Filed: Dec. 15, 1997
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 97-20102 Summary Calendar JIMMY W. BARBER Plaintiff-Appellee VERSUS NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC.; NABORS LOFFLAND DRILLING COMPANY Defendants NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC. Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas December 4, 1997 Before BENAVIDES, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge: I. The opinion previously entered in this case is hereby withdrawn an
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT NO. 97-20102 Summary Calendar JIMMY W. BARBER Plaintiff-Appellee VERSUS NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC.; NABORS LOFFLAND DRILLING COMPANY Defendants NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC. Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas December 4, 1997 Before BENAVIDES, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge: I. The opinion previously entered in this case is hereby withdrawn and..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 97-20102
Summary Calendar
JIMMY W. BARBER
Plaintiff-Appellee
VERSUS
NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC.; NABORS LOFFLAND DRILLING COMPANY
Defendants
NABORS DRILLING U.S.A., INC.
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
December 4, 1997
Before BENAVIDES, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
I.
The opinion previously entered in this case is hereby
withdrawn and replaced with the following. This action was brought
by Jimmy Barber of Taylorsville, Mississippi, against his former
employer, Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. (hereinafter “Nabors”), a
subsidiary of Nabors Industries of Houston, Texas, claiming a
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter
“ADA”). 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Nabors refused to allow Barber
1
to return to his job as a toolpusher on an oil drilling rig after
he received treatment for a back injury (bulging disc) suffered
while on the job. Barber’s doctor had refused to release him to do
anything more than light duty work, but Barber maintained then and
maintains now that he was capable of performing the essential
functions of the toolpusher job in spite of his disability and the
medical assessment thereof. The matter was tried before a jury in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the
amount of $154,188.50 for back pay and benefits and $750,000.00 for
punitive damages, and the district court entered judgment on the
jury’s verdict. On motion of Nabors, the district court reduced
the punitive damages award to $300,000.00, consistent with the
applicable damages cap. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Nabors’
contemporaneous motion for judgment as a matter of law, or,
alternatively, for new trial was denied. The district court
entered its modified judgment on January 7, 1997.1
Nabors brings this appeal aserting the following alleged
errors:
1. Whether the District Court erred by entering judgment on
the jury’s verdict when the work limitations of
Plaintiff, as established by his own doctors, would
prevent him from performing the essential functions of
his job;
2. Whether the District Court erred by refusing to give the
Defendant-Appellant’s requested jury instructions on what
considerations to use when identifying the essential
1
Final judgment was for $154,188.50 in back pay and benefits, plus
$300,000.00 in punitive damages, plus $78,925.00 in attorneys fees and
$5,430.35 in costs awarded over Defendant’s objection.
2
functions of the job and the limits of an employer’s duty
of reasonable accomodation;
3. Whether the judgment entered should be reformed to
eliminate an award of punitive damages because of the
lack of evidence that defendant acted with malice or
reckless indifference.
II.
On March 1, 1993, while working for Appellant’s predecessor in
interest, Grace Drilling, Plaintiff/Appellee, Jimmy Barber, injured
his back moving a nitrogen tank in the course of his duties as a
toolpusher on an oil drilling rig. On June 1, 1993, Grace Drilling
sold out to Appellant, Nabors Drilling, U.S.A., Inc. On or about
June 28, 1993, Barber informed his superior that he needed time off
from work to seek treatment of his back injury.
After consulting several physicians, Barber was eventually
referred to Dr. Kerry L. Bernard, a neurosurgeon in Hattiesburg,
Mississippi, where he was evaluated with an eye toward possible
surgery. A bulging disc was confirmed at the L-4 and L-5 lumbar
vertebrae, and, following a myelogram, Dr. Bernard counselled
against surgery in favor of epidural steroid injections.2 The
first injection was given by Dr. David McKellar and was successful
in relieving Barber’s pain. Nearly a month later, on September 20,
1993, Dr. Bernard was impressed enough with Barber’s improvement
that he gave Barber a release to return to work on light duty.
After two weeks of light duty, Barber was to contact Dr. Bernard by
2
The injections were to be accompanied by occupational therapy at the
Methodist Hospital Wellness Center in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, however,
Barber’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier refused to pay for it and
his enrollment was cancelled.
3
phone for a follow-up. If Barber’s condition remained good, Dr.
Bernard would give him a release to work with only two
restrictions: lifting no more than twenty-five pounds and climbing
no more than fifteen feet.3 If Barber’s condition remained good
after three months on this restricted basis, Dr. Bernard would
reassess him for the possibility of removing the restrictions.4
Immediately after receiving the light-duty release from Dr.
