ADKINS, J.
In this case, we put to an end decades of litigation by a personal representative attempting to secure an unfair portion of a multi-million dollar estate for himself and his sister. The decedent, Walter L. Green, died in 1993. The personal representative, Carlton M. Green, who is also the son of the decedent and a legatee under the will, litigated a number of issues in the orphans' court against the decedent's widow, Helen Nassif. Anticipating an adverse ruling, Green filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court, which ruled in his favor. Nassif appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals reversed. Both parties petitioned for certiorari.
For the reasons described below, we shall affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate in part the Court of Special Appeals and hold that (1) "enforceable claims," as used in Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl. Vol.), Section 1-101(n) of the Estates and Trusts Article,
Walter L. Green ("decedent") died on March 9, 1993, leaving an estate of more than $28 million to his wife, Helen Nassif, and his two children, Anne D. Fotos and Carlton M. Green ("Green"). Instead of receiving her bequest in the Will, Nassif elected on May 3, 1993, to take a statutory share of the estate pursuant to Section 3-206(a). Accordingly, her bequest in the Will, which provided that she would receive a one-third share of the adjusted gross estate less certain expenses, was nullified pursuant to Section 3-208(a).
Green was appointed personal representative ("PR") of the estate, and began settling numerous claims. The estate's assets, and the claims against it, were complex. We quote the Court of Special Appeals' reported opinion, Nassif v. Green, 198 Md.App. 719, 722-723, 18 A.3d 1018, 1020-21 (2011), which itself quotes the PR's brief in that court:
In all, the claims against the estate exceeded $26 million. Many of the larger claims related to loans that the decedent had personally guaranteed, where the primary obligor was a corporation or other business organization in which he had an interest. Thus, the liability of the estate was conditional and dependent upon the capacity of the business entity to pay the debt.
Green was able to reduce or settle many of the claims, and the estate was ultimately diminished by only $102,869. Nevertheless, he claims that he is entitled, under the law in effect when the decedent died, to deduct $13,204,136 in claims from the estate before calculating Nassif's elective share. The Court of Special Appeals summarized the statutory scheme then in effect:
Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 725-26, 18 A.3d at 1022. We too will later discuss the legislative changes as we examine the issues.
Before distributing Nassif's elective share, Green filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County ("Circuit Court"),
When Green filed his complaint for declaratory judgment on July 21, 2006, the estate was already the subject of a pending action in the Orphans' Court for Prince George's County.
After Green moved for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, the Circuit Court partially consolidated the cases on October 23, 2007.
Following a two-month trial, the Circuit Court issued a memorandum and opinion on June 30, 2009. The court reached different conclusions on the issues that had been decided in the Orphans' Court, holding that (1) $13,204,136 in claims, calculated
Nassif appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that
Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 727-28, 18 A.3d at 1023.
The Court of Special Appeals held that (1) "enforceable claims means claims that are valid and are required to be paid or paid," and that the issue of "double deduction" was therefore moot, id. at 731-32, 18 A.3d at 1025; (2) an elective spouse shares in income on estate property, even if the legatees decide to pay her statutory share in cash, id. at 734-36, 18 A.3d at 1027-28;
Both parties filed petitions for certiorari, which we granted. In re Green, 421 Md. 192, 25 A.3d 1025 (2011). In his petition, Green asks the following questions:
In her cross-petition, Nassif asks the following questions:
The amount of Nassif's statutory share depends on the meaning of the statutory term "enforceable claims" in Section 1-101(n). This is because a spouse's statutory share is one third of the net "net estate," which is calculated after all "enforceable claims" are deducted from the gross estate. See Sections 1-101(n), 3-203(a)(3). The Court of Special Appeals summarized the parties' positions on the meaning of "enforceable claims":
Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 728-29, 18 A.3d at 1023-24. Thus, according to Green, "enforceable claims" means "claims that were filed and capable of being enforced," Id. at 730, 18 A.3d at 1024, not "paid" or "allowed" claims.
Green points to the Comments of the Henderson Commission on the original version of this section, Maryland Code (1969), Article 93, Section 3-206,
Although these sections reference the spouse's window to make a decision, they do not clarify what she is supposed to evaluate during that time. Making an "informed determination" based on the "liabilities against the estate" is just as important if "enforceable claims" means claims that ultimately reduce the estate. The elective spouse would simply need to evaluate the extent to which the claims are likely to reduce the estate. Moreover, under Green's interpretation, spouses would have little to evaluate. Green offers no further definition of "enforceable" beyond "capable of being enforced," which appears to simply require that the claim be timely and in proper form. If this is all that "enforceable" means, then there is hardly a need for spouses to evaluate anything during a 30-day window. They would simply need to check to see that the claims are timely and in proper form.
