Filed: May 16, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: REVISED May 16, 1997 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-60431 _ JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs; BENNIE G THOMPSON, United States Congressman, Second Congressional District, Mississippi Plaintiffs - Appellants UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant v. KIRK FORDICE, Governor, Defendants/Senior Colleges; HINDS JUNIOR COLLEGE, Board of Trustees; UTICA JUNIOR COLLEGE, Board of Trustees; MISSISSIPPI DELTA JUNIOR COLLEGE; COAHOMA JUNIOR COLLEGE;
Summary: REVISED May 16, 1997 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-60431 _ JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs; BENNIE G THOMPSON, United States Congressman, Second Congressional District, Mississippi Plaintiffs - Appellants UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant v. KIRK FORDICE, Governor, Defendants/Senior Colleges; HINDS JUNIOR COLLEGE, Board of Trustees; UTICA JUNIOR COLLEGE, Board of Trustees; MISSISSIPPI DELTA JUNIOR COLLEGE; COAHOMA JUNIOR COLLEGE; S..
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REVISED May 16, 1997
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-60431
_____________________
JAKE AYERS, JR, Private Plaintiffs; BENNIE G THOMPSON,
United States Congressman, Second Congressional District,
Mississippi
Plaintiffs - Appellants
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Intervenor Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
KIRK FORDICE, Governor, Defendants/Senior Colleges; HINDS
JUNIOR COLLEGE, Board of Trustees; UTICA JUNIOR COLLEGE,
Board of Trustees; MISSISSIPPI DELTA JUNIOR COLLEGE; COAHOMA
JUNIOR COLLEGE; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Defendants
Defendants - Appellees
v.
LOUIS ARMSTRONG
Movant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
April 23, 1997
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
III. DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. Admissions Policies and Practices . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Background Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Undergraduate Admissions Standards . . . . . . 15
a. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 15
b. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 22
c. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
i. Rejection of plaintiffs’ proposals . 28
ii. Reliance on spring screening and
summer remedial program . . . . . . 32
iii. Elimination of existing remedial
courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
iv. Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
d. Conclusions regarding undergraduate
admissions standards . . . . . . . . . . 38
3. Scholarship Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
a. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 39
b. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 40
c. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
d. Conclusions regarding scholarship
policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B. Enhancement of Historically Black Institutions . . 53
1. Background Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2. New Academic Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
a. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 54
b. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 60
c. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
d. Conclusions regarding new academic
programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3. Land Grant Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
a. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 68
b. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 70
c. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2
d. Conclusions regarding land grant
programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4. Duplication of Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 73
a. Fordice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
b. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 74
c. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 79
d. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
e. Conclusions regarding program
duplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
a. District court ruling . . . . . . . . . . 83
b. Arguments on appeal . . . . . . . . . . . 88
c. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
d. Conclusions regarding funding . . . . . . 94
C. Employment of Black Faculty and Administrators . . 94
D. System Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3
Before KING, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
KING, Circuit Judge:
This case concerns the obligation of the State of
Mississippi and the other defendants to dismantle the system of
de jure segregation that was maintained in public universities in
Mississippi. After we heard the initial appeal of this case in
1990, the Supreme Court established, for the first time, the
standards for determining in the university context whether a
state has met its affirmative obligation to dismantle its prior
de jure system. We now review the district court’s ruling
following trial on remand to determine whether it erred in its
application of these standards.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Mississippi’s system of public four-year universities was
formally segregated by race from its inception in 1848 through
1962, when the first black student was admitted to the University
of Mississippi by order of this court. See Meredith v. Fair, 306
F.2d 374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 828 (1962). The
racial identifiability of Mississippi’s eight public universities
changed little during the decade following the landmark admission
of James Meredith. The student composition of the University of
Mississippi, Mississippi State University, Mississippi University
4
for Women, University of Southern Mississippi, and Delta State
University (collectively, “historically white institutions” or
“HWIs”) remained almost entirely white, while that of Jackson
State University, Mississippi Valley State University, and Alcorn
State University (collectively, “historically black institutions”
or “HBIs”) remained almost entirely black. See United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 722 (1992). The racial identifiability of
these institutions persists to the present.1
Private plaintiffs initiated this class action2 in 1975,
complaining that Mississippi was maintaining a racially dual
system of higher education in violation of the Fifth, Ninth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7. The
United States intervened as plaintiff and alleged violations of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VI.
For twelve years the parties attempted to resolve their
differences through voluntary dismantlement of the prior
1
In the fall of 1993, the on-campus undergraduate
enrollment was at least 75% white at each of the HWIs, and at
least 93% black at each of the HBIs.
2
The class was certified by the court as:
[a]ll black citizens residing in Mississippi, whether
students, former students, parents, employees, or
taxpayers, who have been, are, or will be discriminated
against on account of race in . . . the universities
operated by said Board of Trustees.
Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1526 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
5
segregated system. Unable to achieve ultimate agreement, the
parties proceeded to trial in 1987. The district court ruled
that Mississippi had discharged its affirmative duty to dismantle
the former de jure segregated system of higher education through
its adoption and implementation of good-faith, race-neutral
policies and procedures in student admissions and other areas.
Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1564 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (Ayers
I). Sitting en banc, this court affirmed. Ayers v. Allain,
914
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990). The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Ayers v. Mabus,
499 U.S. 958 (1991).
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for
further proceedings, holding that the mere adoption and
implementation of race-neutral policies was insufficient to
demonstrate complete abandonment of the racially dual system.
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 731, 743. The Court stated that
even after a State dismantles its segregative
admissions policy, there may still be state action that
is traceable to the State’s prior de jure segregation
and that continues to foster segregation. . . . If
policies traceable to the de jure system are still in
force and have discriminatory effects, those policies
too must be reformed to the extent practicable and
consistent with sound educational practices.
Id. at 729. Applying this standard, the Court identified
admissions standards, program duplication, institutional mission
assignments, and continued operation of all eight public
universities as a nonexclusive list of “constitutionally suspect”
remnants of the prior de jure system, “for even though such
policies may be race neutral on their face, they substantially
restrict a person’s choice of which institution to enter, and
6
they contribute to the racial identifiability of the eight public
universities. Mississippi must justify these policies or
eliminate them.” Id. at 733. The Court directed that these and
“each of the other policies now governing the State’s university
system that have been challenged or that are challenged on
remand” be examined “in light of the standard that we articulate
today.”
Id.
On remand, the district court ordered each party to submit
proposed remedies “to resolve the areas of the State’s liability
pursuant to the Supreme Court mandate.” Without conceding
liability, defendant Board of Trustees of State Institutions of
Higher Learning (the “Board”)3 responded by presenting a detailed
proposal for modification of the higher education system. This
proposal contained, among other provisions, uniform standards of
admission for all universities, as well as a plan to merge Delta
State University and Mississippi Valley State University into one
institution to serve students in the Mississippi Delta.4
The private plaintiffs and the United States (collectively,
“plaintiffs”) responded by insisting that the range of
3
The Board is responsible for the management and control
of the eight public universities at issue in this case. MISS.
CODE ANN. § 37-101-1 (1996). Its general powers and duties
include, inter alia, managing all university property, disbursing
funds, establishing standards for admission and graduation, and
supervising the functioning of each institution. See id. § 37-
101-15.
4
The Board submitted its original proposal to the district
court on October 22, 1992. The Board submitted a modified
proposal shortly before trial. The proposed admissions standards
and merger plan were contained in both.
7
constitutionally suspect policies and practices to be examined on
remand had yet to be determined.5 Pursuant to a subsequent court
order, plaintiffs identified the following policies and practices
for examination: admissions standards that allegedly deny black
students equal access to higher education and tend to channel
black students to the HBIs; the use of ACT scores as a basis for
awarding undergraduate scholarships at the HWIs; maintenance of
institutional mission assignments that largely follow historical
racial designations; funding policies that disproportionately
benefit the HWIs; allocation of academic programs that is
unfavorable to the HBIs; allocation of land grant programs
between Alcorn State and Mississippi State that is unfavorable to
Alcorn; duplication of the HBIs’ programs and course offerings at
the HWIs; maintenance of facilities at the HBIs that are inferior
to those at the HWIs; employment practices that perpetuate the
racial identifiability of the universities and compensate faculty
at the HBIs at a lower rate than faculty at the HWIs; maintenance
of all eight institutions; and practices that limit the
participation of black persons in system governance. Trial
commenced on May 9, 1994, following lengthy attempts at
settlement.
After ten weeks of testimony, the district court made
5
Plaintiffs have alleged that the State’s policies and
practices violate both the Constitution and Title VI. As the
Supreme Court noted in Fordice, the reach of Title VI extends no
further than the Fourteenth Amendment. 505 U.S. at 732 n.7. We
therefore follow the approach of the Supreme Court and treat the
issues in this case as they are implicated under the
Constitution.
Id.
8
additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district
court found vestiges of de jure segregation in the areas of
undergraduate admissions, institutional mission assignments,
funding, equipment availability and library allocations, program
duplication, land grant programs, and number of universities.
Ayers v. Fordice,
879 F. Supp. 1419, 1477 (N.D. Miss. 1995)
(Ayers II).6 The district court entered a remedial decree on
March 7, 1995.7
The remedial decree enjoins defendants from maintaining
remnants of the prior system and engaging in practices impeding
desegregation. Specific relief includes adoption of the uniform
admissions standards proposed by the Board and allocation of
additional resources to Jackson State University and Alcorn State
University. The district court did not order implementation of
the Board’s proposal to consolidate Delta State University and
Mississippi Valley State University. The decree establishes a
Monitoring Committee to monitor implementation of the terms and
obligations imposed by the decree. The Monitoring Committee is
to consist of three disinterested persons with experience in the
field of higher education, agreed upon by the parties and
6
In addition, the district court found that the practice
of maintaining participation in racially identifiable athletic
conferences is traceable to de jure segregation but does not have
segregative effects. Athletic programs are not an issue in this
appeal.
7
The remedial decree is set forth in its entirety in the
opinion below, Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1494-96. We limit our
discussion to those aspects of the remedial decree pertinent to
this appeal.
9
appointed by the court. The Monitoring Committee is to receive
and evaluate reports required of defendants and make
recommendations to the district court, which has retained
jurisdiction over the action.8
Plaintiffs now contend that the district court left in place
practices that are traceable to the prior dual system and that
have discriminatory effects and adopted reforms proposed by the
Board without examining the soundness or practicability of
alternative, less discriminatory proposals. Issues on appeal
encompass undergraduate admissions standards, scholarship
criteria, enhancement of historically black universities, system
governance, and employment.9 No party appeals the district
court’s rejection of the Board’s consolidation proposal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Fordice
guides our review of the district court’s judgment. Fordice
established that “a State does not discharge its constitutional
obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable
8
In an order entered on March 1, 1996, the district court
stayed appointment of the Monitoring Committee, along with any
reports required to be made to the Monitoring Committee, pending
completion of “the appellate process.” We see no reason why the
stay contemplated by the March 1 order should continue. We
assume that the stay will be vacated and that the Monitoring
Committee will be activated promptly.
9
The scope of private plaintiffs’ argument on appeal is
broader in some respects than that of the United States, although
the two positions overlap considerably. We note distinctions
where relevant.
10
to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster
segregation.” 505 U.S. at 728. More specifically,
[i]f the State perpetuates policies and practices
traceable to its prior system that continue to have
segregative effects -- whether by influencing student
enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation in
other facets of the university system -- and such
policies are without sound educational justification
and can be practicably eliminated, the State has not
satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled
its prior system.
Id. at 731. We have read Fordice to require that “each suspect
state policy or practice be analyzed to determine whether it is
traceable to the prior de jure system, whether it continues to
foster segregation, whether it lacks sound educational
justification, and whether its elimination is practicable.”
United States v. Louisiana,
9 F.3d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993).
The State’s liability depends upon these factors. Id.10
Once liability is found, the offending policies and
practices “must be reformed to the extent practicable and
consistent with sound educational practices.” Fordice, 505 U.S.
at 729. “[S]urely the State may not leave in place policies
rooted in its prior officially segregated system that serve to
maintain the racial identifiability of its universities if those
policies can practicably be eliminated without eroding sound
10
At this stage in a desegregation case, a state’s
“liability” consists of its obligation to remedy remnants of a
prior de jure system for which constitutional liability has
already been established. In Louisiana, we used the term
“liability” in this sense of an affirmative obligation to remedy
vestiges of the prior system. In the interest of consistency, we
continue to use “liability” in this sense here, albeit with the
understanding that the liability of the State of Mississippi, as
a threshold matter, stems from its operation of a de jure system.
11
educational policies.” Id. at 743. Accordingly, we have
interpreted the directives of Fordice “as recognizing the need to
consider the practicability and soundness of educational
practices in determining remedies as well as in making an initial
determination of liability.”
Louisiana, 9 F.3d at 1164.
We apply the directives of Fordice in conjunction with
general standards of appellate review. This appeal challenges
elements of the district court’s remedial decree and implicates
several of its findings and conclusions. We do not disturb the
district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, although we freely reassess its conclusions of law
under the de novo standard of review. Ross v. Houston Indep.
Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1983). A third standard
applies to our review of the remedial decree itself. A
desegregation remedy is an exercise of a trial court’s equitable
power and as such is reviewable, within the context of Fordice,
for abuse of discretion. Cf. Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd.,
702 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 914
(1983).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Admissions Policies and Practices
1. Background Facts
In 1961, less than one week after James Meredith applied to
the University of Mississippi, the Board adopted a policy
requiring all applicants for undergraduate admission to any state
12
institution of higher education to take the American College Test
(“ACT”). Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1530-31. Several months
later, the Board authorized each university to set a minimum ACT
score for eligibility for admission.
Id. at 1531. By 1963, the
University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, and the
University of Southern Mississippi required an ACT composite
score of at least 15 for all freshmen applicants.
Id. At the
time, the average ACT score among white students was 18, while
that for black students was 7.
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 734.
When this case was tried initially in 1987, admissions
standards for first-time freshman varied along with the
historical racial identifiability of each institution. Four HWIs
continued to require a composite score of at least 15 on the ACT
for automatic admission; the other HWI, Mississippi University
for Women, required a score of 15-17 together with a high school
grade point average of at least 3.0 on a 4.0 scale, or a score of
at least 18. Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1533-34. The HBIs
required a minimum ACT composite score of 13.
Id. at 1534.11
Based on the undisturbed factual findings of the district
court -- and unmoved by lower court determinations that the
admissions standards derived from policies enacted in the 1970s
to redress the problem of student unpreparedness -- the Supreme
Court concluded in Fordice that the policies were traceable to
11
The HBIs maintained more liberal exceptions policies
than the HWIs, although no university could enroll a student with
an ACT score below 9. See Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1533-34.
13
the de jure system, were originally adopted for a discriminatory
purpose, and continued to have discriminatory effects. 505 U.S.
at 734. The Court found that the minimum ACT requirements
“restrict[ed] the range of choices of entering students as to
which institution they may attend in a way that perpetuate[d]
segregation.”
Id. Those students who received ACT scores too
low to meet the admissions requirements at the HWIs were
restricted to the HBIs or community colleges if they wanted a
higher education.
Id. at 734-35. As the Court stated,
“[p]roportionately more blacks than whites face[d] this choice:
In 1985, 72 percent of Mississippi’s white high school seniors
achieved an ACT composite score of 15 or better, while less than
30 percent of black high school seniors earned that score.”
Id.
at 735. The Court also deemed “constitutionally problematic” the
fact that the State denied automatic admission if an applicant
did not achieve the minimum ACT score specified for a particular
institution, without also considering high school grades as an
additional factor in predicting college performance.
Id. at
736.12
Plaintiffs’ challenges on remand included the use of
differential ACT-based admissions policies at the HWIs and HBIs,
as well as the use of ACT cutoff scores and alumni connection in
12
The Court found significant the fact that the disparity
between black and white students’ grade averages was much
narrower than the gap between their average ACT scores,
suggesting that an admissions formula that included grades would
increase the number of black students eligible for automatic
university admission. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 736-37.
