Filed: Aug. 22, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Defendant, Appellant. Cf. Flecha-Maldonado, 373, F.3d at 178 (discerning no prejudice when defense counsel was not, completely ignorant of contents of recordings because he, independently obtained informal translations before trial)., United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1766
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
MUKONKOLE HUGE KIFWA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
David Shaughnessy on brief for appellant.
Richard W. Murphy, Acting United States Attorney, and Renée
M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
August 22, 2017
SELYA, Circuit Judge. It takes a certain degree of
effrontery for an accused person held in pretrial detention to
continue to conduct his criminal enterprise over a prison
telephone, knowing that prisoner calls are customarily recorded.
But defendant-appellant Mukonkole Huge Kifwa did just that,
relying on the masking effect of his use of a language (Lingala)
seldom heard in the United States. That reliance was misplaced,
and even though the appellant moved unsuccessfully to exclude the
government's introduction of the translations of four of the
recorded conversations at trial, he declined the district court's
invitation to ask for a continuance. The jury found him guilty as
charged, and the court sentenced him to serve forty-six months in
prison.
The appellant now exhorts us to vacate his conviction
and sentence. Discerning no merit in the appellant's exhortations,
we affirm the judgment below. We do, however, dismiss without
prejudice one of his claims of error.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the
case. The appellant is a citizen of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) who entered the United States in February of 2014
on a non-immigrant diplomatic visa (purporting to be an employee
of the DRC government). This fiction began to unravel when — in
March of 2015 — federal authorities commenced an investigation
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into the appellant's financial machinations, sparked by complaints
about bad checks. The probe led to the appellant's arrest in July
and his indictment (by a federal grand jury sitting in the District
of Maine) on a number of bank-fraud charges. The government's
investigation continued, and — in November of 2015 — the grand
jury handed up a superseding indictment, charging the appellant
with visa fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a); possession of firearms
by a non-immigrant alien, see id. §§ 922(g)(5)(A), 924(a)(2); bank
fraud, see
id. § 1344; and making materially false statements to
a government agency, see
id. § 1001(a)(2).
About a month before the anticipated trial date, the
district court held a hearing to determine the appellant's
translation needs. The appellant explained that he speaks Lingala,
French, and English (though he is more comfortable in French than
English). The appellant confirmed that he did not need Lingala
translation but instead requested and secured French translation
for trial.
Toward the end of the hearing, the prosecutor stated
that she and defense counsel had just begun discussing the
possibility that the government might use at trial the substance
of certain telephone calls that the appellant had made from jail
while in pretrial detention. She explained that the appellant had
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"made an extraordinarily large number of calls" from jail.1 Each
call was fifteen minutes or less in duration, and at least two-
thirds of the approximately 1200 calls were in Lingala. Like all
personal calls made by prisoners from the jail, the appellant's
calls had been recorded. The prosecutor told the court that the
government was still in the process of identifying the relevant
conversations and requesting the recordings.
Following this hearing, the government requested that
the jail turn over recordings of roughly 285 to 300 calls.
Promptly upon receiving these recordings, the government gave
defense counsel a computer disc containing the audio files.
Approximately two weeks later, the government (with Mintela's
assistance) winnowed out fifteen calls as prime candidates for
translation. The government contemporaneously notified defense
counsel and singled out the relevant calls (all previously
produced) by their identification numbers.
At that point, the government's efforts hit a snag: it
experienced great difficulty in locating a Lingala translator.
Eventually, though, the government was able to hire a Lingala
translator in Boston who worked "around the clock" to translate
1The government did not learn of the existence of these calls
by happenstance. Seemingly unbeknownst to the appellant, Eddy
Mintela (an associate whom the appellant frequently called from
jail) had begun working with the prosecution as a cooperating
witness.
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and transcribe the fifteen calls. The government turned over the
English-language transcripts on a rolling basis as it received
them from the translator. The translator finished the final
transcript around midnight on the evening before the trial was set
to start, and the government gave it to the defense the next
morning.
The appellant objected to the government's proposed use
of the translations at trial, but he did not ask for a continuance
despite the district court's apparent willingness to grant one.
The court proceeded to deny the motion to exclude, but it ordered
the government to show defense counsel the particular transcripts
that it planned to use before calling any witness whom it intended
to query about matters involving the transcribed conversations.
