Filed: Apr. 29, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 29, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 02-30913 Summary Calendar MARK E. MARCHIAFAVA; NICOLE BEAN; LINDA GLAVIANO; CHRISTIE LYNN MARCHIAFAVA; TADDI BROWN; MELINA ARNOLD; TERRI WARNER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, VERSUS MICHAEL R. BARNETT, Chief Criminal Deputy; ELMER LITCHFIELD, Sheriff; CALLENDER, Deputy Sheriff; CHARLES E. P. SPURLOCK, DR.; THERESITA JIMENEZ, DR.; RALPH WILLIAMS, Lieute
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 29, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 02-30913 Summary Calendar MARK E. MARCHIAFAVA; NICOLE BEAN; LINDA GLAVIANO; CHRISTIE LYNN MARCHIAFAVA; TADDI BROWN; MELINA ARNOLD; TERRI WARNER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, VERSUS MICHAEL R. BARNETT, Chief Criminal Deputy; ELMER LITCHFIELD, Sheriff; CALLENDER, Deputy Sheriff; CHARLES E. P. SPURLOCK, DR.; THERESITA JIMENEZ, DR.; RALPH WILLIAMS, Lieuten..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 29, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
02-30913
Summary Calendar
MARK E. MARCHIAFAVA; NICOLE BEAN; LINDA GLAVIANO; CHRISTIE LYNN
MARCHIAFAVA; TADDI BROWN; MELINA ARNOLD; TERRI WARNER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
MICHAEL R. BARNETT, Chief Criminal Deputy; ELMER LITCHFIELD,
Sheriff; CALLENDER, Deputy Sheriff; CHARLES E. P. SPURLOCK, DR.;
THERESITA JIMENEZ, DR.; RALPH WILLIAMS, Lieutenant; TOMMY RICE,
Lieutenant; DENISE M. GRAHAM, DR.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana
(00-CV-111-D)
Before JONES, DUHÉ and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Plaintiffs-appellants Mark Marchiafava and several coworkers
at his place of business filed this suit for civil rights
violations including unlawful search and seizure and detention,
civil conspiracy, and (Marchiafava only) unlawful confinement.
The district court summarily dismissed the complaint, finding no
evidence of the unreasonableness of Defendants’ actions under the
circumstances, and holding that Defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity. After de novo review, we affirm.
I.
The summary judgment evidence showed that Defendant Colonel
Michael A. Barnett of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s
Office executed a sworn statement in connection with an
application to have Marchiafava taken into protective custody.
Col. Barnett attested that he had received information from a
state representative that Marchiafava had telephoned legislative
and other state offices stating that he had acreage in Tunica
Hills which he was reserving as a cemetery for legislators, and
that he agreed 100% with Timothy McVeigh; in another call
Marchiafava said only “boom.” Barnett also detailed a phone call
from the Baton Rouge Police Chief that a news reporter had
informed him that Marchiafava had stated that he was being
harassed by police, and that he would use deadly force the next
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time he was unlawfully stopped by a police officer. Finally,
Barnett attested to his personal knowledge that Marchiafava
habitually carried a handgun and had the means at hand to carry
out threats.
Reporting these threats to the parish coroner, Barnett
signed a protective-custody application stating, “APPLICANT
STATES: PT [patient] HAS MADE A STATEMENT THAT HE HAS A LEGAL
RIGHT TO KILL ANY POLICE OFFICER WHO STOPS HIM. TWO WEEKS AGO,
HE TOLD SOMEONE HE WAS LOOKING FOR LAND SO HE COULD BURY 250
LEGISLATORS. PT CARRIES A GUN.”
The Coroner issued an order for the sheriff’s office or
police department to take Mr. Marchiafava into protective custody
and deliver him to the Coroner’s office for an evaluation,
pursuant to Louisiana involuntary commitment law. La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 28:53.2.
The next day at Marchiafava’s place of business, eight to
ten deputies, two of whom are Defendants-Appellants Captain Ralph
Williams and Lieutenant Tommy Rice, participated in taking
Marchiafava into custody. According to the affidavits, Williams
and Rice made a protective sweep of the building, during which
they encountered one or two of the coworker plaintiffs and
directed them to the front of the building. Williams and Rice
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then departed without touching or questioning any of the
Plaintiffs. (The Plaintiffs who complain of having been touched
did not identify these two Defendants-Appellants).
Upon delivery to the coroner’s office for psychiatric
evaluation, Marchiafava was examined by defendant Charles
Spurlock, M.D., Deputy Coroner for East Baton Rouge Parish.
Marchiafava was uncooperative and refused to talk to Dr. Spurlock
except that he denied making the statements noted in Col.
Barnett’s application. Dr. Spurlock signed a Physician’s
Emergency Certificate (or PEC), finding Marchiafava to be
“dangerous to others,” and authorizing his transport to Baton
Rouge Mental Health Center for psychiatric examination. After a
brief examination, he was transported to Greenwell Springs
Hospital for further evaluation and treatment.