14
the award of undergraduate scholarships at the HWIs.13 The
district court’s ruling on each of these issues is now before us
on appeal.
2. Undergraduate Admissions Standards
a. District court ruling
The district court concluded that “[u]ndergraduate
admissions policies and practices are vestiges of de jure
segregation that continue to have segregative effects.” Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1477. More specifically, the court found
that the admissions standards in place at the time of the 1987
trial were traceable to the prior de jure system and continued to
have segregative effects in a system where racially identifiable
institutions offer numerous duplicative academic programs.
Id.
at 1434. The court held that defendants had a duty to eradicate
use of the ACT cutoff score “as a sole criterion for admission to
the system when the ACT is used in conjunction with differing
admissions standards between the HBIs and HWIs.” Id.14
13
Plaintiffs also challenged policies and practices
pertaining to admissions exceptions. The district court’s
finding that no such policies or practices are traceable to the
de jure system is not contested on appeal.
14
The court did not rule that use of an ACT cutoff is per
se unlawful. “Rather, its particular use in any circumstance
must be examined to consider whether as a component of the policy
challenged, the same is traceable to prior de jure segregation.”
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1434.
Significantly, despite plaintiffs’ claims that the addition
of ACT scores to high school grades as a predictor of freshman
grades improves the prediction only marginally, the district
court concluded that the ACT was “a sound component of the
admissions decision for the reason that the ACT, in combination
with high school grades, remains a better predictor of academic
15
Although admissions standards had been modified somewhat by
the time of the trial on remand, the district court found that
they “basically utilized a version of the 1987 standards with
various exceptions.” Id. at 1431. In 1989, the ACT was replaced
by the Enhanced ACT.
Id. at 1430. Scores on the two tests are
not equivalent; the American College Testing Program accordingly
publishes concordance tables that correlate scores on the old ACT
and Enhanced ACT according to percentile rank.15 The
introduction of the Enhanced ACT prompted the Board to solicit
recommendations from the eight universities for revised
admissions standards based on the new test. Each HWI recommended
use of an Enhanced ACT score of 18 for regular admission, which
approximated the previous standard of an ACT score of 15. Each
HBI recommended use of an Enhanced ACT score of 15 for regular
admission, the concordant value of which was 11 on the old ACT.
Because the HBIs had previously required an ACT score of at least
13 for regular admission, this recommendation represented an
effective lowering of admissions standards at these
institutions.16 Throughout the system, students not qualifying
performance than either criterion alone.”
Id. at 1482. This
conclusion is supported by the record.
15
An ACT score of 15, for instance, has a concordant value
of 18 on the Enhanced ACT, meaning that a score of 15 on the ACT
would be in the same percentile ranking as a score of 18 on the
Enhanced ACT.
16
Private plaintiffs quarrel with the district court’s
characterization of the change in the admissions standard at the
HBIs as a “lowering,” arguing that, viewed in historical context,
this change merely restored some of the access that had been
foreclosed by an earlier increase in minimum ACT requirements.
16
for regular admission could be admitted as “high risk”
exceptions. The recommended Enhanced ACT scores for high risk
applicants ranged from 14 to 17 at the HWIs, and from 12 to 14 at
the HBIs. The Board approved all recommendations.17
Differential admissions standards thus persisted in the system
through the 1994 trial and, as found by the district court,
“resulted in the ‘channeling effect’ described in Fordice.” Id.
at 1434. The district court’s remedial order responded to the
standards in place in 1994.18
Defendants proposed, and the district court ordered
implementation of, new admissions criteria that standardize
requirements at all eight universities beginning with
applications for admission in the fall of 1996. The new criteria
We review the district court’s ruling against this backdrop and
in light of evidence concerning educational soundness.
17
The district court noted that although the lower ACT
requirements at the HBIs were originally proposed by the HBI
presidents, “it is the Board’s responsibility to manage the
higher education system in accordance with constitutional
principles.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1434.
18
While it found that admissions policies continued to
have segregative effects, the district court also found that
“there is no per se policy or practice of minimizing the
participation of African-Americans in the [higher education]
system.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1435. The court found
credible evidence indicating that defendants had made substantial
progress toward increasing minority access to higher education.
See
id. at 1433, 1435. In Mississippi, the ratio of the State’s
share of the nation’s black enrollment in public four-year
institutions to its share of the nation’s black population is
more favorable than the national mean and that of many non de
jure states. See
id. at 1435. Private plaintiffs appear to
contend that the district court’s finding of no current per se
policy of limiting access to the higher education system is
clearly erroneous. We conclude that any such contention is
without merit.
17
grant “regular admission”19 to applicants who have (1) a GPA of
at least 3.20 in a designated core curriculum, (2) a GPA of at
least 2.50 in the core curriculum or class rank in the top 50%
and an Enhanced ACT score of at least 16, or (3) a GPA of at
least 2.0 in the core curriculum and an Enhanced ACT score of at
least 18. Id. at 1477-78.
The admissions policy ordered by the district court provides
an important alternative to regular admission through a spring
screening and summer remedial program for applicants who do not
meet the requirements for regular admission. Students
participating in the spring screening process will take the
Mississippi College Placement Examination (the “accuplacer”)
during the spring of their senior year in high school. Based
upon these scores, Enhanced ACT subtest scores, and counselor
interviews, students will either be admitted for the fall
semester or invited to participate in the summer remedial
program.20 The summer program is designed to provide ten to
eleven weeks of remedial instruction in reading, writing, and
mathematics, taught both in traditional classroom settings and
19
“Regular admission” is the term used throughout the
district court opinion, and will be used herein, to denote
automatic admission based on the criteria listed in the text, as
distinguished from admission via the spring screening and summer
remedial program, discussed infra. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at
1477-78 & n.297.
20
It appears, based on the language of the Board’s
proposal and testimony during trial, that some applicants who
participate in spring screening may not be admitted to the summer
remedial program and will be advised to pursue other educational
options.
18
through computer-assisted individual components. Id. at 1478.
In addition, the program plan incorporates cultural and
recreational activities to “climatize” students to the college
campus. Id.21 Those students who successfully complete the
summer program, by passing at minimum the remedial English and
mathematics courses, will be admitted in the fall.
The district court found that “the new admissions standards
through their uniformity will eliminate the prior segregative
effects of the previous differential admissions standards between
the HBIs and HWIs, noted by the Supreme Court in Fordice.” Id.
at 1481. The district court found that as compared with the
standards litigated in the 1987 trial, the new standards would
result in an overall increase in the number of black students
eligible for regular admission to the university system.22 As
21
Although the district court made no specific findings in
this regard, the undisputed evidence indicates that the summer
remedial program is a departure from past remedial practices
within the university system. Prior to the district court’s
order, full semester remedial courses were offered at each
university. Although students who are granted admission via the
summer program must participate in a year-long academic support
program designed to provide individualized support for marginally
prepared students enrolled in regular academic credit courses,
apparently many of the remedial courses previously offered during
the academic year are to be eliminated under the new plan. See
Part III.B.2.c.iii infra.
22
The new standards were predicted to have the following
impact:
(a) the pool of black students eligible for regular
admission to a public HWI will increase from
approximately 32.4% to 52.5%; (b) the pool of black
students eligible for regular admission at the HBIs in
1995 will be increased from approximately 45.3% to
52.5%; (c) the pool of black students eligible for
admission to the system as a whole will also increase
19
compared with the standards in place at the time of the 1994
trial, which were less stringent than in 1987 as a result of the
1989 changes in requirements at the HBIs, the new standards would
result in an overall decline in the percentage of black students
eligible for regular admission to the system.23 The district
court noted, however, that the summer program offers a distinct
opportunity for applicants to gain admission. Id. at 1479.24
The court found the summer program to be “credible and
educationally advanced. In its proposed form, it is considered
by its developers as an educationally sound developmental
system.”
Id. at 1481. The district court concluded that
[w]hile the new admissions standards may reduce
the number of black students eligible to be admitted to
the system without remedial courses required, it is not
evident that the new standards will actually reduce the
number of black students ultimately admitted to the
system as either regular or remediated admittees.
Id.
Finally, although the State’s community college system is
under the proposed 1995 standards as compared with the
1987 standards.
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1479.
23
While 68.2% of black high school graduates who took the
ACT were eligible for regular admission to some university in the
system at the time of the 1994 trial, the new standards were
projected to reduce this figure to 52.5% or 50.7%. Ayers II, 879
F. Supp. at 1479.
24
The district court stated this finding in terms of the
“summer program” only. We note that, as described by the
district court and in the record, the spring screening program
can lead to admission for the fall semester without participation
in the summer remedial program. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at
1478.
20
the subject of a separate lawsuit, the district court made
findings and ordered relief in this regard because the community
college system is relevant to the issue of access to higher
education. The court found evidence that the community college
system “can have an impact on the admissions policies of the
universities and their ability to further diversify institutions
of higher learning.” Id. at 1475. The court also found,
however, that the community college system in Mississippi is not
providing remediation for students unprepared for four-year
institutions “to any great degree.”
Id. The district court
apparently linked this to at least two factors. First, in
contrast to the open admissions policy that prevailed at all
community colleges when this case was tried in 1987, some
community colleges now require minimum ACT scores for admission
to certain programs.
Id. at 1474-75.25 Second, the
“overwhelming majority” of students who start at the community
college level do not transfer to four-year universities.
Id. at
1475. The University of Southern Mississippi has the highest
proportion of transfer students in its student body, largely
attributable to its recruiting efforts and articulation
agreements with several community colleges in surrounding
regions.
Id. Black students transfer at a significantly lower
25
The use of ACT cutoffs for admission to community
colleges is not an issue in this case, and the district court did
not make findings or conclusions with respect to the
constitutionality of this practice. Accordingly, we do not
address this aspect of the community college system in our
opinion.
21
rate than whites, possibly because a high percentage of black
students in community colleges are enrolled in two-year
vocational programs.
The district court concluded that the State “is losing a
valuable resource in not coordinating the admissions requirements
and remedial programs between the community colleges and the
universities.” Id. The remedial decree contains a provision
ordering the Board “to study the feasibility of establishing
system-wide coordination of the community colleges in the State
in the areas of admissions standards and articulation
procedures,” and to report its findings to the Monitoring
Committee.
Id. at 1496.
b. Arguments on appeal
The district court’s finding that undergraduate admissions
policies and practices are vestiges of de jure segregation that
continue to have segregative effects is not contested on appeal.
Plaintiffs do contest the remedy thereupon ordered.
Plaintiffs’ challenge to the admissions remedy has two
parts. First, plaintiffs argue that the district court’s
adoption of the Board’s proposed standards was improper because
these standards will significantly reduce the number of black
students eligible for regular admission to the university system,
and thereby disproportionately burden black students with a loss
of educational opportunity. Plaintiffs assert that the district
court was obligated by Fordice to consider the educational
soundness of alternative proposals that would have excluded fewer
22
black students, but failed to do so.
Second, plaintiffs argue that the district court’s reliance
on the spring screening and summer remedial program to compensate
for the projected decline in regular admission of black students
was inappropriate because the program was untested and
incompletely defined at the time of trial. Plaintiffs contend
that although the district court found the summer program to be
“credible and educationally advanced,” it did not specifically
find that the program would be an effective means of identifying
students capable of succeeding in college or that it could
achieve the same results as “existing remedial programs.”26 In
addition, plaintiffs argue that the summer program is not a
viable option for the many black students who must work during
the summer in order to afford to go to college in the fall, and
that the community college system currently does not provide an
adequate alternative. Plaintiffs therefore argue that the Board
should be required to maintain existing remedial courses and to
adopt standards that minimize any reduction in the number of
black students eligible for admission, at least during the period
that the summer program is being tested and the community college
26
We understand “existing remedial programs” to mean the
various combinations of remedial, or basic skills, courses and
other forms of educational assistance, such as tutoring and
counseling, that have been offered by the eight universities. In
this record, “remedial education” and “remediation” are to some
degree used interchangeably with “developmental education” and
“developmental studies.” We use the term “remedial programs” to
refer to the entire range of such educational assistance, and the
term “remedial courses” to refer to courses that teach basic,
pre-college skills.
23
system undergoing change.
Although their criticisms of the new admissions standards
coincide, private plaintiffs and the United States advocate
different admissions policies as alternatives. Private
plaintiffs proposed below and re-urge here adoption of a tiered
admissions policy, in which admissions requirements vary along
with the mission of each university,27 with the most accessible
tier having “open admissions.” By “open admissions,” private
plaintiffs mean a policy of granting admission to students with a
high school diploma and ACT score of 10. Id. at 1480. Under
private plaintiffs’ proposal, the three comprehensive
universities would use the admissions standards proposed by the
Board, and Jackson State University would have open admissions
for eight years with the option thereafter of gradually raising
admissions standards to the level prevailing at the comprehensive
universities.
Id. Existing remedial programs would be
strengthened in this scheme.
The United States proposed below and re-urges here an
admissions policy, which was presented to the Board in 1992 but
27
The eight universities are grouped into three classes
according to their programmatic mission. University of
Mississippi, University of Southern Mississippi, and Mississippi
State University are “comprehensive” universities, which offer
the greatest range and highest level of degree programs. Jackson
State University has an “urban” mission to serve the urban
community of Jackson, Mississippi, in which it is located.
Alcorn State University, Delta State University, Mississippi
University for Women, and Mississippi Valley State University are
“regional” universities that focus primarily on undergraduate
education. In private plaintiffs’ framework, the regional
universities would constitute the most accessible tier.
24
never adopted, in which regular admission would be granted to
students achieving (1) a 2.0 GPA in the core curriculum and a
minimum of 16 on the Enhanced ACT or (2) a 2.50 GPA in the core,
a ranking in the top 50% of the class, and a minimum of 13 on the
Enhanced ACT.28 The United States contends that under this
standard, an estimated 73.6% of black students who took the ACT
would qualify for admission, as compared to 52.5% or 50.7% under
the proposal adopted by the district court. The United States
states that “ACT predictive data indicate that, at the [HBIs],
where remedial instruction was given, freshmen with these
qualifications could be expected to achieve at least a C
average.” U.S. Br. at 12.
Defendants argue that the new admissions criteria wholly
eliminate prior policies traceable to de jure segregation.
Defendants contend that the new admissions standards sufficiently
address the concerns articulated in Fordice because they do not
differentiate between universities according to historical racial
designation and do not rely on the ACT as the sole criterion for
admission. Defendants argue that under Fordice, the traceable
admissions policy was the Board’s particular use of differential
ACT cutoff scores, which effectively channeled black students to
the HBIs, and not use of the ACT per se. Accordingly, defendants
contend that the new policy is not traceable to the prior de jure
28
The district court noted that the United States “has
also suggested adoption of a 2.5 overall GPA for admission to all
universities.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1480. The United
States does not urge this standard on appeal.
25
system and may be implemented because the record discloses that
it is educationally sound and was not adopted for a
discriminatory purpose. While defendants maintain that Fordice
does not require the district court to select the educationally
sound alternative with the least discriminatory effect, they
argue that even if the district court did have such an
obligation, its findings regarding the segregative effect and
educational soundness of the new admissions standards effectively
discharged it.
c. Analysis
The district court’s findings that the new criteria for
admission are educationally sound and will not perpetuate
segregation within the system are not challenged on appeal.
Plaintiffs contend, rather, that the district court erred by
failing to consider the educational soundness of proposals that
would have resulted in a smaller reduction in the number of black
students excluded from regular admission.
We agree with plaintiffs that it would be inappropriate to
remedy the traceable, segregative effects of an admissions policy
in a system originally designed to limit educational opportunity
for black citizens by adopting a policy that itself caused a
reduction in meaningful educational opportunity for black
citizens. We do not, however, understand the district court to
have done so. The district court considered and rejected
alternative proposals as educationally unsound, and expressly
contemplated that the remedial route to admission could alleviate
26
any potential disproportionate impact on those black students who
are capable, with reasonable remediation,29 of doing college
level work.