The trial began as scheduled.
During the trial, the government entered four of the
transcripts (totaling five pages of text) into evidence. In the
government's view, the four transcripts showed the appellant
asking Mintela to forge DRC name-change documents and create a
story to bolster a bogus asylum claim. The government also
presented testimony from Mintela himself as well as testimony from
various immigration officials (who described several discrepancies
and inaccuracies in the appellant's visa documentation). In
addition, representatives of various banks described the
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appellant's penchant for passing bad checks and attempting to cash
counterfeit checks.
Following four days of trial, the jury found the
appellant guilty on all counts. The district court imposed a
forty-six-month sentence for each count, to run concurrently. This
timely appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
Before us, the appellant — who is represented by new
counsel on appeal — argues that the district court should have
granted his motion to exclude the transcripts, that their
introduction unfairly prejudiced him, and that his trial counsel
was ineffective. We discuss the first two of these claims together
and then turn to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
We start with the transcripts, which involved a quartet
of recorded calls. Because the appellant seasonably moved to
exclude them below, his first two claims of error are preserved.
See United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 586 n.2 (1st Cir.
2002). Consequently, we review the district court's rulings
concerning the transcripts for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Perez-Ruiz,
353 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003).
In criminal cases, the government has broad disclosure
obligations. See United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 222
(1st Cir. 1999); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a). Those
obligations have teeth: the government's suppression of evidence
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favorable to the accused violates due process. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Furthermore, the government's disclosures must be made
in a timely manner. See United States v. Chaudhry, 850 F.2d 851,
858 (1st Cir. 1988). Typically, litigants offer recordings as
evidence and use transcripts as interpretive aids for the jurors'
benefit. See United States v. Cintolo,
818 F.2d 980, 1004 n.15
(1st Cir. 1987). The recordings control in the event that they
differ from the proffered transcripts. See
id. Foreign-language
recordings, however, are treated differently. For commonsense
reasons, "play[ing] foreign language tapes endlessly to an
uncomprehending jury" is not required.
Chaudhry, 850 F.2d at 856.
As a result, the parties may agree to forgo having jurors
listen to foreign-language recordings that they do not understand.
See United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 983 (1st Cir. 1986).
In such circumstances, transcripts containing translations of such
recordings may be admitted into evidence as long as they are
reliable and properly authenticated. See United States v. Morales-
Madera,
352 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2003);
Rengifo, 789 F.2d at 983.
When dealing with translations of foreign-language recordings, the
transcripts ordinarily must be divulged to defense counsel
sufficiently in advance of trial to allow him to assess their
accuracy, raise objections, and craft an informed defense
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strategy. See United States v. Flecha-Maldonado, 373 F.3d 170,
177 (1st Cir. 2004);
Morales-Madera, 352 F.3d at 8.
If disclosure is delayed without any suggestion of bad
faith on the government's part, "the critical inquiry is
. . . whether the tardiness prevented defense counsel from
employing the material to good effect." United States v. Devin,
918 F.2d 280, 290 (1st Cir. 1990); see
Chaudhry, 850 F.2d at 858-
59. In conducting this inquiry, "a court's principal concern must
be whether learning the information altered the subsequent defense
strategy, and whether, given timeous disclosure, a more effective
strategy would likely have resulted."
Devin, 918 F.2d at 290.
To vacate a conviction on grounds related to a disclosure
delayed without bad faith, we must be convinced of "a reasonable
probability" that the result of the proceeding would have been
different had the defendant received the discovery in a timely
manner. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 8-9. In other words, a defendant
must demonstrate prejudice before we can overturn his conviction.
See United States v. Montoya,
844 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2016),
cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 1832 (2017); United States v. Sepulveda,
15 F.3d 1161, 1178-79 (1st Cir. 1993). The burden is on the
defendant to prove prejudice. See
Devin, 918 F.2d at 290.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the case at hand. To
begin, we have doubts that the lag in disclosure actually
constituted a discovery violation. In the absence of any undue
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delay in securing transcription, the government's disclosure
obligation ordinarily does not mature until a particular
transcript comes into existence. See Chaudhry, 850 F.2d at 859;
see also United States v. Amaya-Manzanares,
377 F.3d 39, 42-43
(1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that government's disclosure
obligation did not extend to document that did not yet exist).
