Filed: Dec. 29, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4416 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. REGINALD LAMAR DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (3:08-cr-00260-MR-1) Argued: October 28, 2011 Decided: December 29, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Noell Pet
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4416 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. REGINALD LAMAR DAVIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (3:08-cr-00260-MR-1) Argued: October 28, 2011 Decided: December 29, 2011 Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Noell Pete..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4416
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD LAMAR DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00260-MR-1)
Argued: October 28, 2011 Decided: December 29, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Noell Peter Tin, TIN, FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Melissa Louise
Rikard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew G. Pruden, TIN,
FULTON, WALKER & OWEN, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Charlotte,
North Carolina, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Officers stopped Reginald Lamar Davis, a convicted felon,
after observing that his vehicle contained what they suspected
to be an illegal window tint. During the stop, they discovered
that Davis’s license was suspended and opted to issue him a
citation for that infraction. After they finished writing the
citation, one of the officers requested that Davis step out of
the vehicle. Davis complied. The officer then asked whether
any drugs or weapons were in the car and if they could search
it. Davis responded that none were and consented to the search.
While one officer searched Davis’s vehicle, another officer
provided Davis with the citation and explained it to him. The
search of the vehicle eventually yielded marijuana and a
firearm.
Davis was charged with being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Prior to trial, he
moved to suppress the seized firearm on the ground that it was
the fruit of an illegal seizure. The district court declined to
suppress the firearm, and a jury subsequently convicted Davis.
On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress because the officers extended the scope
and duration of the traffic stop beyond the circumstances
justifying it. We affirm.
2
I.
On July 9, 2008, Officers Steven Flatt and Joseph Dollar
participated in a saturation patrol in Charlotte, North
Carolina. The saturation patrol involved numerous officers
patrolling a short stretch of road in a high crime area and
stopping motorists for minor traffic infractions. Its purpose
was to make an increased police presence known in the area. On
this particular day, Officer Flatt was training Officer Dollar,
who was graduated from the police academy only about a week
earlier. They were parked in a school parking lot along with
another officer, Officer Charles Bolduc, who was in a separate
vehicle. Officer Bolduc was completing a report while Officer
Flatt watched traffic.
Officer Flatt observed a vehicle driven by Davis pass the
school parking lot. The tint of the vehicle’s windows appeared
to Officer Flatt to be darker than allowed under North Carolina
law, so he decided to conduct a traffic stop. Officers Flatt
and Dollar pursued Davis in their vehicle, and Officer Bolduc,
who had a tint meter, followed them.
The officers signaled their blue lights, prompting Davis to
pull into the parking lot of a nearby gas station. Using his
tint meter, Officer Bolduc read the level of window tint and
determined that it did not comply with North Carolina law.
Meanwhile, Officer Dollar obtained Davis’s license and
3
registration. Officers Flatt and Dollar returned to their
police vehicle to run a check on Davis’s license, which revealed
that his license was suspended. They decided to cite Davis for
driving with a suspended license rather than for an illegal
window tint.
While Officer Dollar prepared the citation, Officer Flatt
returned to Davis’s vehicle to explain that they were citing him
for driving with a suspended license but not for the unlawful
window tint. During this time, Sergeant Gary Brown arrived and
informed the other officers that he earlier had seen Davis
“hanging out” at an apartment complex known for criminal
activity. Because Officer Dollar was in training, preparing the
citation took a little longer than usual, but it nevertheless
took only a few minutes. At one point, he and Officer Flatt
discussed whether to ask for consent to search Davis’s car.
Officer Dollar expressed an interest in observing Officer Flatt
ask for consent.
Officer Dollar finished preparing the citation, and he and
Officer Flatt returned to Davis’s vehicle. Officer Flatt
requested that Davis step out of his vehicle. His purpose in
doing so was to explain the citation and to ask for consent to
search the vehicle. Davis complied and exited the vehicle.
Officer Flatt asked Davis whether any drugs or weapons were
in his vehicle. After Davis responded that none were, Officer
4
Flatt asked for consent to search the vehicle, which Davis
provided. This exchange lasted only a matter of seconds.
Officer Dollar began searching Davis’s vehicle while
Officer Flatt handed Davis the citation, noted the court date,
and asked whether he had any questions. Davis remained
cooperative at all times. At one point, when Officer Dollar
struggled to open the glove compartment, Davis demonstrated how
to open it. As Officer Dollar searched the vehicle, Officer
Flatt asked for consent to search Davis’s person, to which Davis
agreed. Officer Flatt discovered around $1,600.00 in cash on
Davis’s person, but no contraband.
Officer Dollar, however, found a small amount of marijuana
in the vehicle. This discovery prompted Officer Flatt to join
the search of the vehicle, leading to the discovery of a larger
bag of marijuana and a handgun in the center console. Officer
Flatt returned to Davis and placed him under arrest. As he did
so, he asked Davis why he had failed to tell him about the
handgun. Davis responded that he was a convicted felon.