Bernard, Barber attempted to contact Doug Blaire at Nabors’ Tyler,
Texas, office on 12 to 15 occasions about possibly returning to
work, but was unable to reach him. After approximately a month of
trying, Barber contacted Billy Malone, operations manager at
Nabors’ New Braunfels, Texas, office. Mr. Malone was going to
talk to certain executives at Nabors about whether Barber could
return to work and get back in touch with Barber. After several
more weeks of phone-tag, Barber was finally informed that he would
not be allowed to return to work as a toolpusher without a “full
medical release”. Mr. Barber explained that he could perform the
functions of toolpusher just as he had in the period from March 1,
1993, when he was injured, until June 28, 1993, when he went for
treatment. Nevertheless, Nabors was steadfast in its position that
3
There is some conflict as to whether the climbing restriction was
simply no climbing over fifteen feet or no unsecured climbing over fifteen
feet. In his direct testimony, Barber stated that Dr. Bernard was going
to limit him to no unsecured climbing over fifteen feet. However, Dr.
Bernard’s letter of September 20, 1993, to Dr. Bertha Blanchard, who
referred Barber to Dr. Bernard, states that the limitation was to be simply
a “15 feet climb restriction”.
4
Dr. Bernard did express some reservation about whether Barber would
ever be able to lift up to one-hundred pounds, which, according to Barber,
was included in his job description.
4
Barber could not return to work as a toolpusher without a “full
medical release”.
Since Barber was not allowed to return to work on light duty,
he did not return to Dr. Bernard for his scheduled two-week
reassessment. Meanwhile, four to six weeks after Barber’s
September steroid injection, the effect began to wear off and his
symptoms returned just as intensely as before. Thereafter,
starting on November 30, 1993, Dr. Bernard continued to treat
Barber conservatively with epidural steroid injections. The
successive injections provided no relief. After eliminating
degenerative hip disease as a cause of Barber’s pain, Dr. Bernard
discussed with Barber the option of lumbar decompressive surgery.
Dr. Bernard discussed with Barber the risks and potential
benefits of decompressive surgery. The risks include: bleeding
requiring transfusion; infection; increased neurological deficit
(weakness/paralysis, sensory loss, loss of bowel/bladder/sexual
function); cerebral spinal fluid leak; spinal instability; and
general anesthetic risks including death. On the other hand, Dr.
Bernard concluded that Barber’s chances of significant improvement
following the surgery were considerably less than the eighty-five
percent (85%) chance quoted to most patients undergoing this type
of operation. Dr. Bernard explained to Barber that he should
consider surgery only if he was completely unsatisfied with his
current situation and could not live with his pain.
Dr. Bernard also discussed vocational rehabilitation
concerning various job options, but concluded that whether or not
5
Barber wished to pursue those job options was between Barber and
his insurance carrier. In addition, Dr. Bernard explained that he
would not release Barber to work except on light duty status,
unless Barber completed a work conditioning program to his
satisfaction.5 Barber returned to Dr. Bernard on several occasions
for reassessment from February 28 to December 29, 1994. On each
occasion he presented with the same symptoms. At least once during
this period Dr. Bernard again discussed with Barber the possibility
of surgery.6
Barber was unable to find employment from September, 1993
until July, 1995, at which time he started his own business.
During that period, Barber testified that his doctor (the record
does not reveal which doctor) vetoed his attempts to work as an
insurance salesman who needed to drive frequently and as a truck
driver. Barber testifed that he has been unable to do almost every
job for which he is qualified, which the rehabilitation people
suggested to him, because of the medical assessment of his
disability. Since Barber had not elected to have decompressive
surgery and had not completed a work conditioning program, the
medical assessment of Barber’s disability, as of the time of trial,
was that he was not fit to perform anything more than light duty
5
Barber testified on cross-examination that he never had the surgery,
and never underwent work hardening or conditioning.
6
On June 22, 1994, after concluding that, short of a major
decompressive operation, there was nothing to offer Barber to potentially
relieve his lower back and lower extremity complaints, Dr. Bernard
discussed the option of decompressive surgery with Barber for the third
time.
6
work.
III.
A.