Green also cites Winer v. United States, 153 F.Supp. 941, 943 (S.D.N.Y.1957), which interpreted Section 8.12(b)(3) of the former I.R.S. Code and held that "enforceable claims," as used in those provisions, includes claims that "would have been allowed" had other conditions been satisfied. He argues that Winer's definition fits the facts of this case, because the claims reduced, settled, or recouped during the administration "would have been allowed"
Nassif counters that it would be unfair and nonsensical to deduct claims that did not ultimately reduce the value of the estate. This is especially true here, she says, because the PR had a personal stake in reducing the amount of the "net estate" so that he could inherit more as a legatee. Moreover, she argues that under Green's interpretation, the statute's timing would make no sense. If the amount of enforceable claims were set in stone on the date of election, she says, then spouses should elect
Nassif also points out that Winer was overruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Comm'r v. Estate of Shively, 276 F.2d 372, 374-75 (2nd Cir. 1960). That case involved a dispute between a personal representative and the IRS over the amount of Federal estate tax owing. The dispute turned on the interpretation of 26 U.S.C.A., Section 812, which defined the "net estate" for purposes of determining the appropriate tax. The gross estate was to be valued as of the date of death of the decedent. Shively, 276 F.2d at 374. Subsection (b)(3) of Section 812 directed that "claims against the estate" be deducted from the value of the gross estate before determining the net estate.
Id. at 374-75.
Neither Winer nor Shively is directly on point, as we are not interpreting the Federal estate tax law. Yet, we find them analogous because both Section 812(b) of the Internal Revenue Code and Section 3-203 of the Estates and Trusts Article are concerned with deducting claims to arrive at a "net estate" as of a certain date, and the question is whether events after that date can be considered in determining the amount of such claims. We have reviewed cases interpreting the Federal law which take a different view,
Here we have "poster facts" to bolster that reasoning. Green wants to deduct approximately $13,204,136 from the gross estate as claims, most of which were contingent, and reduce Nassif's share by one-third of that ($4,401,378.66) but ultimately pay only $102,869 of the claims, refusing to make any adjustment to the one-third statutory share. Common sense and fair play dictate that we not countenance such machinations.
Moreover, Maryland testamentary law has historically provided that unpaid claims are not deducted from a spouse's elective share. Before the 1969 revisions, Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol.), Article 93, Section 329 provided that an elective spouse took one-third of the "surplus personal estate," which was defined in the comments as "the entire balance of personal estate, principal and income, at the time of distribution[.]" See also Gardner v. Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Md. 280, 283, 164 A. 663, 665 (1933) ("The words `surplus personal estate' ... mean, we think, the entire balance of personal estate, principal and income, at the time of distribution."). Because the calculation took place at the time of distribution, unpaid claims were not deducted from the elective share, as distribution could not happen until all claims were either paid or allowed. See Maryland Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol.), Art. 93, § 133 ("Whenever it shall appear ... that all the claims against or debts of the decedent ... have been discharged or allowed ... it shall be [the administrator's] duty to deliver up and distribute the surplus or residue as hereinafter directed[.]"); see also Kuykendall v. Devecmon, 78 Md. 537, 542-43, 28 A. 412, 413 (1894) (explaining that an electing widow is entitled to "one-third of the personal estate of her husband ... which shall remain
Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 731, 18 A.3d at 1025.
There is nothing in the statute's text or history to suggest that the Legislature intended to upset the historical practice and create an illogical system in which claims may be deducted from the "net estate" even though they do not reduce the value of the estate. We therefore hold that "enforceable claims" means claims that in fact reduce the assets in the estate or are allowed by the court under Section 8-107. We agree with the Court of Special Appeals on this issue and shall remand to that court with directions to remand the case to the Circuit Court for a calculation of enforceable claims consistent with this opinion.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the date on which elective share assets are valued depends on whether the legatees pay the spouse with cash or in kind:
Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 733, 18 A.3d at 1026. Thus, the court held that an elective spouse shares in the appreciation of assets used to pay the statutory share in kind, but does not share in the appreciation of assets subject to a legatee's decision to pay cash under Section 3-208(b). Id.
