Filed: Apr. 21, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-7447 ANTOINE MONTEZ MILES, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DAVID GUICE; GEORGE SOLOMON; LARRY DUNSTON; KIERAN SHANAHAN, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety; BETTY BROWN, Director of Chaplaincy; FRANK PERRY, Defendants - Appellees, and GWEN NORVEIL, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:13-ct-03193-FL) Submitte
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-7447 ANTOINE MONTEZ MILES, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DAVID GUICE; GEORGE SOLOMON; LARRY DUNSTON; KIERAN SHANAHAN, Secretary of the Department of Public Safety; BETTY BROWN, Director of Chaplaincy; FRANK PERRY, Defendants - Appellees, and GWEN NORVEIL, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:13-ct-03193-FL) Submitted..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-7447
ANTOINE MONTEZ MILES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DAVID GUICE; GEORGE SOLOMON; LARRY DUNSTON; KIERAN SHANAHAN,
Secretary of the Department of Public Safety; BETTY BROWN,
Director of Chaplaincy; FRANK PERRY,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
GWEN NORVEIL,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:13-ct-03193-FL)
Submitted: March 21, 2017 Decided: April 21, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Antoine Montez Miles, Appellant Pro Se. Kimberly D. Grande,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Antoine Montez Miles, a North Carolina prisoner and member
of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE), sued officials of the
North Carolina Department of Public Safety under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012). He alleged that certain officials violated his
rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012),
and the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by designating
NGE as a Security Threat Group, not a religion. The designation
resulted from NGE’s ties to a gang, the United Blood Nation, but
NGE members do engage in practices often associated with
religions. In his § 1983 complaint, Miles sought to engage in
certain of those practices, including eating a vegan diet,
fasting on NGE holy days, and studying NGE texts.
In response to Miles’ claims, the officials moved for
summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion. We
review a district court’s award of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from those
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Core
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir.
2014). A court may only award summary judgment when no genuine
dispute of material fact remains and the record shows that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). On appeal, Miles challenges the district
3
court’s grant of summary judgment on his claims under RLUIPA,
the Eighth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 3 of RLUIPA protects prisoners’ right to exercise
their religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). To prevail under
RLUIPA, a prisoner must first make a prima facie showing that a
state substantially burdened his religious exercise. See
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006). “[A]
substantial burden on religious exercise occurs when a state or
local government, through act or omission, ‘put[s] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs.’”
Id. at 187 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)). After a
prisoner makes a prima facie showing of a substantial burden,
the government’s position must survive strict scrutiny.
Id. at
186. Strict scrutiny requires the state to show that its policy
is the “least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest.”
Id. at 189.
The district court assumed that NGE qualifies as a
religion, but ruled that the policies toward NGE practices did
not substantially burden Miles’ exercise of religion. Neither
the lack of access to the vegan diet, see Acoolla v. Angelone,
No. 7:01-CV-01008, 2006 WL 2548207, at *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1,
2006), aff’d, 235 F. App’x 60 (4th Cir. 2007), nor to the NGE
4
texts, which were not subject to a blanket ban, are substantial
burdens. Failing to accommodate fasting on holy days, however,
is a substantial burden. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187.
The district court did not apply strict scrutiny to the
policy for NGE fasts, and the record does not sufficiently show
that the policy satisfies strict scrutiny. We therefore vacate
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the fasting
claim and remand it for consideration under the strict scrutiny
standard.
Next, we turn to Miles’ Eighth Amendment claim. While
prisoners have the right to nutritionally adequate food under
the Eighth Amendment, they must prove deliberate indifference,
meaning that a prison official must have known of and
disregarded an objectively serious condition. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 837 (1994). Miles failed to
establish deliberate indifference.
Miles also sued under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a plaintiff to make a prima
facie showing that the state treated him differently than it
treated similarly situated prisoners and that such unequal
treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful
discrimination. See Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th
Cir. 2002). We conclude that Miles failed to make the required
5
showing because the record shows that other religious groups
were not similarly situated to NGE, which has ties to a gang.
Because the officials did not violate Miles’ Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights, we conclude that they are entitled
to qualified immunity on those claims. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (providing government
officials qualified immunity from civil damages if plaintiff has
failed to establish violation of constitutional right).
Finally, Miles contests the district court’s denial of his
motion for appointment of counsel. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied that
motion because no exceptional circumstances existed to warrant
appointment of counsel. Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163
(4th Cir. 1984), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa,
490 U.S. 296,
300 n.2 (1989).
In sum, we affirm the district court’s ruling under RLUIPA
on Miles’ claims for a vegan diet and access to NGE texts;
vacate the ruling under RLUIPA for Miles’ fasting claim and
remand for further proceedings; affirm the ruling on Miles’
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims; and affirm the district
court’s denial of Miles’ motion for appointment of counsel. We
also deny Miles’ pending motion for appointment of counsel. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
6
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
7