Under Title I of the ADA, no covered employer may discriminate
against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual” in any of the “terms, conditions
[or] privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). In
addition, the ADA imposes upon the employer the duty to provide
reasonable accomodations for known disabilities unless doing so
would result in undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(b)(5)(A). To establish a prima facie violation of the ADA Barber
had to prove: 1) that he had a disability; 2) that he was otherwise
qualified for the job of toolpusher, and; 3) that Nabors refused to
hire him back because of his disability. Robinson v. Global Marine
Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1996). In order to
determine whether Barber was otherwise qualified to be a
toolpusher, the jury must have concluded that he could perform the
essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable
accomodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Taylor v. Principal Financial
Group, Inc.,
93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir. 1996). The determination
of whether Barber was otherwise qualified depends on the resolution
of two corollary questions: 1) what are the essential functions of
the toolpusher’s job, and; 2) are the proposed accomodations, if
any, reasonable? The second corollary question would be irrelevant
if the jury found that Barber could perform the essential functions
of the toolpusher job even without reasonable accomodation.
7
There is no controversy on this appeal about whether Barber
was disabled within the meaning of the ADA or whether Nabors
refused to hire him back because of his disability. The
controversy on this appeal centers around whether there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Barber was
otherwise qualified to do the job of toolpusher, whether the jury
was adequately instructed to make that determination and whether
the evidence supported an award of punitive damages.
B.
Whether the District Court erred by entering judgment on the jury’s
verdict when the work limitations of Plaintiff, as established by
his own doctors, would prevent him from performing the essential
functions of his job.
Appellant argues that reasonable jurors could not have
concluded that Barber was a “qualified individual with a
disabilility” as required to make out a prima facie case under the
ADA, because Barber was not capable of performing the essential
functions of the toolpusher position either with or without
reasonable accomodation. Appellant describes several functions
which are supposedly essential and which Barber cannot perform, to
wit:
1) Filling in for other crewmembers, namely the driller,
especially on a horizontal or directional well;
2) Retrieving equipment and replacement parts needed to keep the
rig running from a stacked rig or elsewhere at the equipment yard;
3) Responding to a fire on the rig, because of the weight of the
fire extinguishers;
4) Strapping on and wearing an oxygen tank, gas mask and
8
breathing apparatus, if sensors indicate the presence of poisonous
gases on an H2S well.7 Appellant maintains that these functions
are essential to the toolpusher position and that Barber cannot
perform them, as indicated by the medical assessment of his
capabilities.
First, we cannot say, on the facts of this case, that any or
all of the above listed emergency duties as a matter of law are
essential functions of the toolpusher job. If we venture to
second-guess then we simply usurp the most critical function of the
jury in ADA cases, i.e., the injection of some indispensable common
sense in the determination of what is or is not an essential
function. When a statutory scheme such as the ADA necessitates
some seemingly arbitrary line-drawing exercise, courts of law do
well to refer the question to the jury, and consequently the
appellate court must respect the jury’s call, unless it is
unsupportable by the evidence. Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359,
367 (5th Cir. 1997)(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1) (jury’s verdict
must be upheld unless there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did).
A highly deferential standard is especially appropriate with
regard to the jury’s determination of what the essential functions
of the job are, since the evidence, as in this case, most often
consists of post hoc descriptions of what the employee was expected
to do and what he actually did, which necessarily requires the jury
7
An H2S well is a well where there is the possibility that Hydrogen
Sulfite, a poisonous gas, will be released by the drilling process.
9
to judge the credibililty of witnesses and the veracity of their
testimony. In as much as the jury’s verdict in this case rests on
the conclusion that the above listed emergency functions are
marginal rather than essential, there is no error. Even though we
might disagree with the jury’s conclusion, that is not the
standard, and on this record the jury’s determination was supported
by a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.
The jury’s determination that Barber was otherwise qualified
for the toolpusher job might also rest on the conclusion that he
could in fact perform the above listed emergency functions. That
conclusion would be problematic in light of the medical evidence
relating to Barber’s physical capabilities at the time he sought to
return to work. However, it is at least as likely that the jury’s
verdict was based on a determination that the essential functions
of the toolpusher job were the physically benign supervisory
functions described by Barber. Therefore, any possible error is
avoided.
C.
Whether the District Court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on what considerations to use when identifying the essential
functions of the job and when determining the limits of an
employer’s duty of reasonable accomodation.
This court has previously articulated the standard of review
for challenges to the district court’s jury instructions as
follows:
First, the challenges must demonstrate that the charge as
a whole creates “substantial and ineradicable doubt
whether the jury has been properly guided in its
deliberations.” Second, even if the jury instructions
were erroneous, we will not reverse if we determine,
10
based upon the entire record, that the challenged
instruction could not have affected the outcome of the
case. If the party wishes to complain on appeal of the
district court’s refusal to give the proffered
instruction, that party must show as a threshold matter
that the proposed instruction correctly stated the law.
Flores v. Cameron County, Tex., 92 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.
