Filed: May 31, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 95-30417 (Summary Calendar) CHERYL V. CANNON, Plaintiff - Counter Claimant - Appellant Cross Appellee, versus PRINCIPAL HEALTH CARE OF Louisiana, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Third Party Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, A Mutual Company, Third Party Defendant - Appellee Cross Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Louisiana (94-1062) May 13, 1996 Before WIENER, PAR
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 95-30417 (Summary Calendar) CHERYL V. CANNON, Plaintiff - Counter Claimant - Appellant Cross Appellee, versus PRINCIPAL HEALTH CARE OF Louisiana, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Third Party Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, A Mutual Company, Third Party Defendant - Appellee Cross Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Louisiana (94-1062) May 13, 1996 Before WIENER, PARK..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-30417
(Summary Calendar)
CHERYL V. CANNON,
Plaintiff - Counter Claimant -
Appellant Cross Appellee,
versus
PRINCIPAL HEALTH CARE OF
Louisiana, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Third Party Plaintiff -
Appellee,
versus
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU,
A Mutual Company,
Third Party Defendant -
Appellee Cross Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-1062)
May 13, 1996
Before WIENER, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM*:
After suffering a work-related injury, Plaintiff-Appellant
Cheryl Cannon brought this suit against Principal Health Care of
Louisiana Inc. (Principal), alleging that she had been terminated
in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).2
Principal moved for summary judgment. Concluding that Cannon was
not a “qualified individual with a disability,” the district court
granted Principal’s motion. We affirm in part and, on two separate
issues, vacate and remand for additional findings and explanations
on the record.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 1992, during the course and scope of her employment
with Principal, Cannon injured her back. The following January,
Cannon’s doctor ordered her to stop work because, in his opinion,
she had become physically incapable of performing her job. That
same month (January 1993) Cannon began receiving both workers’
compensation payments from Principal’s compensation insurance
carrier and temporary total disability payments through Principal’s
employee benefits program. In July 1993, Cannon’s six months of
temporary total disability payments ran out. Cannon never provided
Principal with a physician’s statement that she was physically
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (West Supp. 1995).
2
capable of returning to work. As of August 1993, she was still
unable to perform the work her job required, so Principal
terminated her employment.
In March 1994, Cannon filed suit against Principal alleging
violations of the ADA. Specifically, Cannon alleged that Principal
had (1) failed to accommodate her at work in January 1993, (2)
refused to accommodate her when Principal declined to authorize
payment for a cervical arthrogram, and (3) discharged her because
she was disabled. In October 1994, Principal moved for summary
judgment, contending, inter alia, that Cannon was not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA. In December 1994, the district court
denied that motion, stating that disputed issues of fact precluded
the grant of summary judgment.
Subsequently, Cannon’s case was transferred to a new district
judge of the same court. After the transfer, Principal renewed its
motion for summary judgement, basing its renewal on new information
obtained in the deposition given by Cannon. In January 1995, both
Principal and Cannon asserted third-party claims against Wausau,
Principal’s workers’ compensation insurer.
In March 1995, the district court concluded that Cannon was
not a “qualified individual” under the ADA and granted Principal’s
renewed motion for summary judgment. The court relied on Cannon’s
own deposition testimony that she was not capable of performing her
job from January 1993 until at least December 20, 1994, the date of
her deposition. The court explained that Cannon was not capable of
performing any work, much less the essential functions of her job
3
as required to be a “qualified individual” under applicable
provisions of the ADA. Cannon timely appealed.
II
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Cannon urges that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment. First, Cannon insists that the law of
the case doctrine precluded the judge to whom her case was
transferred from considering Principal’s renewed motion for summary
judgment. Second, she contends that the district court erred in
concluding that she was not a “qualified individual” under the
ADA. Two additional issues presented in this appeal involve (1) a
sanction levied against A. Gill Dyer, attorney for Cannon, and (2)
the denial of Wausau’s motion for attorney’s fees.
A. LAW OF THE CASE
Initially, Cannon asserts that after a district court denies
a motion for summary judgement, the law of the case doctrine
precludes it from considering a renewal of that same motion. We
disagree. While we acknowledge that law of the case rules have
developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of
matters once decided during the course of a single continuing
lawsuit,3 the law of the case is an amorphous doctrine with several
exceptions.4 Primary among these exceptions is the availability of
3
See, e.g., White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir.
1967)
4
See Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1987).
4
new evidence.5
In this case, the first district judge ruled that disputed
issues of fact prevented the grant of summary judgment. The new
judge to whom the case was transferred concluded--with the
advantage of considerably more evidence, including Cannon’s own
deposition--that, as a matter of law, Cannon was not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA. The law of the case doctrine does not
prevent the district court from revisiting an issue in light of new
evidence.6 Under the instant circumstances, the fact that the
revisit is conducted by a different judge to whom the case has been
reassigned is of no moment. Accordingly, we hold that law of the
case did not preclude the district court from considering
Principal’s renewed motion for summary judgment in light of the
considerable new evidence developed through subsequent discovery.
