Filed: Sep. 17, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-40026 Summary Calendar _ GARY FRANKLIN LETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THERESA ANTWINE, Correctional Officer; SANDRA HAYES, Correctional Officer; LOIS HOLLOWAY, Correctional Officer III; CAPRISHA JACK, Correctional Officer III; F. VALCIN, Correctional Officer; D’WANDA MARKS, Counsel Substitute; MICHAEL DABNEY, Unit Disciplinary Hearing Officer; UP KIRKENDALL, Counsel Substitute; UP BROWN, Counsel Substitute; FELICIA DAVIS, Correctio
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 99-40026 Summary Calendar _ GARY FRANKLIN LETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THERESA ANTWINE, Correctional Officer; SANDRA HAYES, Correctional Officer; LOIS HOLLOWAY, Correctional Officer III; CAPRISHA JACK, Correctional Officer III; F. VALCIN, Correctional Officer; D’WANDA MARKS, Counsel Substitute; MICHAEL DABNEY, Unit Disciplinary Hearing Officer; UP KIRKENDALL, Counsel Substitute; UP BROWN, Counsel Substitute; FELICIA DAVIS, Correction..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 99-40026
Summary Calendar
_____________________
GARY FRANKLIN LETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THERESA ANTWINE, Correctional Officer;
SANDRA HAYES, Correctional Officer;
LOIS HOLLOWAY, Correctional Officer III;
CAPRISHA JACK, Correctional Officer III;
F. VALCIN, Correctional Officer;
D’WANDA MARKS, Counsel Substitute;
MICHAEL DABNEY, Unit Disciplinary Hearing Officer;
UP KIRKENDALL, Counsel Substitute;
UP BROWN, Counsel Substitute;
FELICIA DAVIS, Correctional Officer III,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(1:96-CV-434)
_________________________________________________________________
September 16, 1999
Before SMITH, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gary Franklin Lett, Texas prisoner # 663855, pro se and in
forma pauperis (IFP), appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action as frivolous and for failing to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Lett raises four issues.
First, Lett contends that the hearing conducted pursuant to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Spears v. McCotter,
766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), overruled on
other grounds, Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989), was
fundamentally deficient because he was not given sufficient
opportunity to present his version of the facts or to otherwise
present evidence. He has failed to identify a deficiency in the
Spears proceedings. A Spears hearing is not a trial on the merits,
but is similar to a motion for a more definite statement. See
Spears, 766 F.2d at 180-82; Wesson v. Oglesby,
910 F.2d 278, 281
(5th Cir. 1990).
Second, Lett maintains that the magistrate judge improperly
dismissed his action for failure to satisfy the requirements of
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994). To recover damages in a §
1983 action for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, the plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated. See
id. at 486-87. For the first
time on appeal, and without supporting evidence, Lett contends that
a state court issued a writ of habeas corpus invalidating his
prison sentence. This untimely and undocumented contention does
not justify finding plain error. See United States v. Olano,
507
U.S. 725, 736 (1993); Robertson v. Plano City of Texas,
70 F.3d 21,
23 (5th Cir. 1995).
Lett’s third contention is that the sanctions levied against
him through the prison disciplinary proceedings implicate a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause. He complains that he is not
allowed to practice his religion, attend church, attend school,
seek rehabilitation, participate in recreation, or eat meals.
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Other than the inability to attend school, none of these sanctions
were raised in Lett’s § 1983 complaint, and thus are reviewed only
for plain error. See
Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. Lett’s removal from
school does not amount to an atypical or significant hardship that
would implicate a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 483-85 (1995) (explaining that
liberty interests created by the states under the Due Process
Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint”). Nor do
the remaining claims constitute plain error. See
Olano, 507 U.S.
at 736;
Robertson, 70 F.3d at 23.
Finally, Lett claims that the prison disciplinary proceedings
created a cause of action for malicious prosecution. With respect
to each of the disciplinary proceedings identified in his
complaint, Lett has failed to demonstrate either that the
disciplinary proceedings terminated in his favor or that he was
damaged by the proceedings. See Pete v. Metcalfe,
8 F.3d 214, 219
(5th Cir. 1993). Thus, he has failed to state a claim of malicious
prosecution upon which relief may be granted.
Lett has failed to raise a meritorious claim on appeal.
Accordingly, the dismissal of Lett’s action as frivolous, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), is AFFIRMED. The dismissal counts as a
“strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v.
Hammons,
103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirmance of district
court’s dismissal as frivolous counts as a single strike). It is
Lett’s first “strike”. Lett is cautioned that if he accumulates
three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal
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filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless
he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
AFFIRMED
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