Here, the prosecutor provided the recordings (and, later, the
translations) to defense counsel as soon as she received them.
Nor does the record disclose the slightest inkling of bad faith.
The opposite is true: the record strongly suggests diligent and
open communication between counsel. Cf.
Chaudhry, 850 F.2d at 859
(discussing issue of good faith and noting absence of evidence
that prosecution "was fatally unassiduous in preparing the
document, or that it squirrelled the new transcript away for a
period of time"). So, too, the record reveals a wholly innocuous
explanation for the government's delay in obtaining translations:
the relevance of the telephone calls only became apparent late in
the game, a large number of calls had to be appraised, and Lingala
translators proved to be hen's-teeth rare.
Over and above the absence of any showing of bad faith,
the appellant has failed to explain convincingly how the admission
of the transcripts prejudiced him. After all, the appellant was
a party to all of the telephone conversations and, thus, must have
been aware of their contents. What is more, the conversations
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were not retrieved from the distant past; the calls had been placed
by the appellant while awaiting trial. It is fair to presume that
the appellant remembered the contents of the calls (at least, in
general terms).
In the same vein, the government shared the recordings
of the telephone calls with the defense when they were first
obtained. Thus, the appellant had the opportunity to listen to
them weeks prior to trial. Although defense counsel did not speak
Lingala, the appellant indisputably did. His lengthy trial
testimony in English (albeit with occasional assistance from a
French translator) convinces us that he would have been able, at
the very least, to summarize the contents of the recordings for
his attorney's benefit.2
We also think it noteworthy that the appellant has
neither identified any specific inaccuracies in the government's
translations nor pointed to any specific piece of information as
a source of unfair surprise. This lack of specificity has special
significance because whether or not the appellant had adequate
time to review the translations before trial, he surely had
adequate time to review them when preparing his brief on appeal.
2 While this kind of bare bones notice is not ideal, it is
one factor, among many, that pushes back against the appellant's
conclusory claim of unfair prejudice. Cf. Flecha-Maldonado, 373
F.3d at 178 (discerning no prejudice when defense counsel was "not
completely ignorant" of contents of recordings because he
independently obtained informal translations before trial).
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We add, moreover, that this case does not exhibit any of
the familiar telltales of prejudice. For example, one way of
evaluating potential prejudice from delayed disclosure is to
"evaluate how well defense counsel was able to use the information
despite the delay." United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 758
(1st Cir. 1991). Here, the appellant made a valiant (though
unconvincing) attempt to refute the government's interpretation of
the recordings at trial. In the most coherent discussion of
potential translation error, the prosecutor asked the appellant
about a transcript excerpt:
[APPELLANT]: I need one paper (document)
because they haves all papers. One letter
written by the Foreigner Affairs Department,
testifying that I work there, as you poses my
labor serial number.
MINTELA: Okay, no problem.
[APPELLANT]: If you can do it for me, that
paper is always sign by our General Secretary.
You need to steal the seal and use it.
MINTELA: Ummm.
[APPELLANT]: Is just one confirmation letter
predating it two days ago.
MINTELA: Yes, yes I understand.
[APPELLANT]: Add the Foreign affairs
Ministry's address.
. . .
[APPELLANT]: Thank you very much . . . . Is
just to confirm that I'm one of their agent.
I'm an agent at the Bureau of Etudes, Foreign
Affairs Ministry.
(Errors in original). When asked what he meant by "steal the
seal," the appellant said that he was merely asking Mintela to go
to the DRC embassy to obtain information about the appellant's
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identity and blamed the negative connotations attached to the word
"steal" on translation error. Even so, he did not explain the
other suspicious parts of the excerpt, such as specifying that the
letter should be predated — and he offers no explanation now.
There are, of course, other ways in which prejudice may
be shown. Of particular pertinence for present purposes, prejudice
sometimes may be demonstrated by indicating "plausible strategic
option[s] which the delay[ed disclosure] foreclosed." Devin, 918
F.2d at 290. The appellant tries to reach this safe harbor,
arguing that he either would have elected not to testify or would
have pursued a plea bargain had he received the translations
earlier. When faced with what purported to be his own words, he
says that he "had no choice" but to attempt to explain himself
(and, thus, to testify).
