Filed: Jul. 07, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 92-7002 _ CHRISSY F., By Her Next Friend and Guardian Ad Litem Donna Medley, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, versus MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, ET AL., Defendants, MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, THOMAS H. BRITTAIN, JR., Individually and as Commissioner of the MS Dept. of Public Welfare, MARION COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, HANCOCK COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SHARON WHITT, Individually and as Supervisor of Marion County Welfare Department, A
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 92-7002 _ CHRISSY F., By Her Next Friend and Guardian Ad Litem Donna Medley, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, versus MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, ET AL., Defendants, MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, THOMAS H. BRITTAIN, JR., Individually and as Commissioner of the MS Dept. of Public Welfare, MARION COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, HANCOCK COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SHARON WHITT, Individually and as Supervisor of Marion County Welfare Department, AN..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 92-7002
_______________________
CHRISSY F., By Her Next Friend and Guardian
Ad Litem Donna Medley,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Cross-Appellant,
versus
MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, ET AL.,
Defendants,
MS DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, THOMAS H. BRITTAIN, JR.,
Individually and as Commissioner of the
MS Dept. of Public Welfare,
MARION COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT,
HANCOCK COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT, SHARON WHITT,
Individually and as Supervisor of Marion County
Welfare Department, ANGELA LACY, Individually as
Caseworker for Marion County Welfare Department,
PHILLIP BROADHEAD and FRED COOPER,
Defendants-Cross-Appellees,
SEBE DALE, JR., Individually and as Chancellor
for the Tenth Chancery Court District of MS and
GARLAND UPTON, Individually and in his capacity as
Referee of the Marion County Youth Court,
Defendants-Appellants
Cross-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________
July 7, 1993
Before DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges, and PARKER1, District
Judge.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
This case comes to us on appeal for the third time. It
involves allegations that defendants violated a minor's
constitutional rights in Youth Court and Chancery Court proceedings
in Mississippi. After trial, the district court refused to grant
relief on claims made against all but two of the defendants. These
two defendants, a Mississippi chancery court judge and a youth
court referee, were found to have violated the minor's
constitutional right of access to the courts. The district court
also found that the referee had violated the minor's procedural due
process rights. Both defendants appeal the decision of the
district court. The guardian ad litem cross-appeals, seeking to
resurrect her claims against all of the other defendants. We hold
that the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief against the judge and referee. In all other
respects, we affirm.
I
For the sake of brevity we refer the reader to the
carefully detailed statement of facts in the district court's
memorandum opinion and order. Chrissy F. By Medley v. Mississippi
Department of Public Welfare, et al., 780 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.Miss.
1991). What follows is a brief summary of the most recent or
relevant events in the long and tortured history of this case.
1
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting
by designation.
On July 8, 1988, Donna Medley, a California resident,
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of Chrissy F., a
Mississippi minor then six years old, alleging various violations
of a vast array of constitutional and statutory rights and
privileges. The complaint requested that declaratory judgment be
granted against defendants Mississippi Department of Public Welfare
(MDPW); Thomas H. Brittain, Commissioner of MDPW; Mississippi
Attorney General Mike Moore; Sebe Dale, Jr., Chancellor of the
Tenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi; Richard Douglas,
District Attorney for the Fifteenth Circuit Court District; Sharon
Whitt, Supervisor of the Marion County Welfare Department; Jeanette
Werbley, Supervisor of the Hancock County Welfare Department;
Angela Lacey, a caseworker with the Marion County Welfare
Department (state defendants); Dr. Franklin D. Jones; Dr. S.
Kimball Love; Timothy Charles Foxworth, father of Chrissy F.; and
Does 1-25; alleging that these defendants had violated the minor's
right not to be deprived of state and federally created benefits of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, rights to freedom from
harm and violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 5103,
et. seq., and an order issued by the Juvenile Court of the San
Francisco Superior Court of California.
The complaint initially sought to have the United States
District Court set aside the custody rulings of Chancellor Dale, a
Mississippi Chancery Court judge, and award custody of Chrissy F.
to the San Francisco Department of Social Services or to place her
3
in an alleged neutral and stable setting, not with any maternal or
paternal relatives, in cooperation with the National Children's
Advocacy Center in Huntsville, Alabama. Additionally, the
complaint sought an order requiring all defendants to pay for a
comprehensive physical, psychological, and psychiatric evaluation
of Chrissy F., and to force them to file a petition in the Youth
Court of Hancock County, Mississippi, on behalf of the minor, to
immediately investigate and pursue reports of sexual and
psychological abuse.