The Court of Special Appeals observed that, in the typical case, the option to pay cash is exercised early. Nevertheless, it held that, although the Legislature "did not contemplate that [the cash option] would be applied many years after the estate had been opened[, the] statute does not contain a time limit for exercising the cash out option, and we will not write one into the statute." Id.
Nassif argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred by not implying a reasonable time limit on the legatees' decision to pay cash under Section 3-208(b). She contends that the legatees' choice in this case was unreasonably late and should not be allowed. The legatees did not even attempt to invoke Section 3-208(b) until October of 2006, she says, when Green filed a motion titled "Election to Pay Surviving
She cites a number of cases in which this Court has implied a reasonable time for performance under a statute that does not contain a time limit. See, e.g., Crystal v. West Callahan, Inc., 328 Md. 318, 340, 614 A.2d 560, 571 (1992) ("Absent any clear legislative direction as to the duration of the right ... it is a traditional exercise of judicial power to fill the statutory interstices by implying a reasonable time within which to act."); Parker v. Bd. of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130, 186 A.2d 195, 197 (1962) ("[The statute] states no time limit within which the complaint by a qualified voter to the Election Board must be made, but certainly it is implicit in that statute that the action pursuant thereto must be taken within a reasonable time[.]" (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Thirteen years after the decedent's death is unreasonable, she says, because it would allow the legatees to select the assets that have appreciated the most and pay Nassif in cash an amount equal to their lower, 1993 values. This would prejudice the elective spouse, she maintains, because if the assets were distributed in kind, they would be valued as of the date of distribution, including their appreciation during the long administration of the estate. As she says, Green's interpretation would allow the legatees to enjoy a "risk free investment," at the spouse's expense, throughout the administration of the estate.
Green, on the other hand, argues that the Court of Special Appeals rightly declined to imply a time limit. He also points out that the legatees exercised the cash option in 1999, not 2006, only six years after the decedent's death. The legatees' timing was reasonable, he says, because they exercised the option "shortly after all the outstanding claims had been satisfied." He also challenges the other part of the Court of Special Appeals' holding, arguing that even if the legatees must pay Nassif's share in kind, the assets should still be valued as of the date of her election. Thus, under Green's interpretation, a delay by the legatees could not prejudice the spouse, no matter how long, because regardless of whether a spouse's share is paid with cash or in kind, the assets would be valued as of the date of the spouse's election.
First of all, it is clear that the legatees did not exercise the cash option in 1999. Green points to an August 1999 filing titled "Petition to Authorize Partial Distribution," in which he requested permission to distribute certain specific bequests and pay Nassif "in cash ... representing [her] statutory share." He states that the Orphans' Court approved this petition in February of 2000. Yet the petition only requested authorization to make a "partial distribution" of certain specific bequests that are not before us. As the Court of Special Appeals observed, the February 2000 order had "no binding effect beyond the specific bequests," and neither party appealed from it. Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 737-38, 18 A.3d at 1029.
We have traditionally implied time limits when failing to do so would cause injustice or absurdity. See Crystal, 328 Md. at 340, 614 A.2d at 571 ("Implying a reasonable time ... avoid[s] the injustices and potential absurdity of a perpetual right to cancel."); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1180 (1990) (observing that failing to imply a reasonable time limit would "produce[] an absurd and unjust result."); Parker, 230 Md. at 130, 186 A.2d at 197 ("What amounts to `prejudice,' such as will bar the right to assert a claim after the passage of time, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case[.]").
Green argues that no injustice or absurdity will result from allowing a legatee to elect to pay cash at a later date, because both cash and in kind assets are valued as of the date of the spouse's election. Indeed, he contends that this is what the Court of Special Appeals held: that the "date of valuation of the elective share... is the date of election." The Court of Special Appeals, however, clearly held that "in kind assets should be valued as of the time of distribution or, if cash is paid, valued as of the date of election." Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 733, 18 A.3d at 1026. Thus, although Green does not believe he is challenging the holding below, his contention that elective share assets are valued as of the date of the spouse's election, even if paid in kind, is clearly contrary to the Court of Special Appeals' decision.
