Filed: Jul. 18, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2369 GREG BAILEY; JENNIFER BAILEY, Plaintiffs - Appellants, and CRYSTAL MCGEE; DAVID EDMONDS, JR.; JILL EDMONDS, Plaintiffs, v. VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:11-cv-00035-JPJ-PMS) Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: July 18, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KI
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-2369 GREG BAILEY; JENNIFER BAILEY, Plaintiffs - Appellants, and CRYSTAL MCGEE; DAVID EDMONDS, JR.; JILL EDMONDS, Plaintiffs, v. VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:11-cv-00035-JPJ-PMS) Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: July 18, 2012 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KIN..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2369
GREG BAILEY; JENNIFER BAILEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
CRYSTAL MCGEE; DAVID EDMONDS, JR.; JILL EDMONDS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:11-cv-00035-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: July 18, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hugh F. O’Donnell, CLIENT CENTERED LEGAL SERVICES OF SOUTHWEST
VIRGINIA, Norton, Virginia, for Appellants. R. Craig Wood,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia; Aaron James Longo,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Greg and Jennifer Bailey appeal the district court’s
order dismissing their complaint against the Virginia High
School League, Inc. (“VHSL”), for failure to state a claim, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Baileys sought to challenge VHSL’s
“transfer rule,” which denied their son eligibility to
participate in interscholastic and athletic activities at the
school of their choice. The district court granted VHSL’s
motion to dismiss. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus.,
Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). While a court, in
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “must accept as
true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,”
Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the complaint must
contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on
its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
On appeal, the Baileys challenge the district court’s
statement in the dismissal order that it had considered “[t]he
facts, as set forth in the plaintiffs’ Complaint or as agreed by
the parties at oral argument.” The Baileys allege that this
statement reflects the district court’s reliance on facts
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outside the complaint, and that such reliance is reversible
error.
In deciding whether a complaint will survive a motion
to dismiss, a court evaluates the complaint and any documents
attached or incorporated by reference. Sec’y of State for
Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.
2007); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc.,
190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir.
1999). However, the district court cannot go beyond these
documents on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b),
12(d), 56. Such a conversion is error where the parties have
not had a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Kolon Indus.,
637 F.3d at 448-49.
“[S]tatements by counsel that raise new facts
constitute matters beyond the pleadings and cannot be considered
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. at 449. Here, we have reviewed
the record and found no facts raised at the hearing that were
not included in the complaint. Accordingly, this claim fails.
The Baileys also challenge the district court’s
classification of VHSL as an “organization,” because VHSL’s
corporate identity is important “in gauging how the edicts of an
independent private corporation can outweigh the fundamental
right of a parent to make decisions about the welfare of one’s
child.” We reject this argument as it contradicts the Baileys’
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own description of VHSL in the complaint as, in essence, a state
actor.
Finally, the Baileys challenge the district court’s
dismissal of their claim that the transfer rule interferes with
their fundamental right to make decisions in the best interest
of their son. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)
(“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.”) Although “the Supreme Court has never been
called upon to define the precise boundaries of a parent’s right
to control a child's upbringing and education,” C.N. v.
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.,
430 F.3d 159, 182 (3rd Cir. 2005), it is
clear that the right is neither absolute nor unqualified,
Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (holding that
constitutional protection is available for parent-child
relationship in “appropriate cases”). See Littlefield v. Forney
Indep. Sch. Dist.,
268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding
school district’s mandatory school uniform policy); Hooks v.
Clark County Sch. Dist.,
228 F.3d 1036, 1036 (9th Cir. 2000)
(upholding state statute denying speech therapy services to
home-schooled children); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 1-L,
135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding school
district’s full-time attendance policy); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-
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Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996)
(upholding school district’s mandatory community service
program).
The Baileys’ right to control individual components of
their son’s education, including his participation in
interscholastic sports and other activities, is not
constitutionally protected, and the district court correctly
dismissed this claim. Finally, because the complaint does not
implicate a fundamental right, the Baileys’ reliance on
Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551
U.S. 291 (2007), is misplaced.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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