We understand the district court to have determined, in the
specific context of formulating an appropriate remedial decree in
this case under Fordice, that access to higher education must be
provided only to those applicants who can demonstrate, based on
educationally sound and constitutionally permissible indicators,
an ability (with reasonable remediation) to do college level work
and who therefore have a real prospect of earning a degree.30
The court found that admission of students unprepared to do
college level work may result in significant attrition
accompanied by unprofitable debt accumulation. Ayers II, 879 F.
Supp. at 1435.31 Fordice does not require that all students who
29
The record reflects that each of the universities at
issue here has for many years recognized that remediation is
appropriate to enable certain students successfully to complete a
college education. The amount of remediation that has been
provided has varied among the universities. We recognize that
how much remediation is appropriate or “reasonable” is informed
by concepts of practicability and educational soundness.
30
All Mississippi universities at issue here require
students to achieve at least a C average in order to graduate.
Indeed, as indicated in our discussion below, all parties key
their arguments regarding the educational soundness of
alternative admissions proposals to this standard.
31
The court found that Louisiana institutions, which
maintain open admissions, “suffer from a very high attrition rate
resulting in students owing one, two or three years of college
expenses and having little or nothing to show for it.” Ayers II,
879 F. Supp. at 1435. Defendants’ expert, Dr. James Wharton,
testified that access to four-year institutions in Louisiana is
“not meaningful access because we also have tremendous attrition
and students get hurt in that attrition.” Likewise, Dr. Hunter
Boylan testified that “[a]ccess without an opportunity to succeed
27
would have been admitted under the prior, unconstitutional
admissions standards be admitted under the reformed admissions
standards without regard to the educational soundness of the
reformed standards. Instead, the district court’s mandate under
Fordice was limited to reforming traceable, segregative policies
“to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational
practices.” 505 U.S. at 729.32 Having found admissions policies
and practices to be traceable to the de jure system and to have
present segregative effects, the district court properly focused
its consideration of alternative admissions policies on their
educational soundness and potential to eliminate existing
segregative effects; its focus, in turn, on ability to do college
level work is consistent with both the evidence as presented by
plaintiffs and Fordice.
i. Rejection of plaintiffs’ proposals
isn’t really access. If you have an open door it quickly becomes
a revolving door.”
32
The Court in Fordice declined to adopt a standard that
would require the State to eliminate insofar as practicable all
present discriminatory effects of the prior system:
To the extent we understand private petitioners to urge
us to focus on present discriminatory effects without
addressing whether such consequences flow from policies
rooted in the prior system, we reject this position.
. . . Though they seem to disavow as radical a remedy
as student reassignment in the university setting,
their focus on “student enrollment, faculty and staff
employment patterns, [and] black citizens’ college-
going and degree-granting rates” would seemingly compel
remedies akin to those upheld in Green v. School Bd. of
New Kent County were we to adopt their legal standard.
505 U.S. at 730 n.4 (citations omitted) (second alteration in
original); see also
id. at 732 n.6.
28
The district court set forth in detail the respective
admissions standards proposed by private plaintiffs and the
United States. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1479-80. Although
the district court credited expert testimony indicating that
differential or tiered admissions standards are both sound and
routinely used,
id. at 1482, it did not adopt private plaintiffs’
proposal in light of its finding that the open admissions
component of this proposal was educationally unsound.
Id. at
1481-82. The district court found that
universities across the nation generally are moving
toward higher admissions requirements, not lower ones.
According to the testimony, students in working toward
goals will usually do that which is expected of them.
If they believe they need not prepare themselves for
college by taking the core curriculum in high school,
they will not do so. Such unpreparedness may bring
them to college campuses unable to execute the rigors
of college work and result in low retention rates,
college debt accumulations and years expended with no
degrees. . . . It has also been shown that institutions
of higher learning which open their doors to unprepared
students via open admissions not only do a disservice
to many of the admittees, but can lower the quality
and, concurrently, the prestige of the institutions
generally.
Id. at 1482-83. These findings are not clearly erroneous, and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
private plaintiffs’ proposal.
Even assuming that tiered admissions could be implemented
without open admissions as a component thereof, it was not an
abuse of discretion in this context for the district court to opt
instead for a policy based on uniform standards. In the
Mississippi system of higher education, differential admissions
criteria were rooted in the de jure past and fostered both
29
segregation of the races and the public perception that the
institutions with lower standards -- the HBIs -- were of inferior
quality. Id. at 1477, 1486. A tiered system would continue to
differentiate among institutions based on their respective
missions. See
id. at 1482. In light of the history of
differential admissions in Mississippi higher education, and in
light of its finding that policies and practices governing the
missions of the universities are traceable to de jure segregation
and continue to have segregative effects, the district court was
within its discretion to unify standards across institutions.
The standards proposed by the United States met this
interest in uniformity, but were fixed at a level that the
district court found to be educationally unsound. Under the
United States’s proposal, students with a 2.5 GPA and a class
rank in the top 50% would qualify for regular admission with an
Enhanced ACT score of 13. While this formula adds high school
grades and class rank into the eligibility determination, it
nevertheless represents a lowering of the ACT score requirement
from even post-1989 levels at the HBIs. In contrast, students
with identical qualifications would need an Enhanced ACT score of
16 to qualify for regular admission under the Board’s proposal.
The district court concluded that the requirements for regular
admission under the Board’s proposal were “quite moderate,” and
stated that it “does not find persuasive or educationally sound
the adoption of open admissions or continually lowering
admissions standards, as was done at the HBIs after the 1987
30
trial.” Id. We understand this finding to encompass the
standards endorsed by the United States.
Both plaintiffs and defendants cite ACT predictive data in
support of their respective proposals. The United States points
out that such data indicates that students with the minimum
qualifications they propose would be expected to achieve at least
a C average by the end of their freshman year at each of the
HBIs. We note that such students are predicted to complete their
freshman year with grades significantly below a C average, the
minimum required for graduation, at any of the HWIs. See
PP 39-R. Defendants highlight a different aspect of the same
predictive data, which the district court apparently found
persuasive: students with the minimum qualifications proposed by
the Board would be expected to complete their freshman year with
a C average or slightly below at each of the HWIs. The district
court’s finding that the Board’s proposed standards are “quite
moderate” is indeed supported by the evidence. On this record,
the district court could fairly conclude that it would be
educationally unsound to adopt an admissions policy under which
students could do college level work at only three institutions
in the system.33 We realize that no set of standards is without
its flaws. Significantly, as we discuss below, the standards
that the district court did adopt provide an alternative route to
33
Under the United States’s proposal, the three
institutions at which students could do college level work are
the HBIs. The standards proposed by the United States therefore
could have the perverse, albeit unintended, effect of
perpetuating the channeling effect described in Fordice.
31
admission that does not rely on ACT scores whatsoever. The
district court’s decision to order implementation of this system,
rather than dilute standards for regular admission, was a proper
exercise of its discretion.
ii. Reliance on spring screening and summer
remedial program
The district court recognized the likelihood that the
Board’s standards would reduce the number of black students
eligible for regular admission as compared to then-prevailing
standards,34 and chose to adopt them only in conjunction with the
additional opportunity to gain admission through the spring
screening and summer remedial program. The district court was
unable to conclude that the new standards, which provide an
alternative route to admission that does not rely on ACT scores
whatsoever,35 would actually reduce the total number of black
students eligible for admission either as regular or remediated
admittees. In light of the district court finding that lowering
admissions standards “as was done at the HBIs after the 1987
trial” is educationally unsound, the court apparently determined
that to the extent any reduction in the number of black students
eligible for admission relative to post-1989 standards does take
34
On the other hand, the district court found that under
the Board’s standards, the number of black students eligible for
regular admission would increase relative to standards in
existence at the time of trial in 1987. See Ayers II, 879 F.
Supp. at 1479.
35
According to the Board, any high school graduate,
regardless of academic performance, may participate in spring
screening. There is no requirement that participants in spring
screening take the ACT. Bd. R-202.
32
place, it may reflect the educational unsoundness of prior
policies. As contemplated, the new standards should result in
the identification and admission of those applicants who, with
reasonable remediation, can do college level work. This is
consistent with Fordice’s mandate of a reformed admissions policy
that is practicable and educationally sound.
The district court also recognized that the spring screening
and summer remedial program was untested and its standards not
fully established at the time of trial. See id. at 1478-79,
1481. We think that the program was sufficiently defined that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering its
implementation. If, however, as plaintiffs suggest may be the
case,36 the spring and summer program is unable to any
significant degree to achieve its intended objectives of
identifying and admitting otherwise eligible applicants -- i.e.,
applicants who could, with reasonable remediation, successfully
complete a regular academic program -- for whatever reason, then
the program must be reevaluated.37 The district court’s proper
36
In its Motion to Expedite the Appeal, the United States
presents recently discovered evidence concerning the first year’s
implementation of the new standards and the spring and summer
program, which may demonstrate that the new standards exclude a
significant percentage of black students who would have been
eligible for regular admission at the time of the 1994 trial, and
that the spring and summer program offers limited ameliorative
potential. Such evidence, however, is not part of the record
before us and we do not consider it in any substantive way for
purposes of this appeal.
37
The district court’s conclusion that the Board’s
obligation to graduating high school students does not encompass
“students ineligible for regular admission under its proposal,
who do not choose to participate in a screening process for
33
retention of jurisdiction over this action indicates its intent
to examine this important component of the admissions system once
the relevant data becomes available.38 If the district court
ultimately concludes that the spring screening and summer
remedial program (as it may be modified) is unable to any
significant degree to achieve its objectives, then the court
should, if possible, identify and implement another practicable
and educationally sound method for achieving those objectives.
iii. Elimination of existing remedial courses
We have thus far addressed the spring and summer program as
a component of the reformed admissions policy. We turn now to
the argument made by the plaintiffs that the district court erred
in relying upon the summer remedial program to replace the
existing remedial courses in the absence of a finding that the
summer program could achieve the same results as the
universities’ existing remedial courses in enabling students to
succeed in and graduate from college.
We note in this connection that the plan proposed by the
Board provides that “[d]evelopmental studies are only offered
academic placement analysis,” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1481, is
too sweeping insofar as it may include students who, with
reasonable remediation, are capable of doing college level work
but who self-select out of the spring or summer program because
of the unique burdens imposed by the program or flaws in its
design or operation.
38
Cf. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968)
(“Moreover, whatever plan is adopted will require evaluation in
practice, and the court should retain jurisdiction until it is
clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed.”).
34
during the summer session.” In ordering implementation of this
plan, the district court tacitly approved the elimination of
most, perhaps even all, of the remedial courses that had been
offered by all the universities at issue here, most notably by
the HBIs. This is a troubling decision, implicating the reformed
policies for regular admission as well as the spring screening
and summer remedial program. On the one hand, there was evidence
to indicate that an intensive, structured program of remedial
instruction during the summer months prior to a student’s
immersion in the college experience may actually be more
effective at preparing students for college than a more diffused
program of remedial instruction throughout the academic year. On
the other hand, the district court appeared to base its decision
not to consolidate Mississippi Valley State University with Delta
State University, at least in part, on the significant percentage
of students enrolled in remedial, or developmental, education at
Mississippi Valley and on Mississippi Valley’s role as “a
significant nurturer of underprepared blacks,” id. at 1492, a
role that the district court apparently did not want to see
eliminated.39 Further, it is not clear to what extent the
operative predictive data assumes the existence of remedial
programs insofar as it is based on historical achievement. It is
clear that the predictive data relied upon by the State in
39
We find it significant that the presidents of
Mississippi’s HBIs testified that the existing remedial programs
at the HBIs are essential to meet the needs of the students they
serve and at least one questioned whether the summer remedial
program would adequately replace them.
35
support of its argument that its proposed admissions standards
were “quite moderate” indicate that students who are admitted
with the minimum qualifications required under the new standards
are not predicted to achieve a C average during their first year
at at least three of the HWIs. This suggests, as defendants note
in their brief and indicated at oral argument before this court,
that many students who are admitted under the reformed standards
will need “substantial educational assistance,” possibly
including remedial courses.40 Remedial courses may be an
important part of the admissions policy at any school in which a
significant number of students are not predicted to achieve a C
average during their first year.
Plaintiffs did not challenge the State’s existing
remediation policies as traceable to the de jure era. There was
therefore no requirement, under Fordice, for reformation of those
policies as such. However, the Board’s proposed admissions
standards (Bd. R-202) treated the adoption of the summer program
and the elimination of the existing remedial courses as
components of its admissions standards, and the district court,
in ordering the implementation of the Board’s proposal,
effectively did the same. The principle that apparently
underlies the Board’s admissions policy (and, therefore, the
40
There may be a distinction between students who qualify
for regular admission but who are also in need of remedial
education and students who do not so qualify. The total
immersion aspect of the summer program may be important for the
latter group but unnecessarily burdensome for the former group.
In suggesting these considerations, we intimate no view as to
their ultimate merit.
36
district court’s decision) is that, in the case of any applicant,
what can and cannot be accomplished with reasonable remediation
is a key element of the admissions decision. Clearly, this
principle is educationally sound. But the court’s action in
eliminating the existing remedial courses can legitimately be
challenged by plaintiffs as an inappropriate feature of the
court’s admissions remedy. We have recognized that there are
some tensions in the district court’s findings in this regard.
In the light of these tensions and the absence of specific
consideration of the justification for, or reasonableness of,
eliminating these unchallenged courses, we are sufficiently
concerned about the district court’s exercise of its discretion
in this regard to direct the court on remand to reconsider its
decision to eliminate these courses. On remand, the district
court should determine if remedial courses are needed to help
ensure that students admitted under the new admissions criteria
have a realistic chance of achieving academic success.41
iv. Timing
The United States argues that it may take several years for
the summer program to be thoroughly implemented, tested, and
evaluated and argues that during the interim, an admissions
policy that minimizes any reduction in the number of black
41
The decision whether to take more evidence on the
advisability of reinstating any or all of these courses, either
as previously offered or as modified to operate in conjunction
with the summer remedial program, is left to the district court.
37
students eligible for regular admission should be installed.42
We reject this argument. The summer program has sufficient
promise, on the present state of the record, to allow it “to
prove itself in operation,” Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 440-41 (1968), should the district court decide to continue
on that path. There is no reason why, however, reconsideration
of the district court’s decision to eliminate the existing
remedial courses cannot be done promptly. We intimate no view on
the outcome of that reconsideration.
d. Conclusions regarding undergraduate admissions
standards
Except as set forth below, we affirm paragraph 2 of the
remedial decree, which reads in relevant part as follows: “The
1995 admissions standards as proposed by the Board for first-time
freshmen, effective for the academic year [1996-97], shall be
implemented at all universities.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at
1494. We do not affirm paragraph 2 insofar as it eliminates the
remedial courses previously offered at each of the eight
universities. We remand this latter issue for reconsideration in
the light of this opinion. We understand the district court’s
continuing jurisdiction to encompass the evaluation of the
effectiveness of the spring screening and summer remedial
42
The United States makes a similar argument with respect
to the time that it will take to implement changes at the
community colleges. We think that the remedial decree adopted by
the district court adequately addresses the community colleges to
the extent they can be addressed in this case. The fact that
implementation of this aspect of the remedial decree will take
time does not require installation of an interim admissions
policy.
38
program, as a component of the admissions system, in achieving
its intended objectives of identifying and admitting those
students who are capable, with reasonable remediation, of doing
college level work but who fail to qualify for regular admission.
Should the district court ultimately conclude that this program
(as it may be modified) is unable to any significant degree to
achieve its objectives, then the court will need to identify and
implement another method for achieving those objectives.