There Defendant Theresita Jimenez, M.D., had a duty to
evaluate Marchiafava. She reported Marchiafava’s hostile
behavior and refusal to cooperate in her evaluation. She was
unable to definitively diagnose him but provisionally diagnosed
him with “schizoaffective disorder, manic.” During Marchiafava’s
stay, several different doctors attempted to complete his
evaluation, and none was successful due to Marchiafava’s
4
continued refusal to cooperate. Dr. Jimenez determined that
further evaluation was needed.
Meanwhile, Marchiafava asked for a probable cause hearing in
state district court seeking his release. At a hearing held
thirteen days after his admission date, the court found probable
cause to keep Marchiafava hospitalized for evaluation and
treatment. Further evaluation eventually resulted in an opinion
that Marchiafava did not suffer from a major mental illness and
was not a danger to himself or others. He was then released from
Greenwell Springs Hospital.
Marchiafava has sued Col. Barnett, Dr. Spurlock, Dr.
Jiminez, Capt. Williams, Lt. Rice and others (not at issue in
this appeal) claiming they unlawfully searched, detained, and
confined him, violating his constitutional rights. The other
Plaintiffs, coworkers at Marchiafava’s place of business, have
sued the deputy Defendants under § 1983 alleging civil rights
violations. The Defendants all filed motions for summary
judgment, and the trial court has dismissed all claims.
II.
We review a summary judgment dismissal de novo, applying the
same standard of review as the district court, to determine
whether the record discloses any genuine issue as to a material
5
fact. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th
Cir. 1989). If the record taken as whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, summary
judgment is appropriate and there is no issue for trial.
Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574,
586,
106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356,
89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
III.
All the defendants in this appeal were government officials
sued for actions done in the performance of their official
duties. Qualified immunity protects government officials from
individual liability for performing discretionary functions
unless their conduct violates clearly established rights of which
a reasonable person would have known. Coleman v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1997).
The right “to be free from deprivation of liberty due to an
alleged wrongful involuntary commitment” is a clearly established
right under the Due Process Clause. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 491-92 (1980). Whether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful
official action generally turns on the “objective legal
reasonableness” of the action. Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S.
635, 644,
107 S. Ct. 3034, 3041,
97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987).
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Under the protective custody procedure, the coroner reviews
allegations leading to the affiant’s belief that the person is
mentally ill and then determines whether the person should be
taken into protective custody for an immediate examination. La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28:532. After examination of the person, the
coroner or other physician makes a medical determination whether
the person needs immediate treatment because he is dangerous to
himself or others or gravely disabled; if so, he issues a PEC for
admission to a treatment facility. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
38:53(B).
The evidence reveals no question of material fact precluding
a finding as a matter of law that Col. Barnett acted reasonably
in executing his affidavit in support of a coroner’s order for
protective custody. He accurately presented the information
given him. Further, Col. Barnett and reasonably believed the
sheriff’s office should execute the coroner’s order. He is
entitled to qualified immunity.
Captain Williams and Lieutenant Rice, too, reasonably
believed a security sweep of the building was justified to
protect the deputies engaged in apprehending Marchiafava. The
summary judgment evidence demonstrates that they had information
that Marchiafava was likely to be armed and posed a threat to
7
arresting officers. The record discloses no question of fact
impugning the appropriateness of the conduct of those defendants
with respect to either Marchiafava or his co-workers. They are
entitled to qualified immunity.
Under the circumstances Dr. Spurlock’s decision to sign the
PEC was also reasonable. By conducting a brief examination of
the plaintiff in compliance with Revised Statutes § 28:53 B(1),
Dr. Spurlock performed the duty required by law. The
uncontroverted evidence revealed that, from Dr. Spurlock’s
perspective, Marchiafava was hostile, uncooperative, and had
threatened violence toward others. He acted reasonably in
deciding to remand Marchiafava to a mental health facility for
further evaluation by a psychiatrist. Thus, Dr. Spurlock is
entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for his
conduct while in the course of his official duties.2
Despite the repeated efforts by Dr. Jimenez to examine
Marchiafava during the 72-hour period allowed by law, Marchiafava
was not willing to submit to an evaluation and refused to
cooperate. Dr. Jimenez complied with the law which allows an
2
Affirming the dismissal of Dr. Spurlock on grounds of qualified immunity,
we need not reach Dr. Spurlock’s alternative argument that the state judge’s
probable cause ruling precluded Marchiafava’s claims pursuant to Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 144 S. Ct. 2364,
129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994).
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extension of the initial period for an additional fifteen days,
via a Physicians Emergency Certificate (PEC). La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 28:53A(2). She had decided that further evaluation was
necessary and did so extend, so that a complete psychiatric
evaluation could be conducted. After Marchiafava’s probable
cause hearing, Dr. Jimenez was removed from the case; another
doctor was assigned by the court to complete plaintiff’s
evaluation. Because Dr. Jimenez acted in an objectively
reasonable manner, she is entitled to qualified immunity.
The Plaintiff offered no more than conclusory statements to
support his allegations of a conspiracy to violate his rights,
insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Lynch v.
Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369-1370 (5th Cir. 1987).
IV.
The district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit
because Plaintiffs failed to show that the conduct of Defendants
was not objectively reasonable. Further, Plaintiffs failed to
meet the burden of producing evidence of conspiracy. The
judgment dismissing Defendants is in all respects
AFFIRMED.
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