Additionally, the complaint sought compensatory and
punitive damages against all of the defendants except Youth Court
Referee Upton and Chancellor Dale. The defendants moved to dismiss
the complaints pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. § 12(b)(1), or in the
alternative, moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. §
12(b)(6). On August 26, 1988, the district court granted the §
12(b)(1) motion, finding that the complaint was "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court judgment.
We reversed and remanded the case to the district court,
Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare, 883 F.2d 25
(5th Cir. 1989) (Chrissy I), directing the district court to hold
a hearing to determine if Donna Medley should be appointed as
guardian ad litem for Chrissy F. in these proceedings. In that
opinion, we did not address any of the jurisdictional issues raised
in the appeal such as the collateral attack on state court orders,
domestic relations exception, or immunity questions before the
court.
4
On remand, the district court appointed Donna Medley as
guardian ad litem for Chrissy F. The court subsequently dismissed
as defendants, by agreement with the plaintiff, Dr. Franklin Jones,
Dr. Kimball Love, and Attorney General Mike Moore. The remaining
parties conducted discovery and depositions. The defendants filed
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on March 30, 1990, on
the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity,
absolute judicial immunity, and absolute prosecutorial immunity.
The district court denied the motions to dismiss except
as to the Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages of the state
defendants in their official capacities and as to absolute immunity
and damages of the guardians ad litem, Broadhead and Cooper. The
state defendants and District Attorney Douglas immediately appealed
the denial of their immunity claims to this court. We affirmed the
district court's opinion in Chrissy F. v. Mississippi Department of
Public Welfare, et al., 925 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991) (Chrissy II).
Our holding was, however, strictly limited to issues of absolute
and qualified immunity from personal judgments for money damages,
over which this court has interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
The immunity questions were decided only as to those defendants
against whom Chrissy sought monetary damages--District Attorney
Douglass, and Mississippi social workers Brittain, Whitt, Lacy and
Werbley. Chrissy II did not consider the general defense of
failure to state a claim or the availability of declaratory and
injunctive
relief. 925 F.2d at 849, 851.
5
The district court held a nonjury trial on the merits in
June, 1991. Later, the court issued a lengthy memorandum opinion
and order, dismissing all remaining claims against the defendants
except Chancellor Dale and Youth Court Referee Upton. The district
court found that Dale and Upton had violated Chrissy's right of
access to courts. The district court also found that Upton had
violated Chrissy's procedural due process rights. The district
court enjoined Upton, in his capacity as Youth Court Referee of
Marion County, Mississippi, to conduct a new youth court hearing to
reexamine the allegation of Chrissy's sexual abuse. This appeal
followed.
II
Appellants Dale and Upton argue that the district court
had no subject matter jurisdiction to review collateral attacks on
state court judgments. They contend that the relief sought by
Chrissy F. in federal district court was essentially a reversal of
the Chancery Court custody ruling. They also argue that the
district court's order enjoining Upton to conduct a new hearing
actually does reverse the final and definitive orders of the
Chancery Court and Youth Court. They argue that Chrissy's only
recourse was to seek review in the Mississippi state court system
and then ultimately in the United States Supreme Court.
Chrissy F. defends the district court's ruling by
pointing to the Fifth Circuit's previous reversal of the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
appellees argue that the Fifth Circuit implicitly found subject
6
matter jurisdiction by remanding to the district court for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem. The appellees further assert
that Chrissy F. did not seek and has not obtained a reversal of the
state court custody decree in federal court. Rather, they argue
that the district court's order enjoining Upton to hold another
abuse adjudication is designed to insure that the proceeding
conforms to her statutory and constitutional rights. Finally, they
contend that Chrissy F. was not a party in the Chancery Court
proceeding before Judge Dale, which originated as a divorce action
between her parents, and therefore could not seek review in the
state appellate courts.
The Supreme Court has stated that a "United States
district court has no authority to review final judgments of a
state court in judicial proceedings." District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482,
103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "a petitioner's failure
to raise his constitutional claims in state court does not mean
that a United States District Court should have jurisdiction over
the claims."
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16. Such failure may lead
the party to "forfeit his right to obtain review of the state court
decision in any federal court."
Id. This is not a case in which
a party had sued in federal court to "mount a general challenge to
the constitutionality" of a statute or rule.