3. Scholarship Policies
a. District court ruling
While the district court found that undergraduate admissions
policies in general are vestiges of de jure segregation that
continue to have segregative effects, it found that scholarship
policies in particular are not. On remand, plaintiffs challenged
the use of ACT cutoff scores for the award of undergraduate
academic scholarships at the HWIs, as well as the use of ACT
cutoff scores and alumni connection in the award of nonresident
fee waivers for out-of-state admittees.43 Unlike most other
43
The nonresident fee waivers for children of nonresident
alumni are referred to in the record also as “alumni
scholarships.” Our use of the term “scholarships” encompasses
academic scholarships as well as nonresident fee waivers, but we
use the term “nonresident fee waiver” when referring solely to
this type of award.
We note that Mississippi University for Women offers certain
scholarships to resident and nonresident children of MUW alumni
that require a minimum ACT score of 21 for eligibility. These
scholarships are distinct from the nonresident fee waivers, but
plaintiffs challenge the use of the ACT cutoff score and the
alumni connection in determining eligibility for these
scholarships as well.
39
forms of financial aid, the scholarships challenged by plaintiffs
are generally awarded on the basis of academic achievement, not
financial need, and do not require repayment by the recipient.
The district court found a significant disparity in the
percentage of nonresident fee waivers awarded by race in any
given year. Id. at 1433. The evidence indicated similar
disparities in the award of academic scholarships. The district
court concluded, however, that
[t]he Board’s policy of allowing [nonresident fee
waivers] to be based on ACT cutoffs and the use of ACT
cutoff scores as the sole criterion for the receipt of
academic scholarship monies has not been proven to have
linkage with the de jure system, and there is no
evidence that these practices currently foster
separation of the races such as influencing student
choice. Therefore, reformation of these policies
cannot be ordered consistent with the law of the case,
absent evidence of discriminatory purpose of which the
court finds none. The use of ACT scores in awarding
scholarships is widespread throughout the United States
and generally viewed as educationally sound.
Id. at 1434-35 (footnote omitted). The district court did not
make a specific finding with regard to the traceability of the
alumni connection requirement for nonresident fee waivers. The
remedial decree does not order alteration of any of the
challenged scholarship policies.
b. Arguments on appeal
Plaintiffs argue that the district court clearly erred in
finding that the use of ACT cutoffs in the award of academic
scholarships and nonresident fee waivers at the HWIs is not
traceable to the dual system and does not have segregative
effects. Although the district court’s findings and conclusions
40
with respect to academic scholarships focus specifically on
policies that establish an ACT cutoff score as the sole criterion
for award, plaintiffs’ challenge encompasses all instances in
which the HWIs require a minimum ACT score for scholarship
eligibility.44 Accordingly, plaintiffs have identified on appeal
numerous scholarships at various HWIs that are available only to
students with certain minimum ACT scores. Plaintiffs contend
that the use of ACT cutoff scores for scholarship eligibility is
traceable to the de jure system because under that system ACT
cutoff scores were implemented for the purpose of excluding black
students from the HWIs. The segregative effects of this
practice, plaintiffs argue, are evident in the racial disparity
in scholarship awards. Because black students receive only a
very small proportion of such scholarships, yet are more likely
than white students to be in need of financial aid, the policy
effectively reduces the number of black students able to attend
the HWIs. Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the record does not
44
In the Pretrial Order, private plaintiffs listed as a
challenged remnant “[t]he policy of using ACT cutoff scores in
selecting persons to receive particular scholarships at the
undergraduate level at each HWI.” The United States similarly
identified this alleged remnant as “[t]he practice of using the
ACT in selecting persons to receive scholarships at the
undergraduate level.”
Significantly, plaintiffs do not challenge any of the
scholarship policies at the HBIs and no party argues on appeal
that such policies either are traceable to the de jure system or
have present segregative effects. Accordingly, we express no
opinion on the scholarship policies at the HBIs or their
relevance in reforming scholarship policies to eliminate present
segregative effects. In fashioning the most appropriate remedy,
however, the district court may find it relevant to consider all
scholarship policies.
41
support the district court’s finding that the use of ACT cutoff
scores in the award of scholarships is widespread.
Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred in
upholding the practice of limiting nonresident fee waivers to
children of an institution’s alumni. Plaintiffs maintain that
the alumni connection requirement is traceable to the de jure
system in that parents of today’s students were systematically
excluded from the HWIs under the de jure system.
c. Analysis
Although it is clear from the record that undergraduate
scholarship policies were litigated on remand, the district court
made virtually no fact findings with regard to specific policy
criteria or operation. The parties’ original briefing of this
issue on appeal was also scant.45 In response to our request for
supplemental briefing, plaintiffs provided a summary of the
challenged policies along with the racial breakdown of their
distribution for the 1992-93 year (and in one instance, for the
1991-92 year). Defendants have not contested the accuracy of
this summary, which is drawn from defendants’ answers to
interrogatories and from other evidence introduced by defendants.
We therefore accept plaintiffs’ factual summary. According to
that summary, the scholarships alleged to be traceable to de jure
segregation and to have present discriminatory effects are as
45
To ensure that we were apprised of all arguments and
relevant evidence on appeal, we requested, and the parties
supplied, supplemental briefing on the issue of undergraduate
scholarships.
42
follows:
DELTA STATE UNIVERSITY First-time freshman enrollment 1992-93: 21% black
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name46 ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Dean’s and 26 2 160 162 $1,375 $131,175 $132,550
Presidential
1% black 1% black
MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY First-time freshman enrollment 1992-93: 16% black
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Entering 31 1 294 299 $2,000 $546,000 $555,000
Freshman ACT
8,000
Sharp Forestry 31 0 3 3 0 7,500 7,500
Entering 29 5 454 468 16,250 596,836 626,836
Freshman ACT
5,000 and
Schillig
Ramsey & 28 0 41 41 0 115,500 115,500
Elaine O’Neal
and Hearin-
Hess
Entering 28 5 248 267 7,944 239,444 261,388
Freshmen ACT
4,000, South
Central Bell,
and Jesse &
Lillian Tims
Leadership 20 8 71 80 3,600 34,450 38,550
John C. 24 1 6 8 1,000 6,000 8,000
Stennis
Alumni 21 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL 20 1117 1166 $30,794 $1,545,730 $1,612,774
2% black 2% black MISSISSIPPI
UNIVERSITY
FOR WOMEN
46
Plaintiffs advise in their brief that in some instances
data for more than one scholarship with the same ACT cutoff score
has been grouped. This reflects the way defendants provided
scholarship data in response to interrogatories.
43
First-time freshman enrollment 1992-93: 21% black
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Centennial and 28 0 26 26 $0 $142,464 $142,464
Eudora Welty
Regional 21 2 68 70 1,200 74,400 75,600
Alumni 21 2 50 52 600 32,540 33,140
Academic 21 10 208 218 3,402 111,500 114,902
Valedictorian 21 0 6 6 0 7,075 7,075
Salutatorian 21 0 6 6 0 4,125 4,125
TOTAL 14 364 378 $5,202 $372,104 $377,306
4% black 1% black
First-time freshman enrollment 1991-92: N/A
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Special 21 34 154 188 $40,820 $139,163 $179,983
Conditions
Academic 25 0 79 79 0 130,425 130,425
TOTAL 34 233 267 $40,820 $269,588 $310,408
13% black 13% black
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI First-time freshman enrollment 1992-93: 7% black
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Children of 21 1 305 307 $1,960 $529,512 $533,432
Nonresident
Alumni
Children of 18 10 106 118 14,092 88,540 104,196
Faculty &
Staff Post-
1977
Children of 19 10 104 116 19,780 195,263 215,783
Faculty &
Staff Pre-
1977-78
Academic 28 6 683 701 14,130 1,608,555 1,641,805
Academic 30 2 27 29 9,500 105,000 114,500
Academic 22 9 240 253 11,350 244,467 258,642
Special 22 6 130 140 6,810 211,550 224,240
Conditions
44
TOTAL 44 1595 1664 $77,622 $2,982,887 $3,092,598
3% black 3% black
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI First-time freshman enrollment 1992-93: 27% black
Scholarship Minimum Number of Recipients Dollars Received
Name ACT
Score Black White Total Black White Total
Presidential, 29 0 36 36 $0 $194,043 $194,043
Schillig-
Baird, Pulley,
Pulley, and
Gough
Academic 28 7 352 371 8,375 773,490 816,860
Excellence
Regional 25 0 43 47 0 72,914 79,774
Alumni 21 1 143 146 1,960 230,333 236,213
TOTAL 8 574 600 $10,335 $1,270,780 $1,326,890
1% black 1% black
The district court found that basing scholarship eligibility
on ACT cutoff scores is not traceable to the dual system and does
not have current segregative effects. We agree with the
principle articulated by the district court that use of an ACT
cutoff is not unlawful in all circumstances. “Rather, its
particular use in any circumstance must be examined to consider
whether as a component of the policy challenged, the same is
traceable to prior de jure segregation.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1434. In light of the facts set out above, however, we
conclude that the district court erred in arriving at its
findings regarding traceability and segregative effects.47
The district court may have applied an erroneous view of
47
Our conclusion in this regard applies to the use of ACT
cutoffs in all challenged scholarships.
45
traceability. As defendants point out in their supplemental
letter brief, a traceable policy is one “rooted in” the prior
dual system. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 730 n.4, 732 n.6, 743. It
is only “surviving aspects” of de jure segregation that a state
need remedy. See
id. at 733. That is not to say, however, that
a challenged policy as it exists today must have been in effect
during the de jure period in order to be constitutionally
problematic. The undergraduate admissions criteria that the
district court found to be traceable, for instance, had been
modified several times since the de jure era but nonetheless were
found to be rooted in the prior system. Similarly, the Supreme
Court found Mississippi’s scheme of institutional mission
classifications to be traceable to de jure segregation even
though it was not put in place until several years after
termination of official segregation. See
id. at 732-33, 739-41.
The Court noted that “[t]he institutional mission designations
adopted in 1981 have as their antecedents the policies enacted to
perpetuate racial separation during the de jure segregated
regime.”
Id. at 739. In United States v. Louisiana, this court
implicitly recognized that Louisiana’s open admissions policy
could be traceable to that state’s prior de jure system despite
its adoption only after de jure segregation had ended.
See 9
F.3d at 1167. Because the district court had not addressed the
policy’s traceability, we left the issue open for resolution on
remand.
Id.
In this case, plaintiffs concede that the record does not
46
contain evidence directly linking the use of ACT cutoffs for
scholarship purposes with any time prior to 1980. Such evidence
apparently was not developed because plaintiffs concluded, in our
view correctly, that the discriminatory use of ACT cutoffs to
exclude black students from the HWIs during the de jure period
establishes traceability with respect to all current practices
that limit black student access to the HWIs by setting ACT cutoff
scores at a level that disproportionately favors white students.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to prove
traceability because they have not produced evidence establishing
that the practice of using ACT cutoffs in the award of
scholarships was initiated either “(i) during de jure
segregation, (ii) as an integral component of de jure
segregation, (iii) to continue, perpetuate, or further
segregation, or (iv) because of some intentionally segregative
policy which formerly existed.”48 This argument misses the mark.
First, to the extent defendants suggest it is lacking, evidence
of discriminatory purpose is required to establish a
constitutional violation only for present policies that are not
traceable to the prior system; discriminatory purpose is not an
element of traceability itself. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 733 n.8.
Second, this argument ignores the relationship between
scholarship awards and grants of admission, an element missing
48
Upon motion of plaintiffs, the district court placed the
burden of proving traceability on plaintiffs. No party appeals
the allocation of burdens of proof. For purposes of this appeal,
we assume without deciding that the district court did not err in
this respect.
47
from the district court’s analysis as well.
Scholarship decisions are not wholly independent of
admissions in the way that most financial aid determinations are.
Indeed, the record indicates that at University of Mississippi,
Delta State University, and Mississippi University for Women, the
application for admission also constitutes the application for
scholarships. It is because scholarships are intended to reward
exemplary academic achievement, as defendants point out, that
scholarship decision criteria overlap more with those for
admission than for financial aid. By their nature, scholarships
are designed to attract outstanding students to the awarding
institution; that scholarships need not be repaid is a powerful
incentive for students to both pursue and accept them. As a
component of admissions, scholarship policies further the process
that ultimately culminates in matriculation. In finding that the
use of ACT cutoffs in the scholarship context is not traceable to
the de jure system, the district court may have distinguished
scholarships too strictly from admissions, although its opinion,
which addresses scholarships as a component of admissions,
suggests otherwise. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1424, 1431-35.
As presented by plaintiffs, the challenged scholarships
require students to achieve a certain minimum ACT score to be
eligible for the award. Accordingly, a student who has not
achieved the requisite ACT score will not be considered,
regardless of how impressive his or her grades or other academic
achievements might be. This is “constitutionally problematic”
48
for the same reason the Supreme Court found the use of the ACT in
admissions to be so. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 736 (“Another
constitutionally problematic aspect of the State’s use of the ACT
test scores is its policy of denying automatic admission if an
applicant fails to earn the minimum ACT score specified for the
particular institution, without also resorting to the applicant’s
high school grades as an additional factor in predicting college
performance.”). Just as there may be students who could do
college level work yet might be precluded from enrolling in an
institution that maintains ACT cutoffs in admissions, there may
be students who have outstanding academic achievement that merits
recognition apart from their ACT scores.
It bears emphasis that the use of ACT cutoffs in the award
of scholarships raises constitutional suspicion only because of
the history of de jure segregation in Mississippi. The practice
of rewarding academic achievement as determined by standardized
test scores, even where it results in significant racial
disparities in receipt of awards, is not per se unconstitutional.
Use of ACT cutoffs does not take place on a clean slate in
Mississippi, however. The alleged practice of basing scholarship
eligibility on minimum ACT scores flows from earlier
discriminatory use of ACT cutoffs and therefore triggers further
constitutional inquiry, under Fordice, into whether it continues
to have segregative effects.
The use of ACT cutoff scores in the award of scholarships
restricts black students’ access to the HWIs in much the same way
49
that the use of ACT cutoff scores in a system of differential
admissions standards was found to restrict access. The district
court findings and other evidence indicate that scholarships with
ACT cutoff scores are disproportionately awarded to white
students. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1433. In addition, the
district court found that black applicants to Mississippi’s
universities are more likely to need financial aid than white
applicants.
Id. at 1433-34 n.28. To the extent that
academically accomplished black students are unable to achieve
ACT scores that would qualify them for scholarships at the HWIs,
they are discouraged from both applying to and matriculating at
these institutions.49 While the potential segregative effect of
the use of ACT cutoffs in determining scholarship eligibility is
perhaps somewhat less pronounced than that of the use of ACT
cutoffs in admissions, the evidence nevertheless indicates that
such potential does exist.
The fact that some HWIs offer scholarships specifically for
black applicants does not, as the State argues, alter this
conclusion. The evidence suggests that such scholarships
represent an extremely limited proportion of available
scholarship monies, and in most instances fall significantly
short of the amount of aid offered through generally available
scholarships. The availability of a small number of minority
scholarships at the HWIs does not automatically neutralize the
49
The district court found that black students continue to
be significantly underrepresented at most of the HWIs. Ayers II,
879 F. Supp. at 1469.
50
ongoing discriminatory effects of current scholarship policies
rooted in the de jure past.
There is evidence in the record to indicate that the use of
ACT cutoffs in the award of scholarships can be practicably
eliminated consistent with sound educational practices. Of
course, as we noted with respect to undergraduate admissions
policies, we do not hold that reliance on ACT scores for
scholarship purposes must be eradicated entirely. We leave to
the district court on remand factfinding with regard to the
practicability of reforming current policies consistent with
sound educational practices.
Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in
failing to find that basing eligibility for nonresident fee
waivers (and, in the case of Mississippi University for Women,
certain scholarships for children of resident and nonresident
alumni) on relationship to alumni of Mississippi’s HWIs is
traceable to the de jure system and has present segregative
effects. We agree that this practice, which the district court
found to result in the disproportionate award of such
scholarships to white students, has present segregative effects.
