Filed: Mar. 04, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 96-40015 _ RANDALL C. STONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General; KATHLEEN HAWK; CHARLES TURNBO, Regional Director; JAMES DELOACH, Legal Tech FCI Texarkana; DAVID RARDIN, Warden, FCI Texarkana, Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana (23464-91) _ June 10, 1997 Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaint
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 96-40015 _ RANDALL C. STONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General; KATHLEEN HAWK; CHARLES TURNBO, Regional Director; JAMES DELOACH, Legal Tech FCI Texarkana; DAVID RARDIN, Warden, FCI Texarkana, Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana (23464-91) _ June 10, 1997 Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plainti..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-40015
_____________________
RANDALL C. STONE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JANET RENO, U.S. Attorney General;
KATHLEEN HAWK; CHARLES TURNBO, Regional
Director; JAMES DELOACH, Legal Tech
FCI Texarkana; DAVID RARDIN, Warden,
FCI Texarkana,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana
(23464-91)
_________________________________________________________________
June 10, 1997
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Randall Stone filed a pro se civil rights complaint
in federal district court, alleging that prison officials were
violating his constitutional rights by refusing to credit him with
“good conduct time” pursuant to federal statute and regulations.
At the time he filed his complaint, Stone was serving the remainder
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
of his sentence for a 1993 felon-in-possession conviction, after
his supervised release had been revoked for failing to remain in
Texas. Stone sought money damages and an order that he be awarded
good conduct time on the ten-month term he was ordered to serve
after his supervised release was revoked.
The district court liberally construed Stone’s complaint as
raising both a habeas claim and a claim for damages under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). The
district court dismissed Stone’s habeas claim for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The court dismissed Stone’s
Bivens claim under Heck v. Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___,
114 S. Ct. 2364
(1994), which held that a plaintiff could not seek money damages
under § 1983 based upon an unconstitutional conviction or sentence
unless that conviction or sentence had been invalidated.
Stone was released from prison in May 1995 after serving the
full ten months imposed by the sentencing court that revoked his
supervised release. Consequently, all of Stone’s claims except for
his demand for money damages are now moot. Stone argues that the
district court erred in dismissing his claim for damages under Heck
and Stephenson v. Reno,
28 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994) (extending the
rule of Heck to federal prisoners’ Bivens claims).
We pretermit the question whether Heck and Stephenson apply
because we conclude that Stone’s Bivens claim was properly
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dismissed on other grounds. Stone’s argument is that prison
officials have misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3264(b), which provides
that eligible federal prisoners serving terms of greater than one
year shall receive a certain amount of “good conduct time” against
their sentences.
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied right of
action, derived directly from the Constitution itself, that permits
damages for constitutional violations against federal officials
when sued in their individual capacities. We have often considered
the tension that Bivens creates between the need to protect
government officials from being sued for exercising their assigned
duties and the need to protect individuals from violations of their
constitutional rights. We have stated that in the context of
federal program administration, that the constitutional right to
due process
is not implicated unless the decision goes beyond mere
error to an intentional or reckless disregard of the
constitutional rights of the person against whom the
administrative decision is made. Mere failure to make
the “correct” administrative decision does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation.
Williamson v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
815 F.2d 368, 381 (5th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Bass v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
737 F.2d
1408 (5th Cir. 1984)).
Just as the officials in Williamson and Bass were charged with
administering Department of Agriculture programs, federal prison
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officials are charged with administering the federal “good conduct
time” program, and interpreting the statute and regulations is a
necessary element of administering the program. Although we have
serious doubts whether prison officials in fact misinterpreted the
statute and regulations, even assuming that they did, Stone fails
to state a valid Bivens claim. Stone’s complaint, at most, asserts
that prison officials were negligent in their interpretation of the
statute and thereby miscalculated his release date. Absent an
indication that those officials intentionally sought to deprive
Stone of his rights, they will not be held personally liable for
any misinterpretation of the requirements of the statute or
regulations.
The judgment of the district court is therefore
A F F I R M E D.
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