It may be that the substance of the calls had some modest
influence in the appellant's election to testify. We fail to see,
though, how the timing of the receipt of the transcripts could
have affected this decision. As noted above, the appellant had
access to the recordings weeks before trial. To cinch matters,
the translations themselves were in his hands before he took the
stand (indeed, before the start of trial). Knowing of the contents
of the recordings at least in general terms, he and his counsel
had sufficient information on which to base the appellant's
decision about whether to testify.
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The appellant's suggestion that he might have chosen to
enter a guilty plea if he had the translations beforehand stands
on no firmer footing. Even assuming that forgoing the opportunity
to enter into a plea agreement is a cognizable form of prejudice
in a delayed disclosure case, see Flecha-Maldonado, 373 F.3d at
178, the government presented a wide range of witnesses and
documentary evidence — known in advance to the appellant — to focus
the jury's attention on the suspicious discrepancies in the
appellant's visa paperwork, his erroneous statements to
immigration officers, and his pattern of illegitimate financial
dealings. The translations of the four recorded conversations
added little to the mix: they were but the cherry on the sundae.
The sockdolager, of course, is that the appellant never
asked for a continuance when the disclosure was made. Although
this omission does not wholly pretermit his claim of error, see
Lemmerer, 277 F.3d at 586 n.2, it renders the likelihood of
prejudice extremely doubtful. As we have said, "[a]s a general
rule, a defendant who does not request a continuance will not be
heard to complain on appeal that he suffered prejudice as a result
of late-arriving discovery."
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1178.
This failure is particularly striking for two reasons.
First, the turnover of the four transcripts occurred before trial
had started, so a continuance would almost certainly have been a
complete panacea. Second, the district court asked the appellant
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if he wanted a continuance and the government said it had no
objection to one. Yet, the appellant turned a deaf ear to this
suggestion. Where, as here, a defendant spurns a continuance that
would have cured the adverse effects of a delayed disclosure, a
claim of prejudice will not lie. See United States v. Candelaria-
Silva, 162 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1998).
To sum up, we conclude — after canvassing the record and
weighing all the appellant's arguments — that the appellant has
not carried his burden of showing that the delayed disclosure
caused him any unfair prejudice. Here, there is simply no reason
to believe that "learning the information altered the subsequent
defense strategy," or that "given timeous disclosure, a more
effective strategy would likely have resulted." Devin, 918 F.2d
at 290. It follows that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the appellant's motion to exclude the four
translations.
The appellant has a fallback argument: he faults the
district court for not making explicit findings anent prejudice
and bad faith. However, a failure to make subsidiary findings in
connection with an evidentiary ruling, without more, is ordinarily
not a basis for remand. Everything depends on context. Here,
this panoply of factors weighs heavily against a finding of abuse
of discretion. The record, viewed in context, makes manifest that
the district court reasonably concluded both that the government
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was operating in good faith3 and that the appellant was not
blindsided by the transcripts. And because the basis for the
district court's conclusions is evident, more detailed findings
were not required.
Finally, the appellant asserts that his trial counsel
was ineffective. In his view, his trial counsel represented him
poorly because, among other things, the lawyer failed to request
a continuance when the translations surfaced.
This claim of error is raised for the first time on
appeal, and the record is largely undeveloped as to the basis for
trial counsel's strategic decision.4 We have held, with a
regularity bordering on the metronomic, that, with few exceptions,
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, not seasonably raised
in the trial court, are not ripe for review on direct appeal of a
criminal conviction.5 See United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063
3
Indeed, defense counsel arguably conceded that the
prosecutor had acted in good faith by telling the district court
that she (the prosecutor) was "doing the best she [could]" under
the circumstances and later adding that the delayed disclosure was
"not [the prosecutor's] fault."
4
One thing is clear, though: trial counsel told the district
court that his client (the appellant) "resisted any efforts to
delay."
5
The exceptions, which generally involve cases where the
record is already fully developed in all material respects, see,
e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 146 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1998);
United States v. Natanel,
938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991), are
few and far between. The case at hand does not begin to meet those
requirements.
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(1st Cir. 1993) (collecting cases). Rather, such claims must be
brought in collateral post-conviction proceedings. See United
States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 389 (1st Cir. 2015). Accordingly,
we dismiss this aspect of the appeal without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the appellant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. The appeal
is dismissed as to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel; without prejudice, however, to the appellant's right, if
he so chooses, to raise this claim by a petition for post-
conviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
So Ordered.
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