Green argues that assets used to pay a spouse's elective share in kind should be valued as of the date of the spouse's election. He points to a law review article written by two members of the commission that drafted the statutory scheme in 1969 (the "Henderson Commission"
Regarding the law review article, the portions cited by Green do not support the interpretation he puts forth. Although the article mentions a spouse's right to share in the appreciation of estate assets, it does so in the context of certain types of bequests contained in the will, not a spouse's election against the will. See 29 Md. L.Rev. at 99-100. Thus, its discussion of a spouse's right to share in the appreciation of assets has nothing to do with a spouse who elects against the will. Moreover, the portion of the article that does deal with an elective spouse simply explains the cash option, stating that "the spouse will no longer be entitled to a proportionate interest, in kind, of each item of property in the estate," because the legatees have the option to pay her share in cash instead. See id. at 92. Thus, the law review article does not support Green's position that estate assets, used to pay a spouse's elective share in kind, are valued as of the date of election.
Nor does the statutory scheme, adopted in 1969, according the PR title to the decedent's property during administration, suggest anything about a spouse's right to share in the appreciation of estate assets. The comments of the Henderson Commission on Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Article 93, Section 1-301 explain precisely why the change was made:
This reasoning appears again in the Henderson Commission's comments to Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Article 93, Section 3-208:
As the Court of Special Appeals observed, the Henderson Commission's comments make it clear that the 1969 statute gave title to the PR during administration simply to "avoid the problem[s] identified in the comment ... not to change the general scheme with respect to the manner of computation of the distributees' respective interests." Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 732, 18 A.3d at 1026.
Thus, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that nothing in the statute suggests that the Legislature intended to change the traditional rule under which an elective spouse, when she receives her statutory share in kind, is entitled to share in the appreciation of the assets she receives. Indeed, the comments of the Henderson Commission explain that the 1969 law was "similar to that under prior Maryland law by which the spouse acquired a proportional interest in each item of property of the decedent." See Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.), Art. 93, § 3-208; see also Maryland Code (1888), Art. 93, § 292 (providing that when a spouse receives her elective share in kind, she is entitled to one third of the estate property "which shall remain after payment of ... just claims[,]" suggesting that such property was not valued at the time of election, but later, after debts had been paid); Kuykendall, 78 Md. at 542-43, 28 A. at 413 (same).
Yet when a legatee makes a timely election to pay the spouse in cash rather than with specific property, pursuant to Section 3-208(b)(2), the assets designated are valued on the date of the spouse's election, and the spouse does not share in their appreciation. See Section 3-208(b) ("Instead of contributing an interest in specific property to the intestate share, a legatee may pay the surviving spouse in cash ... an amount equal to the fair market value of the interest in specific property
The Legislature may have intended to create such a system, but it certainly did not contemplate that the period of election would last for 13 years. As the Second Report of the Henderson Commission states, the Legislature intended for distribution to occur within six months, in the typical case. It is safe to say, therefore, that the Legislature did not intend to allow legatees to enjoy their "risk free investment," at the spouse's expense, for more than a decade. Such a scheme would create an absurd and unjust windfall for the legatees, because property values change more drastically over decades than over the course of six months. As we did in Crystal, Parker, and D & Y, Inc., we shall infer a reasonable time limit to avoid an absurd and unjust result. Thus, although we affirm the Court of Special Appeals regarding the valuation and appreciation of assets in the spouse's elective share, we reverse that court regarding the timeliness of the legatees' decision to pay cash under Section 3-208(b), holding instead that the legatees' 13-year delay in electing to pay Nassif in cash was unreasonable and shall not be allowed.
The Court of Special Appeals held that a spouse is entitled to income earned on assets in the net estate during the administration of the estate. Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 734, 18 A.3d at 1026-27. Green contests this holding for a number of reasons. First, he contends that because the statute does not specifically provide for an elective spouse to share in income, there is no such right. Second, he asserts that the 2003 amendments, which provided that elective spouses would thereafter be entitled to income, show that spouses were not previously entitled to income. Finally, Green argues, given that the statute mentions distributing income to legatees, but does not mention spouses, the Legislature must not have intended for elective spouses to share in income.