Officer Flatt then instructed Davis as to his Miranda rights.
A grand jury returned a one-count indictment on December
17, 2008, charging Davis as a felon in possession of a firearm,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Prior to trial, Davis filed
a motion to suppress, seeking to exclude the firearm that the
officers seized during the search of his vehicle. He asserted
5
that his continued detention after the officers completed
writing the citation, but before they issued it to him, was
unlawful. According to Davis, the officers exceeded the scope
of the traffic stop. He also sought to suppress statements he
made to the officers. The district court referred the motion to
a magistrate judge, who conducted a suppression hearing and
subsequently recommended that Davis’s motion be granted.
The district court, however, rejected the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. It disagreed with the magistrate judge
that it should suppress the firearm. It reasoned that the
request for consent to search took only a few seconds and did
not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. The district court
further determined that Davis’s consent was voluntary. As for
Davis’s incriminating statements, the district court suppressed
the statements he made after Officer Flatt began arresting him,
but before receiving his Miranda warnings. It declined to
suppress any statements made after Davis received his Miranda
warnings.
The case proceeded to trial on August 17, 2009, but ended
in a mistrial the following day. Davis’s second trial began on
October 13, 2009. Two days later, the jury returned a guilty
verdict. The district court subsequently sentenced Davis to 188
months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
6
Davis immediately filed a notice of appeal on the day judgment
was entered.
II.
Davis raises one issue on appeal. He contends the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm seized
during the search of his vehicle.
When reviewing the district court’s ruling on the motion to
suppress, we will not disturb its factual findings unless we
find they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Massenburg,
654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011). Its legal determinations,
however, warrant de novo review.
Id. Because the district
court denied the motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Hampton,
628 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 2010).
III.
A.
Traffic stops implicate the Fourth Amendment because they
amount to seizures of the subject vehicle’s occupants. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). Therefore, to be
lawful, a traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
command that all searches and seizures be reasonable. See
id.
at 810.
7
We have recognized that traffic stops are most akin to
investigatory detentions, which means that the standard
announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for determining
the legality of an investigatory detention also guides our
determination as to the legality of a traffic stop. United
States v. Digiovanni,
650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). This
standard contains a dual inquiry. United States v. Guijon-
Ortiz,
660 F.3d 757, 764 (4th Cir. 2011). Courts must first
determine whether the stop was justified at its inception, which
requires, at a minimum, that law enforcement officers possessed
a reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot before detaining the
suspect.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 30. If the stop was justified
at its inception, courts must next ensure that it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances justifying it,
id. at 20,
which means that it was limited in scope and duration,
Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507.
B.
Traffic stops are justified at their inception when
officers observe a violation of the applicable traffic laws.
See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008).
There is no question that Officers Flatt and Dollar were
justified in stopping Davis. They perceived that the level of
his window tint likely violated North Carolina law, which
8
provided them with adequate justification to conduct a traffic
stop. Davis rightly concedes that the traffic stop was
justified at its inception. He contends, however, that the
officers extended the scope and duration of the traffic stop
beyond the circumstances justifying it.
C.
We determine whether traffic stops are appropriately
limited in scope and duration by considering the totality of the
circumstances. See Guijon-Ortiz, 660 F.3d at 770. This inquiry
is necessarily highly fact specific.
Id. at 764. Officers act
within the scope of the original justification for a stop when
they utilize investigative methods that are “the least intrusive
means reasonably available to verify or dispel [their]
suspicion[s] in a short period of time.” Florida v. Royer,
460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). The duration inquiry
turns on whether the officers “diligently pursued a means of
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 686
(1985).
In a routine traffic stop, the scope and duration of the
stop is generally limited to “requesting a driver’s license and
vehicle registration, running a computer check, and issuing a
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ticket.” Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507. Officers must obtain the
driver’s consent or possess a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity before they extend the traffic stop beyond what is
reasonably necessary to carry out these tasks.
Id. Otherwise,
“once the driver has demonstrated that he is entitled to operate
his vehicle, and the police officer has issued the requisite
warning or ticket, the driver ‘must be allowed to proceed on his
way.’”
Branch, 537 F.3d at 336 (quoting United States v.
Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Nevertheless, during the course of a traffic stop, officers
may question motorists about matters unrelated to its original
justification as long as the questioning “occurs within the
timeframe reasonably necessary to effectuate the traffic stop.”
United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123, 131 (4th Cir. 2010). We
do not require that “[a]n officer’s questions or actions during
the course of a traffic stop . . . be solely and exclusively
focused on the purpose of that detention.”
Id. Our principal
concern, with respect to both the scope and duration of the
traffic stop, is whether the officer diligently pursued the
objective of the original purpose of the stop.