We are not persuaded, however, that traceability has been
established on this record.50 Plaintiffs’ argument rests upon
the exclusion of blacks from the HWIs during the de jure period.
50
Our conclusion in this regard applies to the alumni
connection requirement in the challenged scholarships offered by
Mississippi University for Women as well as that in the
nonresident fee waivers.
51
This fact, without more, does not establish the traceability of
the alumni element of the present nonresident fee waivers. In
effect, plaintiffs seek relief for “present discriminatory
effects without addressing whether such consequences flow from
policies rooted in the prior system.” Fordice, 505 U.S. at 730
n.4. The Supreme Court has rejected this position.
Id.
Plaintiffs note in their briefs that this court struck down, as
unlawfully discriminating against black applicants to Mississippi
universities, a requirement established by the Board shortly
after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483
(1954), that each applicant for admission furnish letters or
certificates from alumni attesting to the good moral character of
the applicant. See Meredith v. Fair,
305 F.2d 343, 351 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 828 (1962). In our view (assuming
that plaintiffs intend this as an alternative basis for
traceability), on this record the alumni certificate requirement
for admission has no connection, historical or otherwise, with
the nonresident fee waivers presently awarded to the children of
nonresident alumni except for the fact that both involve some
“alumni connection.” Any such argument urges us to a level of
generality that is beyond the traceability contemplated by
Fordice.
d. Conclusions regarding scholarship policies
We reverse the district court’s finding that the use of ACT
cutoff scores as a criterion for the award of scholarships at the
HWIs is not traceable to the de jure system and does not
52
currently foster segregation. We remand for determination of the
practicability and educational soundness of reforming this aspect
of the undergraduate scholarship policies at the HWIs and the
implementation, if necessary, of appropriate remedial relief.
B. Enhancement of Historically Black Institutions
1. Background Facts
Plaintiffs contend that several policies related to funding
and programs at the HBIs are remnants of the de jure system that
must be remedied by relief more expansive than that ordered by
the district court. Plaintiffs’ arguments in this regard
encompass four interrelated areas: new academic programs, land
grant programs, program duplication, and funding. According to
plaintiffs, these aspects of higher education affect student
choice, and existing policies must be remedied in order to enable
the HBIs to attract students of all races.51
In addition, private plaintiffs appear to advocate
enhancement of the HBIs in order to rectify the detrimental
effects of past de jure segregation, without regard to present
policies and practices. This position is at odds with standards
established in Fordice. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the
proposition that the State’s duty to dismantle its prior de jure
system requires elimination of all continuing discriminatory
51
The district court found that “[b]lacks are now
attending the HWIs as a group in statistical parity with their
representation in the qualified pool.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at
1486.
53
effects: “To the extent we understand private petitioners to
urge us to focus on present discriminatory effects without
addressing whether such consequences flow from policies rooted in
the prior system, we reject this position.” Fordice, 505 U.S. at
730 n.4. Likewise,
[i]f we understand private petitioners to press us
to order the upgrading of Jackson State, Alcorn State,
and Mississippi Valley State solely so that they may be
publicly financed, exclusively black enclaves by
private choice, we reject that request. The State
provides these facilities for all its citizens and it
has not met its burden under Brown to take affirmative
steps to dismantle its prior de jure system when it
perpetuates a separate, but ‘more equal’ one.
Id. at 743.
The appropriate inquiry under Fordice, then, is whether
changes in resource allocation are necessary to dismantle fully
present policies and practices rooted in the prior system that
serve to maintain the racial identifiability of the universities
and that can practicably be eliminated without eroding sound
educational policies. See id. Current policies and practices
(as distinguished from lingering disparities in institutional
development per se) implicate the Fourteenth Amendment only
insofar as they are traceable to the prior system and continue to
have segregative effects, either by influencing student choice or
otherwise.
2. New Academic Programs
a. District court ruling
The programmatic expansions of Jackson State and Alcorn
State ordered by the district court respond to its findings
54
concerning deliberate efforts by the State of Mississippi to
restrict the educational opportunities of its black citizens, as
well as the traceability of current mission assignments to these
historical antecedents. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1437-41,
1477, 1483-86. As the district court found, after establishment
of Alcorn State in 1871 and continuing through roughly the first
half of this century, the prevailing notion concerning the
education of blacks was that blacks could benefit only from
agricultural or mechanical training, rather than a liberal
education as provided to whites.
Id. at 1437-38. Alcorn State
was originally designated as an agricultural college for
Mississippi’s black youth, and Jackson State and Mississippi
Valley State, founded in 1940 and 1950, respectively, were
established primarily to train black teachers. Ayers I, 674 F.
Supp. at 1527-28. During the years 1945 through 1970, when both
the HWIs and the HBIs experienced considerable growth in
enrollment, the bulk of the State’s higher education resources,
particularly programmatic allocations, went to University of
Mississippi, University of Southern Mississippi, and Mississippi
State University, the three leading white universities. Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1439.
The district court found that the mission designations
adopted by the Board in 1981 -- and in place throughout both the
1987 and 1994 trials -- effectively fixed the scope of
programmatic offerings that were in place at each university
during the de jure period. Id. at 1438-39. The Board designated
55
University of Mississippi, University of Southern Mississippi,
and Mississippi State University “comprehensive” universities,
thereby indicating that these institutions would continue to
offer a greater number and a higher level of degree programs than
all other institutions. Based on its location in the city of
Jackson, Jackson State was designated an “urban” university with
the mission of serving the urban community. The Board designated
Alcorn State, Delta State, Mississippi University for Women, and
Mississippi Valley State “regional” universities, signifying a
programmatic range limited to undergraduate instruction. Id. at
1438.
In Fordice, the Supreme Court found that
when combined with the differential admission practices
and unnecessary program duplication, it is likely that
the mission designations interfere with student choice
and tend to perpetuate the segregated system. On
remand, the court should inquire whether it would be
practicable and consistent with sound educational
practices to eliminate any such discriminatory effects
of the State’s present policy of mission assignments.
505 U.S. at 741. The district court indeed found that
“[p]olicies and practices governing the missions of the
institutions of higher learning are traceable to de jure
segregation and continue to foster separation of the races.”
Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1477. The remedial decree, however,
does not order any alteration of the mission designations. See
id. at 1483.52 No party appeals retention of the mission
52
The Board apparently has upgraded the mission of Jackson
State to an “enhanced” urban designation. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1483.
56
designations per se.
The remedial decree does order some augmentation of the
programs offered at Jackson State and Alcorn State.53 The
district court found that the policies and practices of de jure
segregation impeded the development of both universities. Id. at
1466, 1484. At Jackson State, the court found that the dearth of
professional programs hindered potential other-race enrollment at
the main campus.
Id. at 1485. Although the court found that the
record supported neither the educational soundness of
transferring programs to Jackson State nor the desegregative
potential of institutional affiliation with the University of
Mississippi Medical Center, it found that the addition of other
unique, high demand programs did have potential to desegregate
the institution. See
id. at 1485-86. The district court
accordingly ordered implementation at Jackson State of programs
in allied health, social work (Ph.D), urban planning
(Masters/Ph.D), and business (DBA).54
Id. at 1494. In addition,
the remedial decree directs the Board to undertake an
institutional study
with the express purpose of determining the nature and
direction of those programs slated to be implemented,
as well as further programmatic expansion at JSU, to
best achieve the urban emphasis of its mission.
Included in this study will be an evaluation of the
53
The remedial decree orders the State to provide the
funding for all measures ordered by the decree. Ayers II, 879 F.
Supp. at 1496.
54
The doctoral program in business is to be implemented at
Jackson State “when existing business programs are accredited.”
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1494.
57
feasibility and educational soundness of establishing
an engineering school, a public law school, and a five-
year pharmacy program under the direction and control
of JSU.
Id. at 1495.
With respect to Alcorn State, the district court found that
certain proposed programmatic enhancements promised realistically
to increase other-race presence and were educationally sound.
Accordingly, the district court ordered implementation of an MBA
program at Alcorn’s Natchez Center, to be funded specially by the
State along with related capital improvements. The court also
ordered the State to provide the Small Farm Development Center at
Alcorn with annual research and extension funds to match similar
federal funds appropriated to Alcorn, up to an aggregate of $4
million each year.55 Id. at 1495.
The district court did not order any programmatic
enhancements at Mississippi Valley State. Although the court
found that Mississippi Valley State’s proximity to Delta State
tended to perpetuate segregation,56 it stated that
[o]n the record . . . the court cannot find that
institutional enhancement of MVSU will eliminate the
vestiges of segregation that have contributed to MVSU’s
status as essentially a one-race institution. Evidence
does not persuade the court that merely adding programs
and increasing budgets will desegregate a HBI. That is
not to say, however, that changes made over time at the
55
The Small Farm Development Center falls within the land
grant function of Alcorn State. While we note this component of
the remedial decree here, we discuss the court’s ruling with
respect to land grant programs separately below.
56
The district court’s findings with respect to the
segregative effects of proximate and nonproximate institutions
are set forth in our discussion of program duplication infra.
58
university consistent with its mission as a
baccalaureate institution cannot promote diversity at
the campus. The court cannot find that institutional
or programmatic enhancement of MVSU is justified as
educationally sound for desegregation purposes based on
this record.
Id. at 1491. The court also found, however, that while
there is evidence to suggest that transferring programs
to MVSU may not be educationally sound, there is
likewise evidence that measures can be taken which,
over time, offer a potential of desegregating MVSU. As
one of the State’s own witnesses testified, evidence
suggests that HBIs in other formally de jure segregated
states have been successful in integrating their
student bodies through a variety of approaches and
measures.
Id. The sole portion of the remedial decree that pertains
specifically to Mississippi Valley State is the following section
concerning the proposed merger with Delta State:
12. If, after further study of any available
educationally sound alternatives, the Board determines
that desegregation in the Mississippi Delta can be
attained only through its DSU/MVSU consolidation
proposal and that abandoning the financial investment
presently in place at the [MVSU] campus and
constructing replacement facilities at the [DSU] campus
present a practical course of action, it shall
substantiate that conclusion no later than July 1, 1996
to the Monitoring Committee.
Id. at 1495.
Finally, the district court determined that practices
concerning accreditation of academic programs at the HBIs did not
warrant remedial relief.57 The court found that while none of
the HBIs was accredited as of 1961, each has now attained
57
Private plaintiffs and the United States challenged
“[t]he practice of failing to take the necessary steps (including
the provision[] of required facilities) to secure the
accreditation of programs at the HBIs.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1497, 1501.
59
accreditation and “[s]ince 1980, with the possible exception of
JSU, the overall percentage of programs accredited at all
universities has increased substantially.” Id. at 1441. The
court found that the State’s “inattentiveness” to the HBIs during
the de jure period with regard to program and institutional
accreditation negatively affected institutional prestige, but
that “there is no evidence that the State’s previous failings in
this regard persist into the present day.”
Id. at 1445. The
court stated that little evidence had been presented on the
present status of the accreditation issue.
Id.
b. Arguments on appeal
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred as a matter
of law by failing to order any new programs at Mississippi Valley
State and only two new programs at Alcorn State. While
plaintiffs do not challenge the district court’s rejection of the
Board’s proposal to merge Mississippi Valley State and Delta
State, they contend that the record does not support the court’s
conclusion that programmatic enhancement of Mississippi Valley
State will not help to desegregate the Delta. Plaintiffs argue
with respect to Alcorn State that further relief is warranted
given the Natchez location of the MBA program, which plaintiffs
contend will not help to desegregate the main campus,58 and the
State’s prior commitment to funding the Small Farm Development
Center. The United States specifically asks this court to remand
58
The Natchez Center is located approximately 40 miles
from Alcorn’s main campus. Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1542.
60
with instructions to order the Board to study and report to the
Monitoring Committee on actions that could be taken to enable
Mississippi Valley State and Alcorn State to attract students of
all races, including improvement of existing programs and the
addition of unique, high demand programs.59 Plaintiffs do not
appeal the district court’s order as it pertains to programmatic
enhancement of Jackson State.60
Private plaintiffs also argue that the district court
clearly erred in finding that problems with accreditation of
programs at the HBIs do not persist to the present.
Defendants contend that the traceability of mission
assignments does not warrant institutional enhancement of the
HBIs beyond that ordered by the district court, and that the
record does not support general enhancement of these institutions
as a desegregation tool.
c. Analysis
The issue of programmatic enhancement directly implicates
policies governing institutional missions, which the district
court found to be traceable to the de jure system and to have
current segregative effects. Fordice mandates that the State
59
The United States in its brief argues that the district
court should have ordered additional funding at the HBIs to,
among other things, “improve the quality of existing programs.”
U.S. Br. at 44. Except for specific issues (such as, for
example, program accreditation and faculty salaries) that we have
addressed elsewhere in this opinion, the general issue of program
quality is not briefed and we therefore do not address it.
60
The parties’ arguments concerning the land grant
programs in particular are discussed in Part III.B.3 infra.
61
eliminate such vestiges of the prior system to the extent
practicable and consistent with sound educational practices.
This is a substantial burden; accordingly, to the extent that the
record indicates that the State could practicably take steps to
desegregate that do not run afoul of sound educational practices,
the State has a duty to do so and the remedial decree should so
reflect.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court’s finding that “merely adding programs and
increasing budgets” is not likely to desegregate an HBI, Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1491, is supported by the evidence and is not
clearly erroneous. There was testimony that the Louisiana
experience with implementation of a consent decree to desegregate
public institutions of higher education was not successful in
attracting white students to historically black universities,
despite investment of over $75 million in new academic programs
at those universities. The evidence showed that there was no
correlation between dollars expended on new program
implementation and white enrollment in those programs. During
the six years (1981-87) that the Louisiana consent decree was in
effect, white enrollment in predominantly black universities
increased by just 1.1%, while black enrollment in predominantly
white universities decreased from 56% to 47% of black enrollment
in the system as a whole.61
61
Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 645
(E.D. La. 1988) (“Despite the slight increase in black enrollment
statewide, the racial polarization has increased as a whole
62
The district court’s findings do indicate, however, that
steps can be taken that might serve to desegregate Mississippi
Valley State, although determining what those steps might be
requires further study. In its discussion of Mississippi Valley
State in the context of the proposed merger with Delta State, the
court stated that “evidence suggests that HBIs in other formally
de jure segregated states have been successful in integrating
their student bodies through a variety of approaches and
measures.” Id. Indeed, evidence presented by the United States
and defendants indicates that well-planned programs that respond
to the particular needs and interests of local populations can
help to desegregate historically black institutions. Witnesses
for both parties testified that programs not duplicated at
proximate institutions, targeted to local demands, and in many
cases offered through alternative delivery systems (such as off-
campus, evening, or weekend programs) have had success in
attracting white students to historically black institutions in
other states.
Consistent with its findings regarding the potential to
desegregate Mississippi Valley State, the district court stated
during the term of the consent decree: the predominantly white
institutions had about 2000 fewer black students in 1987 than in
1981, while the predominantly black institutions showed only a
negligible increase in white enrollment from around 0.3% in 1981
to around 1.1% in 1987.”). According to the three-judge court
that reviewed the special master’s final report in the Louisiana
case, “[t]he experience of the consent decree confirms that
enhancement of [predominantly black institutions] without more
simply makes [predominantly black institutions] more attractive
to black students, without attracting white students.” United
States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 508 (E.D. La. 1989).