1996)(quoting Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co.,
54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th
Cir. 1995)). See also F.D.I.C. v. Mijalis,
15 F.3d 1314, 1318 (5th
Cir. 1994).
i.
In order to determine that Barber was otherwise qualified to
be a toolpusher, the Jury must have concluded that he could perform
the essential functions of the job, either with or without
reasonable accomodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Taylor v. Principal
Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir. 1996). On the
issue of the essential functions of Barber’s job, the relevant
portions of Jury Instruction No.3 are as follows:
The phrase “essential functions” of an employment
position means the basic, fundamental duties of the job
the person with a disability holds or desires. Essential
functions do not include the marginal functions of the
position. A job function may be considered essential for
any of several reasons, including but not limited to the
following:
(1) because the reason the position exists is to perform
that function,
(2) because of the limited number of employees available
among whom the performance of that job function can be
distributed, and/or,
(3) because the function may be highly specialized so
that a person is hired for his expertise or ability to
perform that particular function.
In determining whether a particular function is
essential, you may consider:
(1) the employer’s judgment as to which functions are
essential,
(2) written job descriptions prepared before advertising
11
or interviewing applicants for the job,
(3) the amount of time spent on the job perfoming the
function,
(4) the consequences of not requiring the employee to
perform the function,
(5) the work experience of past incumbents in the job,
and/or
(6) the current work experience of persons with similar
jobs.
This charge was taken almost verbatim from the E.E.O.C.’s
regulations/guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). The district court
then denied the Appellant’s request to instruct the jury that:
[w]ith respect to item (4) above, the EEOC’s Technical
Assistance Manual offers the example of a firefighter
who, because of physical impairment, is incapable of
carrying an unconscious person from a burning building.
The firefighter may be called upon to perform this task
only rarely, but the consequences of being unable to do
it when necessary are sufficient to make it an essential
function of the firefighter’s job.
There was considerable testimony that, in the event of some
unforeseen contigency, Barber might be called on to fill in for
other crewmembers, retrieve heavy parts and equipment, handle and
manipulate heavy safety and emergency equipment, and even to scale
the one-hundred and forty-two (142) foot derrick. Barber himself
testified that he had previously filled in for the driller, gone to
pick up heavy replacement parts and other equipment, and worn the
heavy protective breathing apparatus for poisonous gas releases on
an H2S well. However, due to the infrequency with which Barber
would be called on to perform these “emergency functions”, Nabors
naturally feared that the jury might consider those functions
“marginal” rather than “essential”. As it turns out, that fear was
justified, since Barber’s counsel made that very argument in his
closing.
12
The point of the requested instruction was to make sure the
jury understood that, even though the performance of these
functions might be rare, the consequences of their non-performance
could be so catastrophic as to make those functions “essential”.
However, that very point was made clear enough by the instructions
given and further illuminated by Nabors’ closing argument.8
The jury was instructed that it might consider the
consequences of non-performance as bearing on whether that function
was essential. Nabors, in closing arguments, highlighted the
evidence presented indicating that an oil drilling rig is a
dangerous place and that, in an emergency, the inability of Barber
to perform might have disastrous consequences for other
crewmembers, the company and even Barber himself. However, the
fact that the jury considered that possibility too remote to make
these “emergency functions” essential does not lead to the
conclusion that the jury must have been inadequately instructed.
Even if the jury had been instructed as Appellant requested,
that would not have necessitated a verdict in Nabors’ favor. The
jury, nevertheless, could have found for Plaintiff, if they
believed that the duties of a fireman and those of an oil rig
8
In closing arguments, Nabors Drilling made the following argument to
the jury:
We know what Mr. Barber’s restrictions are. We know what his
doctor says he can and can’t do. And we also know . . . that
fire extinguishers on the Rig 204 weigh over 50 pounds. That
is more than double what he is allowed to lift. Now, is the
employer supposed to say, okay, well, you can come back even
though we know you can’t handle this kind of emergency if it
comes up. And the fact that it may come up only rarely doesn’t
dimish how essential it is for him to be able to respond to it.
13
toolpusher are sufficiently different so that these “emergency
functions”, which Barber might or might not be called upon to
perform, are not essential functions of his job.
ii.
The district court instructed the jury on the issue of
reasonable accomodation that:
[a] reasonable accomodation is defined by the ADA as the
modification or adjustments to the work environment, or
to the manner of circumstances under which the position
held is customarily performed, that enable a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential
functions of that position.
The district court refused to instruct the jury as follows:
You are further instructed that the Americans with
Disabilities Act does not require an employee [sic] to
provide “light duty” or any other “accomodation” that
would result in other employees having to work harder or
longer hours or that would transfer from the disabled
employee any of the essential functions of his job.