Id. at 483. Medley
does not explain how the relief she sought and obtained in federal
court against Dale and Upton differs from that available if direct
appeal had been taken in state court. She argues that the slapdash
7
state process itself, which violated state law in several respects,
also amounted to a deprivation of Chrissy F.'s right of access to
courts and procedural due process rights guaranteed under the
United States Constitution. The Mississippi courts are well
equipped, however, to review violations of federal constitutional
law, as Medley's counsel conceded at oral argument. Chrissy's
guardians at litem were present at the Chancery Court hearing on
December 31, 1987, which led to Chancellor Dale's modified
affirmance of his order awarding custody of Chrissy to her father,
yet Medley offers no reason why neither she nor the guardians ad
litem were unable to appeal the Chancery Court or December, 1987
Youth Court orders in the state appellate courts.2
The record in this case reveals that the plaintiff's suit
is "patently an attempt to collaterally attack the validity of [the
state court judgment]." Almon v. Sandlin, 603 F.2d 503, 506 (5th
Cir. 1979). As the district court originally believed, this suit,
insofar as it seeks a new adjudication of Chrissy's alleged abuse
and custody, is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court's
rulings against the appellants.
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.
Our decision in this case is guided by Reed v. Terrell,
759 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1985). In Reed, the plaintiffs filed suit
2
Chrissy F's maternal grandmother did attempt to
continue the appeal of the August, 1987 Chancery Court custody
order following the death of Chrissy's mother, but her attempt
was denied. The Chancery Court "held in abeyance" its final
custody order, however, after Chrissy F. was brought back from
San Francisco, and it modified that order on December 31 to grant
day-to-day responsibility for Chrissy F. to her paternal
grandmother while her father worked weeklong shifts in the
offshore oil industry.
8
under various statutory provisions, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, and 1986. They asserted that their constitutional rights of
due process and equal protection were violated by an award of
attorney's fees to the defendants. In addition to two attorneys,
the plaintiffs named as defendants a judge, a district clerk, and
the State Bar of Texas. As here, they sought declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and damages. This court remarked that "the
'essential relief' sought by the plaintiffs is reversal of the
state court award of attorneys fees against them." Id. at 473.
Citing Feldman, Reed concluded that the suit was "inextricably
intertwined" with the state court's award against the plaintiffs,
and it affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for want
of jurisdiction.
The appellees attempt to distinguish Reed by noting that
the parties to the state suit in that case were also the parties to
the federal suit, and thus, they would have been able to seek
review in state court. However, as we have noted, Medley has not
indicated why she or any other interested persons could not pursue
an appeal in state courts. The guardians ad litem, for instance,
had a duty to act in Chrissy F's best interest. Medley challenges
their effectiveness and judgment, but they were knowledgeable
attorneys, and it is on their shoulders that the duty to object to
the informality of the Youth Court hearing rested. The district
court erred in attributing to Upton and Dale, as judicial officers,
the constitutional duty to protect Chrissy F's procedural rights
9
beyond appointment of a guardian ad litem.3 To impose such a duty
on a judicial officer in the performance of judicial duties is to
circumvent the state court appellate procedures and potentially to
cast the judge in a role uncomfortably close to that of advocate.
It is enough that appellate procedures exist and that a remedy may
be had against the guardians ad litem.
Finally, the appellees' assertion that we decided in
favor of jurisdiction to award this injunctive relief in Chrissy I
is unavailing. The court did not address any jurisdictional issues
in that opinion. Instead, we remanded to the district court for a
determination of whether Medley was the appropriate person to
represent Chrissy under Mississippi law in accordance with Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. § 17(b). Resolution of guardian ad litem status was
regarded as a predicate to any further consideration of the case,
including jurisdictional questions. Thus, the court did not decide
jurisdiction either explicitly or by necessary implication.4 We
have done so today.
III.
3
Specifically, the district court held that Dale
violated Chrissy's right of access to the courts by conducting a
"hearing" on December 18, 1987, over which he "lacked
jurisdiction", by not having the hearing transcribed, and by not
securing attendance of the guardians ad litem at the hearing.
The district court held that Upton violated Chrissy's right of
access to Youth Court and her procedural due process rights by
the informality of his December 30, 1987 proceeding and by
failing to insure proper representation of Chrissy F. by the
guardians ad litem. All of these deficiencies raised issues that
were potentially correctable within the Mississippi judicial
system.
4
Similarly, as above noted, we did not decide
jurisdiction in Chrissy II.
10
On cross-appeal, Medley challenges the district court's
failure to award relief under § 1983 for constitutional claims and
the alleged violation of the federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. The targets of these
claims are welfare department officials Brittain, Whitt and Lacy
and the guardians ad litem Broadhead and Cooper. We agree with and
adopt the district court's analysis of these claims. Its factual
findings were not clearly erroneous, and its legal analysis was
correct and appropriate.
Accordingly, the district court erred in exercising
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief against Upton and Dale in
this case. Its decision in this respect is REVERSED and RENDERED
in their favor. In all other respects, the decision of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
REVERSED and RENDERED in Part, AFFIRMED in Part.
11