Prior to 1969, an electing spouse was entitled to income on estate assets. See Gardner, 164 Md. at 283, 164 A. at 665 ("[T]he surviving husband or wife shall take ... one-third of the surplus personal estate (if the deceased spouse shall be survived by descendants).... The words `surplus personal estate' ... mean, we think, the entire balance of personal estate, principal
Green argues that, in 2003, the Legislature was explicit in saying that spouses had not been entitled to income under the law as revised in 1969. He again refers to Senate Bill 312 of 2003. This bill added Section 3-203(e)(1), providing that "a surviving spouse who has elected to take against a will shall be entitled to ... income earned on the net estate during the period of administration." Chapter 234 of the Acts of 2003. Green argues that, because the bill stated that its amendments "shall be construed to apply only prospectively[,]" a spouse's right to income on assets in the net estate was not previously part of the statutory scheme. As he points out, the floor report for Senate Bill 312 stated that one of the "most significant changes" in the bill was to "allow the spouse to be paid a proportionate share of the income earned on the net estate during the period of administration." If such a rule had existed previously, he says, it would not have been a "significant change."
As support for this argument, Green selectively quotes a portion of our opinion in Chesek v. Jones, in which we observed that "[a]lthough a subsequent legislative amendment of a statute is not controlling as to the meaning of the prior law, nevertheless, subsequent legislation can be considered helpful to determine legislative intent." Chesek v. Jones, 406 Md. 446, 462, 959 A.2d 795, 804 (2008). Thus, Green argues that Senate Bill 312's provision of income for the spouse shows that, previously, legislative intent was to the contrary.
Chesek did not hold, however, that an amendment to a statute is evidence that the law was previously different. Indeed, it held the opposite:
Id.
Similarly, here, we are not convinced that Senate Bill 312 was intended to modify the law with respect to income. As Chesek made clear, amendments to a statute that merely "clarify" the law are still significant changes. See id. Senate Bill 312 also lists among its "most significant changes" the provision that elective share assets are to be valued "as of the date of distribution, rather than the date of election[.]" Chapter 234 of the Acts of 2003. As we explained above, this was the rule under the prior statute as well, at least for assets paid in kind, although the statutory language was less clear. See Maryland Code (1888), Art. 93, § 292; Kuykendall, 78 Md. at 542-43, 28 A. at 413; Gibber, supra, § 9.38. Thus, in legislative bills, prefatory clauses sometimes characterize as "significant" a language change that merely clarifies an earlier ambiguous statute.
Moreover, even if the Legislature believed it was making a substantive change, "a statement by present members of a legislative body, as to what their predecessors intended in a statute enacted several years previously, is not entitled to much weight." State v. Coleman, 423 Md. 666, 683, 33 A.3d 468, 477-78 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Collier v. Connolley, 285 Md. 123, 126, 400 A.2d 1107, 1108 (1979) ("[W]e do not place much weight upon what the Legislature, in 1977, said was intended in a 1974 statute."); Dir. of Fin. for Balt. County v. Myers, 232 Md. 213, 218, 192 A.2d 278, 280 (1963) (holding that an "amendment ... is not controlling as to the meaning of the prior law").
We are left, then, with Green's contention that Section 7-304(b)'s express provision that income be distributed to "legatees," coupled with its silence regarding elective spouses, implies that elective spouses are not entitled to such income. In 1993, Section 7-304(b) provided:
Thus, Green argues that, because the definition of "legatee" did not include an elective spouse, elective spouses were not entitled to share in income.
Green asks us to make a negative inference from statutory silence, i.e., that because the Legislature did not mention elective spouses in Section 7-304, it intended to exclude them from sharing in income on estate assets. Were we to read Section 7-304(b) in isolation, we might agree, but we cannot ignore other provisions that undermine Green's argument. See Potomac Abatement, Inc. v. Sanchez, 424 Md. 701, 37 A.3d 972 (2012) ("When, in [a statutory] scheme, two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other, address the same subject, they must be read together, i.e., interpreted with reference to one another, and harmonized, to the extent possible, both with each other and with other provisions of the statutory scheme." (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
Section 7-304 is not in the part of the statutory scheme dealing with an elective spouse's rights. Title 7 is titled "Administration of the Estate," and Subtitle 3 pertains to "Accounting." Title 3, on the other hand, is titled "Intestate Succession and Statutory Shares," and Subtitle 2 pertains to the "Family Allowance and Statutory Share of Surviving Spouse." Thus, looking at the statutory scheme as a whole, it appears at first blush that an elective spouse's rights would be defined in Title 3, not Title 7.