B. THE ADA CLAIM
1. Standard of Review
In employment discrimination cases, we review summary
judgments de novo, applying the same standard as the district
5
Wright, Miller & Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure:
Jurisdiction § 4478, 790-91 (1981 & Supp. 1995); White v.
Wiliamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243,
251 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(“A subsequent motion for summary judgment
based on an expanded record is always permissible.”); but see
Dictograph prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp.,
230 F.3d 131, 134-36
(2d Cir. 1956)(noting the concern that litigants should not be
encouraged to shop about in hopes of finding a judge more favorably
inclined to their views justifies a general rule of practice
against reconsideration).
6
See id.
5
court.7 Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue as
to any material fact exists.8 A dispute about a material fact is
"genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.9 In making our
determination, we draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.10
2. Was Cannon Covered by the ADA?
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a “qualified
individual with a disability” in the contexts of (1) job
application procedures, (2) the hiring, advancement, or discharge
of employees, (3) employee compensation, (4) job training, and (5)
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.11 The term
"qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with
a disability who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires.12 In other words, while the ADA
protects individuals with disabilities that can be accommodated in
the work place, it does not afford protection to individuals with
7
Waltman v. Int'l. Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir.
1989).
8
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
9
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
10
Id. at 255.
11
42 U.S.C. s 12112(a); see also Daugherty v. City of El
Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir.1995); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding,
53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir.1995).
12
42 U.S.C. s 12111(8).
6
a total disability, i.e., those disabled individuals who, even with
accommodation, cannot perform essential job functions.
Like the district court before us, we conclude that Cannon is
not a “qualified individual” for the purposes of the ADA. Also
like the district court before us, we do so in reliance on Cannon’s
own testimony to the effect that she was totally disabled during
the relevant periods. Cannon testified that she was unable to work
at all from January 1993 until at least the time of her deposition
in December 1994. Translating her testimony into the idiom of the
ADA, Cannon conceded that even “with . . . reasonable
accommodation” she was unable “to perform the essential functions
of the employment.” Consequently, for purposes of the ADA, she is
not a “qualified individual with a disability” and may not avail
herself of the protections of that act.
C. SANCTIONS
Cannon’s attorney, A. Gill Dyer, urges this court to relieve
him of the fine levied against him for statements made in documents
he submitted to the district court while representing Cannon. We
review sanctions imposed against an attorney by a district court
under the abuse of discretion standard.13 A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.14
Dyer does not argue that the sanctions were based on an
13
United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 28 (5th Cir.
1995)(citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32 (1991)).
14
Chaves v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)
7
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of
the evidence. In fact, he cites no case law in support of his
position. Instead, in but a single, conclusionary swipe, Dyer
asserts that we should reverse the fine because it was not “fair.”
In addition to the lack of assistance from counsel, we find the
district court’s ruling on this issue, and its reasons and
reasoning, somewhat opaque. In a minute entry, the court stated
that the grounds for the sanction can be found on “page two of
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Wausau’s Motion to Dismiss.” We have
located and read that page in the record, yet we remain unable to
discern the court’s reason for imposing the sanction. Without
more, appellate review is not possible. Given the seriousness to
an attorney of having a sanction levied against him, we are
reluctant either to affirm or reverse the district court’s decision
to sanction Dyer. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the
district court’s judgment granting sanctions and remand this issue
to the district court for further explication of its reasons and
reasoning for assessing the sanction against Dyer. In so doing, we
neither express nor imply an opinion on the propriety of the
court’s ruling; we simply return this issue to the district court
for a more particular and precise explanation.
D. CROSS-APPEAL FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
In a cross-appeal, Wausau contends that the district court
should have granted its motion for attorney’s fees. Wausau sought
attorney’s fees under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 42 U.S.C. § 12205,
and the inherent power of the court. As noted earlier, we review
8
all aspects of a district court’s decision to grant or deny
sanctions on an abuse-of-discretion standard.15
In a brief four-sentence minute entry, the district court
canceled the attorney’s fee hearing that it had scheduled and
declined to award Wausau any attorney’s fees. The court gave no
explanation for its actions and conclusions. Based on this sparse
record, we are unable to determine whether the district court
abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion. Thus, we must
vacate the denials of attorney’s fees and remand this issue as
well, so that the court can supply a more detailed explication--
either why Wausau was not awarded attorney’s fees or, if it should
change its conclusion, how much Wausau should receive in attorney’s
fees. As in the instance of Dyer’s sanction, we neither express or
imply an opinion on the merits of this issue; we simply remand for
a more detailed explanation of whatever determination it makes.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court
awarding summary judgment in favor of Principal is affirmed. With
respect to the sanction levied against Dyer and the denial of
Wausau’s motion for attorney’s fees, however, we vacate and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED and REMANDED in part.
15
Childs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 29 F.3d
1018, 1022 (5th Cir 1994).
9
