Filed: Jan. 17, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1650 DESHANE A. MCCASKEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JANA HENRY; YMCA OF GREATER CHARLOTTE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00390-GCM) Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: January 17, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and rem
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-1650 DESHANE A. MCCASKEY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JANA HENRY; YMCA OF GREATER CHARLOTTE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00390-GCM) Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: January 17, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and rema..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1650
DESHANE A. MCCASKEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JANA HENRY; YMCA OF GREATER CHARLOTTE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:10-cv-00390-GCM)
Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: January 17, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
DeShane A. McCaskey, Appellant Pro Se. Homer Bernard Tisdale,
III, Michael Lawrence Wade, Jr., OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK
& STEWART, PC, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
DeShane A. McCaskey appeals the district court’s order
granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss her complaint. In
her complaint, McCaskey alleged that the Defendants
discriminated against her by failing to promote her and by
terminating her employment. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
We review de novo the grant of a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th
Cir. 2010). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pro se parties’ pleadings
are to be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam).
Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (2006). In order to establish a prima facie claim of a
discriminatory failure to promote under Title VII, a plaintiff
2
must show that: “(1) she is a member of a protected group,
(2) there was a specific position for which she applied, (3) she
was qualified for that position, and (4) [her employer] rejected
her application under circumstances that give rise to an
inference of discrimination.” Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370
F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2004).
The district court found that McCaskey met the first
two elements and declined to rule on the third. It dismissed
McCaskey’s complaint because it found that she had failed to
plead facts that gave rise to an inference of discrimination.
We disagree. In her filings, McCaskey, who is black, asserts
that she was denied a promised promotion to a supervisory
position and that, thereafter, a white female was promoted into
the supervisory position. A showing that a member outside of
the protected class received a promotion instead of the
plaintiff is sufficient to create an inference of
discrimination. Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir.
1994). McCaskey has thus alleged facts that give rise to an
inference of discrimination sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of
her failure to promote claim. * On remand, the district court
*
By this disposition, we indicate no view of the ultimate
resolution of McCaskey’s claim of discrimination.
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should determine whether McCaskey sufficiently pleaded that she
was qualified for the position.
McCaskey’s complaint also alleged that she was
wrongfully terminated as a result of racial discrimination.
McCaskey’s filings state that a black man was promoted to fill
her position after her termination. A claim of discriminatory
termination requires a showing that the position remained open
after the plaintiff’s termination or was filled by an applicant
outside of the protected class. Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). McCaskey identified racial discrimination as the sole
basis of her complaint. The district court properly found that
her claim of discriminatory termination fails because a member
of her protected class was promoted into her position after her
termination.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
of McCaskey’s wrongful termination claim. We vacate the
dismissal of her failure to promote claim and remand so that the
district court may rule in the first instance on the alternative
grounds set forth in the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
4
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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