The conclusion that Section 7-304(b) was not intended to define an elective spouse's rights is further confirmed by its first few words, which state: "Unless the will provides otherwise[.]" This phrase clarifies that the provisions of Section 7-304(b) can be overridden by the will, but an elective spouse's rights most certainly cannot be overridden by the will. See Shimp v. Huff, 315 Md. 624, 638, 556 A.2d 252, 259 (1989) ("[T]he applicable statutes give a higher priority to a surviving spouse's elective share than to testamentary bequests[.]"); Eugene F. Scoles and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems and Materials on Decedents' Estates and Trusts 94 (5th ed. 1993) ("[R]ights in the nature of dower... cannot be defeated by will."). Thus, we have further reason to believe that the Legislature did not intend to define an elective spouse's rights in Section 7-304.
Moreover, although the statute is silent as to a spouse's right to income, the law in place when the statute was enacted was not. As mentioned above, our cases were clear that a spouse's elective share was a percentage of "the net estate for distribution,
Summary of Changes made in Second Report of Governor's Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland (Jan. 31, 1969); see also Comments to Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl.Vol.),
Because the Legislature said that it "decided to retain the present law," we affirm the Court of Special Appeals' holding that there is "nothing in the language of the statute as it existed in 1993 that convinces us that the Legislature intended to change the law, with respect to sharing of income." Nassif, 198 Md.App. at 734, 18 A.3d at 1027.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the Maryland Uniform Principal and Income Act, Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), § 15-501 et seq. of the Estates and Trusts Article, applies to this estate. Id. at 734-36, 18 A.3d 1018. Green partially contests this holding, arguing that the Legislature did not intend to apply the Act to a spouse's elective share. Nassif maintains that the Act applies.
To decide this issue, we must first determine that a justiciable controversy exists. A declaratory judgment shall not issue unless
Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 3-409 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
We described this standard in 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. City, 413 Md. 309, 356, 992 A.2d 459, 488 (2010):
Part of showing a justiciable controversy is pointing to specific "factual allegations which, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy ... of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 340, 353 A.2d 634, 637 (1976) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Liss v. Goodman, 224 Md. 173, 177, 167 A.2d 123, 125 (1961) ("[D]eclarations should not be made where they would not serve a useful purpose or terminate a controversy."); Staley v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 189 Md. 447, 456-57, 56 A.2d 144, 149 (1947) ("[C]ourts have some judicial discretion to refuse a declaratory judgment when it does not serve a useful purpose or terminate controversy.").
In Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 45-47, 464 A.2d 1076, 1078-79 (1983), we vacated a declaratory judgment because the plaintiff had failed to point to specific facts that would have been affected by the judgment. Although the parties disagreed about how to interpret a county regulation, they did not identify how their proposed interpretations would have any tangible effect on the case at hand. See id. As we explained,
Id.; see also Prince George's County v. Board of Trustees, 269 Md. 9, 12-13, 304 A.2d 228, 229-30 (1973) (same).
As in Hatt, the parties have not shown how the issue presented for our decision— whether the Maryland Uniform Principal and Income Act applies to elective share assets—will affect the case at hand. The Act provides general rules regarding how fiduciaries should identify and manage income on trusts and estates. See generally Maryland Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.), § 15-501 et seq. of the Estates and Trusts Article. Green complains that it would be "unfair" to apply the Act, but does not point to any specific facts that would be affected by a decision on this issue. We hold that there is no justiciable controversy at this point regarding the Act's applicability, and shall vacate the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals to the extent that it addresses the Act, with directions to vacate the trial court's declaratory judgment on that issue as well. See Hatt, 297 Md. at 47, 464 A.2d at 1079.
HARRELL, J., concurs and dissents.
HARRELL, J., concurring and dissenting.