The Appellant argues that the refusal to give this instruction
allowed the jury to conclude that reassignment of certain of
Plaintiff’s essential functions to other employees would have been
a reasonable accomodation.
It is true that the law does not require an employer to
tranfer from the disabled employee any of the essential functions
of his job. If it is necessary to transfer any of the essential
functions of the toolpusher job to others on the rig, then Barber
is not otherwise qualified. We cannot say that he can perform the
essential functions of the job with reasonable accomodation, if the
only successful accomodation is for Barber not to perform those
essential functions. For that reason, this not an accomodation
14
case.
The only accomodation proposed by Barber was task
reassignment, namely reassignment of the four emergency tasks
outlined by Nabors. If the jury determined that any one of those
functions was essential, then reassignment of that function would
no longer be an accomodation option. On the other hand, if the
jury determined that those emergency functions were not essential,
then accomodation would not be necessary, because Barber would not
have to perform them in order to be otherwise qualified.
Therefore, it was error to instruct the jury on reasonable
accomodation at all, because: 1) the task reassignment option would
not be a reasonable accomodation if these emergency functions were
essential; and 2) if those emergency functions are not essential,
then Barber is otherwise qualified whether he performed those
functions or not, and the question of reasonableness of task
reassignment as an accomodation becomes moot. However, the error
in giving this instruction is of no import. Since it is at least
as likely that the jury found these emergency functions to be
marginal rather than essential, whether their reassignment to
others was a reasonable accomodation is a moot question, upon which
the jury’s verdict does not depend.
D.
Whether the judgment entered should be reformed to eliminate an
award of punitive damages because of the lack of evidence that
defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference.
Barber’s contention that this error was not adequately
preserved for appeal is of no avail. Nabors did not object to the
15
submission of a punitive damages instruction to the jury.
Furthermore, Nabors did not urge the insufficiency of the evidence
as grounds for judgment against Barber on the issue of punitive
damages at the close of Barber’s case under Rule 50(a) or at the
close of all the evidence under Rule 50(b). In part the purpose of
Rule 50 is to “alert the opposing party to the insufficiency before
the case is submitted to the jury, thereby affording it an
oportunity to cure any defects in proof should the motion have
merit.” Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.
1995), quoting Bohrer v. Hanes Corp.,
715 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1026,
104 S. Ct. 1284,
79 L. Ed. 2d
687 (1984). However, failure to object to the jury instruction and
non-compliance with Rule 50 need not be fatal. Errors raised for
the first time on appeal may be reviewed for plain error. Matter of
Hudson,
107 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1997); Brown v. Bryan County,
Okl.,
67 F.3d 1174, 1182 (5th Cir. 1995); Stokes v. Delcambre,
710
F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983). “This court may correct a plain
error only if it seriously affected the ‘fairness, integrity, or
public reputation’ of the judicial proceedings.” Matter of
Hudson,
107 F.3d at 357 (quoting United States v. Calverly,
37 F.3d 160,
164 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1196, 115 S.
Ct. 1266,
131 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1995)). This court has stated that
“[f]ailure to object to the jury charge in the trial court
precludes review on appeal unless the error is so fundamental as to
result in a miscarriage of justice.” Farrar v. Cain,
756 F.2d 1148,
1150 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616
16
F.2d 116, 126 (5th Cir. 1980).
It was plain error for the district court to allow the
question of punitive damages to go to the jury. Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, punitive damages may be awarded in cases of
intentional employment discrimination, “if the complaining party
demonstrates that the respondent [employer] engaged in a
discriminatory practice ... with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
The record in the instant case is simply devoid of evidence
that Nabors acted maliciously or with reckless indifference for
Barber’s rights under the ADA. It is true that Nabors refused to
allow Barber to return to work without a “full medical release”.
However, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated a good faith
dispute as to whether a “full medical release” would be necessary
for Barber to perform the essential functions of the toolpusher
job. Therefore, Nabors insistence on a “full medical release”
before Barber could return to work cannot form the basis for a
conclusion that Nabors acted with malice or reckless indifference.
Furthermore, there can be no question that any error that costs a
party $300,000.00 dollars is “so fundamental as to result in a
miscarriage of justice”. Therefore, the award of punitive damages
must be reversed.
IV.
There is no reversible error in the charge to the jury, and
the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence. However, it was
17
plain error to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury.
Therefore, we reduce the award of punitive damages to zero and
affirm the judgment in all other respects.
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED and RENDERED in part.
18
