrate that the
employer’s proffered reason was false, and that age
discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment
action.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47; Holland v. Washington
Homes, Inc.,
487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007).
In the present case, the district court held that Ramos
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
because he did not present evidence that, at the time he was
fired, he had performed at a level meeting his employer’s
legitimate expectations. The court considered the February 2011
email from Brewer commending Ramos for his performance, as well
as the absence of documentation showing any unsatisfactory job
performance, but found that those items did “not establish the
employer was satisfied but more readily establish the inverse—
class.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d
277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
15
that the employer was not dissatisfied.” (Emphases in
original). The court further observed that even if Ramos had
established a prima facie case of discrimination, he had failed
to sustain his burden of proving as pretextual the non-
discriminatory reasons Molina articulated for firing him,
namely, his negative interpersonal interactions with fellow
employees, failure to follow instructions, unsatisfactory
performance on the project, threats to cease work on the
project, and unprofessional conduct during a conference call.
In examining this issue, we will assume, without deciding,
that Ramos satisfied his initial burden to make a prima facie
showing that, at the time he was fired, he was meeting his
employer’s legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, we conclude
that the district court correctly determined that Ramos had
failed to rebut as pretextual Molina’s stated reasons for
terminating his employment. Apart from the email from Brewer in
February 2011, a co-worker’s statement concerning Ramos’
demeanor on conference calls, and Ramos’ conflicting account of
the two incidents discussed by Brewer, Ramos presented no other
evidence to rebut Molina’s stated reasons for terminating his
employment. In contrast, Molina offered significant evidence in
support of its proffered reasons, including Krajewski’s notes
from a meeting with an employee who complained about Ramos’
unprofessional “melt-down” during a conference call, emails from
16
January 2011 in which Brewer and Skeen criticized Ramos’
performance, and testimony that Brewer witnessed Ramos berate
co-workers and received complaints about Ramos from other
employees.
Moreover, Ramos failed to produce any evidence supporting a
conclusion that age discrimination was the real reason for his
firing. While, in certain cases, a court may infer
discrimination based on the strength of a plaintiff’s prima
facie showing and the probative value of the plaintiff’s
evidence that the employer’s reasons for the adverse employment
action were false, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, the district
court properly declined to draw such an inference here given the
tenuous nature of Ramos’ evidence. Therefore, we hold that the
district court properly awarded summary judgment in favor of
Molina on the ADEA claim of age discrimination, because Ramos
failed to satisfy his burden of showing that age was the “but-
for” cause of his termination.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78.
B.
Finally, we turn to consider Ramos’ ADEA retaliation claim.
In relevant part, the ADEA prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an employee “because such individual,
member or applicant for membership has opposed any practice made
unlawful by this section,” including discharging an employee
based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
17
Ramos primarily argues that the district court erred in
concluding that he failed to establish a causal link between his
protected activity and any adverse employment action. Ziskie v.
Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 229 (4th Cir. 2008). Ramos asserts that
the district court failed to consider the circumstantial
evidence he provided concerning the timing of his protected
activity and the adverse employment action, as well as his
direct evidence that Brewer told Ramos that his team was being
taken away because he refused to fire Friedrichs. We find no
merit in Ramos’ argument.
To establish his retaliation claim under the ADEA, Ramos
was required to produce sufficient evidence at the summary
judgment stage showing that: (1) he engaged in protected
activity; (2) Molina took an adverse employment action against
him; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action. See id. However,
Ramos failed to establish the causation element by producing any
evidence showing that Brewer, the undisputed decision maker with
respect to the adverse employment action, was aware when he
fired Ramos that Ramos had reported to Krajewski his concerns
about Skeen’s discriminatory animus toward Friedrichs. Although
Ramos asserted that Brewer was aware of Ramos’ refusal to follow
Skeen’s instruction to fire Friedrichs, the protected activity
in this case was not Ramos’ refusal to follow that directive,
18
but rather Ramos’ complaints to Krajewski about Skeen’s comments
regarding Friedrichs. As the district court correctly observed,
Ramos did not produce any evidence showing that Brewer had
knowledge of the content of Ramos’ discussions with Krajewski. 4
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in
awarding summary judgment to Molina on the ADEA retaliation
claim, because Ramos failed to show that any protected activity
caused the termination of his employment.
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED
4
We note that this lack of causation evidence is fatal to
Ramos’ claim regardless whether the adverse employment action in
this case is construed as Brewer’s reassignment of Ramos’ team
or as Brewer’s ultimate termination of Ramos’ employment.
19