I disagree with but a single holding of the majority opinion: that the value of Nassif's elective share distribution should include a pro rata portion of the income generated by the decedent's estate during its administration. Section 3-203 of the Estates and Trusts Article, the governing statute, was silent at the time of the decedent's death in 1993 as to whether an electing spouse was entitled to interest upon distribution of his or her elective share. The principles of statutory interpretation demonstrate forcibly to me that the surviving spouse's elective share at the time of decedent's death was exclusive of estate income. The majority opinion, however, sidesteps this conclusion, justifying
A plain reading of Senate Bill 312-2003 militates against the majority opinion's conclusion that Nassif's elective share includes income earned on the estate during its administration. The decedent passed on 9 March 1993. At that time (the determinative point of reference for our purposes), the statute was silent as to entitlement to income in this regard. Senate Bill 312 amended § 3-203 in 2003 to include estate income in a surviving spouse's elective share. This amendment was prospective in effect expressly. Senate Bill 312 provided, "For purposes of this section, a surviving spouse who has elected to take against a will shall be entitled to the surviving spouse's portion of the income earned on the net estate during the period of administration based on a one-third or one-half share, whichever is applicable.... [T]his act shall be construed to apply only prospectively...." 2003 Md. Laws 234. An elementary principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the plain language of a bill. See, e.g., Md. Ins. Comm'r v. Cent. Acceptance Corp., 424 Md. 1, 36, 33 A.3d 949, 970 (2011) (citing Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 286, 26 A.3d 878, 891 (2011)). A statute so adopted should not be construed to have retrospective effect. See, e.g., State v. Stowe, 376 Md. 436, 454, 829 A.2d 1036, 1047 (2003) (quoting State Tax Comm'n v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 182 Md. 111, 117, 32 A.2d 382, 384 (1943)); Granahan v. Prince George's Cnty., 326 Md. 346, 357, 605 A.2d 91, 96-97 (1992) (citing Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560-64, 520 A.2d 1319, 1321-23 (1987)).
Senate Bill 312 effected a substantive amendment to § 3-203, which supports further that estate income was not included in the elective share in 1993. A substantive amendment to a statute is one that establishes the rights of persons. 1A Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 41:4, at 4423 (7th ed.2009) [hereinafter Statutory Construction]. Senate Bill 312 was a substantive amendment in this relevant regard because it created for surviving spouses, who elect the statutory share, a right to income generated by the estate during its administration, proportionate to the size of the surviving spouse's elective share. We have observed that "a substantive amendment to an existing statute indicates an intent to change the meaning of that statute." In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 689, 516 A.2d 976, 984 (1986) (citations omitted). Further, substantive amendments are presumed to indicate a change in legal rights. Statutory Construction, supra, § 22:30, at 355-56. When the Maryland General Assembly amended § 3-203 in 2003 to include in a surviving spouse's elective share a pro rata share of estate income generated during its administration, the presumption is that it did so because it disagreed with (or changed its mind as to) the law as it existed prior to the amendment, and intended to create a new legal right. If including estate income was a new legal right, logically, such a right could not have existed at the time of the decedent's death, which occurred prior to the effective date of the substantive amendment in Senate Bill 312.
The majority opinion circumvents this reasoning by relying on Chesek v. Jones for the proposition that a significant statutory amendment does not evince that the statute was construed differently before
The majority opinion defends further its position that income is included in the elective share in the present case by pointing to two pre-1969 cases. Those cases were superseded, however, in 1969 by Senate Bill 316 of that year. On 24 March 1969, then Governor Marvin Mandel signed into law Senate Bill 316. As the majority opinion notes, the bill repealed, revised, and reorganized the disparate statutes of Maryland estates and trusts law. Shale D. Stiller and Roger D. Redden, Statutory Reform in the Administration of Estates of Maryland Decedents, Minors and Incompetents, 29 Md. L.Rev. 85, 85 (1969). When a legislature revises an entire statutory body of law by repealing former statutes and enacting a new statute, "there is a strong implication of legislative intent to repeal former statutory law and also to supersede the common law relating to the same subject." Statutory Construction, supra, § 23:13, at 489-90. Therefore, the 1969 amendment, as a substantive and comprehensive revision of Maryland estates and trusts law, rendered inapplicable the antecedent common law relevant to the topic of § 3-203, which itself was revised (but remained silent as to inclusion of income in an elective share). The majority opinion attempts to avoid this construction by quoting selectively from the Summary of Changes Made in Second Report of Governor's Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Laws of Maryland, noting that "`with respect to the widow's statutory share ... the Commission has decided to retain the present law.'" op. at 291, 44 A.3d at 340 (2012). This partial quotation shared with us by the majority opinion is inapposite and misapplied because, when reviewing the full quotation in context, one discovers that it refers to § 3-102 of the Estates and Trusts Article, which governs a surviving spouse's intestate share, not an elective share.
For these reasons, income generated by the deceased's estate during its administration should be excluded from Nassif's elective share.
Gibber, supra, § 9.38. In 2003, the Legislature revised Section 3-208(b) to provide that even assets subject to a legatee's decision to pay in cash are valued on the "date or dates of distribution." See Chapter 234 of the Acts of 2003.