63
in its opinion that it “will direct the Board to explore these
areas more thoroughly to determine what measures have had success
in other systems of higher education, if any, which also have a
reasonable chance of success in desegregating MVSU.” Id. at
1492. This directive, however, was not incorporated into the
remedial decree. This may be explained by the fact that the
future of Mississippi Valley State was uncertain at the time the
district court drafted its opinion. Under the remedial decree,
merger with DSU remained a possibility that depended upon the
Board’s study of options for desegregating the Delta region. We
cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to order the above relief when the very existence of
Mississippi Valley State as an independent institution remained
in question. At present, however, all parties apparently have
concluded that merger of Mississippi Valley State with Delta
State is neither required nor desired.62 On remand, the district
court must clarify the status of the merger proposal. If the
district court confirms that merger will no longer be pursued,
then the district court must address the continuing segregative
effects of Mississippi Valley State’s limited mission and
incorporate into its remedial decree a provision requiring the
Board, on a continuing basis, to study and report to the
62
Counsel for defendants stated at oral argument before
this court that defendants had publicly announced that they were
no longer pursuing merger. In its brief, the United States
expressed unqualified support for the district court’s rejection
of the merger proposal. Private plaintiffs’ argument for
enhancement of Mississippi Valley State likewise indicates their
opposition to merger.
64
Monitoring Committee on new academic programs that have a
reasonable chance of increasing other-race presence at
Mississippi Valley State.
Plaintiffs’ contention that the district court was required
to order further relief at Alcorn State is less persuasive, at
least as it addresses the short term. We are not persuaded that
further relief is warranted on the basis of the MBA program’s
location away from the main campus at Natchez; plaintiffs’ own
expert testified that off-campus offerings are among those
initiatives that have been successful at attracting other-race
students to historically black institutions. Nor are we
persuaded that the State’s prior commitment to funding the Small
Farm Development Center necessitates the order of additional
relief; this fact does not implicate the Fordice standard for
remedial relief. The record does suggest, however, that measures
that have been successful in desegregating historically black
institutions in other states may have potential over the longer
term to be effective also at Alcorn State. We see no reason, in
light of the traceability of the HBIs’ limited missions and of
their continuing racial identifiability, to limit continuing
study of new academic programs with desegregative potential to
Jackson State. The district court should have incorporated such
relief with respect to Alcorn State into the remedial decree.
We recognize that substantial evidence indicates that
efforts to desegregate an HBI can succeed only insofar as they
tap into locale-specific demands. Any such inherent limitation
65
on the potential to achieve desegregation in the university
context may underlie some of the district court’s findings and
suggests that implementation of unique, high demand programs that
can reasonably be expected to attract white students to HBIs may
ultimately turn out to be quite modest.
Private plaintiffs’ argument that the district court clearly
erred in finding no present neglect by the State with respect to
accreditation of programs at the HBIs is unavailing. The
district court’s finding of substantial increases in the
percentage of programs accredited at all universities is
supported by the record, and private plaintiffs do not identify
any present policy that currently hinders accreditation of
programs at the HBIs.
Private plaintiffs’ accreditation concerns are relevant,
however, to one aspect of the district court’s remedial decree.
The doctoral program in business that the court ordered at
Jackson State is not to be implemented until existing business
programs are accredited, and the record indicates that despite
the Board’s goal of achieving accreditation for these programs,
set forth as early as 1974 in the Board’s plan of compliance with
Title VI, it has not yet been accomplished. The record is not
clear as to the reasons that these programs are not yet
accredited. In the interest of ensuring that the district
court’s order concerning the doctoral program in business be
given meaningful effect, the district court on remand should
inquire into present efforts to achieve accreditation of Jackson
66
State’s business programs and order any relief that is
appropriate with respect to the Board.
d. Conclusions regarding new academic programs
We affirm the portions of the remedial decree addressing the
addition of new academic programs at Jackson State and Alcorn
State. We direct the district court on remand to clarify the
status of the Board’s proposal to merge Mississippi Valley State
with Delta State. If the district court confirms that merger
will no longer be pursued, it should incorporate into the
remedial decree a provision directing the Board to study and to
report to the Monitoring Committee on whether there are any new
academic programs, including programs which have had success in
desegregating other systems of higher education, that may have a
reasonable chance of success in desegregating Mississippi Valley
State. We further remand for incorporation into the remedial
decree of a similar provision directed to Alcorn State covering
new academic and land grant programs. On the issue of
accreditation, the district court should determine the status of
current efforts to achieve accreditation of existing business
programs at Jackson State and order appropriate relief, if
necessary, to ensure that the Board is taking steps commensurate
with its role in this accreditation process.
3. Land Grant Programs
a. District court ruling
Mississippi State University and Alcorn State University are
67
Mississippi’s two public land grant institutions.63 As found by
the district court, the traditional elements of the land grant
function consist of residential instruction, agricultural
research (including an experiment station), and an extension
service.64 Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1464. The district court
found that during the de jure period the State consistently
directed federal and state land grant funds toward Mississippi
State University rather than Alcorn State.
Id. at 1464-65.
Specifically, Mississippi directed all federal funding for
agricultural research under the Hatch Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a-361i,
and all federal funding for extension services to farmers under
the Smith-Lever Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341-349, to Mississippi State,65
while Alcorn State received federal funding only under an 1890
federal statute providing funds for black land grant colleges.
63
“A land grant institution is defined as a college
university [sic] entitled to financial and programmatic support
from the federal government pursuant to a series of statutes
originating with the Morrill Acts enacted by Congress in 1862 and
1890.” Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1543. The Morrill Act of 1862
and subsequent statutes “defined the land grant college to be an
institution that provides instruction in agriculture and
mechanical arts, research in agriculture through the experimental
stations, and extension of knowledge to farmers through
cooperative extension programs.”
Id.
64
Cooperative extension is a joint effort of the federal
government, land grant institutions, and county governments to
transfer knowledge to farmers and assist in the development of
farm operations. Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1545. Cooperative
extension originated with the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 341-349, and is jointly financed by federal, state, and county
governments. Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1545.
65
Although the district court made no specific finding in
this regard, the evidence indicates that matching state funds
were directed to Mississippi State along with the Hatch and
Smith-Lever federal appropriations.
68
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1464. As a result, Mississippi State
enjoys land grant activities of much greater size and breadth
than Alcorn State.
Id. at 1466. The district court found that
“[o]peration and maintenance of two racially identifiable land
grant programs are traceable to de jure segregation and have
segregative effects.”
Id. at 1477.
The court made findings with respect to each of the
traditional land grant functions. The court found that the
quality of residential instruction is directly and positively
affected by agricultural research conducted on the campus of a
land grant institution, which is more extensive at Mississippi
State than at Alcorn State due to Mississippi State’s broader
research mission. Id. at 1464, 1466. Turning to agricultural
research, the court found:
With little or no exception, federal Hatch Act
dollars are administered in every state by a single
institution. In this time of fewer and fewer persons
entering the field of agriculture, but the system
nevertheless effectively feeding more and more people,
it would be inefficient and, thus, educationally
unsound to administer two separate agricultural
research programs in the state. To diffuse the program
would create two separate administrative entities,
difficulties in communication among the participating
scientists, and inefficient duplication.
Id. at 1465.
Similarly, the court found that it would be unsound to
administer federal funds for cooperative extension work through
two independent cooperative extension programs:
The general rule of practice is that Smith-Lever
funds are administered by only one university in each
state. . . . To duplicate administrative processes and
procedures as it relates to the delivery of extension
69
programming is unsound because the short duration of
extension educational programs makes program
coordination difficult from year to year.
Id. at 1465-66.
Although the court found that “the operation of two racially
identifiable land grant institutions might continue to have some
segregative effects that would be minuscule because of the small
number of students now majoring in agriculture,” id. at 1484, it
concluded that “[t]he current allocation of agricultural
education programs is educationally sound and there exists no
practical alternative to the current method of providing research
and extension services.”
Id. at 1466. With the exception of a
special funding allocation for the Small Farm Development Center
at Alcorn State, the remedial decree did not mandate any changes
in current land grant policies or practices. See
id. at 1494-96.
b. Arguments on appeal
The United States argues that “the court erred as a matter
of law when it failed to evaluate alternative proposals for
changes in the allocation of land grant programs short of
dividing the land grant programs equally between the 2
institutions.” U.S. Br. at 47. The United States further
contends that to the extent the district court’s conclusion that
there are no practical alternatives to the current method of
providing research and extension services “is a finding that
there are no educationally sound alternatives to the present
allocation of programs, that finding is clearly erroneous.” Id.
Private plaintiffs advance similar arguments. Both the United
70
States and private plaintiffs cite evidence that there are unmet
needs in Mississippi for new land grant programs, such as water
quality, that could be met at Alcorn State.
Defendants argue that the district court correctly found
that any segregative effects associated with the operation of two
racially identifiable land grant institutions could not be
remedied consistent with sound educational practices. Defendants
further contend that the addition of agricultural programs at
Alcorn State will not contribute to desegregation.
c. Analysis
The district court’s finding that it would be impractical
and educationally unsound to alter the current method of
providing research and extension services is well supported by
expert testimony in the record. As the district court found, the
primary source of federal funds for agricultural research is the
Hatch Act, and for cooperative extension funds the Smith-Lever
Act. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1464. Substantial evidence
indicates that federal (and matching state) funds appropriated
through these acts typically are administered by a single
institution in each state and that it would be unsound to
administer in Mississippi either two separate research programs
with Hatch funds or two separate extension programs with Smith-
Lever funds.
Contrary to the suggestion of plaintiffs, the district court
opinion does not limit its consideration of changes in the
allocation of research and extension funds to “equally” dividing
71
such funds between Mississippi State and Alcorn State. While the
court recognized that it would be inappropriate to break up the
academic and research facilities at Mississippi State and Alcorn
State and divide them “equally” between educational institutions
solely on the basis of Alcorn State’s heretofore restricted
development, see id. at 1466, this statement reflects a legal
standard rather than a finding drawn from the evidence on
practicability or educational soundness. The evidence led the
district court to conclude more generally that “[t]he current
allocation of agricultural education programs is educationally
sound and there exists no practical alternative to the current
method of providing research and extension services.” Id.66
Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court should have
considered alternatives other than an “equal” division of land
grant programs accordingly is without merit.
We read the district court’s conclusion that it would be
impractical and educationally unsound to change the current
practice of administering research and extension services
primarily through Mississippi State to be limited to research and
extension services funded through the Hatch and Smith-Lever Acts,
as those statutes are now configured. Significantly, we do not
read the district court opinion to preclude future implementation
of land grant programs at Alcorn State. Instead, the district
66
The district court similarly stated that “[t]he evidence
preponderates toward the conclusion that dividing the roles
within the extension arena between two universities rather than
as it is currently conducted is not an educationally sound
alternative.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1484.
72
court’s implicit decision not to order implementation at this
time at Alcorn State of a program in water quality or any other
land grant program offered by plaintiffs reflects the lack of
sufficient definition of any of these programs in this record.
The addition to the remedial decree, see Part III.B.2.d supra, of
a provision directing the Board, on a continuing basis, to study
and to report to the Monitoring Committee on programs that have a
reasonable chance of increasing other-race presence at Alcorn
State encompasses land grant programs as well as new academic
programs and permits further study of the programs proposed by
plaintiffs.
d. Conclusions regarding land grant programs
We affirm the district court’s ruling as it concerns land
grant functions at Mississippi State and Alcorn State.
4. Duplication of Programs
a. Fordice
Program duplication was one of the four remnants of the de
jure system identified by the Supreme Court in Fordice. 505 U.S.
at 738. Following the 1987 trial, the district court found
significant duplication of programs at the HBIs by the HWIs,
Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1541, but concluded that “there is no
proof” that such duplication “is directly associated with the
racial identifiability of institutions,” and that “there is no
proof that the elimination of unnecessary program duplication
would be justifiable from an educational standpoint or that its
elimination would have a substantial effect on student choice.”
73
Id. at 1561. The Supreme Court stated that “[i]t can hardly be
denied that such duplication was part and parcel of the prior
dual system of higher education -- the whole notion of ‘separate
but equal’ required duplicative programs in two sets of schools -
- and that the present unnecessary duplication is a continuation
of that practice.”
Fordice, 505 U.S. at 738. The Court
emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving that
present-day program duplication is not constitutionally defective
and held that the district court had improperly shifted the
burden to plaintiffs.
Id. The Court indicated that, on remand,
the district court should “consider the combined effects of
unnecessary program duplication with other policies, such as
differential admissions standards, in evaluating whether the
State had met its duty to dismantle its prior de jure segregated
system.”
Id. at 739.
b. District court ruling
The alleged remnant presented by plaintiffs to the district
court on remand was “[t]he policy and practice of unnecessarily
duplicating HBIs’ programs and course offerings at HWIs.” Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1498, 1502. The district court defined
“unnecessary duplication” as “‘those instances where two or more
institutions offer the same nonessential or noncore program.’”
Id. at 1441 (quoting Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1540). “‘Under
this definition, all duplication at the bachelors level of
nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work and all
duplication at the masters level and above are considered to be
74
unnecessary.’” Id.
The district court found that 40% of the noncore bachelors
programs offered at one or more of the three HBIs are
unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; 83% of
the masters programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are
unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; 60% of
the specialist programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are
unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; and 25%
of the doctoral programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are
unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs.
Id. at
1443. As a group, the HWIs have significantly more high demand,
noncore programs that are not duplicated anywhere else in the
system as compared with the HBIs as a group.
Id. at 1442.
Analyzing program duplication in general, the district court
found that the joint operation of duplicative offerings between
racially identifiable institutions and differential admissions
standards “raises a serious inference that this duplication
continues to promote segregation.” Id. at 1445. The court drew
a distinction, however, between proximate and nonproximate
institutions in making more specific findings on the question of
segregative effect. The court concluded that only program
duplication between proximate, racially identifiable institutions
was traceable to de jure segregation and had segregative effects.
Id. at 1477, 1486.
The court addressed two instances of program duplication
between proximate, racially identifiable institutions. First,
75
in its remedial decree, the district court ordered the Board to
“take whatever remaining steps are necessary, if any, to vest
complete institutional control in JSU over the facility formerly
known as the Universities Center in JSU.” Id. at 1495. The
Universities Center, located in Jackson, consisted of extension
programs operated by various HWIs. Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at
1542. In 1972 the Board voted to assign management
responsibilities for the Universities Center to Mississippi
State, the University of Mississippi, and Jackson State.
Id. At
the trials in 1987 and 1994, plaintiffs identified continued
operation of these extension programs in close proximity with
Jackson State as a vestige of the de jure system. The district
court’s order eliminates whatever competition for enrollment the
Universities Center fostered with respect to Jackson State.
Second, the court considered program duplication between
Mississippi Valley State and Delta State, which are proximate,
racially identifiable institutions in the Delta. The district
court found that
[b]ecause of the proximity of these institutions
(approximately 35 miles apart) and the similar scope of
their missions, (liberal arts undergraduate
institutions) [sic] location, costs and program
offerings would not appear to have a significant impact
on student choice. Rather, lower admissions standards
at MVSU appear more likely to attract black students of
the Delta region, since as a class black students score
lower on the standardized tests used for admission to
universities. In light of differing admissions
standards, it is clear that program duplication between
these two universities does foster segregation.
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1486. The district court noted that
merger of Mississippi Valley State and Delta State would
76
eliminate segregative duplication, id. at 1486, 1489, but
rejected the Board’s merger proposal for a number of other
reasons. See
id. at 1491-92. In so doing, the court indicated
that measures “less drastic” than merger should be considered.
Id. at 1492. In its conclusions of law, the district court
stated that “the Board must study program duplication between DSU
and MVSU to determine whether any segregative duplication may be
eliminated consistent with sound educational practices.”
Id. at
1494. Neither this directive nor any other remedy pertaining to
decreasing program duplication with respect to Mississippi Valley
State, however, was incorporated into the remedial decree.
Turning to program duplication between nonproximate
institutions, the district court found that “it has not been
established that program duplication between non-proximate
racially identifiable universities significantly fosters
segregation.” Id. at 1486. The court found that factors
affecting student choice included location, academic reputation,
and prestige, none of which is implicated by program duplication.
Id. Noting that admissions standards help to shape public
perceptions of an institution, the court found that “[t]he
consistently lower admissions standards in effect at the HBIs
have perpetuated the perception that these institutions are
inferior. Accordingly, the likelihood of significant
desegregation of HBIs is small and confined to those students who
are academically underprepared.”
