Filed: Jan. 25, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-1909 JASON VICKS; MEKEISHA VICKS, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; JOHN DOE 1-5, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cv-00263-FDW) Submitted: January 20, 2017 Decided: January 25, 2017 Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-1909 JASON VICKS; MEKEISHA VICKS, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; JOHN DOE 1-5, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cv-00263-FDW) Submitted: January 20, 2017 Decided: January 25, 2017 Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1909
JASON VICKS; MEKEISHA VICKS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; JOHN DOE 1-5,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:16-cv-00263-FDW)
Submitted: January 20, 2017 Decided: January 25, 2017
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Jason Vicks, Mekeisha Vicks, Appellants Pro Se. Dennis Kyle
Deak, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jason and Mekeisha Vicks (“Appellants”) appeal the district
court’s order dismissing their civil action against Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC (“Appellee”), arising from Appellee’s involvement
in mortgage foreclosure proceedings in North Carolina state
court related to Appellants’ residential property. The district
court dismissed four of Appellants’ claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, invoking the Rooker-Feldman * doctrine. It
dismissed their remaining claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
We review de novo the district court’s determination that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims.
Flame S.A. v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572, 580 (4th
Cir. 2015). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars state-court losers
from seeking review in federal court of “injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
*
D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923).
2
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Under this narrow
doctrine, federal courts may entertain claims previously
examined by a state court, so long as those claims do not seek
review of the state court decision itself. See Elyazidi v.
SunTrust Bank,
780 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2015). Where a
federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension
with, a state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is
not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction”
simply because “the same or a related question was earlier aired
between the parties in state court,” and any tension created by
the concurrent federal and state proceedings “should be managed
through the doctrines of preclusion, comity, and abstention.”
Thana v. Bd. of License Comm’rs for Charles Cty., Md.,
827 F.3d
314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court concluded that Appellants’ claims were
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court’s foreclosure order because
success on their federal claims would require the district court
to determine that the state court order was wrongly decided or
to take action that would render that order ineffectual. While
we have previously articulated a similar standard, see Plyler v.
Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997), subsequent authority
from the Supreme Court and this court has clarified the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine’s narrow scope. As we have explained,
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[u]nder Exxon, [the] “inextricably intertwined”
language does not create an additional legal test for
determining when claims challenging a state-court
decision are barred, but merely states a conclusion:
if the state-court loser seeks redress in the federal
district court for the injury caused by the state-
court decision, his federal claim is, by definition,
“inextricably intertwined” with the state-court
decision, and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction
of the federal district court.
Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir.
2006); see also
Thana, 827 F.3d at 319-20 (describing doctrine’s
narrow application). Thus, as the court also has clarified, the
mere fact that a ruling favorable to the federal plaintiff may
call into question the correctness of a state court judgment has
no bearing on the federal court’s jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims under Rooker-Feldman. See
Thana, 827 F.3d at
322.
Here, Appellants’ first four claims for relief seek either
a declaration that Appellee has no rights to the loan proceeds
or damages against Appellee for violations of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), see 12 C.F.R. § 1024.35
(2016), and several provisions of North Carolina state law.
While success on these claims could call into question the
validity of the state court’s May 2011 order authorizing
foreclosure, the claims do not seek appellate review of that
order or fairly allege injury caused by the state court in
entering that order. We therefore conclude that the district
4
court erred in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar
Appellants’ claims. Further, while we are not precluded from
affirming the dismissal of these claims on alternative grounds,
see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th
Cir. 1992), upon review of the record and the parties’
submissions on appeal, we conclude that prudence counsels in
favor of reserving further judgment on the propriety of
Appellants’ claims to the district court in the first instance.
We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of
Appellants’ first four claims for relief and remand for further
proceedings.
Appellants also challenge the district court’s dismissal of
their IIED claim. We review de novo a district court’s
dismissal for failure to state a claim. King v. Rubenstein, 825
F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). To survive Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record
confirms the district court’s conclusion that Appellants failed
to state a valid IIED claim. See Holloway v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., N.A.,
452 S.E.2d 233, 240 (N.C. 1994) (stating
elements of claim); Waddle v. Sparks,
414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C.
1992) (describing requirement of “severe emotional distress”).
5
We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this
claim.
In summary, we affirm the district court’s judgment in
part, insofar as it dismisses Appellants’ IIED claim. We vacate
the district court’s judgment in part, insofar as it dismisses
Appellants’ remaining claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. In so doing, we express no opinion as to the
legal sufficiency of Appellants’ reinstated claims or to the
application of the doctrines of issue preclusion and claim
preclusion to those claims, leaving the adequate development of
these issues to the parties and to the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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