In July 1969, MRW conveyed the majority of the land to Millbrook Development Company. Millbrook reconveyed the property to MRW in October 1969. In November 1971, MRW conveyed approximately eighty acres of the tract to Woodson Broughton. One month later, Woodson conveyed to MRW all of his interest in the property, less the eighty acres. In March 1972, Woodson reconveyed the eighty acres back to MRW. These conveyances, and reconveyances, of the property at issue (or parts thereof) continued throughout the 1970's. By 1981, MRW had conveyed all of the 274 acres to the three brother-partners.

Appellants filed suit both in bankruptcy court3 and in the district court alleging that the Broughton brothers had unlawfully conspired together to fraudulently convey the 274 acres in such a way as to deprive Celeste of some marital interest. By orders entered March 29, 1985; June 3, 1985; July 12, 1985; and August 1, 1985, the district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on Appellants' claims brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) and Sec. 1985 (1988); dismissed Appellants' pendent state law claims; and referred to the bankruptcy court Appellants' claim against the estate of Woodson for fraudulent conveyance and the related civil conspiracy claims against the three brothers.4 In May 1990, the bankruptcy court entered final judgment against Appellants finding that (1) Appellants failed to establish the elements of a fraudulent conveyance under North Carolina law (N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 39-15 (1984)); (2) in any event, Appellants' action was barred by the statute of limitations (N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 1-52 (1983)); and (3) that Appellants failed to establish a claim for civil conspiracy under North Carolina law. The district court, by order entered October 22, 1991, summarily affirmed the bankruptcy court's order. The district court also denied Appellants' motions for a stay (Nov. 8, 1991); for rehearing (Nov. 13, 1991); for reconsideration (Dec. 17, 1991); to correct the docket sheet (Apr. 30, 1992); and for leave to conduct discovery in aid of their rule 60(b) motion, which had already been denied (May 7, 1992).

In No. 92-1138, Appellants appeal the district court's orders of March 29, 1985; June 3, 1985; July 12, 1985; August 8, 19855; October 22, 1991; November 8, 1991; November 13, 1991; and December 17, 1991. None of Appellants' claims has any merit. We address each of the orders referenced in the notice of appeal:

1. District court's order of March 29, 1985:

In this order, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and dismissed Appellants' claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) (1988) against all Defendants. Their claim against the Estate of Woodson Broughton for fraudulent conveyance and the related civil conspiracy claim against Robert, Melville and the Estate of Woodson Broughton were referred to the bankruptcy court.

Because Appellants failed to show any state action in connection with the actions of the Defendants, their claim under Sec. 1983 was properly dismissed. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Their claim under Sec. 1985(3) is similarly without merit as they made no showing of a racial or other invidiously discriminatory motive behind the Defendants' alleged conspiracy. See Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971).

2. District court's orders of June 3, 1985; July 12, 1985; and August 8, 1985:

By order entered June 3, 1985, the district court summarily denied Appellants' motions to (1) vacate the March 29 order, and (2) have the district court judge recuse himself. Their motion to amend the Complaint based on "newly discovered evidence" of a conspiracy with state officials was conditionally denied, if, within twenty days of the order, they failed to file affidavits from the named state parties attesting to conversations which Celeste alleged took place.

Appellants' response stated that "[s]aid individuals would not even return plaintiffs' phone calls to them." On July 12, 1985, the district court dismissed Appellants' motion to amend the Complaint for failure to submit the required affidavits. The motion to reconsider the July 12 order was denied on August 1, 1985.

Because Appellants failed to show any facts to sustain a claim under either Sec. 1983 or Sec. 1985(3), we find that the district court properly dismissed these claims and properly refused to reconsider its decision. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Griffin, 403 U.S. at 101-02. Further, as Appellants have shown no extrajudicial bias, the recusal motion was properly denied. In re: Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826-27 (4th Cir.1987).

3. District court's order entered October 22, 1991:

In its final order, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order of May 20, 1990, which found that the claims referred from the district court were without merit. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the Defendants, finding that Appellants had failed to prove that a fraudulent transfer took place under North Carolina law because:

[T]here has been no transfer from Robert to Woodson of any of Robert's interest in the 274.23 acres. The transfers did not change the amount of property owned by Robert or Woodson. It simply changed the character of their ownership. Woodson's interest was changed from a "one-third interest as tenants in partnership in 274.23 acres" to a fee simple ownership of 83 acres in the same land. Robert's interest was changed from a one-third interest as tenants in partnership in 274.23 acres to a one-half interest as tenants in partnership in 181.23 acres.

Bankruptcy court's final order entered May 3, 1990, p. 14. Therefore, the claim of conspiracy to fraudulently convey property failed as well.

In addition, the court noted, the applicable statute of limitations had run. N.C. Gen.Stat. Sec. 1-52.

We find that the bankruptcy court, and the district court, properly dismissed Appellants' claims. In essence, they are attempting to do indirectly what they cannot do directly-attack a state court judgment in federal court. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Therefore, we affirm the district court's orders affirming the bankruptcy court's final order and denying Appellants' motion for stay (Nov. 8, 1991), motion for rehearing (Nov. 13, 1991), and motion for reconsideration (Dec. 17, 1991).

In No. 92-1751, Appellants appeal the district court's order entered on April 30, 1992, which denied their motion to correct the district court's docket sheet. Appellants argue that the district court improperly refused to correct its docket to accurately reflect the attorneys representing the Defendants. Specifically, Appellants claim that an attorney named Greg Crampton entered an appearance for seven of the Defendants in August 1983; that all but one of those Defendants is now listed as pro se; that "[t]he record contains no written request or notice thereafter that Mr. Crampton withdrew after August 1983 as counsel for said entities, nor does the record contain an order allowing Mr. Crampton to withdraw as counsel." Appellants offered no facts in support of this motion or any legal basis for her request. Therefore, we affirm the district court's order.

In No. 92-1774, Appellants appeal the district court's order denying their motion to conduct discovery pending the appeal. They argue that such discovery (in the form of requests for production of documents) "is necessary for the added reason that there is likelihood the defendants and their silent partners will destroy the requested papers and/or dispose of the property before the matter is remanded after appeal." In light of our disposition in No. 92-1183, this order is also affirmed.

The Appellees' motions to dismiss the appeals and strike Appellants' briefs are denied. The Appellants' motion to expedite the appeal is denied. The Appellants have also filed a motion seeking permission to file an informal reply brief. Because they have already done so, this motion is granted. Celeste Broughton has also filed a motion to stay sale of the property or enforcement of the district court's orders pending appeal. In light of the disposition of the appeals, this motion is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.