Id. The court concluded that
absent differences in “prestige or public image,” unnecessary
77
duplication “has little to do with student choice.” Id. Program
duplication is most likely to influence students who are not
place-bound and who have the greatest flexibility in choosing an
institution. Id.67
The court concluded that “[s]ystem-wide admissions
standards, coupled with the financial and programmatic
enhancements of JSU and ASU, realistically promise to obviate or
lessen whatever segregative effects are potentially harbored by
the duplication between racially identifiable non-proximate
institutions.” Id. In addition, the court found that the
Board’s existing process for reviewing programs is an
educationally sound method of managing duplication in the system.
Id. Under this process, Board staff consults with university
officials whenever a program’s enrollment or graduation rates
drop below a certain level predetermined by the Board. The
university is then given an opportunity to justify continuation
of the program despite its deficiencies.
Id. at 1443.
Although the court indicated that uniform admissions,
programmatic enhancements, and the Board’s program review
procedures would adequately mitigate any potential segregative
effects of program duplication between nonproximate institutions,
it ordered the Board to study program duplication with respect to
67
Elsewhere, the district court found that operation of
Alcorn State and Mississippi State, which are nonproximate,
racially identifiable, land grant institutions, “might continue
to have some segregative effects that would be minuscule because
of the small number of students now majoring in agriculture.”
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1484.
78
Jackson State. The Board is to undertake this as part of a
general study:
4. The Board shall undertake an on-site
institutional study of JSU to determine the relative
strengths and weaknesses of its existing programs as
soon as is practicable. . . . The nature and extent of
duplication with other institutions in the system will
be addressed in this study in the context of
determining whether meaningful programmatic uniqueness
may be gained which would bring about significant white
enrollment through elimination and/or transfer of
existing programs at other institutions and the
feasibility/educational soundness of such elimination
and/or transfer.
Id. at 1494-95.
c. Arguments on appeal
The United States argues that the district court erred in
failing to order the Board “to undertake a system-wide effort to
reduce program duplication and to increase the numbers of unique
high demand offerings at the [HBIs].” U.S. Br. at 47-48. The
United States’s argument on this issue continues, in its
entirety, as follows:
The court’s finding that duplication between
nonproximate institutions does not cause segregation
contains no citations or references to record evidence,
and appears to be based upon its findings that other
factors, such as location, affect student choice,
rather than any evidence that duplication does not
affect choice. Again, the court impermissibly placed
the burden of proof on the plaintiffs, rather than on
the defendants. And its finding that the Board’s
existing program review process is adequate to
eliminate any segregative effect of duplication, is
clearly erroneous, since that process is not triggered
by the existence of duplication or the need to promote
desegregation.
Id. at 48 (citations omitted). Private plaintiffs do not raise
the issue of program duplication on appeal.
79
d. Analysis
No party contests the district court’s finding that program
duplication between proximate racially identifiable institutions
is traceable to de jure segregation and continues to have
segregative effects. We therefore accept this finding as
supported by the record and conclude that the United States’s
argument as it applies to Mississippi Valley State is well taken.
The district court itself stated that it would order a study of
program duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta
State, see Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1494, yet failed to
incorporate any such provision into the remedial decree. Again,
the omission may have been occasioned by the continuing
possibility that Mississippi Valley State would be merged with
Delta State. See Part
III.B.2.c supra. We cannot conclude that
the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a
study of program duplication at Mississippi Valley State when the
continued existence of Mississippi Valley State remained in
question. However, upon conclusion of the inquiry we have
ordered above, if the district court confirms that merger will no
longer be pursued, then the district court must incorporate into
its remedial decree a provision requiring the Board to study and
report to the Monitoring Committee on unnecessary program
duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta State.68
68
As we noted in our discussion of new academic programs,
Part III.B.2.b supra, the specific relief requested by the United
States on appeal with respect to enhancement of the HBIs is an
order requiring the Board to study and report to the Monitoring
Committee on actions that could make the HBIs more attractive to
80
The United States’s argument as it applies to nonproximate
institutions, on the other hand, is not briefed sufficiently for
this court to review this aspect of the district court’s ruling
for error. Cf. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied,
513 U.S. 868 (1994)(“A party who inadequately
briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”). It
is of no consequence that the district court did not cite to the
record in the portion of its opinion addressing the potential
segregative effects of program duplication in nonproximate
institutions. While citations to the record are helpful, and we
commend the district court for its abundant documentation of the
record throughout its opinion as a whole, the district court is
not required to provide them. Significantly, the United States
does not contend that the court’s finding of no segregative
effect in the context of nonproximate institutions is clearly
erroneous.
The United States argues, rather, that the court
impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on this issue to the
plaintiffs. While the court’s language might suggest imposition
of the burden of proof on plaintiffs (“it has not been
established that program duplication between non-proximate
racially identifiable universities significantly fosters
segregation”), its reasoning indicates reliance not on the
absence of evidence of segregative effect, but rather on the
white students. In light of this request and the structure of
the remedial decree, where we have ordered relief in the
enhancement area, we have done so in those terms.
81
presence of evidence that factors other than duplicative program
offerings have a more significant effect on student choice. We
are not persuaded that the court erred in its allocation of the
burden of proof.
The United States’s argument that the district court’s
finding “that the Board’s existing program review process is
adequate to eliminate any segregative effect of duplication is
clearly erroneous” mischaracterizes the district court’s finding.
The court found that “the Board’s program review process is an
educationally sound way of managing duplication in the system.”
Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1486. This finding is supported in the
record and makes no pretense of disposing of the issue of
potential segregative effects. The court went on to conclude
that “[s]ystem-wide admissions standards, coupled with the
financial and programmatic enhancements of JSU and ASU,
realistically promise to obviate or lessen whatever segregative
effects are potentially harbored by the duplication between
racially identifiable non-proximate institutions.”
Id. We note
that even in light of this conclusion, the district court did
order a study of program duplication at Jackson State to
determine if elimination or transfer of programs at other
institutions might help attract white students to Jackson State.
Id. at 1495.
e. Conclusions regarding program duplication
We affirm the district court’s findings and conclusions on
the issue of program duplication. If, on remand, the district
82
court confirms that the merger of Mississippi Valley State and
Delta State will no longer be pursued, the district court should
incorporate into its remedial decree a provision requiring the
Board to study and to report to the Monitoring Committee on
unnecessary program duplication between Mississippi Valley State
and Delta State.
5. Funding
a. District court ruling
Mississippi’s eight universities receive state funding
through both an annual legislative general support appropriation
and line item appropriations. The universities also rely on
self-generated funds, which include private contributions as well
as federal grants and loans. See id. at 1446-53; Ayers I, 674 F.
Supp. at 1546-48. In its overall findings of liability, the
district court concluded that “[f]unding policies and practices
follow the mission assignments and, to that degree only, are
traceable to prior de jure segregation.” Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1477. We discuss each source of state funding and the
relevant findings of the district court in turn.
The Board is responsible for allocating the legislative
general support appropriation among the universities. Beginning
in 1974, the Board utilized a funding formula that allocated this
funding to the universities in accordance with their mission
designations. In November of 1987, following the first trial,
the Board adopted a new funding formula under which level of
funding is determined by the size of a university’s enrollment,
83
faculty, and physical plant. Id. at 1449 & n.122. The 1987
funding formula consists of eight components: instruction,
research, public service, academic support, student services,
institutional support, operation and maintenance, and
scholarships and fellowships.
Id. at 1447. By far the largest
of these components is instruction, which accounted for more than
58% of the total budget in fiscal year 1994-95.
Id. The general
support appropriation does not include funds for capital
improvements.
Id.
The district court found that
because the size of the university’s enrollment
determines the level of funding, the larger
institutions with the highest percentage of upper level
programs obtain the greatest amount of funding. This
causes practically the same result as under the
previous formula that funded by institutional mission
designation.
Id. at 1449. Stated differently, the court found that “the
historical disparity in funding between the HWIs and HBIs once
practiced by law persists through perpetuation of the status quo
as it existed then.”
Id. at 1452-53. The court concluded,
however, that
[c]urrent policies and practices governing funding
of institutions are lawful. There is no per se funding
policy or practice traceable to the de jure era.
Attainment of funding “equity” between the HBIs and
HWIs is impractical and educationally unsound. It can
neither be attained within our lifetime nor . . . does
it realistically promise to guarantee further
desegregation given the present institutional
landscape. The testimony showed that the formula is
largely geared to funding the students without
consideration of race at whichever institution the
students choose to attend and at the program level the
students choose. Accordingly, the court finds that the
funding formula should not be altered.
84
Id. at 1453.
Line item appropriations fund specific activities and
programs offered at the public universities. Capital
improvements and repair and renovation of existing facilities are
funded through a combination of line item appropriations and
self-generated funds. The district court found that line item
funding accounts for a “substantial” share of total state
appropriations for institutions of higher education and
contributes “significantly” to the quality of any given
institution. Id. at 1451.
The district court found that, in general, line item funding
“disproportionately flows to the HWIs.” Id. In the context of
capital improvements and repair and renovation, however, the
court concluded that funding policies and practices do not follow
the mission assignments and are not traceable to de jure
segregation.
Id. at 1477. Although the State provided new
construction funds disproportionately to the HWIs during the late
1960s, figures from 1970 through 1994 indicate that the HBIs
received a percentage of capital improvements funds that exceeded
their percentage of systemwide enrollment.
Id. at 1454.69
69
From 1970 through 1980, when the HBIs had approximately
25% of the total systemwide enrollment, the HBIs received 39% of
the state appropriations for new construction. From 1981 until
1994, the HBIs averaged 22% of systemwide enrollment yet obtained
32% of total funding available for capital improvements. Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1454; see also Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1548-
49.
We note that these findings appear to conflict with evidence
credited by the district court that no HBI received a line item
appropriation until 1993. See Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1451.
85
The district court made distinct findings with respect to
library allocations and equipment availability. The court found
that the library collections of the HWIs have been consistently
superior to those of the HBIs for the past 40 years, and that the
physical space of the HBIs’ libraries is “of a lesser quality
overall” than that of the HWIs’ libraries. Id. at 1456-57. The
court likewise found that investment in equipment at the HWIs
exceeded that provided to the HBIs during the de jure era and
that, currently, the quality of fixed equipment at the HBIs is
inferior to that at the HWIs.
Id. at 1457. The court concluded
that “[p]olicies and practices governing equipment availability
and library allocations follow the mission assignments and, to
that degree, are traceable to de jure segregation.”
Id. at 1477.
As to the present segregative effects of library and
equipment funding policies, the district court found generally
that “[t]he nature and condition of facilities of a campus are
factors that influence student choice in deciding where to attend
college.” Id. at 1457. With respect to equipment in particular,
the court found that “[t]he quality and type of equipment
available on a campus is important from the student’s standpoint
in terms of adequately preparing the student to enter the job
market.”
Id. As to libraries, the court recognized that, as
part of an institution’s image, the library “plays a part in the
recruitment of students and faculty,”
id. at 1456, but also found
No party, however, challenges either finding, and resolution of
this apparent discrepancy is not essential to our ruling on the
issue of funding.
86
that “the number of books in the library is [not] a significant
feature of a university that influences student choice of where
to attend.” Id. at 1457. In light of these findings, the court
ultimately concluded that “increasing the size of the HBIs’
libraries beyond that consistent with their missions is not
educationally sound.”
Id. at 1458. The court found it
significant that the libraries at Alcorn State and Jackson State
are presently undergoing expansion. Id.70
The remedial decree orders the State to provide special
funds to both Jackson State and Alcorn State in addition to the
funds necessary for the programmatic additions outlined
earlier.71 At Jackson State, the State is to provide, per Board
proposal over a five-year period, up to $15 million earmarked for
property acquisition, campus entrances, campus security, and
grounds enhancement. For the benefit of Jackson State and Alcorn
State, respectively, the State is to establish two $5 million
endowment trusts, “with the income therefrom to be used to
provide funds for continuing educational enhancement and racial
diversity, including recruitment of white students and
scholarships for white applicants in a number and an amount
70
The court found that the State legislature had recently
approved a $12 million expansion of the library at Jackson State,
already underway at the time of the district court’s opinion.
Expansion of the library at Alcorn State was also underway, with
$3 million having already been invested. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1457.
71
The decree contains a general provision that orders the
State to provide funding for all measures ordered therein. Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at 1496.
87
determined by the court upon recommendation from the Monitoring
Committee.” Id. at 1495.72
b. Arguments on appeal
Plaintiffs argue that the district court misapplied Fordice
in concluding that “[t]here is no per se funding policy or
practice traceable to the de jure era.” Plaintiffs contend that
disparities in current funding are traceable to the de jure
system, have discriminatory effects, and should be reformed to
the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational
practices.
Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred by
failing to consider adjustments to the funding formula to take
into account student financial need and the higher costs of
remedial education, “or increases in funding to the [HBIs] to aid
them in overcoming the cumulative effects of decades of
underfunding.” U.S. Br. at 44.73 Plaintiffs specifically
request funding to enhance existing facilities, including
72
The court found that “the endowment for JSU . . . and
the funds proposed to be set aside to purchase adjoining land are
sound steps toward correcting JSU’s image.” Ayers II, 879 F.
Supp. at 1485. Likewise, the court found that “the proposed
funding for the small farm development center and the proposed
endowment . . . promise realistically to solve ASU’s other-race
presence problems and is [sic] otherwise educationally sound.”
Id. at 1486.
73
Plaintiffs suggest in their briefs that the district
court erroneously focused solely on achieving funding “equity”
between the HBIs and the HWIs. While the district court found
that “[a]ttainment of funding ‘equity’ between the HBIs and HWIs
is impractical and educationally unsound,” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp.
at 1453, the court did not purport to rely exclusively on this
finding for its determination that “the funding formula should
not be altered.”
Id.
88
libraries and equipment, at the HBIs.74
Defendants contend that the district court correctly found
that no current funding policy is traceable to de jure
segregation. Moreover, defendants argue that the dedication of
funds for general institutional enhancement does not contribute
to the desegregation of historically black institutions.
c. Analysis
We find the district court’s ruling to be supported by the
record and consistent with Fordice. Fordice required the
district court to examine challenged policies and practices to
determine if they had roots in the de jure era. The district
court correctly focused on the traceability of policies and
practices that result in funding disparities rather than the
traceability of the disparities themselves, as plaintiffs urge.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that the
funding formula itself is not traceable to de jure segregation.
Unlike the previous formula, which allocated funds based on
mission designations, the present formula allocates funds as a
function of the size of each institution’s enrollment, faculty,
and physical plant. While the formula responds to conditions
that to a significant degree have resulted from the mission
designations (and consequently results in the HWIs receiving a
74
Plaintiffs request funding to develop and support new or
transferred programs and to enhance existing programs. Their
arguments relating to programs have been addressed in Parts
III.B.2 and III.B.3 supra. Plaintiffs also suggest that funding
increases at the HBIs could provide resources to hire new faculty
or increase the pay of existing faculty. Arguments related to
faculty hiring and salaries are addressed in Part III.C infra.
89
greater proportion of funds), the manner in which the formula
does so is guided by valid educational concerns and is not linked
to any prior discriminatory practice.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court should have
considered adjustments to the funding formula in two respects,
neither of which has merit. First, plaintiffs argue that the
formula should be adjusted for the higher cost of remedial
education, citing evidence that a disproportionately high number
of black students in Mississippi are underprepared for college
and that such an adjustment would encourage the HWIs to provide
remedial courses and to attract black students and would aid the
HBIs in providing the remedial instruction needed by their
students. Plaintiffs have not, however, identified any traceable
policy related to the funding of remedial education, nor have
they identified any record evidence that remedial education as
structured under the remedial decree is or is likely to be
underfunded; the decree itself requires the State to provide
funding for the summer program. If, after examination of the
results of the summer program implementation, the district court
finds that the program needs to be modified or expanded, then the
district court should order appropriate funding at that time.75
We have also ordered the district court to reconsider paragraph 2
75
Private plaintiffs contend that because the funding
formula does not provide additional funds to meet the needs of
less adequately prepared students, the formula encourages HWI
“disinterest” in using available exceptions to admissions. This
argument is moot in light of our ruling on undergraduate
admissions standards.