Guijon-Ortiz,
660 F.3d at 766. As long as the officer diligently pursues the
purpose of the traffic stop, which generally involves performing
those tasks attendant to investigating the traffic violation
and, if appropriate, issuing a citation, some unrelated
10
questioning is reasonable. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507-09.
But when the unrelated questions demonstrate that the officer
has “‘definitively abandoned the prosecution of the traffic stop
and embarked on another sustained course of investigation’ or
where the unrelated questions ‘constitute[] the bulk of the
interaction’ between the police officer and the defendant,” they
unreasonably extend the scope and duration of the stop.
Id. at
508-09 (quoting United States v. Everett,
601 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2010)). Relevant to this consideration is whether the
delay caused by the unrelated questioning was de minimis. See
id. at 509.
Davis insists that, after Officer Dollar completed writing
the citation, the purpose of the stop was effectuated and
Officer Flatt should have given him the ticket and allowed him
to proceed on his way. Instead, according to Davis, Officer
Flatt unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the traffic
stop by asking him to step out of the vehicle, questioning him
about the presence of weapons or drugs, and requesting consent
to search the vehicle. These actions and unrelated questions,
Davis contends, rendered the stop unlawful. As a result, he
maintains, the district court should have suppressed the firearm
because the unlawful detention tainted his consent to the search
of his vehicle and the subsequently seized firearm is a fruit of
the unlawful search and seizure.
11
Contrary to Davis’s assertions, at the time Officer Flatt
asked him to exit his vehicle and requested consent to search,
the officers had not effectuated the purpose of the traffic
stop. The purpose of the traffic stop was to investigate a
traffic violation and, if appropriate, issue a citation. After
learning that Davis’s license was suspended, the officers’
ultimate purpose was to issue a citation for driving with a
suspended license. Issuance of the citation was the necessary
and final step to effectuating the purpose of the stop. Hence,
although the officers had finished writing the citation, they
had not issued it and therefore had not yet effectuated the
purpose of the stop. With this in mind, we must determine
whether the officers’ actions and unrelated questions toward the
end of the traffic stop demonstrate a lack of diligence so as to
unlawfully extend the scope and duration of the stop beyond the
circumstances justifying it.
To complete the final step of issuing the citation, Officer
Flatt requested that Davis step out of his vehicle, partly so he
could explain the citation to him before issuing it. Officers
may, of course, ask drivers to step out of their vehicles during
a traffic stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111
n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (“[O]nce a motor vehicle has been
lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers
may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating
12
the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures.”). It was therefore reasonable and permissible for
Officer Flatt to ask Davis to step out of the vehicle to explain
and issue the citation. Furthermore, asking Davis to step out
of the vehicle to explain and issue the citation was tailored to
the underlying justification for the stop—issuing the citation.
Thus, Officer Flatt’s request that Davis exit the vehicle does
not suggest a lack of diligence in prosecuting the stop and did
not extend the scope and duration of the stop beyond the
circumstances justifying it.
Officer Flatt’s following two questions, which asked
whether any drugs or weapons were in the vehicle and for consent
to search it, were unrelated to the underlying justification for
the traffic stop, but they do not demonstrate a lack of
diligence in prosecuting the stop so as to unlawfully extend its
scope and duration beyond the circumstances justifying it. They
neither constituted the bulk of the encounter between Officer
Flatt and Davis nor signaled a definitive abandonment of the
prosecution of the traffic stop to embark on another sustained
course of investigation. They were the first and only unrelated
questions asked until that point. All of the officers’ actions
leading up to that exchange were tailored to prosecuting the
traffic stop. The delay resulting from the exchange, which
lasted a matter of seconds, was de minimis. Furthermore, after
13
obtaining Davis’s consent, Officer Flatt returned to prosecuting
the traffic stop while Officer Dollar searched the vehicle.
Officer Flatt explained the citation to Davis and issued it to
him. Because the officers diligently pursued the objective of
the traffic stop, we hold that the brief exchange surrounding
the request for consent did not extend the scope and duration of
the stop in a manner that rendered the stop unconstitutional.
Thus, Davis’s consent was not the product of an illegal
detention. As Davis’s consent was voluntary ∗ and provided during
a lawful detention, it was valid and not tainted. When Davis
provided his consent to search the vehicle, he necessarily
consented to an extension of the traffic stop long enough for
the officers to conduct the search. See United States v.
Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 2009) (“When a motorist
gives consent to search his vehicle, he necessarily consents to
an extension of the traffic stop while the search is
conducted . . . .”). His further detention during the search of
his vehicle was, therefore, lawful. The consensual search
yielded the firearm at issue. Because the firearm was recovered
∗
As earlier noted, the district court found that Davis’s
consent to the search was voluntary. Similarly, at oral
argument, Davis conceded that he did not assert the consent was
involuntary in the sense that his will was overborne, just that
it was the product of an illegal detention.
14
during a lawful detention and search, it was not tainted, and
the district court correctly declined to suppress it.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
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