90
of the remedial decree insofar as it eliminates the remedial
courses previously offered at each of the eight universities.
If, after such reconsideration, the district court concludes that
any or all of these courses should be reinstated, then it should
order appropriate funding.
Second, plaintiffs argue that the funding formula should be
adjusted to take into account the proportion of students at a
university who are in need of financial aid. As it currently
operates, the funding formula provides funds for scholarships and
fellowships (which are only a portion of the total financial aid
available to students at each university) on the basis of each
university’s tuition income.76 The district court found that
this practice is neither unusual nor unique to Mississippi, but
that in Mississippi the universities that charge the highest
tuition -- the three comprehensive HWIs -- also generally have
the largest proportion of students who have little or no need for
financial assistance. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1451. Again,
however, plaintiffs have identified no traceable policy
76
According to evidence presented by the Board, the
“scholarships and fellowships” component of the formula is
defined as follows:
Includes expenditures for scholarships and fellowships
in the form of outright grants to students selected by
the institution and financed from current funds,
restricted or unrestricted. It also should include
trainee stipends, prizes, and awards. The recipient of
an outright grant is not required to perform service to
the institution as consideration for the grant, nor is
he expected to repay the amount of the grant to the
funding source.
Bd. R-274.
91
concerning the adequacy of scholarship and fellowship funds
provided to the HBIs. Any potential segregative effects of the
failure of the formula to take financial need into account is a
function of the socioeconomic status of black applicants, not a
traceable policy of the de jure system.
Plaintiffs’ argument for general funds to enhance facilities
is not supported by this record. The district court found “no
pattern of inequity in funding in recent years for the HBIs as a
group” with respect to facilities. Id. at 1457. The court’s
finding that funding for capital improvements and repair and
renovation disproportionately benefitted the HBIs during the
1970s and 1980s is supported by the record, as is the court’s
finding that the inferior maintenance of the HBIs is not due to
funding inequities but may result from decisions at the HBIs to
set aside operation and maintenance funds for other uses. See
id. at 1455, 1458.
As to library allocations, the district court’s finding that
it would be educationally unsound to increase the size of the
holdings of a university’s library beyond the scope of its
mission is not clearly erroneous. Funds for library acquisitions
are provided through the academic support component of the
funding formula, and plaintiffs identify no evidence that this
method of providing library funding is itself traceable to the de
jure system.
The court’s findings and conclusions concerning equipment
funding are more difficult for us to interpret. The court found
92
that the quality of fixed equipment, such as science lab
furnishings, at the HBIs is inferior to that at the HWIs. Id. at
1457. Likewise, the court found that the technical and
scientific equipment at the HWIs is “more advanced and generally
in better condition than that of the HBIs.”
Id. We are unable
to determine based on this record, however, whether these
equipment disparities implicate the funding formula, line item
appropriations for capital improvements, or self-generated funds.
Nor are we able to determine the reasons for the disparities,
which the district court opinion leaves unexplained. The court’s
determination that policies and practices governing equipment
availability follow the mission assignments is perplexing in view
of overlaps in the missions of the eight universities. Each
university offers, for instance, undergraduate instruction.
Undergraduate instruction in foreign languages, chemistry,
biology, or computing, to take a few examples, benefits from the
availability of appropriate equipment. Libraries likewise
benefit from the availability of modern technological equipment.
There is no apparent reason why the mission assignments, insofar
as they relate to common university features such as these,
should result in disparities in equipment quality between the
HBIs and the HWIs. Put somewhat differently, if the different
mission assignments are adduced as a reason for marked
disparities in equipment that is necessary or desirable for the
undergraduate education that is provided at all eight
universities, then they may indicate the existence of a policy or
93
practice traceable to the de jure era that has present
segregative effects in that equipment quality may affect student
choice. We therefore remand the issue of equipment funding to
the district court for further factfinding on the causes of the
disparities. To the extent the disparities are attributable to
the mission assignments and have segregative effects that will be
reduced by additional funding, relief may be in order.
d. Conclusions regarding funding
We affirm the district court’s findings and conclusions
regarding funding, except with regard to funding of equipment.
We remand the issue of equipment funding to the district court
for further factfinding on the cause and segregative effect of
the disparities, and, if necessary, the implementation of
appropriate relief.
C. Employment of Black Faculty and Administrators
At both the 1987 and 1994 trials, plaintiffs challenged
defendants’ employment policies and practices on the ground that
they perpetuated segregation by resulting in racially
identifiable faculty and administrators at Mississippi’s public
institutions of higher education and in race-based differences in
faculty rank, tenure, and salary. Id. at 1459. After hearing
extensive testimony on remand, the district court found that no
current employment policies or practices are traceable to de jure
segregation.
Id. at 1477.
Plaintiffs contend on appeal that the dearth of black
94
faculty and administrators at the HWIs is traceable to the dual
system and continues to have segregative effects by impeding the
ability of those institutions to recruit black students. While
not challenging the district court’s finding that the HWIs have
been making genuine efforts to recruit more black faculty and
have hired more black faculty than would be statistically
predicted, plaintiffs nevertheless argue that this finding
addresses only entry-level hiring and not the limited employment
of blacks in tenured faculty and administrative positions.
Plaintiffs therefore maintain that the district court was
constitutionally required to order the Board to increase efforts
to hire and promote more black individuals to these levels. In
addition, plaintiffs contend that the district court should have
ordered relief with regard to the disparities in faculty salaries
at the HBIs and HWIs.
Under the de jure system, no blacks served as faculty,
administrators, or managers at the HWIs. Id. at 1459. The
district court found during the initial trial in this case that
Mississippi has since adopted race-neutral hiring practices.
Id.
As the district court recognized, however, the inquiry on remand
must go beyond implementation of race-neutral practices and focus
“upon the identification of remnants within the hiring process
that continue to foster segregation or the racial identifiability
of the institutions of higher learning in Mississippi.”
Id.
Although the district court found that the HWIs remain
racially identifiable at the level of administrators and tenured
95
faculty,77 id. at 1462, it also found that since 1974 the HWIs
have hired more black faculty than would be expected based on a
statistical analysis of the qualified labor pool and national
hiring demands.
Id. at 1461, 1463. Mississippi’s HWIs compete
with other universities, particularly predominantly black
universities, as well as business, industry, and government for
the relatively small number of blacks who earn doctorate degrees
each year.78
Id. at 1461. Under these circumstances, the
district court found that “[a]lthough the racial predominance of
faculty and administrators at the HWIs and the shortage of
qualified black faculty are to some extent attributable to de
jure segregation, the HWIs are making sincere and serious efforts
to increase the percentages of African-American faculty and
administrators at these institutions.”
Id. at 1463.
The relatively small number of blacks in tenured faculty and
administrative positions at the HWIs may be attributable at least
in part to the de jure system, but racial identifiability at
these levels itself does not establish a constitutional
77
For the period 1986-92, 94% of the full professors at
the HWIs were white, and only 2% were black. For fiscal year
1992, 98% of the administrators at the HWIs were white, and 2%
black. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1460.
78
In 1991, for instance, blacks earned 3.8% of doctorates
awarded to U.S. citizens nationwide. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at
1461. In general, only about 40% of black holders of doctorates
earned in any given year move into academia.
Id. The district
court’s 1987 findings reflect a similar shortage of minority
scholars; in addition, the district court found that out-of-state
institutions are frequently able to use higher salaries to lure
black professors away from Mississippi universities after they
have gained experience. Ayers
I, 674 F. Supp. at 1537-38.
96
violation. See Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743. As we noted earlier,
Fordice rejects the notion that the State must remedy all present
discriminatory effects without regard to “whether such
consequences flow from policies rooted in the prior system.”
Id.
at 730 n.4. Plaintiffs identify no such policies with respect to
selection of tenured faculty and administrators.79 The district
court found, rather, that black doctorate holders are relatively
few and in high demand,80 that representation of blacks in the
faculty ranks of the HWIs exceeds reasonable expectations, and
that the HWIs actively employ a variety of measures to attract
and retain qualified black faculty. Ayers
II, 879 F. Supp. at
1461-62.
79
With respect to administrative positions, private
plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to consider
evidence indicating that the Board approves all such hires, and
in the case of at least three institutions the Board makes such
approvals with knowledge of the race of the prospective
employees. Private plaintiffs link this practice with evidence
that in the history of the system, only nine black persons have
served at the level of dean or above at the HWIs, and with
testimony of black faculty members concerning unsuccessful
efforts to secure administrative positions at MSU.
We find that the district court did not err by failing to
find a traceable practice on the basis of such evidence. Without
more, these facts are insufficient to establish that the Board
maintains a practice of discriminating against black candidates
for administrative openings; notably absent is any claim that the
Board refused to approve any qualified black candidates.
80
The district court did not link the limited number of
black doctorate holders with the dearth of high-level black
administrators. We note that there is record evidence to
indicate that, to the extent that a terminal degree is a
necessary or desirable qualification for an administrative
position (as it may be, for example, in the case of an academic
dean), the scarcity of black doctorate holders found by the
district court would adversely affect the number of high-level
black administrators.
97
The very low percentages of blacks holding either full
professor status or administrative rank at the HWIs are indeed a
sobering reflection of longstanding efforts to limit the
educational opportunities of black citizens, not in Mississippi
alone. In view of the above findings, however, and combined with
the lack of evidence linking any present policies to the de jure
system, we find no error in the district court’s ruling. We
conclude that the district court correctly applied the standards
articulated in Fordice in determining that “[t]here is no current
policy or practice in a relevant sense that produces the shortage
of available black faculty, nor can liability be based on prior
exclusionary admissions policies and practices that reduced the
qualified pool, in light of the State’s continuous substantial
affirmative efforts to correct this imbalance.” Id. at 1463.
With respect to disparities in faculty salaries, the
district court did not err in declining to order relief in light
of its finding that such disparities reflect legitimate
differences, keyed to discipline and rank, in average faculty
salaries at peer institutions in the region. Id. at 1459. The
court found it significant, moreover, that, although funding for
faculty salaries is provided by the State under the formula, each
institution has the autonomy to determine the number of faculty
positions needed, their rank within the university, and the
compensation for that rank.
Id. Finding no traceable policy,
the court properly declined to order relief.
We affirm the district court’s findings of fact and
98
conclusions of law on the subject of the defendants’ employment
policies and practices.
D. System Governance
Plaintiffs argued before the district court that vestiges of
the de jure system could be found with respect to the composition
of the Board and its staff. All institutions of higher learning
in Mississippi have been governed by a single entity -- the Board
of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning -- since
1932. No black person served on the Board until 1972, and no
black person was appointed to serve as a professional staff
member until 1974. Id. at 1473. At present, the twelve members
of the Board are appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the Mississippi senate.
The district court found no evidence of a current practice
of denying or diluting the representation of black citizens on
the Board. Id. At the time of trial, the Board had three black
members and its immediate past president was black.
Id. Of the
Board’s 108 employees, 26 were black.
Id. The district court
noted that black Board staff members hold professional positions
of responsibility such as Assistant Commissioner for Academic
Affairs and Associate Commissioner of Academic Affairs.
Id.
Private plaintiffs contend that the district court ignored
evidence of Board selection practices that minimize the
participation of black persons on the Board, as well as evidence
of the Board’s practice of hiring blacks for only low-level
99
positions on staff.
With respect to Board composition, private plaintiffs cite
evidence that from 1972 to 1992, only six out of 24 to 30 newly
seated Board members were black. We are unable to conclude on
the basis of this bare statistic that the district court clearly
erred in finding no traceable policy or practice concerning Board
composition. After reviewing both the history of black persons’
exclusion from the Board and the post-1972 role of black Board
members, the district court found that “[t]he fact that blacks
have actively participated on the Board for more than twenty
years indicates that no current exclusionary policy exists.” Id.
As with employment, numerical disparities alone do not establish
liability for maintaining remnants of the prior dual system.
With respect to Board staff, private plaintiffs advance two
related contentions. First, they argue that the district court’s
findings regarding staffing totals are clearly erroneous. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that this argument is without
merit.81 Second, private plaintiffs argue that a significant
majority of staff positions held by blacks are in low-level job
categories. This argument is unavailing for reasons similar to
those discussed above; private plaintiffs rely on employment
figures without regard to other information that might reveal a
81
Private plaintiffs argue that blacks held only 23 of a
total of 105 staff positions in 1992. Private plaintiffs’ own
exhibit, however, indicates that the district court did not err
in its finding that blacks held 26 of 108 staff positions in that
year. Private plaintiffs offer no explanation in their briefs
for this disparity.
100
traceable practice with discriminatory effects, such as the
relevant pool of qualified candidates or the particulars of the
appointment process. Accordingly, we do not disturb the district
court’s finding of no traceable policy or practice in the area of
system governance. We affirm the district court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the subject of system governance.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and remedial decree except
as follows:
1. In affirming the district court’s
implementation of the Board’s admissions standards, we
do not affirm the elimination of the remedial courses
previously offered at each of the eight universities.
We remand this issue for immediate reconsideration in
the light of this opinion. If the district court
concludes that any or all of the previously offered
remedial courses should be reinstated, the same should
be implemented, with appropriate funding, to be
effective beginning with the academic year 1997-98.
The district court should provide findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its decision regarding
reinstatement.
2. We reverse the district court’s finding that
the use of ACT cutoff scores as a criterion for the
101
award of scholarships at the HWIs is not traceable to
the de jure system and does not currently foster
segregation. We remand for determination of the
practicability and educational soundness of reforming
this aspect of the undergraduate scholarship policies
at the HWIs and the implementation, if necessary, of
appropriate remedial relief to be effective beginning
with the academic year 1998-99.
3. We direct the district court on remand to
clarify the status of the Board’s proposal to merge
Mississippi Valley State with Delta State and, if the
district court confirms that merger will no longer be
pursued, to vacate paragraph 12 of the remedial decree
and to incorporate into the remedial decree (a) a
provision directing the Board to study and to report to
the Monitoring Committee on new academic programs that
have a reasonable chance of increasing other-race
presence at Mississippi Valley State and (b) a
provision requiring the Board to study and to report to
the Monitoring Committee on unnecessary program
duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta
State.
4. We direct the district court on remand to
incorporate into the remedial decree a provision
directing the Board to study and report to the
Monitoring Committee on new academic and land grant
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programs that have a reasonable chance of increasing
other-race presence at Alcorn State.
5. On the issue of accreditation, the district
court should determine the status of current efforts to
achieve accreditation of existing business programs at
Jackson State and order appropriate relief, if
necessary, to ensure that the Board is taking steps
commensurate with its role in this accreditation
process.
6. We remand the issue of equipment funding to
the district court for further factfinding on the cause
and segregative effect of the disparities, and, if
necessary, the implementation of appropriate relief.
We understand the district court’s continuing jurisdiction
to encompass the evaluation of the effectiveness of the spring
screening and summer remedial program, as a component of the
admissions system, in achieving its intended objectives of
identifying and admitting those students who are capable, with
reasonable remediation, of doing college level work but who fail
to qualify for regular admission. If the district court
ultimately concludes that this program (as it may be modified) is
unable to any significant degree to achieve its objectives, then
the court should, if possible, identify and implement another
practicable and educationally sound method for achieving those
objectives in sufficient time for the academic year 1999-2000.
If, after examination of the results of the summer program
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implementation, the district court finds that the program needs
to be modified or expanded, then the district court should order
appropriate funding at that time.
Any further appeals shall be to this panel.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each party shall bear
its own costs.
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